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Executive Summary  
 
China’s ability to innovate is becoming an increasingly important global issue, whereas 
without strong innovation as the next stage in the country’s development process, its economic 
growth, while impressive to date, will stagnate and thus create dramatic consequences not just in 
China but also abroad. To be sure, innovation, which can be defined as the collective act of 
inventing (creating something considered “new”) and exploiting that invention, is touted in an array 
of economic literature as an important tool for countries to build competitiveness and thus in the 
long-term drive their economies. Not only will China’s future ability to innovate decide its future, but 
it deeply impacts foreign countries, many of who heavily rely on both demand and supply from 
China. In short, the future direction of the world economy – inclusive of many businesses, 
consumers, and governments – to a notable extent hinges on China’s ability to innovate. 
 
In assessing China’s innovation capabilities, this study looks into a variety of innovation metrics 
yet focuses on one often overlooked area: patent quality. Patents, which are legal rights to exclude 
others from exploiting (i.e. making, using, or selling) inventions, are linked to innovation as, while by 
no means an ideal single indicator, they can be used as an intermediate measure of innovation, i.e. 
an invention output upon which innovation is built. Unfortunately, absolute numbers of patents are 
often solely used or otherwise overemphasised as a measure of innovation. In fact, patent quality 
provides far more insight into innovation capacity as it measures actual application of inventions in a 
way that impacts society.  
 
While patents are exploding in China and certain innovation is also on the rise, patent quality has 
not proportionately kept up and in fact the overall strength of China’s actual innovation appears 
overhyped. Statistical analysis in this study not only reveals concerning trends in the quality of 
China’s patents at present, but suggests that while patent filings in China will likely continue to 
notably grow in the future, patent quality may continue to lag these numbers. In fact, projections in 
this study indicate there might be over 2.6 million less-than-“highest-quality” patents filed in China 
in 2015 alone, which is substantially more than estimated “highest-quality” patents filings in that 
year. With this in mind, and objectively considering its performance on additional innovation metrics, 
it is clear that China’s innovation ecosystem deserves a new type of scrutiny.  
 
The core of this study is devoted to investigating, through in-depth on-the-ground research and 
analysis, significant reasons for China’s patent quality and related innovation shortcomings. In an 
effort to hone this investigation, the study focuses on key unaddressed institutional and regulatory 
issues closely related to patent quality that can be practically remedied in the near future.   
 
This study uncovers how a network of patent-related policies, other measures, and practices in 
China collectively hamper both patent quality and innovation at large. These dulling devices are 
categorised in terms of certain government-set patent targets and indicators (Chapter 2); policies 
and other measures meant to promote patents (Chapter 3); and rules and procedures for reviewing 
patent applications and those for enforcing patents (Chapter 4). Although given their intertwined 
nature it is not always possible to clearly separate their impacts on patent quality as distinct from 
those on innovation at large, these dulling devices collectively create a vicious cycle: they hamper 
patent quality which then hampers innovation and vice versa, i.e. hamper components of innovation 
which then hampers patent quality, which then again further hampers innovation.  
 
Over 50 practical recommendations are proposed to remedy the concerns flagged in the analysis. 
Abridged versions of some of these are included in this Executive Summary.  
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This study is not just an important read for intellectual property rights (IPR) professionals, 
academics, business leaders, and government officials, but also anyone interested in 
understanding both the nuances within and important impacts of China’s regulatory and 
institutional environment for innovation. In fact, it provides insights into arguably one of the most 
important legal and economic questions determining China’s future, and, as a consequence, the 
future of the world economy.  
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Section Summaries 
 
Introduction 
 
This section discusses key terms and other information that is essential to know before starting a 
new assessment on China’s patent quality situation and larger innovation ecosystem. 
 
This study sets out a number of definitions for the main types of innovation. It refers to two main 
recognised categories of innovation: “breakthrough innovation,” creation of brand new/cutting-edge 
innovations; and “incremental innovation,” exploitation of existing innovations in a way that 
improves upon them, but less dramatically than via breakthrough innovation. While both forms of 
innovation have value, breakthrough innovation typically affords a higher level of competiveness 
than incremental innovation. In terms of application, innovation is manifested through exploitation 
of inventions in goods, services, processes, organisation, or marketing. 
 
China grants three types of what it considers “patents”: invention patents (“invention patents”), 
utility model patents (“utility models”), and design patents (sometimes also called registered 
designs).1 Not all countries grant these same three types of patents, although most countries have 
the equivalent of China’s invention patent, and sources suggest that over 40 countries, including a 
number in Europe, have a utility model patent system.  
 
The definitions for different thresholds of patent quality used in this study are as follows:  
 “Quality” patents must (1) meet or exceed the statutory requirements for patentability in 
China, and (2) have reasonable prospects of (i) ultimately being commercialised or (ii) 
otherwise being transformed to contribute to social, economic and/or environmental 
progress in China; 
 “Highest-quality” patents must (1)-(2) meet or exceed the two criteria for quality patents 
(see aforementioned definition); and (3) best advance Chinese government objectives of 
sustainably increasing breakthrough research and innovation led by domestic entities and 
foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs) in China; and 
  “Low-quality” patents are those that do not meet the aforementioned standard for quality 
(or highest-quality) patents.  
 
The study broadly categorises China’s three types of patents within these definitions. It posits that 
on one hand, given their higher invalidation rates and higher risk of being filed solely for and used in 
“malicious prosecution actions,” utility models have a higher risk of being of of lower quality than 
invention patents. On the other hand, it is important to recognise that a variety of evidence debunks 
the idea that utility model patents are always of low value, whereas a range of empirical studies 
show that the utility model system in certain countries successfully enables movement from 
relatively low levels of innovation and competitiveness, and poor diffusion of technology, to higher 
levels. Still, given the higher patentability threshold for invention patents as confirmed by a 
Substantive Examination, utility models and design patents are typically of less-than-highest-quality 
                                                           
1
 Invention patents can be granted to both products and processes, and must meet a standard for novelty (not part of the 
“prior art,” i.e. not openly known to the public abroad or in China before their filing date),“inventiveness,” and practical 
use as determined by a review called a Substantive Examination. Utility models can be granted on the shape and/or 
structure of a product, and do not undergo a Substantive Examination but are required to be novel, meet a far lower level 
of “inventiveness” than invention patents, and must meet criteria for practical use/functionality. Invention patents and 
utility models enjoy basically the same level of legal protection during their lifetimes. Design patents are granted on the 
appearance of a product that makes it particularly recognisable, do not undergo a Substantive Examination nor have to 
meet any technical or functional thresholds but must be distinct from prior designs, and should not conflict with prior 
rights like copyrights or trademarks. 
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whereas invention patents have a much higher chance of being highest-quality. Given these findings, 
this study suggests not all utility models and design patents in China are inherently of low-quality; 
however, subject to contextualisation, the study suggests that utility models and design patents in 
China are generally not of highest-quality, whereas invention patents have a much higher chance of 
being highest-quality. 
 
This study reviews a substantial volume of major recent Chinese policies and other measures dealing 
with patent development. Review of these documents suggests that Chinese regulators have 
recently enacted and are currently further enacting a range of commendable initiatives to address 
China’s patent quality problem: for example, within the most recent major provincial/municipal and 
national-level policies reviewed in this study alone, there are over 80 references to initiatives to 
improve future IPR and/or patent-specific “quality.”And this is to say nothing of the massive number 
of other important provisions reviewed that intend to build patent quality but simply do not 
mention the specific keyword “quality.” A listing of the main types of patent quality-related issues 
openly discussed in China and for which certain initiatives are being enacted can be found in the 
Introduction in the full version of this study (also a selection of related policy statements are 
translated into English in the Annexes of this study, and many are referenced throughout the study). 
 
In late 2011, what appears to be the first detailed assessment of China’s patent quality problem was 
completed by Gao, Li, and Cheng of the Beijing IPR Institute; still, while that study is an important 
contribution to the debate over patent quality in China, significantly more investigation is needed to 
fully understand and address China’s patent quality problem – and filling this need, along with 
looking into certain aspects of the larger innovation ecosystem in China, is the objective of this study. 
Still, this study is not intended to detail all issues that affect patent quality and innovation at large in 
China in any capacity; rather, it focuses on key unaddressed institutional and regulatory issues most 
closely related to patent quality that can be practically remedied in the near future.2 
 
Chapter 1: Statistical analysis of China’s patent quality situation and larger 
innovation ecosystem 
 
Statistical analysis suggests that while patent filings are exploding in China and certain innovation 
is also admirably on the rise, this has not necessarily translated into a ‘proportionate’ rise in 
patent quality and in some sense the strength of China’s actual innovation is overhyped.  
                                                           
2
 Note on scope: The research and analysis in Chapters 2-4 focus of the study focus on certain key institutional and 
regulatory issues most closely related to patent quality that (1) appear to be largely unaddressed at present (whereas 
“unaddressed” means (a) not appearing from readily available evidence to be undergoing significant enough reforms or (b) 
already have undergone reforms that have arguably had enough time to take effect but still remain largely ineffective; of 
note, in a few instances, short of making allegations that certain initiatives clearly “do not” effectively address or are 
actually detrimental to patent quality, the study identifies areas where, given limited readily available information, further 
discussion is warranted with the authorities to clarify the details of such otherwise concerning initiatives); and (2) of these, 
issues that with the proper government buy-in can be relatively practically remedied in the near future. “Key” herein refers 
to issues deemed most significant. 
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Patent quality situation 
 
Analysis of a variety of patent statistics suggests that China’s progress in patent quality lags behind 
its rates of patent filings. There are higher ratios of domestic to foreign filings of invention patents in 
EU countries sampled than in China. There are significantly lower average life-spans of Chinese 
patents and lower percentages of patents in-force owned by domestic filers vs. foreign filers in China 
compared with the rates in EU and other countries sampled; higher rates of utility model 
invalidations than invention patent and design patent invalidations; concerning rates of patents filed 
solely for malicious prosecution actions, which may be made up more so of utility models than other 
types of patents; poor scores in terms of patent citations; and empirical econometric analyses 
generally show foreign enterprises at large do not typically file patents on breakthrough inventions 
in China. China also has lacklustre scores on several other patent quality indicators. In effect, the 
analysis confirms that China indeed has a patent quality problem as certain scholars and industry 
experts, as well as Chinese government officials in meetings with the European Chamber and 
otherwise, have suspected.  
 
In addition, it is troublesome when looking ahead to realise the possibility that China’s patent 
ecosystem may be less composed of highest-quality patents than perhaps envisaged (see Chart 1). 
For example, this study’s projections indicate that, all else constant, there might be over 2.6 million 
less-than-highest-quality patents (utility models and design patents) filed in China in 2015 alone, 
which would be substantially more than the estimated filings of highest-quality patents in that year. 
Of note, it is projected there might be 39% more (over 430,000) total utility model applications than 
total invention patent applications filed in China in 2015, which is 28 percentage points more than 
the comparison rate between the two in 2011. The year 2015 is significant because major Chinese 
policies set it as the year by which their patent targets are to be realised. 
 
Chart 1: Total (foreign + domestic) patent applications in China in 2011 vs. 2015 estimates* 
 
 Source: SIPO statistics; calculations; 2015 estimates using methodological Approach A discussed in the 
“Chapter 1” section in the Annex  
 
Innovation ecosystem at large 
 
In terms of its innovation capacity at large, metrics suggests that China indeed has a growingly 
impressive innovation potential, although in some sense its actual innovation is overhyped. For 
example, China does not attract EU innovation spending on a scale as perhaps otherwise suspected; 
and, despite some exceptions, empirical evidence suggests foreign firms at large avoid developing or 
transferring breakthrough technology, and filing patents on such technology, in China. There are 
reports of concerning distribution of government-sponsored innovation investment, which can drag 
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down innovation; and evidence that Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), in which many 
innovation hopes are invested, typically lag on a variety of innovation metrics. Further, even the 
most positive rankings show there are at least 20 highly competitive countries that are more 
innovative than China at present, which, from one point of view at least, is in fact a sizeable number. 
 
Chapter 2: Government-set patent targets and indicators   
 
China has emphasised a range of quantitative patent targets, which while ambitious may not 
encourage quality let alone highest-quality patents and innovation as efficiently and effectively as 
envisaged; in fact, they may actually discourage highest-quality patents and at worst may 
sometimes actually encourage development and filing of low-quality patents. Similarly, a range of 
patent indicators in performance evaluation systems deserve scrutiny to determine their impact 
on patent quality and innovation at large. 
 
Quantitative patent targets 
 
The range of quantitative patent targets set out in China at the national, provincial/municipal, and 
local levels, while in some ways admirable, are also concerning in that some do not include helpful 
targets for ensuring patent quality. Within major recent policy documents reviewed for this study, 
there are over 10 national-level quantitative future patent targets, and over 150 
provincial/municipal quantitative patent targets, mostly for 2015. Examples of these are included in 
Table 1 below (and all reviewed indicators are translated into English in the Annex of the full version 
of this study).  
 
Table 1: Example quantitative patent indicators in major recent Chinese policy documents  
Name of policy Quantitative patent target 
China’s National Patent Development 
Strategy (2011-2020) 
2 million annual patent filings by 2015 
Hebei’s 12
th
 Five-Year IP Plan (issued in 
2011) 
Targets by the year of 2015: 
• Annual patent applications = 25,000 
• Patent applications ≥ 12% annual growth rate 
• Annual invention patent applications = 8,000 
• Invention patent applications ≥ 15% annual growth 
rate 
State Council (SC)’s Notice on IPR in 
Strategic Emerging Industries (issued in 
2011) 
By 2015, triple the number of international patent 
applications in strategic emerging industries compared to the 
number in 2010 
Source: Author’s selection of patent targets from some policies reviewed  
 
While most of the policies reviewed appear to set forth relatively solid patent targets, there are at 
least some minor weaknesses in the plans. Some appear to only set targets for patent applications, 
whereas by no means are all patents filed actually granted or transformed into useful patents; most 
proposals do not appear to set indicators for “patents in-force,” a key indicator of how and if patents 
are being utilised; most proposals do not set any type of quantitative future indicators for reducing 
infringement to supplement their other quantitative targets; and the policies do not specifically 
mention potential ‘double-counting’ of utility models later abandoned for invention patents in 
meeting their quantitative targets.  
 
Moreover, the most fundamental problem with what appears to be an overly heavy focus on 
quantitative patent targets in China is it overshadows the type of benchmarking that better reflects 
the nuances underlying creativity and actual utilisation of inventions, which are fundamental 
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building blocks of quality patents and highest-quality patents in particular. One cannot ‘force’ 
creativity, but instead must nurture it, whereas creativity leading to breakthroughs of the type that 
typically produce the highest-quality patents at best comes in spurts and is most often only realised 
in the mid- to long-term through a range of solid inputs. Further, absolute numbers of patents are an 
imperfect single indicator of the actual economic relevance of inventions (i.e. their ability to be 
transformed into something useful, and thus constitute innovation), and what appears to be China’s 
overly heavy focus on quantitative patent targets instead of a more dynamic gauging of a range of 
innovation-relevant targets (e.g. those involving educational capacity, R&D returns, certain product-
to-market introductions, and patent quality metrics) may not optimally, or at worst distortedly, 
foster innovation in China. Also, given the still developing nature of China’s regulatory and 
institutional framework, for example in comparison to developed European countries, it is easier for 
lone patent targets as opposed to a composite of innovation targets to be reached through a skirting 
of appropriate monitoring and evaluation, IPR enforcement, and other quality control mechanisms. 
As such, overemphasis on quantitative patent targets in China undermines the ostensible underlying 
policy objectives of the targets to sustainably build quality patents and innovation at large.  
 
Patent-based performance evaluations 
 
Assurances from different government officials would be helpful to ensure the variety of patent-
based performance evaluation mechanisms for Chinese SOEs; other enterprises; experts/academics 
and managers, and research institutes and universities; as well a variety of staff performance and 
programme evaluation criteria for Party officials and government ministries, sufficiently discourage 
low-quality patents and actually encourage quality patents and innovation at large. In terms of 
specific ministries, it is worth further investigation with regulators if the patent-indicator-based SOE 
evaluation criteria of the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 
and other ministries sufficiently discourages SOEs from filing patents of lower than desired quality to 
meet indicators, keeping in mind that roughly 65% of medium-to-large sized Chinese SOE’s patent 
applications in recent years are for utility models and design patents; if the Ministry of Science and 
Technology (MoST) and other government/quasi-government science & technology (S&T)-
promotion entities’ patent-based performance evaluations for projects sufficiently builds highest-
quality patents; how exactly SIPO’s performance criteria for examiners works; and how effective 
efforts have been to improve the performance of patent intermediary services (patent application 
writers) in China. 
 
Other targets 
 
Cross-cutting the patent target and performance review issues mentioned is some concern that GDP 
targets imposed by provincial/municipal level governments in China may in some ways discourage 
risk-taking needed to boost breakthrough innovation and create according patents in a way that 
other types of indicators might do better. 
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Select and Abridged Recommendations:  
 
• Consider alternative strategies and composite metrics for measuring the strength of 
Chinese innovativeness (e.g. based on the equivalent of the European Commission (EC)’s 
Regional Innovation Scoreboard (RIS)), and base policy more so on these approaches than 
overly on quantitative patent targets.  
 
• Review SASAC’s performance evaluation mechanism for SOEs to ensure that any patent-
based evaluation process best stimulates quality patents, and therein undertake a number 
of specific reforms suggested in Chapter 1 of this study. 
 
• The SC, in partnership with relevant ministries, could set-up an incentive system and 
monitoring mechanism whereby departments that implement the best systems for 
specifically encouraging patent quality are given certain recognitions/awards. 
 
Chapter 3: Other policies meant to promote patents  
 
China has a wide-range of patent-specific, and otherwise patent-related, policies and other 
measures in place, many of which are at least partially meant to encourage patents; however, 
some of these can actually discourage quality patents, and highest-quality patents in particular, 
and innovation. 
 
Patent-specific measures 
 
Patent filing subsidies 
 
Some governments across China are commendably already taking steps to reform their approaches 
to subsidising official fees for patent application processing and related attorney fees. However, a 
number of specific initiatives that do not appear to be currently discussed, at least publically, could 
be undertaken to more fully improve this system.  
 
Indigenous Innovation Policies linked to financial incentives 
 
There are a variety of Indigenous Innovation Policies (IIPs) based upon overly restrictive IPR 
requirements linked to financial incentives that appear currently in-force. While the IIP system was 
delinked from government procurement via a number of well-received policy proclamations in 2011, 
the essence of the IIP system, in terms of setting forth controversial IPR requirements linked with 
financial incentives, appears very much still in force.3 These controversial IP requirements are 
embodied in the term “indigenous intellectual property rights” (zìzhǔ zhīshì chǎnquán/自主知识产
权) which appears to typically be defined as IPR owned by a Chinese entity (which is specifically 
defined as an entity that does not have foreign majority ownership). (While not the norm, the term 
is defined somewhat differently in the HNTE tax scheme [see below section on the scheme for 
                                                           
3
 Central-level public statements requiring this delinking were issued on July 1
st
 2011, a written notice on July 4
th
 2011, and 
another written notice on November 17
th
 2011. Also, the April 2010 Draft Notice Regarding the Launch of the National 
Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation Work for 2010, which was interpreted as altering controversial IP provisions to 
allow for licensing of IP for use in China that is owned abroad as an alternative method for qualifying under IIP preferences 
rather than via otherwise required IP ownership or licensing of IP fully owned by a Chinese entity, does not appear to be in-
force at present and it is unclear if it was ever in-force. And no other measures appear to have subsequently taken that 
measure’s place in making such changes. As such, it appears China’s IIP framework is not legally bound to only instituting 
the type of IP requirements that were present in the April 2010 Draft Notice. 
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details]; and in some cases includes an option for restricted licensing of IP fully owned by a Chinese 
entity.) Hereafter these aforementioned concepts of indigenous intellectual property rights are 
collectively referred to as “IND IP” requirements.4 
 
This study finds several IND IP requirements, many of which are directly linked to financial incentives, 
in measures that appear to still be in-force. Examples of these (which are discussed within 
subsequent sections hereto) include: 
 Specific indigenous innovation product accreditation/management measures from sub-
central level governments; 
 Measures that stipulate IND IP requirements as an exclusive precondition for qualifying for 
subsidies from a foreign trade fund worth several billion Euros; 
 2011 measures from provinces and municipalities on subsidising enterprises that meet IND 
IP requirements using monies from various S&T and other invention-specific funds;  
 Policies setting out IP ownership targets for 2015 that are linked with funding through 
measures still being drafted; and 
 Measures underpinning the HNTE tax scheme. 
 Measures setting IND IP requirements linked to significant financial grants for developing 
standards.  
 
While building IND IP can indeed boost innovation and patent quality, the devil is in the details in 
terms of how this is approached. Criticisms presented of current IND-IP-based innovation policy 
include:  
 First, ‘IND IP thought’ in current IIPs in terms of specific IND IP requirements linked to 
financial incentives does not seem to be an optimal approach to innovation grounded in 
rigorously proven (e.g. empirical) economic evidence – and thus what appears to be 
overemphasis on this approach can indoctrinate the policymaking system in a way that 
prevents creation and implementation of other domestic Chinese innovation polices that 
could be more helpful for building-up innovation and longer-term quality patent filings. This 
phenomenon is likely compounded by the comparative power of certain personalities in 
ministries making innovation policy which complicate a truly collegial approach to 
policymaking.  
 Second, it seems unlikely that IND-IP-based policies will effectively stimulate competitive 
foreign firms at large to increasingly transfer ownership of IP or provide exclusive licenses to 
Chinese entities. In fact, the contrary may happen as these policies do nothing to alleviate 
the fear about the quality of the IPR environment in China and such policies in fact worsen 
foreign enterprises’ perception of the friendlessness of the innovation environment at large 
in China. 
 Third, IND-IP-based policies, particularly when combined with other factors, may even push 
some companies to develop certain innovation initiatives in alternative countries where they 
can enjoy policies that allow them to contribute to local innovation and quality patents 
without such pressure. On a related note, given the globalised nature of production chains 
at present, China’s national economic and technological security justifications for IND IP 
policies may not be particularly warranted.  
 Fourth, China’s IND IP policies may conflict with WTO rules, particularly Article 3 of the 
WTO’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, and thus if 
effectively challenged will need to be replaced by a strategy that less discriminatorily 
attempts to promote patent-building and innovation. 
                                                           
4
 Note 1: Although some measures using the term conspicuously do not define the term. Note 2: The definitions used in 
the April 2010 Draft Notice are not considered to constitute IND IP requirements.  
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Sub-central level indigenous innovation product accreditation/management measures  
 
Although many sub-central level indigenous innovation product accreditation/management 
measures that contain concerning IND IP requirements have clearly been invalidated at some point 
in 2011, some do not appear to be officially invalidated. It is thus worth investigating if they are 
currently or in the future will be linked to financial incentives, albeit outside government 
procurement preferences. At a very minimum, if the measures have been invalidated through non-
publicly disclosed notices, it is disconcerting they are still published online with no such notifications. 
 
Foreign trade subsidies 
 
A variety of measures that include IND IP and export-based preconditions for receiving subsidies are 
a drag on patent quality for the same reasons mentioned above, and also given they appear to 
conflict with Article 3 of the WTO’s Subsidies and Countervailing Duties (SCM) Agreement among 
other provisions in China’s WTO commitments. Some of these subsidies are from China’s Central 
Foreign Trade Development Fund (CFTDF), a fund worth over 37.7 billion RMB according to even old 
estimates which has somehow flown under the radar of even industry insiders.  
 
Various sub-central level incentives 
 
While setting out some quite commendable initiatives stimulating invention, some 
provincial/municipal measures are questionably effective in promoting patent quality and innovation. 
These include measures subsidising enterprises that meet IND IP requirements using monies from 
various S&T and other invention-specific funds. Another interesting example is provisions in 
national-level law, implemented in some provinces, that prisoners, even those with life sentences, 
can commute their sentences if they produce “inventions or major technological renovations.” Most 
other examples surround incentives for employers to motivate their employees to invent, whereas it 
is unclear how these approaches change behaviour not just for the sake of producing patents but to 
also better contribute to the overall competitiveness of their employing institution.  
 
Central-level S&T funding programs 
 
A range of large funds are available to domestic Chinese institutions, and much less so to foreign 
institutions, for innovation – for example via MoST’s Key Technologies Program, 863 Program, 973 
Program, Torch Program, and National Key Laboratories program – that are built on a number of 
overly broad restrictions that in some cases lessen the effectiveness of such projects’ ability to build 
quality patents. Article 20 of the Law on Scientific and Technological Progress stipulates the Chinese 
government must own technology resulting from research partnerships that tap into government 
S&T funds and is relevant to “national interest,” a concept distinguished from national security and 
public interests. Further, money or other support from SOEs, universities, or government-funded 
institutes used to fund such projects may also be considered to fall under these restrictions in 
certain cases. There are also requirements that exclusive licensing of IP resulting from such projects 
to foreign entities requires burdensome government approvals. In contrast, the EC’s rules for 
funding research and technological development are far more flexible, and as a consequence this 
difference of treatment appears to be in conflict with several provisions in the Agreement for 
Scientific and Technological Cooperation between the European Community and the Government of 
the People’s Republic of China. While some recent policy statements, in particular the 2012 National 
IP Strategy, appear to acknowledge China’s current S&T funding system needs more reform, it is 
uncertain how these policies will be implemented in a way that better stimulates patent quality and 
related innovation.  
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HNTE scheme  
 
While certain tax components of the High and New Technology Enterprise (HNTE) status scheme are 
not new to industry insiders, less discussed components of the scheme directly related to patents 
can undermine the underlying objective of the program to build highest-quality patents in China. 
Many components of the HNTE scheme raise concerns mentioned in the above section on IND-IP-
based policies, whereas the HNTE scheme stipulates overly restrictive qualifying enterprises must 
own core IP registered in China or have “worldwide rights to the exclusive use” of IP for five or 
more years, although some suggest that in practice this latter condition is legally impossible to 
satisfy. Further, while positive restrictions are put on the types and usage of utility models and 
design patents that can be used in applying for HNTE status, Chinese government consultations 
suggest that many enterprises take advantage of the criterion in the HNTE Application Form that 
allows six utility model patents to constitute one invention patent for the purposes of applying for 
HNTE status. Overall, there is room for concern that the HNTE scheme as is does not best stimulate 
highest-quality patents and related innovation. 
 
Standards 
 
Discriminatory standard-making procedures, withholding information on such standards, and 
discriminatory de jure standards and de facto application of standards have long been used to 
promote Chinese innovation, and these initiatives stifle competition, potentially denying the Chinese 
market certain patents and know-how. Specifically:  
 FIEs often do not have access to the Technical Committees in which standards are decided, 
and therefore cannot join patent pools;  
 FIEs are unable to obtain information on the scope and requirements of patents to 
implement the standards that are frequently used in mandatory certification schemes;  
 Standardisation is frequently and increasingly being used to promote Chinese technologies 
or other inventions by developing national standards exclusively reflecting the capabilities of 
SOEs and certain private Chinese companies;  
 European IP holders have continued to experience great difficulties in engaging the Chinese 
telecommunications industry in licensing discussions over “essential” patents, i.e. those 
containing one or more claims that are critical to the implementation of a technical 
specification or standard; 
 Direct competitors of applicants have unnecessary access to IP submitted in application 
documents for chemical projects in China above $300 million USD and often also for smaller 
projects;  
 Direct competitors of applicants sit on the State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA)’s 
approval panel for pharmaceuticals and thus access the applicant’s IP, and can delay 
approval of pharmaceuticals while they themselves seek approval on a similar or the same 
one(s);  
 Enterprises remain concerned over proprietary IPR leakage during China Compulsory 
Certification (CCC) Mark certification given recent revisions to related rules allegedly still do 
not adequately reform the system;  
 The Multi-Level Protection Scheme (MLPS) includes domestic IP requirements that do not 
allow foreign companies to build a variety of Chinese infrastructure, whether as part of 
government procurement or commercial initiatives; and 
 Certain measures encourage standardisation via potentially concerning IND IP requirements 
linked to significant subsidies, for example those providing 1 million RMB per standard 
developed.  
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Overall, the aforementioned Chinese standardisation policies may actively encourage 
standardisation initiatives that will ultimately fail domestically and/or fail during international 
expansion attempts, thus wasting resources and detracting from healthy innovation and the 
associated building of quality patents. Also, some initiatives raise the same aforementioned 
concerns surrounding IND IP provisions. 
 
Raw deals in closed sectors 
 
In closed sectors where the only way of market access is through Joint Ventures (JVs) with Chinese 
companies, usually SOEs, sources suggest the Chinese partner may leverage low-quality patent 
portfolios, “force” disclosure of know-how, and otherwise create what are considered in this study 
as “raw deals” – all of which in turn create a drag on patent quality and innovation at large. 
Specifically, sources suggest that in this situation: 
 Chinese firms may leverage patent portfolios of dubious quality to get a better financial deal 
via demanding royalties while using their superior negotiating position to block due 
diligence on the contents of these patents;  
 The prospective Chinese JV partner of a foreign enterprise may unreasonably require 
transfer of key patented technology as a precondition to entering the JV;  
 Prospective Chinese partners may use other forceful tactics to acquire know-how, for 
example requiring foreign partners open an R&D centre in China as a precondition for 
entering a JV; and 
 Raw deals of different types are found in the government procurement bidding process, for 
example in the rail industry. 
 Compounding the abovementioned concerns, sources identify instances where Chinese SOEs, 
after they acquire foreign technology through such raw deals, utilise preferential 
government support to strategically displace foreign firms from the domestic Chinese and 
even foreign markets.  
From one perspective, the raw deal approach might be justified by arguing the Chinese market is 
‘just too good to give up’ for some companies’ business operations and thus they must agree to 
deals they would not have in other less promising markets. However, at large, empirical evidence to 
date shows this is not the case for breakthrough innovation-intensive operations that involve 
patents. Also, forcing technology transfer has made Chinese firms more reliant on foreign 
technology, and worse, sometimes has even made such Chinese firms lose the independent 
innovation capacity they may have once had. Additionally, it is possible that the raw deal 
phenomenon creates a perverse incentive for Chinese companies to register less-than-highest-
quality patents. Further, the market access for technology arrangements at the heart of many raw 
deals are in conflict with WTO commitments, which might be an additional argument for foreign 
nations, especially those put under pressure by the financial crisis, to support their own stricter 
techno-economic security policies in response to such deals. As such, it is neither effective nor 
efficient policy to rely on raw deals to push companies to contribute to the development of highest-
quality patents in China, and in fact these practices may very well instead deter enterprises from 
contributing valuable knowledge to building highest-quality patents and linked innovation in China.  
 
Technology import and export rules 
 
Several ambiguities in the rules on technology import and export create a drag on patent quality in 
China. Article 27 of the Administrative Measures for the Registration of Technology Import and 
Export Contracts (TIER), which requires that subsequent improvements on technology development 
in contractual relationships are owned by the party making the improvements, creates notable 
ambiguity for entities working with others to innovate, resulting in a drag on patent quality. The TIER 
are also unclear about what technologies are covered within their category of “restricted” and, even 
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more unclear regarding “prohibited” import/export technology. The definition of “technology import 
and export” in Article 2 of the measures is overly broad. Lastly, Article 24 of the TIER sets overly 
burdensome requirements in mandating foreign technology licensors to bear liability for any 
accusation of infringement that may be brought against a technology importer in relation to the use 
of licensed technology. All of these requirements create uncertainty that hampers building of quality 
patents and innovation at large. 
 
Inventor remuneration rules  
 
Although some provinces have undertaken initiatives to shape the inventor remuneration system, at 
large there are unclear requirements in China’s remuneration rules that sometimes make companies 
reluctant to conduct high-value research in China, thus hampering patent quality. Specifically, 
ambiguity with regards to the scope of the legal liability for “reasonable” inventor remuneration in 
different situations (e.g. for a foreign-owned R&D centre or contract research) causes uncertainty 
and thus efficiency losses that somewhat hamper patent creation and undertaking of innovation 
activities at large. 
 
Other patent-related measures 
 
Current incremental-innovation-centric indigenous innovation policies 
 
Inappropriate IIPs jeopardise patent quality in China. First, while long recognised by economists as 
important stepping-stones for developing countries to better innovate, it is also clear that an overly 
heavy focus on IIPs encouraging assimilation, absorption, and/or re-innovation (hereafter, for 
simplicity, referred to interchangeably as incremental innovation policies [which are a prominent 
type of China’s IIPs]), at worst makes enterprises so reliant on foreign technologies that they are 
unable to “independently” innovate, let alone produce breakthrough innovations, in the short, mid- 
and long-term. Second, such policies may be used to justify, or actually interpreted to encourage, 
development of products and processes in a way that nearly outright encourages infringement; and 
this can unintentionally increase administrative actions, arbitration, or litigation. Further, it is 
concerning that such policy advice is explicitly at the heart of judicial approaches to future patent 
cases as outlined in the December 16th 2011 Supreme People’s Court (SPC) Opinion. Third, in some 
instances, overemphasis on currently conceived Chinese incremental-innovation-style IIPs can 
indoctrinate the policymaking system in a way that prevents creation and implementation of other 
more effective innovation polices. These current policies are not only ineffective in stimulating 
incremental innovation but also ineffective as stepping stones towards breakthrough innovation. 
While not appearing to be universal across all provinces/municipalities, at least some, for example as 
illustrated in the Innovation Promotion Regulations of Guangdong Province effective in 2012, are 
seeking to revise their current incremental-innovation-style IIPs in response to this third concern. In 
general, China could benefit from more reform of inappropriate IIPs. 
 
Other measures 
 
There are a wide variety of other Chinese policies that collectively create a magnified drag on patent 
quality and innovation in China. Massive government “megaprojects” are used instead of arguably 
more effective ways to foster key innovations, namely those drawing on comparatively smaller 
teams. There are a range of financial incentives that given their discriminatory nature can hamper 
innovation and resulting patent quality including the “national champion” logic explicitly only 
favouring “big companies” embedded in the Electronics and IT Development Fund (EIDF), a several 
billion RMB fund. A general lack of transparency in Chinese policy formulation and implementation, 
which is not fully aligned with China’s WTO commitments on transparency, in effect drags down 
innovation and linked patent quality. There are also difficulties in coordinating industrial park 
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initiatives in order to optimally stimulate innovation and produce associated highest-quality patents. 
Other policies also somewhat drag down innovation and linked patent quality in China. 
 
Select and Abridged Recommendations:  
 
• In all provinces/municipalities, reform the award criteria for and oversight of the 
patent subsidy application process in line with the more detailed recommendations 
provided in Chapter 3 of this study. 
 
• In line with the more detailed recommendations in Chapter 3 of this study, IND IP 
policies linked to subsidies and any other financial preferences, inclusive of WTO-
inconsistent financial preferences, should be nullified. Amend the requirements in 
current IND-IP-based policies to include better determinants of the success of an entity 
in building quality patents. 
 
• Enact revisions to the criteria for HNTE status as outlined in the detailed 
recommendations in Chapter 3 of this study. 
 
• Conduct an audit or series of audits, led by the National Auditing Office, on the 
workings of all major innovation-related funding programs and other key innovation 
policies in China. This report(s) could be used as the basis for improving related 
programs and policies, to be discussed in a formal dialogue among SIPO, MoST and 
other relevant bodies involved in patent and larger innovation strategy and 
implementation. 
 
• Open at least partially more of China’s government-sponsored S&T funding programs 
to foreign entities. And revise IP restrictions therein to allow project partners to own 
the knowledge produced from the projects, and beyond this simply require that the 
project partners reach an agreement among themselves on IP ownership and licensing.  
  
• Establish a Working Group with topical sub-groups made up of government officials, 
Standard-Setting Organisations (SSOs), industry representatives (foreign and domestic), 
and other experts to investigate and provide recommendations on improving 
standard-development and oversight policy in China. One of the group’s end goals 
would be to ensure all overly discriminatory de jure and de facto restrictions on 
foreign entities accessing the Technical Committees in which standardisation is 
decided are removed, and more reasonable access is granted to patent pools and 
essential patents.  
 
• A taskforce should be created among industry associations in China (foreign and 
Chinese) to conduct an audit of all raw deals and other forms of forced-disclosure of 
know-how their members have experienced. A dialogue with MOFCOM could be set 
up to discuss and address their findings. 
 
• Revise several components of the TIER in line with the specific recommendations in 
Chapter 3 of this study. 
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Chapter 4: Rules and procedures for reviewing patent applications and those 
for enforcing patents  
 
There are a variety of concerns surrounding rules and procedures for patent application review 
and those for enforcement of disputes that can discourage building of quality patents and related 
innovation in China.  
 
Patent application-specific issues 
 
Confidentiality Review process 
 
The Patent Law (2008) in China and its implementing rules set forth an overly burdensome 
Confidentiality Review process for all foreign patent filings for inventions made in China’s territory. 
According to the Implementing Rules of the Patent Law amended in January 2010, if it is determined 
that a solution “may relate to the security or vital interest of the State and is required to be kept 
secret,” a confidentiality notice is sent to the applicant with which they have to comply, and the 
patent will not be published (even if approved in China) and it cannot be filed in a foreign country. 
The level of ambiguity as to what constitutes a solution that “relates to the security or vital interest 
of the State” opens up the possibility that a wide-range of solutions might fall within this category 
and thus face complications. Further, even if the Confidentiality Review reveals no problem for first 
filings abroad, as should be the case in most instances, the requirements for this review create a 
burden because the texts for the review need to be translated or a costly Patent Cooperation Treaty 
(PCT) application has to be filed with SIPO by external counsel in order to comply with SIPO’s request. 
Even more troublesome is the requirement that patent applications that are amended shortly before 
foreign filings within the 12 month priority period need another Confidentiality Review as such 
amendments need to be checked even if in the scope of the original claims. 
 
Green channel process 
 
Uncertainties in application of the expedited examination of patents/the “green channel” approval 
of patents may somewhat discourage patent quality. The most pressing concern worth discussing is 
how SIPO will keep track of and take into account the pending applications which have not been 
prioritised but of course may still constitute relevant prior art for any expedited application. It will 
also be helpful to discuss ways to ensure that recent policy initiatives allowing green channel 
approval of patents in strategic industries do not translate into an approval mechanism for low-
quality patents just because they are in an industry defined as strategic. 
 
Patentability in agro-sciences 
 
There are a number of restrictions on core inventions in the biotechnology field for agro-sciences. 
For example, SIPO’s Patent Examination Guidelines (2010 revision) largely exclude genetically 
modified plants from patentability in China and limit protection of genetic material to a non-
meaningful, overly narrow, scope, which clearly prohibits building of quality patents in these areas.  
 
Patent-specific enforcement issues 
 
Abuse of patent rights 
 
Given weaknesses in application of the specific principles of “abuse of right of action” and therein 
“malicious prosecution action” in cases involving complex patents and ambiguity in the scope of 
patent claims, complainants in some patent cases can force accused infringers to undertake overly 
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strong liability. This provides a perverse incentive for litigation that deters development of quality 
patents and linked innovation. Some sources go as far as to suggest that over 50% of patents in 
China are filed for the sole purpose of being used for retaliation and/or to first initiate litigation. 
These concerns, where patents are used as first-attack and/or tit-for-tat weapons, make businesses 
reluctant to establish or expand operations in China, especially IP-based operations. While it 
deserves to be recognised that there is a commendable recent focus from the Chinese government 
on addressing the phenomenon of abuse of patent rights, for example via the December 16th 2011 
SPC Opinion and statements from SIPO, it appears more still needs to be done to fully address this 
area. 
 
Prior art submissions in utility model invalidation cases, and prior art review in infringement cases 
 
Under the Patent Examination Guidelines (2010 revision), petitioners are sometimes restricted to 
presenting too few pieces of prior art in an attempt to prove lack of inventiveness in a utility model 
invalidation case. This restriction on pieces of admissible prior art for utility model infringement 
cases can make it notably more difficult to invalidate utility models than invention patents, as it 
normally requires one or two pieces of “knock-out prior art” to show that the utility model has been 
anticipated.  
 
In a related vein, sources suggest that, in an infringement case, SIPO’s Patent Evaluation Report 
assessing prior art for utility models is currently overly limited to the art in the identical technical 
field. And this is compounded by what sources suggest to be SIPO’s examiners’ lack of easy access to 
information on the larger amount of prior art disclosed by use or other methods that are not part of 
patent litigation materials.  
 
Judicial review of Patent Evaluation Reports 
 
Not enough weight is given to Patent Evaluation Reports in infringement proceedings, reinforcing 
the perception that China has a less than optimal patent adjudication system. In an infringement 
proceeding in China, the Patent Evaluation Report for utility models is only considered “evidence” 
and not necessarily binding. This is significantly problematic as it undermines the expert Patent 
Evaluation Report of SIPO examiners, which while facing some limitations (as discussed above) is still 
arguably one of the best tools assessing patentability of a utility model, in favour of different types 
of other potentially dubious evidence in patent enforcement cases. Also, it is concerning that while 
most judges require utility model patent infringement cases in court be suspended or adjourned 
pending the outcome of validity proceedings at the PRB, this requirement is not universally applied.  
 
Anti-Monopoly Law 
 
There is continued uncertainty over how Article 55 of the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), which discusses 
regulation of monopolistic behaviour based on IPR, will be implemented in practice, which in turn 
somewhat creates a drag on developing quality patents. Anti-monopoly enforcement is important in 
breaking-up monopoly-building from certain types of patent pools (although in some circumstances 
patent pools can in fact create positive impacts on patent quality), related behaviour stemming from 
the discriminatory standardisation process, amongst other practices. The absence of improved 
regulation herein can deter innovation investments and resulting quality patents.  
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Protection of process patents 
 
It is very difficult for rights-holders to prove infringement of process patents (which are only granted 
under invention patents), and thus adequately protect such patents given lack of access to 
evidence/appropriate evidence preservation protocols in patent process cases. Difficulties enforcing 
process patents drag down patent quality and innovation at large as protection of process patents is 
important to stimulate not just process innovation but also subsequently related product innovation. 
Further, the importance of process patent protection in China as a basis to stimulate innovation will 
likely grow in the future. 
 
Obtaining preliminary injunctions 
 
Difficulties in obtaining preliminary injunctions (PIs) in China can hamper development of quality 
patents and related innovation. The December 16th 2011 SPC Opinion may encourage reluctance in 
granting PIs in IP cases, which could particularly harm development of quality patents in the 
pharmaceutical industry. With a “Bolar exemption” and no strong patent linkage, the 
pharmaceutical industry may need to rely on PIs if generics enter the market well before patent 
expiry; and if PI’s are rejected because the simple chemical analysis for determining the content of a 
patented compound is considered to be “technically complex,” generics will not be estopped from 
sale and prices may be influenced significantly even before patent expiry. While these concerns 
reflect a challenge to developing quality innovations in the pharmaceutical sector in particular, they 
can also have a larger impact on innovations and linked patents in China in other fields if even simple 
technical cases are denied PIs in practice. More generally, industry in China face both difficulties 
obtaining PIs before a potentially infringing good enters the market and a burdensome threshold for 
obtaining PIs, which can somewhat deter building of quality patents and related innovation. 
 
Other patent-related issues 
 
Rules and procedures on evidence 
 
Evidence preservation orders in China can be relatively ineffective, which degrades the strength of 
the IP enforcement environment in China, patents inclusive, discouraging patent-building and 
related innovation. In practice, defendants often refuse to co-operate with the request to produce 
documents even after an evidence preservation order is granted by the court, and there is limited 
recourse for the IP owner to deal with this situation. This reinforces concerns over China’s patent 
adjudication environment, thus deterring patent-building and related innovation. 
 
Other issues 
 
A range of other factors make it particularly difficult to enforce patent rights in China, which 
exacerbate the often negative image of the country’s IPR enforcement environment and in turn 
somewhat hamper building of quality patents and related innovation in China. Such factors include 
lack of publication of patent case decisions, which conflict with publication requirements in Article 
63 of TRIPS; reluctance of the Public Security Bureau to acknowledge when criminal prosecution 
thresholds for IPR infringement have been reached and accept cases therein, high prosecution 
thresholds in the first-place, and too small penalties for such prosecutions; burdensome rules on 
notarisation and legalisation of evidence and other materials (which are often essential in IPR cases 
and enforcement actions) that appear to conflict with Article 41.2, 41.22, 44 and 50 of TRIPS; and 
unreasonable requirements that make it difficult for rights holders to enforce their patent rights at 
trade fairs. Other IPR enforcement difficulties also hamper patent quality and related innovation in 
China. 
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Select and Abridged Recommendations:  
 
• Set forth several specific reforms to ensure reliability and compliance with patentability 
requirements within the prioritised patent examination process. 
 
• Formulate guidance in line with the detailed recommendations in Chapter 4 of this study 
that better defines the concept of “abuse of patent right.” 
 
• Create better disincentives for patent applicants to file “abnormal” applications (Fēi 
zhèngcháng zhuānlì shēnqǐn/非正常专利申请) and bad faith applications.   
 
• Mandate that Patent Evaluation Reports (for utility models) are presumed as fully valid in 
all court infringement proceedings and moreover given substantial weight in such 
proceedings, unless, through a formal process, a judge demonstrates deviation from this 
requirement is necessary to appropriately adjudicate the case. 
 
• When an applicant has submitted more than one or two pieces of prior art in the course of 
a utility model invalidation proceeding, the PRB should be explicitly required to consider 
such prior art when assessing patentability of the utility model.
 
This requires revising the 
Guidelines for Patent Examination (2010 revision). 
 
• Develop appropriate guidelines on how Article 55 of the Anti-Monopoly Law will be 
implemented to regulate IPR issues.  
 
• Enact specific revisions to adjudication rules surrounding process patents as set out in 
Chapter 4 of this study. 
 
• Revise Article 16 of the December 16
th
 2011 SPC Opinion to clarify if circumstances where a 
claimed compound is found in the accused infringers product constitutes an infringement 
and therefore if preliminary injunctions in such instances are obtainable. Also, develop 
guidance to encourage judges to grant more necessary preliminary injunctions in patent 
cases at large. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Chinese government clearly desires to stimulate innovation in China and has already undertaken 
many commendable initiatives to try and improve the country’s innovation system, inclusive of its 
patent quality situation. Still, it is essential to realise that China’s patent quality problem is systemic: 
it goes far beyond the often cited reasons of patent filing subsidies and occasional tax incentives, 
having roots in a wide range of policies and other measures, as well as administrative and 
enforcement approaches, that do not seem to be effectively addressed at present, nor on course to 
be effectively addressed, and in some cases are not even discussed at all. Individually, and much 
more so collectively, these dulling devices create a vicious cycle which inhibits patent quality and 
innovation at large in China. Only when these effects are recognised to be a product of a large 
network of patent-related issues can China’s institutional and regulatory environment for innovation 
be understood and systematically improved.  
 
This study is intended as a discussion piece about certain practical ways to in the near future (as 
distinguished from certain changes to the educational system, culture of risk-taking, and credit 
system which are arguably less practical in the near term) maximise China’s innovation and related 
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patent quality potential. To be sure, it is clear that China possesses great innovation potential; 
however, overall, China still lags behind many developed countries in terms of innovation at large 
and quality patents in particular, let alone breakthrough innovation and highest-quality patents. 
While China may indeed be able to largely sustain its economy in the mid-term, i.e. the next five to 
ten years, through incremental innovation, the efficiency and effectiveness of certain policies, other 
measures, and practices meant to stimulate such innovation and the quality of patents produced 
therein deserve notable improvement. Moreover, it is clear that policymakers want to increasingly 
build breakthrough innovation capacity as distinct from incremental innovation, realising that in the 
long-term this type of innovation is essential to grow the economy. However, the efficiency and 
effectiveness of a variety of Chinese policies, other measures, and practices intended to stimulate 
breakthrough innovation and the highest-quality patents produced therein deserve serious 
improvement. This study attempts to flag many of these areas needing improvement and provide 
practical recommendations for doing so.  
 
The European Union Chamber of Commerce in China looks forward to a productive discussion with 
Chinese officials on the issues and suggestions presented in this study. It is hoped that these efforts 
will help sharpen China's patent and larger innovation ecosystem into one that will sustainably drive 
its economy and provide for its people, as well as attract European businesses.  
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Ⅰ  Introduction 
 
Ⅰ.1 Key terms 
  
Introduction: This sub-section defines key terms used throughout this study. It first defines different 
types of innovation, what types of patents can be filed in China, how patents and patent quality are 
related to innovation, and sets out definitions of different thresholds of patent quality.  
 
Ⅰ.1.1 Innovation vs. invention 
 
There is a difference between innovation and invention, although this difference is often confused. 
The terms are defined as follows: 
 “Invention” is the creation of something considered new (e.g. in the form of a physical 
product, service, or method).  
 “Innovation” is the collective act of inventing and the exploitation of that invention.5 
As such, if an invention is not applied, for example is not introduced to the market and thus given a 
practical purpose, it is not part of a complete cycle considered “innovation.”  
 
Ⅰ.1.2 Types of innovation 
 
Innovation is described in an array of economic literature as an important economic driver.6 This 
study refers to two main recognised categories of innovation defined below.7  
 “Breakthrough innovation” (which may also be called “radical” or “discontinuous” 
innovation) is creation of brand new/cutting-edge innovations. Breakthrough innovations 
often have the potential to create completely new markets and/or displace existing 
innovations.  
 “Incremental innovation” is exploitation of existing innovations in a way that improves upon 
them, but less dramatically than via breakthrough innovation. Incremental innovation 
involves less risk and takes less time than breakthrough innovation, resulting in solutions 
considered less cutting-edge than those from breakthrough innovation.8 
 
Both of the aforementioned types of innovation have value. Incremental innovation is used hand-in-
hand with breakthrough innovation, for example a successful breakthrough innovation is often 
followed by a number of innovations incrementally improving its performance or extending its 
application. While incremental innovation is important, a balance between such innovation and 
breakthrough innovation is important, whereas the latter typically affords an innovator a much 
higher level of competitiveness.9 Generally speaking, breakthrough innovation is found more so in 
developed economies than developing ones; and developing economies rely proportionally more on 
                                                           
5
 Amongst numerous other sources discussing the distinction between invention and innovation see: 
Managing creativity and innovation: Practical strategies to encourage creativity. (2003). Harvard Business Essentials. 
Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Publishing Corporation; and Bessant, J. et al. (2010). Beyond light bulbs and pipelines: 
Leading and nurturing innovation in the public sector. Report Commissioned by the UK Cabinet Office and Department for 
Business, Innovation & Skills. Sunningdale Institute. p. 8 
6
 Among others, see Schumpter’s theory of creative destruction in: Schumpeter, J. (1942). Capitalism, socialism, and 
democracy. New York: Harper & Brothers. 
7
 While different categories may be used, these are two types of innovation distinguished as such in relevant literature. For 
example, among others, see Managing Creativity and Innovation: Practical Strategies to Encourage Creativity (2003) 
8
 Definitions compiled by author after review of relevant literature, for example, among others: Managing Creativity and 
Innovation: Practical Strategies to Encouraging Creativity (2003) 
9
 Ibid 
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incremental innovation on their way to become more developed. A variety of measures reviewed in 
this study reflect the Chinese government’s desire to first and foremost foster indigenously-led 
incremental innovation, but to also stimulate breakthrough innovation.  
 
Although the distinctions are not focused on at length in this study, it is worth noting that innovation 
can also be thought of in terms of additional more function-specific categories rather than those 
representing the degree of innovation. For example, there is both technological innovation and non-
technological innovation. Innovation is also often thought of in terms of (1) goods and services 
innovation (changes in physical products [goods] or services); (2) process innovation (changes in 
production or delivery methods); (3) organisational innovation (changes in workplace organisation, 
business practice, or a firm’s external relations); and (4) marketing innovation (changes in product 
design, packaging, placement, pricing, and/or promotion).10  
 
Ⅰ.1.3 Patents and patent quality as indicators of innovation 
 
Patents, which are legal rights to exclude others from exploiting (i.e. making, using, or selling) 
inventions (below see exact definitions of different types of patents in China), are linked to 
innovation as, while by no means an ideal single indicator, they can be used as an intermediate 
measure of innovation, i.e. an invention output upon which innovation is built.11 Unfortunately, 
absolute numbers of patents are often solely used or otherwise overemphasised as a measure of 
innovation. In fact, the quality of patents provides far more insight into innovation capacity as it is a 
better metric of application of inventions in a way that impacts society. 
 
Ⅰ.1.4 What types of patents can be filed in China? 
 
Patents, which are legal rights to exclude others from making, using, importing, selling or offering to 
sell inventions, are granted in three forms in China. These include invention patents, utility model 
patents and design patents. Definitions of these three types of patents are as follows: 
  
Invention patents can be granted on both products (good and services) and processes, and must 
meet a standard for novelty (not part of the “prior art,” i.e. not openly known to the public abroad 
or in China before their filing date), “inventiveness,” and practical use. Invention patents take on 
average three to five years to grant, a process which includes a detailed examination called a 
“Substantive Examination.” They enjoy protection of 20 years maximum if maintained.  
 
Utility model patents (“utility models”) can be granted on the shape and/or structure of a product. 
They do not undergo a Substantive Examination, but to receive approval are required to be novel, 
meet a far lower level of “inventiveness” than invention patents, and must meet criteria for practical 
use/functionality (usually improving the functionality of a product rather than serving as a 
completely new solution). Utility models are most appropriate for products with lower levels of 
inventiveness and/or short lifecycles (which require they enter the market quickly) given they have a 
lower inventiveness threshold, take about one year or even less (e.g. eight to 10 months) to be 
granted, and enjoy protection of 10 years maximum if maintained. They confer basically the same 
legal rights in terms of level of protection as invention patents when enforced. 
 
                                                           
10
 Definitions adapted from, among others: World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO]. (2011). World intellectual 
property report (p. 23). Retrieved from 
http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/en/intproperty/944/wipo_pub_944_2011.pdf 
11
 Among other sources see: OECD Stats: Concepts & Classifications, Key statistical concept 
http://stats.oecd.org/oecdstat_metadata/ShowMetadata.ashx?Dataset=PATS_IPC&Coords=&Lang=en 
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Design patents (also called registered designs) are granted on the appearance of a product that 
makes it particularly recognisable (i.e. the shape, pattern or their combination, or the combination 
of colour and shape and/or pattern). Design patents do not undergo a Substantive Examination nor 
have to meet any technical or functional thresholds, but to be approved must be distinct from prior 
designs, and in the same vein must not conflict with others’ prior rights like copyrights or trademarks. 
They enjoy protection of 10 years maximum if maintained.12  
 
It should be noted that while the aforementioned three types of IPR are considered “patents” in 
China, not all countries grant these same types of patents. While many countries only grant and 
consider “patents” to be in line with the abovementioned definition of the Chinese invention patent, 
a number of other countries outside of China also have utility model and design patent systems 
which they consider as part of their patent systems. And, in fact, Kardam (2007) suggests that 
protection of utility models in particular is not uncommon, whereas over 40 countries, including a 
number in Europe, have a utility model patent system.13 
 
Ⅰ.1.5 What are the definitions of patent “quality” employed in this study? 
 
There has long been a debate on what exactly a definition of “patent quality” should entail. One 
conventional definition is that patent quality is determined by legal compliance with core statutory 
requirements for patentability.14 Others look at the commercial value of a patent,15 and in the same 
vein look at patents that are maintained over an extended amount of time such that they can be 
commercialised to make profits.16 Yet others suggest that patents that are not commercially valuable 
can still be of good quality according to statutory criteria.17 Some use frequency of patent citations in 
patent literature and also sometimes in non-patent literature as a gauge of the significance of a 
patent and thus its quality.18 Some define quality in relative terms, whereas higher quality patents 
exclusively refer to inventions that would not have been made without the incentive afforded by 
their patent protection.19 Yet others, particularly observers of China’s patent system, appear to only 
consider invention patents as of good quality, whereas all non-invention patents (or utility models in 
particular), are “junk” (low quality). Yet other definitions may be used. 
 
The below Table 2 outlines the definitions for different thresholds of patent quality used in this 
study in terms of “highest-quality,” “quality,” and “low-quality” patents: 
                                                           
12
 For one resource on distinguishing the three types of patents in China see: China IPR SME Helpdesk. Helpdesk ELM 3: 
Patents [E-learning module]. Retrieved from http://www.china-iprhelpdesk.eu/en/e-learning-modules/156-helpdesk-elm-
3-patents 
13 
Kardam, K. S. (2007). Utility model – A tool for economic and technological development: A case study of Japan. (pp. 2-3). 
World Intellectual property Organization [WIPO] and Japanese Patent Office [JPO]. Retrieved from http://www.training-
jpo.go.jp/en/uploads/text_vtr/ws_pdf/kardam.pdf Note: For a listing of countries with utility models and details on their 
regimes see: Richards, J. (2010). Utility model protection throughout the world. Intellectual Property Owner’s Association. 
Retrieved from   http://www.ipo.org/AM/Template.cfm?Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=25244 
14 
Among other see: Scellato, G., Calderini, M., Caviggioli, F., Franzoni, C., Ughetto, E., Kica, E., & Rodriguez, V. (2011). Study 
on the quality of the patent system in Europe. European Commission (p. 19). Retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/patent/patqual02032011_en.pdf
 
15 
Ibid
 
16
 Gao, L., Li, M., Cheng, Y. et al. (2011, September). Report on the quality of patents for invention in China. IPR2, European 
Commission, p. 6, p. 28. Note: in the same sentence the authors also mention that patents are sometimes kept in-force in 
response to demand of the rights holder’s patent strategy as a “technology backup,” and are also sometimes kept in-force 
to prevent competitors from conducting further technical development and research in related areas – although it is not 
clear from the wording if these are suggested as a criteria for patent quality. 
17
 Scellato et al. (2011) 
18 
For example, see OECD. (2011). Competing in the global economy, technology performance: Quality. In OECD Science, 
Technology and Industry Scoreboard. Retrieved from http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/sti_scoreboard-2011-
en/06/13/index.html?contentType=/ns/Book,/ns/StatisticalPublication&itemId=/content/book/sti_scoreboard-2011-
en&containerItemId=/content/serial/20725345&accessItemIds=&mimeType=text/html 
19
 Scellato et al. (2011) 
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Table 2: Definitions for different thresholds of patent quality used in this study 
Threshold Definition Measurement 
“Highest-
quality” 
patents 
(1) Meet or exceed the statutory 
requirements for patentability in China 
that best advance Chinese government 
objectives of sustainably increasing 
breakthrough research and innovation led 
by China-based entities (domestic 
enterprises, research institutions, 
universities, and individuals as well as 
foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs)); and 
(2) Meet criterion (2) for “Quality” 
patents (see below definition) 
 
Rates of granted invention patents that 
are not subsequently invalidated; and 
Same metrics used for criterion (2) for 
“Quality” patents (see below mentioned 
metrics)  
 
(Note: See below “How do utility models 
and design patents in particular fit into 
these definitions?” and Box 1 for further 
explanations on why these metrics look at 
invention patents rather than utility 
models and design patents.) 
“Quality” 
patents 
(1) Meet or exceed the statutory 
requirements for patentability (for 
invention patents, utility models, and 
design patents)  in China; and 
(2) Have reasonable prospects of (i) 
ultimately being commercialised OR (ii) 
otherwise being transformed to 
contribute to social, economic and/or 
environmental ‘progress’ in China (e.g. 
used to build key knowledge in the field of 
nationally-sponsored disease research)* 
Rates of granted patents (invention, 
utility model, and design patent) that are 
not subsequently invalidated nor would 
likely be invalidated if the enforcement 
system for patents were improved in line 
with the recommendations in Chapter 4 
hereto; and 
Rates of commercialisation of patents 
and/or rates of patents transformed to 
contribute to progress in China as 
measured by patents in-force, average 
patent life-spans, patent citations, survey 
data, and/or empirical statistical and 
econometric analyses 
“Low-
quality” 
patents 
(1)-(2) Those that do not meet the 
aforementioned standard for “Quality” 
patents 
Rates of patents (invention, utility model, 
and design) granted but subsequently 
invalidated and for which this invalidation 
is not overturned in a re-examination 
procedure; and  
Rates of patents not efficiently and 
effectively commercialised or otherwise 
not transformed to contribute to progress 
in China as measured by patents in-force, 
average patent life-spans,  patent 
citations, usage in malicious prosecution 
actions, survey data, and/or empirical 
statistical and econometric analyses 
Source: Author’s own definitions after review of relevant literature and consultations with experts in the field. *Note: The 
definition of ‘progress’ herein is intentionally left relatively open, whereas there may be a wide variety of patents argued to 
have value of the type directly or indirectly contributing to economic, social and/or environmental progress, and it is not 
the intention of this study to define all possible instances of this, some of which may be very case-specific. Additionally, it 
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should be noted that, for a variety of reasons, not all innovations that might contribute to economic, social, and/or 
environmental progress are patentable. 
 
Although broad tools for measuring the types of patents defined in Table 2 above are also set out in 
that table, and although some of these tools are employed in the statistical analysis in Chapter 1 of 
this study, it is not the intention of this study to attempt a thorough quantitative assessment of 
exactly how many patents in China fit within the different aforementioned thresholds for highest-
quality, quality or low-quality. This said, some rough quantitative estimates are provided in Chapter 
1 for “less-than-highest-quality-patents,” i.e. those that do not meet the threshold for highest-
quality.  
 
 
Ⅰ.2 Key background information 
 
Introduction: This sub-section provides an overview of information that must be known before 
starting a new investigation into China’s patent quality situation. It shows that China is not the only 
country with a patent quality problem; reviews relevant research already available for assessing 
patent quality in China; discusses how utility models, design patents, and invention patents fit into 
the definitions of patent quality used in this study; discusses the consequences of proliferation of 
low-quality vs. quality patents; summarises key patent quality initiatives already being undertaken to 
date by the Chinese government; provides comments on the first formal study on patent quality in 
China; and defines the focus of this study. 
 
Ⅰ.2.1 China is not the only country with a patent quality problem 
 
It is important to recognise that a number of other countries, not just China, face patent quality 
problems. Developing countries face notable patent quality problems. And even developed countries 
like the US and those in Europe, for example, have been criticised for their proliferation of low-
quality patents.20 As mentioned later in this section, the Chinese authorities, to their credit in 
particular, have realised their nation has a patent quality problem and done a commendable job in 
reflecting the need to address this in many recent policies and other measures.  
 
Ⅰ.2.2 Relevant research already available for assessing patent quality in China 
 
Ⅰ.2.2.1 Academic and industry opinion 
 
It is recognised among certain industry experts and academics, Chinese and foreign alike, that China 
has a patent quality problem. Lu (2011), an article from China’s state-owned media, cites corporate 
and academic opinions generally find that “over 50% or even 80% of Chinese patents are junk,”21 
whereas “junk” conventionally means of low-quality.  
 
Gao, Li, Cheng et al. (2011), a report by Chinese academics, discusses how China has a significant 
amount of low-quality patents, and how these are key contributors to the many negative 
                                                           
20
 Among others see: Wagner, P. R. (2009). Understanding patent quality mechanisms. Federal Trade Commission. 
Retrieved from http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/ipmarketplace/apr17/docs/rwagner2.pdf; Scellato et al. (2011); and 
Hilty, R. M. (2009). The role of patent quality in Europe. In Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition 
Law Research, 11 (11). 
21
  Lu, J. (2011, March 6). Who is making junk patents? China Intellectual Property: China Daily. Retrieved from 
http://ipr.chinadaily.com.cn/2011-03/06/content_12126586.htm (note: link working when last checked on August 1st 
2012) 
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consequences mentioned later in this section. That report finds that utility models and design 
patents in China are perceived to be of lower quality than invention patents in China given 
thresholds inventions must meet to be granted invention patent protection are higher than those 
utility models and design patents must meet – namely the standard of inventiveness as confirmed by 
a more rigorous Substantive Examination – and this generally makes invention patents in China 
higher quality than utility models and design patents. The report cites a recent survey by the Beijing 
IPR Institute showing 70% of the 156 respondents found the quality of invention patents in China 
was better than that of utility models in China. This is used to argue that many patents filed in China, 
particularly utility models, are not of particularly high quality.22  
 
 Gao et al. (2011) also notes that China grants very few “key and essential patents,” 23 roughly in line 
with the concept of “quality” patents used in this study, in part defining these as patents that are 
maintained over an extended amount of time such that they can be commercialised to make profits. 
The authors gauge patent performance by, among other metrics, the rate of patents in-force and the 
related life-span of patents.24   
 
It is also suggested by Gao et al. (2011) that the quality of invention patents in China is below the 
average of developed countries, including those in the EU, and thus needs improvement. 
Additionally, the study suggests that Chinese filers’ invention patents are of lower quality than 
foreign invention patents filed in China, as gauged by, among other metrics, win-rates in patent 
litigation.25  
 
In 2012, the Intellectual Property Development and Research Centre (IPDRC), a non-profit academic 
research unit under China’s State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO), released a ranking of national 
and regional “patent strength” in China in 2011. More on this ranking is found in the “Ⅲ.1.1.1.4 Core 
measures of patent quality” section in Chapter 1. 
 
Other academic sources, like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
which constructed a Patent Quality Index that focuses heavily on patent citations, rank China quite 
poorly on patent quality.26 More on the OECD index and its 2011 scores for China are found in the 
“Ⅲ.1.1.1.4 Core measures of patent quality” section in Chapter 1. 
 
While it is worth noting that some other studies suggest the quality of patents in China is improving, 
the methodology of these studies and presentation of their results deserves scrutiny. In particular, 
Zhou and Stembridge (2010) track the ratio of Chinese invention patent applications to granted 
invention patents and reach the conclusion that “despite the growing use of utility model 
patents…patent quality is trending up.” 27 First, while the ratio of invention patent applications to 
granted invention patents can indeed be a method of measuring patent quality, a more rigorous and 
all-encompassing method could be used, for example along the definitions presented in this study 
and statistical analysis in Chapter 1. Second, it is arguably misleading not to clearly say the growing 
                                                           
22
 Gao et al. (2011) pp 1-127. Note: For context, although not challenging the aforementioned sentiments, it is worth 
noting that many Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries do not have an inventive step requirement for 
utility model patents, and China, even though it does not check this requirement upon first review, does have one. In other 
words, China’s statutory threshold for utility models is higher than that in many ASEAN countries. (Source: June 14
th
 2012 - 
Consultations with Elliot Papageorgiou, Executive and Partner at Rouse Shanghai) 
23
 Gao et al. (2011), p. 8 
24
 Gao et al. (2011), p. 28 
25
 Gao et al. (2011) 
26
 OECD (2011) 
27
 See:  China poised to become global innovation leader. (2011, October 19). Thomas Reuters. Retrieved from 
http://thomsonreuters.com/content/news_ideas/white_papers/corporate/patented_in_china_2; and Zhou, E. Y., & 
Stembridge B. (2010). Patented in China II: The present and future state of innovation in China. Thomson Reuters. 
Retrieved from http://ip.thomsonreuters.com/content/patented-china-ii 
 26 
 
use of utility model patents as it is currently playing out in China is concerning (this issue is explored 
through statistical analysis further in Chapter 1 and is discussed further in this Introduction section 
and in other sections of this study). Further, it is worth noting that the tone in Zhou and Stembridge 
(2010) contrasts dramatically with Gao et al. (2011), as illustrated already. It also contrasts with 
Eberhardt et al. (2011), which upon conducting regression analyses of patent data from domestic 
Chinese invention patents and the equivalent of Chinese invention patents filed by ‘Chinese entities’ 
at US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO),28 concludes that China’s “patent explosion does not 
reflect a general technological take-off, but the success of an extremely small group of firms 
[including foreign-invested firms] within a single industry [ICT].”29  
 
Ⅰ.2.2.2 Chinese government opinion 
 
Key Chinese officials openly recognise that China has a patent quality problem. For example, during 
recent meetings like the one on October 28th 2011 between representatives of the European 
Chamber and SIPO Commissioner Tian Lipu and other senior SIPO officials, such officials expressed 
concern about the state of patent quality in China, and opened the door to the European Chamber 
for discussion on ideas for addressing this issue.30 By way of further example, Mao Jinsheng, Director 
of Intellectual Property Development & Research Centre in SIPO, recently noted at an IP conference 
that “room for improvement” in patent quality was a key issue facing the IP ecosystem in China.31 
Ma Weiye, Director General of SIPO’s Patent Department, also noted in a December 2010 
conference that “Our companies should pay much more attention to patent quality instead of only 
quantity.”32 Other SIPO officials have recently publicly noted there is a patent quality problem in 
China.33  
 
 Ⅰ.2.2.3 Other relevant research and sentiments 
 
It is essential to realise that a variety of economic research and other evidence debunks the idea that 
utility model patents are always of low-quality. A range of empirical studies show that the utility 
model system in certain countries like Germany, South Korea, and Taiwan, among other once or 
currently developing countries, has successfully enabled movement from relatively low levels of 
innovation and competitiveness as well as poor diffusion of technology in those countries to high 
levels therein.34 This is in-part because when the life-cycle of a product is quite short (e.g. certain 
                                                           
28
 Note: The study measures utility models filed with the USPTO noting the concept of “utility” model in the US is in fact 
tantamount to China’s concept of invention patents and as such is different than China’s concept of a utility model patent.  
29
 Source: Eberhardt, M., Helmers, C., & Yu, Z. (2011). Is the Dragon learning to fly? An analysis of Chinese patent explosion. 
Center for the Study of African Economies. Retrieved from http://www.csae.ox.ac.uk/workingpapers/pdfs/csae-wps-2011-
15.pdf p. 2 and 17    
Note 1: While only measuring invention patent applications, albeit using a notably different methodology, Eberhardt et al. 
(2011) does not necessarily come to the same positive conclusions on patent quality as mentioned in Zhou and Stembridge 
(2010). Note 2: Eberhardt et al. (2011) constructs a “patent productivity” metric which in part forms the basis of the 
findings therein. 
30
 2011, October 28- Meeting at SIPO in Beijing. Other attendees at this meeting include Ms. Song Jiang Hui, SIPO’s Legal 
Department; Mr. Wu Kai, Deputy Director General of International Cooperation at SIPO; other SIPO officials; and several 
members of the European Chamber. 
31
 Ockenden, J. (2011, December 5). China must boost patent quality, protection and use, says IP boss. Blueskies China. 
Retrieved from http://blueskieschina.com/mambo/content/view/303/86/ 
32
 Ibid 
33
 Presentation from  Xu H. (2011). China IP policy research and national IP policy requirement. [Presentation, slide 9]. SIPO. 
Retrieved from http://www.unescap.org/tid/projects/ipep-cn.pdf 
34
 Among others see: Kardam, (2007); Odagiri, H., Goto, A., Sunami, A., & Nelson, R. R. (2010). Intellectual property rights, 
development, and catch up: An international comparative study. Oxford University Press. Retrieved from 
http://www.oup.com/us/catalog/general/subject/Economics/Developmental/?view=usa&ci=9780199574759; and Lee, K., 
Kim, Y. K., & Park, W. G. (2006). Appropriate intellectual property protection and economic growth in countries at different 
levels of development. Retrieved from The American University, College of Arts and Sciences. Retrieved from 
http://www.american.edu/cas/faculty/wgpark/upload/Intellectual-Property-Rights.pdf. Note: Interestingly, Lee and Park 
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electronics) and/or where small innovative firms are simply not well-monied, a utility model 
approval process that is comparatively faster and cheaper than the invention patent process best 
enables innovation.35  
 
 Ⅰ.2.3 How do utility models, design patents, and invention patents fit into the definitions 
of patent quality used in this study? 
 
This study closely considers the aforementioned sentiments in broadly categorising utility models, 
design patents, and invention patents in China within the definitions of patent quality set forth in 
Table 2. The fundamental assertions upon which this study operates, which are in line with the 
academic and government sentiments mentioned above that are not debunked in the analysis in 
Chapter 1 hereto, are discussed in Box 1 below.  
 
Box 1: How do utility models, design patents, and invention patents fit into the definitions of 
patent quality used in this study? 
 
All utility models and design patents in China are not inherently of low-quality. 
 
It is essential to stress that this study does not presume that all utility models and design patents in 
China are inherently low-quality. This is because some of both types of patents inevitably meet the 
aforementioned standard for quality patents. Moreover, as mentioned above, this is because of the 
tested economic value of utility models to developing countries in particular: to be sure, utility 
models, when used properly, can enable useful forms of innovation, particularly incremental 
innovation.   
 
However, there appear to be more low-quality utility models than invention patents in China, 
although this finding requires contextualisation. 
 
While some utility models inevitably meet the standard for quality patents set out in this study and if 
used properly are clearly useful economic development tools – there appear to be more low-quality 
utility models than invention patents in China according to invalidation figures and incidences of 
malicious patent prosecution as further explained in chapters 1 and 4. First, utility models typically 
face invalidation rates over twice as high as invention patents in China (i.e. 47% vs. 21% of all 
patents that are challenged in front of the Patent Re-Examination Board (PRB)). On one hand, it is 
important to note that as a percentage of total patents granted and in terms of absolute numbers, 
China’s invalidation rates for both invention patents and utility models (and design patents) are 
relatively low even compared to international standards, and thus these numbers alone should not 
be used to suggest that China has a significant absolute number of low-quality utility model patents; 
on the other hand, these invalidation rates for utility models would likely be higher if the 
adjudication system for utility models in China was made more effective. Second, given the 
potentially higher risk that utility models rather than invention patents may be filed solely for and 
used in future malicious prosecution actions, they are singled out in this study as potentially being of 
lower quality on average than invention patents. (Note: A variety of issues surrounding design 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
(2006) find that patent rights create an incentive to innovate in developed countries, but among developing countries at 
large do not necessarily create the same incentive; however, the authors find that utility model patents have a positive 
influence on developing countries innovation, diffusion of technology, and economic growth, as it protects minor, 
incremental inventions these countries are more equipped to produce. 
35
 Among others see: Suthersanen, U. (2006). Utility models and innovation in developing countries. (UNCTAD Project on 
IPRs and Sustainable Development, Issue paper No.13). United Nations Conference on Trade and Development. Retrieved 
from http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/iteipc20066_en.pdf 
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patents may mean that compared to utility models they do not run the same risk of being, nor is it as 
exigent to determine to what extent they actually are, low-quality.36)  
 
Utility models and design patents in China are generally not of highest-quality, whereas invention 
patents have a much higher chance of being highest-quality.  
 
While some utility models and design patents inevitably meet the standard for quality patents set 
out in this study and, for utility models in particular, if used properly are clearly useful economic 
development tools – they generally fall short of meeting the highest-quality threshold even though 
they potentially serve as the stepping stones towards creating highest-quality patents. This 
statement does not necessarily also assert that all invention patents are of highest-quality (or even 
quality, unless in line with the definition of “quality” set out herein); however, invention patents 
have a much higher chance of being highest-quality than utility models and design patents. This is 
due to the abovementioned reasons as to why there are more low-quality utility models than 
invention patents, and moreover given that invention patents face a relatively higher threshold for 
patentability and a relatively more rigorous process (a Substantive Examination) to ensure they meet 
this threshold when compared to utility models and design patents.37  
 
 
Ⅰ.2.4 What are the consequences of proliferation of low quality vs. quality (highest-quality 
inclusive) patents? 
 
Country-specific impacts  
 
Gao et al. (2011) and Wagner (2009) suggest that proliferation of low-quality patents have serious 
negative consequences. Collectively, these sources and this study suggest that proliferation of low-
quality patents have the following consequences, some of which are closely inter-related:  
 (1) First and foremost, given many patents are low quality because they involve inventions 
which are never exploited, their proliferation represents a growth in time and resources 
spent on initiatives that lack innovation. (In contrast, growth of quality patents reflects a 
growth in innovation). This is one indicator that innovation efforts (e.g. commercialisation of 
inventions) are not optimal.  
 (2) Inhibits innovators from becoming properly prepared for international competition.  
 (3) Raises business transaction costs (e.g. given uncertainty about the validity of granted 
patents, scope of granted patents, whether an invention is patentable, and/or whether a 
patent will be fully enforced).  
 (4) Unnecessarily encourages patent disputes.  
 (5) “Self-reinforces” the low-quality components of the patent ecosystem, whereas the 
response of a rational firm to a patent system with a sizeable number of low-quality patents 
– which more so than a system with better quality patents results in increased litigation, 
strategic behavior, and general increased uncertainty – is to seek more patents regardless of 
the quality of such patents.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
36
 Note 1: Although design patents in China, like utility models, typically also face higher invalidation rates than invention 
patents (31% vs. 21%), their prevalence in future invalidations if the patent adjudication system in China were to be 
improved is unclear, and their usage in malicious prosecution actions may be less than utility models, making it less clear 
that these models run the same risks of being low-quality as utility models. And moreover, overall, given the different 
nature of what they protect, the concern over what extent design patents are of low-quality may in some ways be less 
exigent than that over utility models.  
37
 Note: it is difficult to point to utility model vs. invention patent life-spans and rates of utility models in-force, also gauges 
of patent quality set out in this study, in a way that while appropriately considering the differences in these two types of 
patents also shows a clear difference in patent quality between the two; thus these particular metrics are not used to show 
there are more less-than-highest-quality utility model patents than invention patents. 
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 (6) Wastes government resources, including those meant to encourage innovation and 
patents.  
 (7) Given all the abovementioned consequences, it generally harms development of 
innovations, particularly breakthrough innovations, as well as overall development of 
science & technology (S&T). 38   
   
In contrast, proliferation of quality patents, highest-quality patents inclusive, can create notably 
positive impacts. Development of quality patents, at least insomuch as it reduces proliferation of low 
quality patents, minimises the incidences of the abovementioned impacts.39  
 
How are these and other consequences mentioned in this study? 
 
This study shows in closer detail how not only the abovementioned consequences, but others that 
drag down patent quality and innovation ultimately result from a range of different Chinese policies, 
other measures, and practices in what is a vicious circle of cause and effect. Although given their 
intertwined nature it is not always possible to clearly separate their impacts on patent quality as 
distinct from those on innovation at large, Chapters 2-4 show how these devices collectively create a 
vicious cycle: they hamper patent quality which then hampers related innovation and vice versa (i.e. 
hamper components of innovation which then hampers patent quality, which then again further 
hampers innovation).40 To be sure, the study does not stipulate there is a mandatory sequence of 
first improving patent quality which then improves innovation at large, although this is one possible 
sequence, rather it finds that reforming the devices discussed will in time likely improve both areas. 
More generally, these consequences are recognised in the overall conclusion of this study to impact 
the future of the world economy – inclusive of many businesses, consumers, and governments – 
given that they effect China’s ability to innovate.  
 
Ⅰ.2.5 Key patent quality initiatives already being undertaken by the Chinese government 
 
A substantial volume of Chinese policy documents and other measures were reviewed for this study. 
This research shows that the Chinese authorities have set out an impressive number of initiatives to 
boost patent quality in China. This section provides a very brief overview of the key initiatives 
reviewed.  
 
Older policy documents generally related to IPR and patent-specific quality 
 
Although more of an exigent issue recently, IPR quality, patent quality inclusive, has at least 
generally received Chinese government attention for a notable amount of time. Herein, a range of 
important policies meant to improve the IPR and innovation framework in China have included the 
State Council (SC)’s Guidelines on the National Medium- and Long-Term Program for Science and 
Technology Development (2006-2020) (hereafter the “S&T MLP”) issued in 2006,41 the 2008 National 
IP Strategy, issued by the SC on June 5th 2008,42 amongst other initiatives. 
                                                           
38
 Note 1: Wagner (2009) defines patent quality as the capacity of a patent to meet or exceed statutory standards of 
patentability and finds that proliferation of low-quality patents creates a wide range of problems. (Consequences of a low-
quality patent ecosystem mentioned on pp 5-11). Note 2: Gao et al. (2011) pp 106-109 mention consequences of a low-
quality patent ecosystem in China.  
39
 Wagner (2009) 
40
 Note: As such, when specifically mentioned, the cycle of cause and effect involving both patent quality and larger 
innovation issues along feedback loops discussed in this study are only intended to be illustrative, not necessarily 
exhaustive.     
41
 Retrieved from: http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-02/09/content_183787.htm; one English translation available here: 
http://www.etiea.cn/data/attachment/123%286%29.pdf.  
42
 Retrieved from: http://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/developing/200906/t20090616_465239.html 
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More recent policies discussing patent quality 
 
The Chinese authorities have more recently enacted a range of major policies to address China’s 
patent quality problem (for the sake of highlighting the most recent initiatives herein, this study 
focuses on major policies from 2011 and 2012, although also reviews a number of important policies 
from a few years prior). These initiatives both address important issues that underlie the 
development of IPR in China, inclusive of patents, and China’s innovation ecosystem at large. They 
are also targeted at specific quality issues: for example, within the most major recent 
provincial/municipal and national-level policies reviewed in this study alone, there are over 80 
references to initiatives to improve future intellectual property rights (IPR) and/or patent-specific 
“quality.” And this is to say nothing of the massive number of other important provisions reviewed 
for this study for building patent quality simply not mentioning that specific keyword (for example, 
provisions for boosting rates of invention patents granted, among numerous other initiatives).  
 
The major recent policies reviewed and referenced herein include the following:  
 
 National Patent Development Strategy (2011-2020), released by SIPO on November 11th 
2010 (hereafter also referred to as the “NPDS”);43 
 Provincial/Municipal 12th Five Year Intellectual Property Plans and equivalent plans (all 
publicly available recent plans reviewed, whereas most were from 2011)44; 
 Provincial/Municipal Intellectual Property Strategy Outlines and equivalent strategies (all 
publically available recent strategies reviewed, whereas most were from 2009, 2010, and 
201145); 
  Promotion Plan for the Implementation of the National Intellectual Property Strategy in 
2012 (hereafter the “2012 National IP Strategy”), issued by the Inter-Ministerial Joint 
Conference of China’s National IP Strategy Implementation (made up of 28 ministerial 
members) on April 6th 2012 at the 3rd Plenary Meeting of the Inter-Ministerial Joint 
Conference, and implemented by the Office of the Inter-Ministerial Joint Conference;46 and 
 Annual Provincial/Municipal Intellectual Property Implementation/Work Plans and 
equivalent plans (publically available recent plans reviewed, whereas most were from 2012), 
meant to implement the more long-term provincial/municipal plans and strategies 
mentioned above.47  
 
Box 2 below provides a very brief summary of the main patent quality issues openly discussed and 
initiatives being put into action in some form in China through these abovementioned policies. 
Additionally, a wide selection of important sections of these policies are highlighted and translated 
into English in the “Introduction” section in the Annex of this report, and many of these sections are 
specifically referenced throughout Chapters 2-4 of this study. 
                                                           
43
 Retrieved from (English version): http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/SIPONatPatentDevStrategy.pdf 
44
 Note: for simplicity, this reference also includes the strategies of designated “autonomous regions” 
45
 Note: for simplicity, this reference also includes the strategies of designated “autonomous regions” 
46
 English version retrieved from: http://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/developing/201204/t20120410_667158.html; Official 
Chinese version at: http://www.sipo.gov.cn/twzb/2012zscqjlsstjjh/bjzl/201204/t20120410_667306.html   
47
 Note: for simplicity, this reference also includes the strategies of designated “autonomous regions” 
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Box 2: Key patent quality initiatives in major recent policies reviewed being put into action in 
some form in China  
 
Improving the education and training system 
 
Although not only related to patent quality, less than optimal education and training systems are a 
significant and recognised reason for the lack of human capital needed to build up more quality 
patents and innovation in China. A variety of the major policy initiatives reviewed for this study have 
emphasised some solutions herein: for example, to boost Chinese research institutes’ attraction of 
overseas talent, encourage students to study abroad, develop programs to foster creative-thinking in 
schools, build educational awareness of IP protection, among others. It is also at least being 
increasingly discussed that much more needs to be done along these lines to truly have a deep 
impact.  
 
Improving the financial credit system 
 
Another one of the most significant inhibitors to the development of quality patents and innovation 
in China, which is at least increasingly being addressed, is a credit system that does not appropriately 
provide credit to the most deserving entities. The current credit system is geared to provide credit to 
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) at subsidised interest rates, far from being set by market forces, in 
effect excluding smaller private enterprises from being offered credit.48 More specifically, the system 
is not developed to a level that identifies and properly funds entities with breakthrough inventions 
and solid innovation capacity.  
 
Recent regulations and major policy statements reviewed for this study have set forth a variety of 
initiatives in an attempt to better shore up and provide credit to build IP. These include generally 
improving the availability and offering of credit, as well as more specific initiatives, for example the 
development of a Patent Bank for funding IPR development; encouraging banks to defuse and 
control loan risk for better funding IPR development; increasingly accepting IP-based collateral as 
security for loans; the establishment of venture capital funds for investment in IP-intensive areas; 
among others. Further, there is evidence that these policies are moving beyond paper and actually 
being put into practice, for example, CTEX, a Beijing-based government-supported technology 
exchange is said to be creating an IP Ventures Fund to purchase IP in foreign markets, and the 
Shanghai Silicon IP Exchange is developing a similar mechanism.49 
 
Addressing a wide range of other issues closely related to patent quality 
 
The major policy documents reviewed for this study set-forth a number of other important, albeit in 
some cases general, initiatives in an attempt to improve the quality of IPR in China, patents inclusive. 
Major initiatives covered in the documents are summarised below: 
  
 Improve development of IP law, consulting, evaluation, trading, forensic and other 
intermediary services; as well as raise the number and quality of patent lawyers. 
 Set-forth patent-specific quantitative targets. 
                                                           
48
 Among others see: World Bank. (2012). China 2030: Building a modern, harmonious, and creative high-income society. 
Retrieved from 
http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2012/02/28/000356161_20120228001303
/Rendered/PDF/671790WP0P127500China020300complete.pdf 
49
  Note: CTEX and Shanghai Silicon Exchange examples found in: The quality patent challenge facing China and its 
businesses. (2011, January 20). IAM Magazine. Retrieved from http://www.iam-
magazine.com/issues/article.ashx?g=64724577-cf28-4cb1-bad6-c012264ee060 
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 Set-forth incentives, including awards, funding schemes, and so on to stimulate the 
development of IPR, inclusive of or specifically for patents. This includes further developing 
the subsidy system for patent filings. 
 Develop or improve current patent-based performance and evaluation assessment systems. 
 Improve IPR dispute settlement mechanisms and otherwise improve the enforcement of 
patents. 
 Improve IPR regulations. 
 Build up IP monetisation/valuation tools and IP exchanges (note: point partially mentioned 
above). 
 Improve the less than optimal national and regional patent information service centers. 
Build up a patent database and retrieval system. Build up an early warning and patent risk 
assessment centre. 
 Develop further initiatives to attract talent with a view to having such talent help develop 
patented products and services (note: point partially mentioned above). 
 Improve efforts to industralise and sell IP products. 
 Improve cooperation with research universities and research institutes, as well as 
enterprises, to build patents (note: point partially mentioned above). 
 Improve clarity in management mechanisms and responsibilities for government 
departments involved in developing IP, as well as improve cooperation therein. Also, 
improve training levels of government and business leaders on IPR related issues. 
 Build up high-tech development zones and industrial parks that create IP in an effort to 
create “IP clusters,” create National Patented Technology Incubation Centres and/or other 
similar initiatives 
 Build patent pools. 
 Build up the number and quality of conferences and other outreach activities on IP 
protection, and foster further regional and international exchanges on IP issues. 
 
Snapshot: 2012 National IP Strategy  
 
Given its wide scope and buy-in from multiple government ministries, and given it provides 
important IP guidance for the year this study was written, it is worth specifically highlighting the 
patent-quality-related initiatives within China’s 2012 National IP Strategy. This document sets forth a 
number of initiatives that reinforce the types of measures already mentioned above. The plan also 
emphasises, in Part 1 provisions 1-9 specifically, boosting IPR quality in China. And a number of other 
measures throughout the plan reflect positive attempts to boost patent quality, for example, 
commitments to set policy that enables better commercialisation and utilisation of service patents,50 
the commitment of the Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST) to review and improve measures 
on managing IP in national science and technology projects,51commitment to drafting other IP S&T 
innovation plans,52amongst other measures.53  The plan also designates specific implementing 
agencies to establish ownership of the provisions. As later explained in certain sections of this study, 
some of the strategy’s measures might not most effectively boost patent quality, although at least 
over half appear to be positive developments and show a commitment by the authorities to enact 
certain measures to build patent quality in China.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
50
 Part 3, measure 22 
51
 Part 6, measure 61 
52
 For example, see Part 6, measure 59, which outlines a commitment to draft a 12th Five-Year Special Plan on IP Work of 
Science and Technology Innovation. Depending on the contents of this plan, this may be positive or negative in boosting 
patent quality.  
53
 For example, Part 1, measure 9 which commits to improving patent applications and getting more qualified patent 
examiners in the area of national defense. 
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Source: Author’s review of the NPDS; Provincial 12
th
 Five Year Intellectual Property Plans, and equivalent plans; 
Provincial Intellectual Property Strategy Outlines (recent ones mostly from 2009, 2010, and 2011); Promotion 
Plan for the Implementation of the National Intellectual Property Strategy in 2012; Annual Provincial/Municipal 
Intellectual Property Implementation/Work Plans and equivalent plans (mostly from 2012); and several other 
major recent IP-specific measures mentioned throughout this study. 
 
Other important measures and opinions 
 
A number of other important recent measures related directly or more indirectly to patent quality 
have been promulgated recently or are still being drafted. Some measures directly implementing the 
aforementioned policies appear to have been drafted, and if so those that were readily available 
were reviewed for this study, and it is certain that the Chinese government will continue to 
implement further initiatives to follow-up on the aforementioned policies in order to better build 
patent quality in China.  
 
Although less IP-specific, there are other initiatives that compliment the major IP-specific policies 
reviewed in improving quality of innovation and patents in China (for example, Article 5, Section VII 
of the latest Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue (2011 Revision),54 and National 
Medium and Long-term Talent Development Plan (2010-2020)
55). Many other non-IPR-quality-
specific, but still related, measures have been promulgated which effect the overall IPR environment, 
inclusive of patents, in China. 
 
This study reviews a number of measures focusing on IPR development, patents inclusive, in 
“strategic emerging” industries. China’s nationwide 12th Five Year Plan, officially promulgated on 
March 2011 at the Fifth Plenum of the 17th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, 
sets invention patent targets (see Chapter 2). It also importantly defines “strategic emerging” 
industries in which a variety of implementing measures have sought to build patents. Specifically, 
Chapter 10, Section 1 of the 12th Five Year Plan defines these industries as follows: “In the energy 
conservation and environmental protection industry, focus on the development of key technological 
equipment for efficient energy conservation, advanced environmental protection and resource 
recycling, products and services. In the new-generation IT industry, focus on the development of new-
generation mobile communication, new-generation Internet, three-network convergence, Internet of 
things, cloud computing, IC, new displays, high-end software, high-end servers and information 
services. In the biological industry, focus on the development of biopharmaceuticals, biomedical 
engineering products, bio-agriculture and bio-manufacturing. In the high-end equipment 
manufacturing industry, focus on the development of aviation equipment, satellites and application 
thereof, rail traffic equipment and intelligent manufacturing equipment. In the new energy industry, 
focus on the development of new-generation nuclear energy and solar energy utilisation, 
photovoltaic and photo-thermal power generation, and wind power technological equipment, 
intelligent power grids and biomass energy. In the new material industry, focus on the development 
of new functional materials, advanced structural materials, high-performance fibers and compound 
materials, and common basic materials. In the new energy automobile industry, focus on the 
development of plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, pure electric vehicles and fuel cell automobile 
technologies.” 56 A variety of implementing measures have recently set out to build patents in these 
                                                           
54
 Whereas the Foreign Investment Industrial Guidance Catalogue (2011 Revision), promulgated by NDRC and MOFCOM on 
December 24, 2011 and effective on January 30, 2012 “encourages” investment in IP-related services. (See:  Article 5, 
Section VII, “Encouraged,” “Intellectual property services”) Retrieved from 
http://www.ndrc.gov.cn/zcfb/zcfbl/2011ling/W020111229379511927834.pdf  
55
 The National Medium and Long-term Talent Development Plan (2010-2020), and its implementing regulations and 
otherwise related initiatives, set-up a wide variety of policies to attract foreign talent through preferential housing, 
insurance, taxation and other policies. This initiative furthers the objective mentioned in Box 2 to attract talent in China 
that can develop IPR-protected products and services. 
56
 Retrieved from http://www.scio.gov.cn/zxbd/gdxw/201103/t876235.htm  
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specific industries, including many  provincial/municipal policies reviewed for this study; the 2012 
National IP Strategy (i.e. in provisions 10-15); and the Notice of the General Office of the State 
Council on Advancing Several Opinions of Ten Departments Including SIPO on Strengthening the 
Work of IPR in Strategic Emerging Industries (hereafter the “SC Notice on IPR in Strategic Emerging 
Industries”), issued on April 28th 2012 by the State Council and other departments.57   
 
This study also considers a number of key court rulings and judicial opinions that involve patents. 
The most prominent of these are from the Supreme People’s Court (SPC), for example a December 
16
th
 2011 SPC Opinion. 
 
Ⅰ.2.6 Comments on Gao et al. (2011), the first formal study on patent quality in China 
 
Gao et al. (2011), commissioned by the European Commission(EC)-funded IPR2 Project and finished 
in late 2011, appears to be the first detailed study investigating inhibitors of patent quality in China, 
although by design focuses on the quality of invention patents and only in-passing mentions utility 
model and design patent quality issues. As mentioned previously, the report finds that the quality of 
invention patents in China is better than that of utility models and design patents in China. Through 
a statistical analysis it finds that Chinese entities’ invention patents are of lower quality than foreign 
invention patents in China, as gauged by granting rates, rates of patents in-force and life-span of the 
patents, and win-rates in patent litigation.58  
 
The report notes that China has problems with the quality of its invention patents for a number of 
reasons. There are deficiencies in the general innovation capacity and scientific research ability of 
inventors in China, as well as weak capacity of patent-related professionals in Chinese companies.59 
There are significant problems with the quality of applications produced by intermediary services, i.e. 
patent agencies and their patent application writers.60 Problems are noted with the level of patent 
examination by SIPO examiners and lack of condensed information on the prior art for use during 
examination, in addition to concerns over patent invalidation rules.61 An insufficient level of patent 
protection is noted as an inhibitor to patent quality.62 The report very briefly mentions that there are 
government policies effecting patent quality in China, particularly patent filing subsidies (although 
does not go into detail about any other types of policies).63 The report discusses the effects of the 
patent quality problem in China by listing out problems reflected in patent litigation, and other wider 
problems. 64  It then mentions consequences of perpetuating low- quality patents.65 The last part of 
the report provides recommendations to address some of the patent quality problems flagged.66  
 
Gao et al. (2011) is an important and seminal report that looks at the patent quality problem in 
China; however, the report only provides a partial look into the full gamut of patent quality problems 
in China. As mentioned, by design, that report focuses largely on issues related to invention patents, 
although in-passing does mention utility and design patent issues and mentions many issues that 
cross-cut all three types of models. Perhaps intentionally, the report sometimes mentions issues for 
which the Chinese government appears to be already seriously undertaking initiatives (like those 
                                                           
57
 Retrieved from: http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2012-05/02/content_2127881.htm Note: Ten authorities mentioned: SIPO, 
NDRC, Ministry of Education, MoST, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT), SAIC, MoF, MOFCOM, 
National Copyright Administration of China (NCAC), and Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS). 
58
 Gao et al. (2011), pp 8-63 
59
Ibid, pp 64-74 
60
 Ibid, p. 76-78 
61
 Ibid, pp 78-83 
62
 Ibid, p. 83-87 
63
 Ibid, pp 87-89 
64
 Ibid, pp 90-105 
65
 Ibid, pp 106-109 
66
  Ibid, pp 110-127 
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mentioned in Box 2 above); sometimes seems to blur root causes when mentioning the different 
contributors to China’s patent quality problem; only in-passing mentions certain important issues 
that are at the root of China’s patent quality problem; and in other cases does not mention key 
issues therein.  
 
Ⅰ.2.7 The focus of this study: “unaddressed” patent quality issues that can be practically 
remedied in the near future 
 
In line with the stated focus of this paper in the “Note on research scope” in the Methodology 
section, this study focuses on key unaddressed institutional and regulatory issues most closely 
related to patent quality that can be practically remedied in the near future.  Herein, most of the 
issues highlighted in Box 2 above (and, with just a few exceptions, those in Gao et al. (2011)67), are 
not discussed further in this study because (1) they appear, at least with more time, to be on track to 
improve patent quality in China and/or (2) some of these issues, in particular those related to 
China’s educational and credit systems, even with the proper government buy-in cannot likely be 
practically remedied in the near future.68 Still, a number of the initiatives mentioned in Box 2 above 
(in addition to others) are indeed discussed further in Chapters 2-4 of this study as potential problem 
areas hampering patent quality in China.69  
 
This study uncovers how a network of patent-related policies, other measures, and practices in 
China collectively hamper both patent quality and innovation at large. These dulling devices are 
categorised in terms of certain government-set patent targets and indicators (Chapter 2); policies 
and other measures meant to promote patents (Chapter 3); and rules and procedures for reviewing 
patent applications and those for enforcing patents (Chapter 4). It also proposes practical 
recommendations to remedy these shortcomings. 
                                                           
67
 This study for the European Chamber very briefly mentions a few key reasons behind patent quality problems also 
emphasised in Gao et al. (2011) (i.e. patent intermediary services, patent filing subsidies, “abuse of patent rights,” Patent 
Evaluation Reports [although this study takes an alternative perspective on this issue than Gao et al. (2011)), but more 
importantly further investigates the roots of the patent quality problem in China unaddressed or not addressed in-depth in 
Gao et al. (2011), namely: government patent indicators, a wide range of patent-related policies, and certain patent review 
and adjudication issues. 
68
 These issues also involve components more indirectly related to patents and overall can only be resolved in the longer 
term. For example: The educational issues mentioned are compounded by what sources suggest to be serious academic 
fraud issues in China, and while there are certain elite universities in China, most people cannot afford them and/or are not 
considered for admission given the stringency of the university entrance exam, the Gao Kao; and there are a variety of 
inter-related cultural issues related at least in part to the educational system that stifle independent-thinking and risk-
taking. With regards to the credit system, SOEs in a variety of industries are an entrenched interest group in Chinese 
policymaking, and it remains to be seen how recent initiatives in certain sectors (e.g. banking) will change this situation. 
Collectively, tackling all these issues requires a wide-range of reforms only realised in the longer term that go far beyond 
the sphere of patent quality and patent-related policies and practices. 
69
 Note 1: These include patent-specific quantitative targets; incentives, including awards, and funding schemes intended 
to stimulate the development of IPR, inclusive of or specifically for patents, and including the subsidy system for patent 
filings; patent-based performance and evaluation assessment systems; and certain efforts to “improve” IPR regulations. 
Note 2: For most of these issues, short of making allegations that the aforementioned major policies and related measures 
do not effectively address or are actually detrimental to patent quality, this study suggests that given limited readily 
available information, further discussion is warranted with the authorities to clarify the details of otherwise concerning 
related initiatives. Note 3: It is possible that some may consider other initiatives mentioned in the major policies reviewed 
as “unaddressed” in line with the definition of such in the “note on scope” in this study. As such, certain initiatives 
mentioned in these major policies that are not reviewed at length in this study may deserve future scrutiny. For example, 
in several years (e.g. two) it is worth assessing in-depth how initiatives on the development of IP law, consulting, 
evaluation, trading, forensic and other intermediary services, as well as initiatives to increase the number and quality of 
patent lawyers, is playing out in China. 
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Ⅰ.3 Summary 
 
This section discusses key terms used throughout this study and other key background information. 
Importantly, it shows that China is not the only country that has a patent quality problem, and the 
Chinese authorities have realised that this problem exists and taken some commendable initiatives 
to attempt to address the issue. Considering this, this study seeks only to address problem areas that 
appear to be inefficiently and/or ineffectively addressed by these important initiatives. It is essential 
to know this contextual information before a proper assessment on China’s patent quality situation 
can be made. 
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Ⅱ Methodology 
 
The methodology of this study is divided into three parts: research, analysis, and recommendations. 
These parts are summarised below. 
 
Ⅱ.1 Research 
 
Three basic questions underlie the research performed for this study. The first question, which was 
broadly answered in the Introduction section, is what fundamental background information is 
necessary to understand the patent quality situation in China, including what is China already doing 
to specifically address its patent quality problem? The second question, further discussed in Chapter 
1, is how does China measure up on core statistical metrics of patent quality and innovation? The 
third and main question underling the research performed in this study that is presented in Chapters 
2-4, is what are the key institutional and regulatory issues involving patents/patent-quality that 
hamper innovation in China and both appear largely unaddressed and with the right buy-in can be 
relatively practically remedied in the near future?  
 
Legal and policy, economic, and statistical research was conducted on a substantial volume of both 
primary and secondary sources. Main primary sources used for original legal and policy research 
include various Chinese policies and other measures (e.g. laws, regulations, implementing notices, 
among others) typically found on Chinese government websites or through legal databases (in 
Chinese, and also those translated into English). Statistical databases from SIPO, WIPO, and others 
sources were reviewed. A variety of secondary resources, including academic papers, government 
reports, law firms’ and consulting firms’ reports, books, European Chamber documents/publications, 
news articles, among other sources, were reviewed (in Chinese and English). Also, key consultations 
were conducted with a variety of actors, chiefly members of the European Chamber’s IPR Working 
Group (many names of those consulted have been concealed in citations upon requests to preserve 
anonymity).  
 
After compiling the initial research, gap analysis was conducted to identify areas in need of further 
research. Follow-up research was then conducted. 
 
Box 3: Note on research scope: “unaddressed” issues that can be practically remedied in the near 
future 
 
Gap analysis was used to hone the research on certain key unaddressed institutional and regulatory 
issues closely related to patents/patent quality (while these policies and practices involve certain 
reference to patents, by no means are patents the only components therein, and in fact they may 
contain many different important innovation-related components) that hamper innovation in China 
and with the proper government buy-in can be relatively practically remedied in the near future. 
Certain “unaddressed” issues herein mean those (a) not appearing from readily available evidence to 
be undergoing significant enough reforms or (b) already have undergone reforms that have arguably 
have had enough time to take effect but still remain largely ineffective. (In a few instances, short of 
making allegations that certain initiatives clearly “do not” effectively address or are actually 
detrimental to patent quality, the study identifies areas where, given limited readily available 
information, further discussion is warranted with the authorities to clarify the details of such 
otherwise concerning initiatives.)  
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“Key” herein refers to issues deemed most significant. However, and importantly, certain issues 
mentioned within this study are more significant than others. In general, the collective impact of the 
issues flagged, rather than only the individual impacts of a few policies and practices, are identified 
as truly creating the most significant impacts on patent quality and innovation in China.  
 
To be sure, it is not the study’s intention to look in-depth into all patent-quality-related issues in 
China, let alone all innovation-related issues. For example, the Introduction section of the study 
illustrates that that the government is already arguably appropriately addressing a number of patent 
quality issues, some issues are arguably more difficult than others to remedy in the near future, and 
some are less significant than others. As mentioned in the Introduction, certain important 
innovation-building initiatives, like those surrounding reforming the educational system and financial 
credit system in China, will likely only be adequately resolved in the longer term and are not as 
specific to the patent-related issues on which this study focuses. 
 
 
 
Ⅱ.2 Analysis 
 
The research was compiled and analysed using a number of different tools, depending on the 
content of the material, with a view to presenting the best possible answers to the abovementioned 
questions. Legal analysis was used when reviewing procedural and substantive rules and their 
application. Management structure and incentive theory analysis was used when reviewing policy 
documents, for example those involving patent indicators. Applied economic and incentive theory 
analysis was used when reviewing policy documents, particularly those involving financial incentives. 
Statistical analysis was used in interpreting a variety of statistical data and trends.  
 
These analyses and the aforementioned research are presented in the Introduction section and 
Chapters 1-4, and each chapter is organised to include a sub-section of main issues and another sub-
section of more auxiliary or broad, yet important, issues flagged. Also, examples of issues that were 
considered for inclusion in the body of the report but ultimately not included therein are listed in the 
“Other sample issues” section in the Annex.  
 
Ⅱ.3 Recommendations 
 
Recommendations were created to accompany the issues discussed in the analysis. This was done by 
brainstorming, often simply extending the specific types of mentioned analytical methods beyond 
tools of problem-analysis to tools for creating recommendations. Care was taken to make 
recommendations practical in the context of China. For readability, according recommendations are 
put at the end of each chapter, and are divided into “Core Recommendations” for the main issues 
and “Other Recommendations” for the auxiliary/broader issues mentioned.   
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Ⅲ Results 
 
 
Ⅲ.1 Chapter 1: Statistical analysis of China’s patent quality 
situation and larger innovation ecosystem 
 
Ⅲ.1.1 Analysis 
 
Ⅲ.1.1.1 Sub-section 1.1: Patent filings have exploded, but this has not 
translated into a proportional rise in patent quality 
 
Introduction: This sub-section explores how China measures up on a wide range of patent statistics70 
and what this reflects in terms of the patent quality situation in China. Herein, this section finds that 
the claims made by an increasing number of sources that China’s recent patent filing explosion 
shows it is well on its way to become an impressively innovative economy need better 
contextualisation, as while patent quality in China is rising in some sense it does not appear to be 
‘proportionally’ keeping pace with patent filings.  
 
Ⅲ.1.1.1.1 A patent explosion 
 
China has explosively increased its domestic filing of patent applications over the years, becoming 
the world’s top patent filer in 2011, surpassing the US’ and Japan’s rate of domestic filings.71 Since 
1985, the year the first Chinese Patent Law was released and implemented, there has been a 
significant increase in the number of invention patent, utility model, and design patent filings in 
China. 
 
This development has likely been enabled by a number of factors. One likely contributor is 
improvement in regulation surrounding patents, which, among other effects, has led to 
improvements in the patent review process – for example, the examination period for invention 
patents has been reduced from 53 months in 2001 to less than half of that in 2010.72 A variety of 
socioeconomic factors (e.g. rise in the educated workforce) and economic competition have likely 
led to the growing capacity and drive of Chinese entities to file patents. Additionally, as discussed 
throughout this study, although not necessarily widely measured by empirical evidence, a variety of 
patent-related incentives and other policies may have in part encouraged this surge in absolute 
numbers of patents.  
 
Despite this explosion of patents, it is important to keep in mind that China still somewhat lags 
behind a number of other innovative countries in terms of patent filings per capita. Per capita 
measures provide necessary context to date, and in the case of patent filings, arguably better reflect 
penetration rates of invention capacity than absolute patent filings. As one illustration of this trend, 
Table 3 below illustrates that China’s invention patent filings/the equivalent thereof by domestic 
entities per capita lag behind a sample of other countries. 
                                                           
70
 Note: As this section relies heavily on patent statistics from SIPO, it is important to note that SIPO’s figures for 
“domestic” filings do not differentiate between filings made by Chinese-controlled entities or certain foreign-invested 
entities in China. 
71
  Lee, C. Y. (2011, December 21). China tops US, Japan to become top patent filer. Reuters. Retrieved from 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/21/us-china-patents-idUSTRE7BK0LQ20111221 
72
 Gao et al. (2011), p. 13 
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Table 3: Patent filings by domestic entities in sample countries per capita (2010)  
 
Source: WIPO, OECD; calculations 
 
Ⅲ.1.1.1.2 Types of patents filed to date 
 
By industry, and service vs. non-service invention  
 
In terms of industries, from 1995-2004, the largest number of domestically filed patents were for 
machinery, chemicals, and telecommunications equipment, respectively.73 Similarly, in 2010 the 
highest number of patents filings was concentrated in electrical machinery, digital communication, 
computer technology, measurement instruments, and pharmaceuticals.74  
 
Overall, from 1985-2010, the vast majority of invention patents filed were on service inventions, and, 
due to the filing habits of domestic filers, most utility and design patents were filed for non-service 
inventions. This said, while the averages from 1985-2010 provide a general idea of trends in filings, it 
is worth noting that in recent years domestic filers are filing more service utility models than non-
service utility models (e.g. in 2010, 61.1% of domestic enterprises’ utility models were for service 
solutions and 38.9% were for non-service solutions).75  It is also worth noting that the vast majority 
of invention patents “in-force” (a term explained further below in section “Ⅲ.1.1.1.4 Core measures 
of patent quality”) owned by domestic and foreign entities during time periods reviewed in this 
study were service patents.76 
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Hu, A. G. (2010). Propensity to patent, competition and China’s foreign patenting surge. Research Policy, Vol. 39, 985-993. 
Retrieved from http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048733310001101 
74
 Stembridge, B. (2011). Chinese patenting: Report on the current state of innovation in China. Thomson Reuters. Retrieved 
from http://ip.thomsonreuters.com/ 
75
 State Intellectual Property Office. (2011, January 25). Grants for three kinds of patents received from home and abroad 
(January 2010-December. 2010). A SIPO Statistics. Retrieved from 
http://english.sipo.gov.cn/statistics/gnwsqnb/2010/201101/t20110125_570600.html 
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 Note: In 2010, out of the patents in-force held by Chinese owners, 81.3% were service inventions (and 18.7% non-service 
inventions), and out of those held by foreigners, 97.9% were service inventions (and 2.1% were non-service inventions). 
(Source: Gao et al. [2011], p. 32) 
Country  Number of patents filed 
by domestic entities 
(equivalent invention 
patents in China) (WIPO, 2010) 
Population (1,000) 
(OECD, 2010) 
Patent filings in 
country per capita 
(per 1,000 people) 
Japan  290,081 128,057 2.3 
US 241,977 309,050 0.8 
Germany  47,047 81,777 0.6 
Austria 2,424 8,389 0.3 
Denmark  1,626 5,548 0.3 
China 293,066 1,341,335 0.2 
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Table 4: Total applications for three patents types received from home and abroad (1985-2010) 
May 1985-December 2010 
Invention Utility Model Design Total 
 
Number % Number % Number % Number % 
Sub-
total 
2,325,01
2 
100.
0 
2,414,32
4 
100.0 
2,298,23
8 
100.0 
7,037,57
4 
100.0 
Service 
1,825,48
7 
78.5 969,048 40.1 
1,011,14
2 
44.0 
3,805,67
7 
54.1 Total 
Non-
service 
499,525 21.5 
1,445,27
6 
59.9 
1,287,09
6 
56.0 
3,231,89
7 
45.9 
Sub-
total 
1,429,64
8 
100/
61.5 
2,397,52
3 
100/99.
3 
2,173,28
9 
100/94.
6 
6,000,46
0 
100/85.
3 
Service 960,761 67.2 955,832 39.9 891,690 41.0 
2,808,28
3 
46.8 Domestic 
Non-
service 
468,887 32.8 
1,441,69
1 
60.1 
1,281,59
9 
59.0 
3,192,17
7 
53.2 
Sub-
total 
895,364 
100/
38.5 
16,801 100/0.7 124,949 100/5.4 
1,037,11
4 
100/14.
7 
Service 864,726 96.6 13,216 78.7 119,452 95.6 997,394 96.2 Foreign 
Non-
service 
30,638 3.4 3,585 21.3 5,497 4.4 39,720 3.8 
Source: Directly adapted from SIPO statistics chart
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By type of patent (invention, utility, and design), and origin of filer 
 
It is clear that domestic filers are strongly contributing to China’s increased patent filings; however, 
deeper analysis uncovers a potentially concerning recent trend: in 2010 and 2011, domestic filers 
drove China’s total utility model filings to in fact outpace filings of invention patents. This trend 
diverges from that during the last decade in terms of having invention patents increasingly replace 
utility models, reflecting a recent disproportionate rise in less-than-highest-quality patents (even if 
one assumes all invention patent filings are of highest-quality).78 In further illustrating these points, 
the below sections illustrate trends in average annual growth rates (AAGR) of patent applications to 
date, and absolute numbers of patent filings to date.  
 
AAGR of applications for different patents in China to date 
 
Despite notable growth of applications for both utility model and invention patent applications, in 
the last five years in particular, the growth rate of utility model filings has notably outpaced that for 
invention patent filings and is a trend led by domestic filers. Drawing from calculations in Table 5 and 
Table 6 below (more calculations are presented in the “Chapter 1” section in the Annex), it is 
apparent that while total (from foreign and domestic filers) invention patent applications grew at a 
higher AAGR than utility models from 1997-2001 and from 2002-2006, from 2007-2011 the AAGR of 
total utility model applications significantly outpaced the AAGR for total invention patent 
applications. Specifically, from 2007-2011, the AAGR for total utility model applications was 9 
percentage points higher than that for total invention patents. Further, from 2007-2011 the AAGR of 
utility model filings by domestic entities (30%) has been higher than at any other time in the prior 
                                                           
77
  Retrieved from http://english.sipo.gov.cn/statistics/szslzljb/201101/t20110125_570591.html 
78
 At worst, this increased filing of less-than-highest-quality patents could also include a disproportionate rise in low-quality 
patents, although more evidence would need to be gathered to better determine if this is happening. 
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decade. And this rate was higher than the AAGR for domestic entities filings of invention patents 
during the same period (28%), and exponentially higher than the AAGR for foreign filings of 
invention patents during the same time period (5%). (Note: while the growth rate of foreign utility 
model applications was notably high from 2002-2006 [32%] and 2007-2011 [27%], given, as 
illustrated in the “Chapter 1” section in the Annex, such applications make a relatively insignificant 
amount of absolute number of utility model filings compared with those from domestic filers, they 
thus have a very small impact on the total patent filing AAGR.) This reflects that recently there is a 
trend towards a disproportionate rise in filings of less-than-highest quality patents. 
 
Table 5: Invention patent applications in China: AAGR (%) by filer and five year period 
Five year time period Domestic apps. AAGR Foreign apps. AAGR Total (domestic + 
foreign) AAGR 
1997-2001 23 15 18 
2002-2006 33 22 27 
2007-2011 28 5 21 
Source: Calculations in “Chapter 1” in the Annex. All percentages are rounded.  
 
Table 6: Utility model applications in China: AAGR (%) by filer and five year period 
Five year time period Domestic apps. AAGR Foreign apps. AAGR Total (domestic + 
foreign ) AAGR 
1997-2001 10 15 10 
2002-2006 15 32 15 
2007-2011 30 27 30 
Source: Calculations in “Chapter 1” in the Annex. All percentages are rounded.  
 
A number of trends are visible when analysing the AAGRs for design patent applications (see Table 7 
below, and the “Chapter 1” section in the Annex for more details). The AAGR of domestic entities’ 
filings of design patents fell in 2007-2011 (22%) from the rate in 2002-2006 (27%). The AAGR for 
foreign entities’ filings of design patents plunged in 2007-2011 (2%) compared with the rates of their 
filings in 2002-2006 (26%). The AAGR of total design patent applications from 2002-2006 (28%) was 
higher than the AAGR for total invention patent applications in the same period, and also higher 
than the total utility model applications during the same period. 
 
Table 7: Design patent applications in China: AAGR (%) by filer and five year period 
Five year time period Domestic apps. AAGR Foreign apps. AAGR Total (domestic + 
foreign ) AAGR 
1997-2001 21 7 20 
2002-2006 27 26 28* 
2007-2011 22 2 19 
Source: Calculations in “Chapter 1” in the Annex. All percentages are rounded.*Reminder: number due to rounding. 
 
Absolute numbers of filings by type of patent/model to date, and ratios 
 
Further to the above discussion, analysis of absolute numbers of patent filings shows utility models 
outpacing filings of invention patents in recent years, which is a trend led by domestic filers. Table 8 
below illustrates that in terms of absolute numbers, in 2004, for the first time during the sample 
period of 1996-2011, more total invention patents were filed than total utility models; however, in 
2010 and 2011, more total utility models were filed than total invention patents, meaning patent 
filing trends have recently shifted to pre-2004 type of ratios. (Additionally, the statistics presented in 
the “Chapter 1” section in the Annex show that from 1996-2011 domestic filers have filed and 
continue to file overwhelmingly more utility model applications than foreign filers, although this 
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trend, as discussed in the below section “Filing ratios put in an international perspective,” is shared 
in sampled European countries.) As further illustrated by the ratio of invention patents filings to 
utility model filings, as shown in Chart 2 below, These trends reflect that China in recent years is 
witnessing a disproportionately small filing of highest-quality patents.  
 
Table 8: Total (by domestic and foreign filers)  
invention patent vs. utility model apps. in  
China (1996-2011) 
Year Invention 
Patents 
Utility 
Models 
Ratio* 
  1996 28,517 49,604 0.6 : 1 
1997 33,666 50,129 0.7 : 1 
1998 35,960 51,397 0.6 : 1 
1999 36,694 57,492 0.6 : 1 
2000 51,747 68,815 0.8 : 1 
2001 63,204 79,722 0.8 : 1 
2002 80,232 93,139 0.9 : 1 
2003 105,318 109,115 1 : 1 
2004 130,133 112,825 1.2 : 1 
2005 173,327 139,566 1.2 : 1 
2006 210,490 161,366 1.3 : 1 
2007 245,161 181,324 1.4 : 1 
2008 289,838 225,586 1.3 : 1 
2009 314,573 310,771 1 : 1 
2010 391,177 409,836 1 : 1 
2011 526,412 585,467 0.9 : 1 
Source: SIPO statistics database; calculations.  
*Ratios are approximations. 
 
 
It is also worth noting that domestic filers have filed and continue to file overwhelmingly more 
design patent applications than foreign filers. For further analysis/comparisons of patent filing 
trends by type of application and filer, including but not limited to those for design patent 
applications, see the “Chapter 1” section in the Annex. 
 
Snapshot: Patent filings in China in 2011 
 
Chart 3 illustrates that total utility model applications, which make up 36% of all patent applications 
filed last year (2011), were 4 percentage points higher than the respective number of invention 
patent and design patent applications (32% for both) as a proportion of total patent filings. 
Comparing the absolute numbers directly, there were 11% more total utility model filings than total 
invention patent filings in China in 2011. 
 
 
Chart 2: Total invention patent vs. utility 
 model applications in China by ratio  
(1996-2011) 
Source: SIPO statistics; calculations. Ratios are 
approximations 
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Chart 3: Total (domestic + foreign) patent applications in China (2011) 
 
  Source: SIPO statistics; calculations 
 
Further, Chart 3 above and Charts 4 and 5 below illustrate that in 2011 domestic applicants led the 
trend of more utility model applications being filed in China than invention patents or design patents. 
Chart 4 shows that as a proportion of their total patent filings, domestic applicants filed more utility 
models than invention patents (and more utility models than design patents). Comparing the 
absolute numbers directly, domestic applicants filed roughly 40% more utility model than invention 
patents. Chart 5 shows that the vast majority of foreign patent applications in China in 2011 were for 
invention patents (86%), whereas only 3% were for utility models (and 11% for designs). This reflects 
that domestic applicants are largely responsible for the recent disproportionate filing of less-than-
highest-quality patents in China. 
 
Chart 4: Domestic patent applications in  
China (2011) 
 
Source: SIPO statistics; calculations 
 
Filing ratios put in an international perspective 
 
As illustrated in the “Chapter 1” section in the Annex, when comparing the ratio of utility model 
applications vs. invention patent applications in China to several EU countries with broadly similar 
patent regimes (in so much as they also protect invention patents, utility models, and design 
Chart 5: Foreign patent applications in  
China (2011) 
 
SIPO statistics; calculations 
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patents),79 it is apparent that patent filings in the EU countries are significantly more geared towards 
invention patent filings and those are more so led by domestic applicants. In recent years (2008-
2010 being the sample period reviewed) more domestic applicants than foreign applicants in Austria, 
China, Denmark, and Germany filed utility models through their domestic patent offices. However, 
unlike in China, far more invention patents were filed in the aforementioned EU countries than 
utility models in terms of both total applications and in terms of those from domestic filers 
specifically.80 Subject to contextualisation about the difference in the countries utility model and 
invention patent systems, these trends generally reflect that China’s patent filings lean much more 
towards less-than-highest-quality patents when juxtaposed with a variety of EU countries with 
broadly comparable patent systems.  
 
Distribution of patents among entities in China 
 
Snapshot: Dispersion of different types of patents by type of company 
 
With some exceptions, invention patents are dispersed across a wide variety of entities in China. 
Over a 20 year period reviewed, and within a sample of firm data from China’s top 500 companies, 
Zheng and Lan (2009), found that five corporations -- Huawei Technology Ltd., China Petroleum and 
Chemical Group, Lenovo, and lastly, ZTE Corporation — accounted for over 60% of all of domestic 
firms’ invention patents in the sample (see Table 9 below). While this shows a high concentration of 
patent filings amongst just a few firms in the sample, the sample itself was only representative of 
less than 5% of total domestic invention patent filings whereas over 95% of invention patents filed in 
the same 20 year period were from firms outside China’s top 500 firms. This shows a high 
concentration of invention patent filings among some of China’s top 500 companies, but Zheng and 
Lan find notable dispersion of the majority of invention patent filings among different domestic 
entities in China.81 
 
Table 9: Domestic enterprises with over 200 invention applications during 1984-2004 
  Corporation Number 
Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd  5,365 
China Petroleum & Chemical Ltd.  2,093 
China Petroleum and Chemical Group 782 
Lenovo Ltd. 745 
ZTE Corporation 739 
China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation 458 
Petro China Company Limited 346 
Baosteel Ltd. 325 
Haier Ltd. 256 
Source: Zheng and Lan (2009)
82
 
 
Rather than go into an exhaustive analysis, it is sufficient to note that, as further illustrated in the 
“Chapter 1” section in the Annex, entities with different legal registration statuses in China typically 
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 Although there are still some notable differences in these countries patent systems which must be considered when 
making such a comparison. 
80
 Note: these figures are exclusively representative of the aforementioned European countries’ patent filings in their own 
country’s patent offices, not at the European Patent Office (EPO). As also illustrated in the “Chapter 1” section in the Annex 
therein, filers originating in those countries can and certainly do also file notable amounts of patents with the EPO. 
81
 Zheng, L., & Lan, X. (2009). A tale of two cities: A comparison of patent-based innovative performance of domestic and 
multinational companies in China. Proceedings of the Joint Symposium of US-China Advanced Technology Trade and 
Industrial Development. Journal of International Commerce & Economics, 3(1), p. 32 Retrieved from 
http://www.usitc.gov/journals/entire_journal_2010_11_4.pdf 
82
 Zheng and Lan (2009), Table 4, p. 33 
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file different percentages of invention patents, utility models, and design patents. By way of one 
example, the patent filing characteristics of Chinese SOEs are singled out for further discussion in the 
below section. 
 
SOEs in particular 
 
Chinese SOEs, despite their support from the government, arguably perform less than optimally in 
terms of producing patented products and services. From one perspective, for example looking at 
the data in Table 9 above, some Chinese SOEs in fact produce relatively significant numbers of 
patents. However, this is not widespread across all SOEs in China. According the data and 
calculations in the “Chapter 1” section in the Annex, in 2009 (2009 is used as a proxy year given it is a 
recent year and all relevant data is readily available for that year whereas data is not readily 
available for other recent years), out of all medium- and large-sized domestic-funded Chinese 
entities, Chinese SOEs accounted for 10% of all patent applications, 9% of all invention patent filings, 
and 10% of all utility and design patent filings. Their filings of utility and design patents made up 65% 
of the total number of patent applications they filed that year (35% were for invention patents), 
which is a higher percentage of utility and design patents than a number of other enterprises with 
different legal registration, although was also lower than that of a number of other enterprises with 
different legal registration.83 While on one hand it could be argued that these figures show that SOEs 
do not file insignificant amounts of patents, they also show that SOEs could certainly be filing more 
patents, and, importantly – just as a number of other domestic enterprises could – file more 
invention patents instead of design and utility models. Moreover, Chinese SOEs arguably should be 
producing better patent figures given the level of financial and other support they enjoy from the 
government in an attempt to make them innovative and competitive. (R&D figures of Chinese SOEs 
and their scores on other innovation metrics are mentioned in section “Ⅲ.1.1.2.1 Fundamental 
metrics of innovation outside patent statistics”)  
 
International patent filings by China-based entities 
 
International patent applications are a decent measure of the desire of filers to actually use or at 
least protect their inventions abroad. Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) applications and triadic 
patent applications, among other metrics, gauge international patent filings.  
 
PCT applications – Commendably, China ranks in the top five in the world for PCT applications. It 
filed a total of 16,406 PCT applications in 2011, at an annual growth rate of 33.4% which was the 
highest in the world.84 Still, this should at least be contextualised in that a few companies, like ZTE 
and Huawei clearly lead these numbers (see Table 10).  
 
                                                           
83
 Note 1: “State-owned Enterprises” are distinguished in National Bureau of Statistics records from “State Joint Ownership 
Enterprise” and “State-Sole Funded Corporation.” Note 2: Statistics only readily available for medium- and large-sized 
enterprises, thus excluding smaller enterprises. 
84
 China IPR (2012, April 5). China boasts sharpest growth in PCT applications. Retrieved from 
http://www.chinaipr.gov.cn/newsarticle/news/government/201204/1287307_1.html 
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Table 10: PCT Applications Published in 2011, by top 5 applicants 
Ranking Applicant’s name PCT App. Pub. in 
2011 
Change from 2010 
(number) 
1 ZTE Corporation 2,826 958 
2 Panasonic Corporation 2,463 310 
3 Huawei Technologies Co. Ltd. 1,831 304 
4 Sharp Kabushiki Kaisha 1,755 469 
5 Robert Bosch Corporation  1,518 217 
Source: WIPO statistics
85
 
 
DWPI – Outside of PCT filings, another metric to measure “global” filings is the Thomas Reuters 
Derwent World Patents Index (DWPI), which measures published patent applications in Europe, 
China, Japan, South Korea, and the US. A 2011 report using this database noted marked rises in 
Chinese applications in recent years, on the order that will likely soon compete with filings from 
Japan and the US, the biggest current filers in the DWPI. The report noted that as of 2010, the 
highest DWPI shares of domestic Chinese applications, i.e. the ratio of Chinese domestic applications 
to applications in the DWPI, are concentrated in pharmaceuticals (58% in traditional medicines), 
food chemistry and basic materials chemistry, followed by biotechnology and digital 
communication.86  
 
Triadic patent filings – China does not score particularly well on per capita triadic patent filings, an 
arguably more appropriate measure of invention capacity than absolute patent filings. OECD (2011b), 
finds that China ranks comparatively low out of countries sampled (OECD countries as well as several 
non-OECD countries) in terms of per capita filings of triadic patent family filings, i.e. patents filed at 
the European Patent Office (EPO), Japan Patent Office (JPO), and US Patent and Trademark Office 
(USPTO) to protect the same invention.87  
 
Other metrics – Also, on yet other metrics of international filings, Chinese enterprises have only been 
granted a miniscule amount of patents abroad. In fact, sources suggest that patent offices outside 
China only have granted 1% of their patents to China-based entities, and half of these patents were 
granted to subsidiaries of foreign multinational enterprises.88   
 
Ⅲ.1.1.1.3 Estimates of patent filings in China in 2015   
 
Not only are patent applications in recent years being dominated more so by utility models than 
invention patents (or design patents), but, according to calculations in this study illustrated in  
Chart 6 below, these trends are on course to continue through 2015. In fact, by 2015, it is possible 
that there will be 39% more (over 430,000) total utility model applications than total invention 
patent applications. This would be 28 percentage points more than the 2011 percentage at which 
utility model applications outnumbered invention patent applications (11%). When comparing Chart 
6 below with Chart 3 above, this estimated 2015 growth in utility model applications (who make up 
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 WIPO. (2012, March 5). International patent filings set new record in 2011. Retrieved from 
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86
 Stembridge (2011). Note: 58% figure based on calculations from data on p. 15 therein. 
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 OECD. (2011b). OECD Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 2011. OECD Publishing. Retrieved from 
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value and “eliminate biases from home advantage and influence of geographical location.” (p. 45) 
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 China’s innovation capacities may be over-hyped. (2011, August 7). International Business Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/193820/20110807/china-innovation-railway-patent-education-system-academic-
fraud.htm 
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41% of total applications) is at the expense of proportionate growth in invention patent (and design 
patent) applications, whereas invention patent (and design patent) filings as a proportion of total 
patent filings is predicted to actually fall in 2015 compared to 2011 by 2 percentage points (and 3 
percentage points, respectively). In other words, in 2015 invention patents will make up a smaller 
percentage of total patent filings than they do today while utility models will make up a larger 
percentage.  
 
By way of further example, the projections suggest there will be over 2.6 million less-than-highest-
quality patents filed in 2015 alone. This includes the utility models and design patents for the 
reasons explained in the Introduction to this study. Even if all the invention patents estimated as 
being filed in 2015 were considered to be highest-quality patents, this would still mean there would 
be substantially more less-than-highest-quality patents than highest-quality patents filed in 2015. 
 
Chart 6: Estimated* total (foreign + domestic) patent applications in China in 2015 
 
Source: *Methodological Approach A discussed in the “Chapter 1” section of the Annex 
 
Further, the projections find that this increase in the amount of utility model applications as a 
proportion of total patent applications will be largely led by domestic filers and, notably, foreign 
filers, albeit a very small contributor, are also predicted to increasingly add to this trend by filing 
more utility models than invention patents as a proportion of their total patent filings. A comparison 
of projections in Chart 4 above to Chart 7 below shows the share of domestic utility model filings to 
total patent filings in 2015 will increase from their share in 2011 (by 2 percentage points, to 40% 
from 38%), and also the share of domestic invention patent filings in 2015 will increase from their 
share in 2011 (by 2 percentage points, to 30% from 28%). (The share of domestic design patent 
filings in 2105 will fall from their share in 2011 by 4 percentage points, to 30% from 34%.) A 
comparison of Chart 5 above and Chart 8 below shows that foreign contributions to utility model 
filings as a percentage of all patent applications in 2015 will increase from their rate in 2011 (by 2 
percentage points, to 5% from 3%), and foreign filings of invention patents as a share of total foreign 
patent filings will actually fall (1 percentage point, to 85% from 86%). (Foreign filings of design 
patents as a share of total foreign patent filings will fall by 1 percentage point, to 10% from 11%.)  
 
By way of summarising the key trends herein, on one hand, invention patent filings by domestic 
filers are projected to increase as a percentage of total domestic filings, yet on the other hand utility 
model filings by domestic filers as a share of total filings will simultaneously increase and exceed 
invention patent filings. Also, utility model filings by foreigners are projected to increase as a share 
of their total patent filings and their invention patent filings as a share of their total filings will 
actually marginally decrease.  
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Chart 7: Estimated* domestic patent applications  
in China in 2015 
 
Source: *Methodology Approach A discussed in the 
“Chapter 1” section in the Annex 
 
 
Judging from the above figures, while it seems China is commendably on track to meet and very 
likely exceed major government-set targets for overall patent growth by 2015, it also appears these 
targets will be met due to a disproportionate growth in utility model applications compared with 
growth in invention patent (and design patent) applications. 2015 is used as a projection year given 
it is specifically mentioned as the year by which the main targets in the NPDS, and a variety of 
different provincial/municipal 12th Five Year IP Plans and IP Strategies, are set. 89 For example, the 
NPDS, issued in November 2010, sets the goal for 2 million annual patent filings in China by 2015. 
(See Chapter 2 and the “Chapter 2” section in the Annex for detailed information on government-set 
patent targets.) While it is quite possible the figures presented in the above Charts 6 – 8 are an 
upper bound, and although calculated based upon past growth rates with all else constant, they are 
useful to at least generally show that unmitigated there will very likely be some potentially 
concerning trends in the composition of China’s future patent growth. The projections reflect that 
not only is China in recent years witnessing a disproportionately small filing of highest-quality 
patents, but in the near future may very well see this imbalance rise even more. It also should not be 
ruled out that, at worst, this increased filing of less-than-highest-quality patents may include a 
concerning rise in low-quality patents. (See the “Chapter 1” section in the Annex for a full 
description of methodology employed for the calculations used for Charts 6-8, as well as other 
estimates not presented in this section using different methodological approaches.) 
 
Ⅲ.1.1.1.4 Core measures of patent quality  
 
Patents granted 
 
Many patents in China never make it past the application stage given high rates of withdrawal and 
invalidation. Gao et. al (2011) finds that during a 10 year period of time reviewed, 50% of the 
invention applications filed in China by domestic Chinese applicants were withdrawn.90 In 2010, SIPO 
received 391,177 invention patent applications, whereas 29,448 invention applications were 
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 Also it is used as it represents the patent filing situation in the near-future although not too distant future (whereas 
estimating patent composition in the too distant future would face even more estimation uncertainties). 
90
 Gao et al. (2011), p. 20 
Chart 8: Estimated* foreign patent  
applications in China in 2015 
 
Source: *Methodological Approach A  
discussed in the “Chapter 1” section in the  
Annex 
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rejected and 75,949 were withdrawn (105,397 between the two, i.e. about 27% of total 
applications).91  
 
In terms of breakdowns among foreign vs. domestic filers, while previously noted that there have 
been more domestic applications for invention patents in China than foreign ones since 2003, it in 
fact was not until six years later, in 2009, that invention patents granted to domestic entities 
outnumbered patents granted to foreign entities. And this was the first time this occurred since 
1989.92 Further statistical breakdown on numbers of invention patents, utility models, and design 
patents that are granted from 2006-2011 can be found in the “Chapter 1” section in the Annex.  
 
Looking at a more narrow and recent sample (from 2006-2010), one finds, albeit using a rough 
proxy-based methodology, that 45% of all patent applications in China are ultimately “not granted” 
(this term is used hereafter subject to qualifications mentioned in the methodology explained in the 
“Chapter 1” section in the Annex). Of these patents not ultimately granted, invention patents have 
the highest rate of not being granted (67%), followed by design patents (38%) and utility models 
(25%).93 Herein while the high rates of not granting invention patents seems intuitively explained 
given the higher thresholds required for qualifying for such protection, it is notable that design 
patents, which do not bear similarly high thresholds to invention patents and in fact have relatively 
low thresholds, are still granted at notably higher rates than utility models in China.  
 
For context, within the same sample period (2006-2010), China appears to experience roughly 
similar rates of ultimately not granting invention patents and utility model patents applications 
when compared to several sample countries in the EU which are known to be innovative. Using the 
same methodology mentioned (see the “Chapter 1” section in the Annex), China’s 67% rate of not 
granting invention patents is higher than that of Austria (52%), but lower than that of Denmark (89%) 
and Germany (72%). China’s 25% rate of not granting utility model patents is higher than Germany 
(15%) and Austria (23%), but not Denmark (26%).  
 
Patents invalidated 
 
Judging from readily available statistics, China has patent invalidations rates at the same level or 
perhaps even lower than well developed countries, although it is worth noting that these figures are 
sometimes debated. SIPO’s 2010 Annual Report suggests that in 2010 the PRB received 2,411 
invalidation requests, whereas 21.1% were for invention patents, 47.6% were for utility models (over 
twice as many as for invention patents), and 31.3% were for design patents.94 This translates into a 
miniscule number of patent invalidation requests let alone resulting invalidations as a percentage of 
patents that are granted on a yearly basis. The accuracy of these numbers are sometimes 
questioned.95 In the EU, it appears that in 2009 less than 5% of patents filed with the EPO were 
invalidated.96 And in the earlier part of this decade at least, less than 4% of patents in Japan, which 
has a utility model and invention patent system, were invalidated.97 For context, the rates of 
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subsequently upholding patent validation after an invalidation claim appear to be roughly similar for 
both the EPO and China’s PRB, at around 30% of cases.98  
 
Still, and importantly, it is likely that if China’s patent enforcement system were improved to be 
more effective these patent invalidation rates would be higher. For example, if the system were 
improved in terms of allowing a more appropriate number of pieces of prior art to be admissible in 
invalidation proceedings utility model invalidation rates in particular would likely be higher (see 
Chapter 4 for more details). This reflects that the scale of China’s patent quality problem is larger 
than that reflected by current invalidation rates alone. 
 
“Patents in-force” and related life-span of patents 
 
Another metric of the quality of the patent ecosystem in China is the rate of “patents in-force,” i.e. 
those that are granted and valid in China. This is one useful metric of the value of patents as it 
measures patents that have not been invalidated or abandoned by the owner and thus are 
ostensibly serving some commercial or other use.  
 
There were a large number of patents in-force in China in 2010. Out of 2,216,082 patents in-force in 
2010, 82.4% were owned by domestic filers and 17.6% were owned by foreign filers.99 Sources tout 
that 46.4% of Chinese invention patents last over five years,100 contributing to the aforementioned 
patent in-force indicator.101  
 
Despite the aforementioned findings, patents in China, particularly those owned by domestic 
entities, are only maintained for a relatively short amount of time. Gao et al. (2011), reviewing 
recent statistical trends, find that the average life-span for invention patents awarded to domestic 
Chinese entities is only 5 years, whereas it is 9 years for foreign-owned invention patents in China.102 
Other data shows that as of 2010 only 4.6% of invention patents in China were maintained for more 
than 10 years. The typical life-span of utility models owned by Chinese patentees was between 2-4 
years, and those owned by foreign patentees was between 2-7 years. The life-span of design patents 
owned by Chinese patentees was between 1-4 years, and 2-7 years for those owned by foreign 
patentees.103  
 
By way of one comparison, the life-spans of invention patents in China are substantially less than the 
average life of an equivalent patent in various developed countries sampled for this study. For 
example, the median life-span of patents in the US is around 12 years. 104 A review of the life-span of 
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patents by Danguy and Van Pottelsberghe (2009) shows that German patents typically have a life-
span of a bit over 12 years, and the typical life-span of Japanese patents is around 17 years.105 Life-
spans of patents granted by the patent office in Finland in recent years are over 11 years.106 While a 
number of factors not necessarily related to patent quality partially explain these trends, the figures 
still likely indicate the number of quality and highest-quality patents in China is, on average, 
comparatively lower than in these countries.  
 
Further, it is strikingly clear that foreigners hold an exponentially higher ratio of invention patents in-
force than domestic entities as a proportion of their individual filings, and Chinese entities hold an 
exponentially higher ratio of utility models and design patents in-force than foreign entities. As 
illustrated in Chart 9 below, between 2006-2011, out of all patents in-force owned by domestic 
entities, 85% were not invention patents (i.e. 48% were utility models and 37% were design patents), 
whereas only 15% of patents in-force owned by domestic entities were invention patents. In 
contrast, as illustrated in Chart 10 below, during the same time period, out of all foreign patents in-
force in China, 79% were for invention patents and only 21% were for utility models (2%) and design 
patents (19%).107 These numbers show low rates of invention patents in-force held by domestic filers, 
who make up the vast majority of patent holdings in China, which additionally confirms that despite 
China’s patent filing explosion many patents filed in China are likely of less-than-highest-quality.  
 
Chart 9: Domestic patents-in force in China  
(Avg. 2006-2011)     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SIPO statistics; calculations 
 
This said, for context, it is worth noting that there has been a recent uptick in the number of 
invention patents in-force out of total patents in-force owned by domestic entities.108 Specifically, 
domestic entities owned slightly more than 50% of all invention patents in-force in 2011, a change 
from the past trend of foreign enterprises owning more (see the “Chapter 1” section in the Annex 
for related statistics). 
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Chart 10: Foreign patents in-force 
in China (Avg. 2006-2011) 
Source: SIPO statistics; calculations 
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Patents filed solely for patent litigation/malicious prosecution actions 
 
Some patents serve as tools for “malicious prosecution actions,” those with the sole purpose of 
being used to litigate and, in doing so, harm another entity. Some sources go as far as to suggest that 
more than 50% of the patents filed with SIPO “are of foreign innovations with the sole intention of 
suing the same for patent infringement.” 109 It is worth noting that given utility models are cheaper 
and easier to obtain than invention patents, it theoretically makes the most sense for applicants to 
apply for these types of patents if they indeed intend to utilise their patents for the sole purpose of 
malicious prosecution actions. While in the absence of a detailed analysis of patent litigation (which 
is difficult in the first place given lack of publication of many patent cases) it is not possible to 
determine to what extent this phenomenon is playing out, it nonetheless warrants that close 
attention is paid to the intentions of utility model filers in China.110 (See Chapter 4 for a further 
discussion herein.) 
 
Patent citations 
 
The frequency of patent citations in patent application literature and also in non-patent application 
literature can be used as a gauge of the significance of a patent and thus its quality. The idea is that 
particularly significant patented inventions will be cited more often in patent documents, which 
must disclose all relevant prior art, than less significant patents.  
 
As mentioned in the Introduction section, the OECD sets forth a Patent Quality Index that focuses 
heavily on patent citations, and this index ranks China quite low. According to the 2011 index, 
China’s performance from 2000-2010 is ranked below the world average. It is also ranked below the 
OECD average; below the EU27 average; and as the second lowest out of 25 individual countries 
highlighted in a report featuring the index, including lower than Brazil (which is a developing country, 
like China). The index is a composite indicator using six criteria: forward citations (number of 
citations of a patent); backward citations (number of patents and scientific papers cited by a patent); 
patent family size (number of countries in which that patent is “taken”); number of claims; 
“generality index” (dispersion of patent citations over technology classes); and grant lag.”111 (Note: 
While patent citations are indeed a useful metric for judging patent quality, methodology 
qualifications should at least be noted to better contextualise the limitations of such metrics.112) 
 
IPDRC’s Patent Strength Ranking for China 
 
In 2012, it was announced that the IPDRC, a non-profit academic research unit under SIPO, released 
a ranking of national and regional patent strength in China in 2011. The ranking uses criteria of 
patent creation, “patent application,” protection, management, and service. Beijing (1), Shanghai (2), 
and Guangdong (3) rank in the top three for patent creation; Guangdong (1), Beijing (2) and Jiangsu 
(3) rank highest in terms of patent application; Guangdong (1), Hunan (2), and Jiangsu (3) rank 
highest in terms of patent protection; Jiangsu (1), Guangdong (2) and Beijing (3) rank highest in 
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terms of patent management; and Beijing (1), Shanghai (2), and Guangdong (3) rank highest in terms 
of patent service. Guangdong (1), Beijing (2), and Jiangsu (3) ranked highest overall on the index.113  
 
Empirical research on foreign firms’ patenting decisions in China 
 
Empirical evidence generally shows that weaknesses in China’s IPR institutional and regulatory 
system, in addition to other factors, deter foreign firms from developing and filing highest-quality 
patents in China. Hu (2008) finds that strengthening of IPR enforcement in China should lessen risk 
and lead to an increased propensity of foreign firms to patent in China.114 Also, Hu (2008) sets out 
empirical evidence to support the “competitive threat hypothesis,” whereby competing imports in 
China lead foreign industry to increase patent filings in China; however, Hu finds no strong evidence 
supporting the “market covering hypothesis” that expansion of an industry’s own sales in China 
raises the propensity to file patents. Hu explains the latter situation in that the incentive to seek 
patent protection may be offset by the market power of the industry that could encourage it to 
avoid introducing new technologies to China.115 Hu and Jefferson (2009) find recent surges in patent 
activity by foreign firms largely take the form of “patenting existing intellectual property that they 
created elsewhere.”116 Additionally, Hu (2010) also finds that a notable number of foreigners 
develop and file patents in China in response to technology-proximity-based import competition in 
China.117  
 
 
Ⅲ.1.1.2 Sub-section 1.2: Other metrics show innovation in China is impressive, 
but this often deserves better contextualisation  
 
Introduction: This sub-section explores how China measures-up on a number of innovation metrics 
not exclusively related to patent statistics, finding that China indeed has a growingly impressive 
innovation potential although in some senses its actual innovation is perhaps overhyped. This sub-
section is by no means exhaustive in the innovation metrics it discusses, and is only intended to give 
a brief snapshot of China’s innovation landscape. 
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Ⅲ.1.1.2.1 Fundamental metrics of innovation outside patent statistics 
 
R&D expenditures 
 
Overview 
 
R&D expenditures are one useful metric of inputs into innovation in China. Battelle (2011) notes that 
in 2011 China’s gross expenditures on R&D (GERD), which include R&D expenditures by government, 
business, and higher education institutions, amounted to 1.6% of its GDP. These expenditures are 
predicted to stay at 1.6% of China’s GDP in 2012. In 2011, China’s total R&D expenditures 
represented 13.1% of the world total (with Europe representing 24.5% of the total); and in 2012, 
China’s total R&D expenditures are predicted to reach 14.2% of the world’s total (whereas Europe’s 
could drop slightly to 24.1%).118 From 1996-2007, China experienced average annual total R&D 
growth rates of 22%, the highest in the world.119 R&D investments in China have grown annually at 
12% over the last several years, outpacing annual GDP growth by 2-3%.120   
 
Other statistics provide more disaggregated details on the levels of R&D in research collaborations 
and R&D expenditures by Chinese companies in particular, showing they score relatively 
impressively on some metrics but lag well behind other countries on others. China has the highest 
percentage of R&D collaborations (16%) if compared with Japan (7%), India (5%), and South Korea 
(3%).121 Still, while China has the largest amount of researchers, in terms of per capita researcher 
within its labour force it scores far below the world average.122 As of 2010, there were no Chinese 
companies among the top 20 global R&D spenders.123 However, in fairness, Huawei and ZTE, two big 
Chinese companies, are experiencing some of the fastest R&D growth out of any company in the last 
decade;124 and within the top 1,000 R&D spenders in 2009 and among fast growing middle-income 
countries therein, China clearly leads with the likes of Petro-China Co Ltd., ZTE Corp., China Railway 
Construction Corp. Ltd., China Petroleum & Chemical Corp., and a laundry list of other Chinese 
companies.125  
 
SOEs in particular 
 
In terms of Chinese SOEs in particular, it could be argued that they do not spend utterly insignificant 
amounts on R&D, although this amount could certainly be higher particularly given the level of 
financial and other support they enjoy from the government in an attempt to make them 
competitive. According to statistics and calculations presented in the “Chapter 1” section in the 
Annex, out of all medium- and large-sized domestic-funded enterprises in China, Chinese SOEs spent 
on average 13% of annual R&D expenditures from 2006-2010. During the same time, Chinese SOEs 
on average employed 15% of the R&D personnel out of all medium- and large-sized domestic-funded 
enterprises in China. 126 Chinese SOEs’ R&D expenditures are not dispersed equally across all SOEs 
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but concentrated only in some, whereas, for example, by some estimates, 80% of large Chinese SOEs 
do not have an R&D team and thus inferably not much R&D expenditure.127 Generally, according to 
Chan and Daim (2011), Girma and Gong (2008a), and Girma and Gong (2008b), Chinese SOEs’ 
operations tend to focus on short-term performance rather than risky longer-term investments in 
R&D and innovative building.128 Further, Guan et al. (2006) and OECD (2007) find that overall, 
despite some exceptions, Chinese SOEs are not particularly efficient in knowledge production and 
utilising R&D to innovate.129  
 
Other metrics 
 
Not all companies rely on R&D, neither abroad nor in China, to boost certain types of technological 
and also non-technological innovation – and so other metrics are needed to measure this innovation. 
In middle- and low-income countries it is common for enterprises to invest in machinery and 
equipment rather than R&D per se to build up innovation.130 Process and organisational innovation 
in the services sector are particularly important forms of non-technological innovation that do not 
require formal R&D but rather other forms of innovation investment.131 SMEs in particular may 
innovate without conducting formal R&D.132  
 
Box 4: Distribution of government-sponsored innovation investment 
 
As this section highlights innovation investment metrics, it is also important to mention that not only 
absolute value of investment is an important metric to gauge innovation, but so is distribution of 
such investment. Herein China may not measure up as well as perhaps assumed in terms of access to 
government-sponsored innovation investment in particular. Many Chinese and foreign companies 
suggest that access to government-sponsored sources of finance is critical in allowing them to boost 
innovation at large and patent creation and utilisation in particular, and denial of this type of 
support inferably harms innovation and patent initiatives. For example, survey data from EU 
companies suggests that outside access to talent, access to public grants, fiscal incentives, and public 
loans and guarantees are some of the most important factors affecting EU companies’ innovation 
plans and activities.133 Consultations suggest that access to the aforementioned types of financial 
support is also a key factor affecting many private Chinese companies’ innovation plans and 
activities.134 Thus, denial of such support by Chinese funding bodies, which is further discussed in 
Chapter 3 hereto, hurts innovation at large and building of quality patents in particular.  
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Ⅲ.1.1.2.2 Certain trends in innovation in China 
 
Trends in innovation from foreign entities in China 
 
Innovation spending, development of technology, and tech-transfer 
China is becoming an increasingly attractive place for foreign R&D investment. For example, at the 
end of 2011, there were over 1,400 foreign-invested R&D centres in China, a relatively significant 
number.135 In particular, firms from the EU, US, Japan and Korea invest in R&D operations in 
China.136 
 
In terms of EU firms specifically, surveys suggest that when investing outside of their home country, 
such firms may invest in R&D activities in China. As illustrated in Chart 11 below, a 2010 EC survey 
finds that the largest share of EU companies’ R&D investments outside the EU is concentrated in the 
US and Canada (13%), India (2.6%), China (2.2%), non-EU European countries (1.9%), Japan (1%), and 
the Rest of the World (RoW) (4%).137 And India and China will see some of the highest growth rates 
in new innovation-related investment from European (and US) firms in the near future.138 
 
Chart 11: Share of EU enterprises’ R&D investment outside home country 
 
Source: Data from European Commission (2010) 
 
Nonetheless, survey data of an aggregated sample of representatives from a range of industries 
suggests outsourcing of R&D to China is typically not a particularly significant innovation activity for 
the sampled EU companies at present, and the absolute amount of these investments is still 
relatively low. Specifically, the aforementioned 2010 EC survey finds that “outsourcing R&D is overall 
the least relevant activity for innovation” among the EU firms surveyed, which include those from 
high R&D-intensity, medium R&D-intensity, and low R&D-intensity firms. 139 Further, this R&D 
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investment in China in particular, while rising in growth terms from around 1% in 2005140 is not 
insignificant it is still a meager 2% of the average global R&D expenditures of EU firms surveyed. Also, 
on average, surveyed EU firms’ R&D investment in China is not projected to rise by more than 3% (to 
about 5% of total R&D expenditures) in 2013.141  
 
Also, survey data shows that China is not receiving particularly significant amounts of non-R&D 
innovation-related investment from EU firms. European Commission (2010) measures EU-based 
companies’ investments in “knowledge sharing activities” (collaboration, outsourcing and licensing 
activities)142 with public and private partners outside their home country and specifically finds the 
highest concentration of such investments in the US and Canada (14%), RoW (6%), non-EU European 
countries (4%), and lastly, in China, India, and Japan (roughly 2% each).143  
 
Further, academic studies suggest foreign enterprises do not develop breakthrough patented 
technologies in China given concerns over the IPR environment. Bruun and Bennett (2002) find that 
foreign companies are particularly concerned about losing the technical lead to China in high-tech 
sectors through misappropriation or leakage of IPR, which, despite the fact that there may be 
common interests for cooperation with Chinese entities in the near-term, leads them to be reluctant 
to develop advanced innovation operations in China. This generally leads companies to keep their 
core R&D in headquarters or other more IPR-friendly areas, and to disperse their R&D activities in 
China in order to reduce risks created by IPR infringement of any one unit. Exacerbating this concern 
is the general lack of transparency in the Chinese legal system.144 Wu and Pangarkar (2006), who 
investigated a sample of listed Chinese firms, find that FDI tends to favour low-tech industries in 
China, and this trend has only slowly changed recently whereas high-tech sectors still particularly lag 
in S&T development.145 Asakawa and Som (2008) note that while many foreign companies are keen 
to expand research operations in China, in practice they have been reluctant to do so due to IPR 
concerns.146 Chan et al. (2011) raise issues similar to those in the aforementioned studies.147 Other 
studies also reflect these type of concerns, for example, an older study finds that foreign companies 
transfer technologies to China that are at least five years behind global standards or transfer 
technologies that would be obsolete in the near future unless certain means can be utilised to 
protect the technology particularly well.148  
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Given the above findings – as well as those from Hu (2008), Hu and Jefferson (2009), and Hu (2010) 
mentioned previously – as an aggregate it appears that foreign entities, despite having some of the 
highest-quality patents in the world, purposefully do not as a first priority develop breakthrough 
patented products in China for either the Chinese or foreign markets. This is largely due to perceived 
weak IPR protection in China, in addition to foreign firms having strong market power.  
 
Additionally, although it deserves to be tested through a fuller investigation of its own, it is the 
opinion of this study that foreign firms may be particularly reluctant to develop breakthrough 
patented products in China given the magnitude of the threat of Chinese entities to use illegally 
acquired IPR from foreign firms to very seriously jepoardise their business operations not just in 
China but also abroad. Specifically, foreign firms may be reluctant to develop such products in China 
given concerns over perceived weakness in IPR protection are magnified by the very real possibility 
that IPR could fall into the hands of a Chinese entity that is able to produce the IPR-protected 
products and through economies of scale only afforded in China and/or preferential government 
support very seriously threaten the IPR owners’ business operations not just in China but also 
abroad. This magnitude of this threat arguably exists in China to an extent unparalleled by that 
associated with other developing countries that have IPR regimes also perceived to be weak.  
 
Still, these findings should be taken in context, as depending on industry and firm there are likely a 
variety of exceptions to these findings. The promise of tens or hundreds of millions of customers 
clearly does attract a large number of foreign business operations to China, some of which are 
undeniably innovating to some extent. There are certain industries, for example the pharmaceutical 
industry, for which these trends may not play out as described in the aggregated survey data, and 
may in fact play out in the opposite manner. There are high-tech transfers from foreign companies 
to operations in China, even if at large these are not of the most breakthrough of such technologies. 
Also, many of the aforementioned studies do not appear to specifically address introduction of non-
technological innovations, which are important forms of innovation in China.  
 
Trends in innovation from Chinese entities 
 
From one standpoint, Chinese entities are admirably becoming more innovative. It is undeniable that 
China has dramatically improved its innovation capacity over the years, importantly led by a growing 
number of domestic firms that are well-regarded for being innovative in their own right. Many 
Chinese companies have innovation-related strengths that many EU companies do not even have in 
terms of the ability to make quick decisions without going through lengthy internal 
processes/discussions and the ability to very quickly commercialise products and services and adjust 
them subsequently to the particular tastes of the Chinese market.149 Generally, China is adept at 
incremental innovation.150 
 
From a comparative standpoint, however, Chinese enterprises at large are likely not yet as 
competitive in innovation as their foreign counterparts. The 2012 China Innovation Survey in Booz & 
Co. et al. (2011), which surveys foreign and Chinese executives in China, shows that over 50% of 
respondents felt Chinese companies were less innovative than their foreign competitors.151 Much 
more could be said of and many tools could be used to further analyse the innovation capacity of 
domestic entities in China although an exhaustive analysis herein is beyond the scope of this study. 
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Trends in innovation from foreign entities in China and domestic Chinese entities 
 
Some sources tout that China’s innovative potential is relatively high. For example, a variety of news 
sources, including Reuters and Forbes, have run the headline that China is a global leader in 
innovation.152  
 
Also, from one perspective, China scores well on academic rankings for innovation. A 2011 report by 
the Chinese Academy of Science and Technology for Development (CASTED) found China to rank 21st 
in terms of innovative abilities amongst the world’s top 40 most innovation economies.153 The World 
Economic Forum’s 2011 Global Competitiveness ranks China 31st out of 142 countries on the 
composite “Innovation and sophistication factors” indicator, therein scoring 37th on “Business 
sophistication” and 29th on “Innovation” whereas the latter score is led by good performance on the 
sub-indicator of “government procurement of advanced technological products,” followed by 
indicators like “innovation capacity.” 154 INSEAD et al. (2011) Global Innovation Index 2011 ranks 
China 29th globally in terms of its innovation capacity.155 
 
Still, from another perspective, China has a notable way to go in becoming innovative. For example, 
despite the aforementioned high scores on China’s innovation capacity, it is striking to note that 
China ranks a very low 100 out of 142 countries, including some of most underdeveloped countries 
in the world, on the World Economic Forum’s 2011 Global Competitiveness sub-indicator for 
“Availability of the latest technologies.” And in the same report China ranks 77th on the composite 
“Technological readiness” indicator and 61st on the “Firm-level technology absorption” sub-
indicator.156 More importantly, to put all the innovation rankings mentioned in the above paragraph 
in better context, these studies suggest there are at least 20 highly competitive countries at present 
that are more innovative than China, which, from one point of view at least, is in fact a sizeable 
number. Additionally, some sources, for example Vaitheeswaran (2012), find that while China does 
well in certain types of innovation, its innovation capacity is in fact typical of developing economies 
seeking to catch up with innovative developed countries, and it overall fairs poorly on an important 
aspect of innovation: using new thinking to create market value.157 Much more could be said of and 
many tools used to further analyse China’s innovation capacity; however, an exhaustive analysis 
herein is beyond the scope of this study. Nonetheless, collectively, the findings mentioned thus far in 
this study clearly show that China indeed has a growingly impressive innovation potential, although 
in some sense its actual innovation at present is overhyped. 
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Ⅲ.1.2 Summary 
 
Analysis of a variety of patent statistics suggests that China’s progress in patent quality lags behind 
rates of patent filings. There are higher ratios of domestic to foreign filings of invention patents in EU 
countries sampled than in China. There are significantly lower average life-spans of Chinese patents 
and lower percentages of patents in-force owned by domestic filers vs. foreign filers in China 
compared with the rates in EU countries sampled; higher rates of utility model invalidations than 
invention patent and design patent invalidations; concerning rates of patents filed solely for 
malicious prosecution actions, which may be made up more so of utility models than other types of 
patents; poor scores in terms of patent citations; and empirical econometric analyses generally 
shows foreign enterprises at large do not typically file patents on breakthrough inventions in China. 
In effect, the analysis confirms that China indeed has a patent quality problem as certain scholars 
and industry experts, as well as Chinese government officials in meetings with the European 
Chamber and otherwise, have suspected.  
 
In addition, there is reason for concern when looking ahead at the possibility that China’s patent 
ecosystem may be less composed of highest-quality patents than perhaps envisaged. For example, 
this study’s projections indicate that, all else constant, there might be over 2.6 million less-than-
highest-quality patents (utility models and design patents) filed in China in 2015 alone, which would 
be substantially more than the estimated filings of highest-quality patents in that year. Of note, it is 
projected there might be 39% more (over 430,000) total utility model applications than total 
invention patent applications filed in China in 2015, which is 28 percentage points more than the 
comparison rate between the two in 2011. The year 2015 is significant because major Chinese 
policies set it as the year by which their patent targets are to be realised. 
 
In terms of its innovation capacity at large, metrics suggests that China indeed has a growingly 
impressive innovation potential, although in some sense its actual innovation is overhyped. For 
example, China does not attract EU innovation spending on a scale as perhaps otherwise suspected; 
and, despite some exceptions, empirical evidence suggests foreign firms at large avoid developing or 
transferring breakthrough technology, and filing patents on such technology, in China. There are 
reports of concerning distribution of government-sponsored innovation investment, which can drag 
down innovation; and evidence that Chinese SOEs, in which many innovation hopes are invested, 
typically lag on a variety of innovation metrics. Further, even the most positive rankings show there 
are at least 20 highly competitive countries that are more innovative than China at present, which, 
from one point of view at least, is in fact a sizeable number. 
 
Given these findings, the question then becomes what unaddressed patent-related policies and 
practices in China hamper it from better building patent quality and innovation, and which of these 
might be able to be practically solved in the near-term. These issues are explored in Chapters 2-4 of 
this study. 
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Ⅲ.2 Chapter 2: Government-set patent targets and 
indicators   
 
Ⅲ.2.1 Analysis 
 
Ⅲ.2.1.1 Sub-section 2.1: Patent-specific targets and indicators 
 
Introduction: This sub-section explores how the system of a vast amount of patent-related goals 
China has set out at the national-level and more so at the provincial/municipal level likely do not 
best allow the authorities to meet their aims of stimulating future patent quality and innovation in 
China. The analysis concentrates on quantitative patent targets set out in a range of policies, as well 
as patent indicators in performance evaluation assessments for a range of entities.  
 
Ⅲ.2.1.1.1 Quantitative patent targets 
 
Nationwide and provincial/municipal targets 
 
Although also the subject of policy initiatives previously, in the last few years China has released an 
increasing number of policy plans to encourage patent filings. These policies are promulgated at 
both the national and provincial/municipal levels. 
 
In the major recent national-level policies reviewed, China has set-forth over 10 different 
quantitative patent targets for the next several years. Some of these targets include: 
 The S&T MLP sets the goal for China to be among the top five countries in the world in 
terms of annual invention patents granted to Chinese nationals by 2020.
158
  
 China’s nationwide 12th Five Year Plan sets the target that “invention patents owned should 
be increased from 1.7 to 3.3 per ten thousand people by 2015.”159  
 The SC Notice on IPR in Strategic Emerging Industries sets out targets that by 2015 the 
number of invention patents owned and international patent applications in strategic 
emerging industries will be tripled compared to the figures in 2010.160  
 The most overarching of China’s patent-specific development plans is the NPDS, mentioned 
in the Introduction section, which sets a number of ambitious goals in patent development, 
including for China to file 2 million annual patent applications by 2015 (other targets from 
the NPDS are outlined in the “Chapter 2” section in the Annex). 
 
In addition to the recent national-level patent development policies, China’s 
provinces/municipalities have collectively set over 150 region-specific quantitative patent targets for 
the next several years, mostly 2015, in the major recent policies reviewed in this study alone. Many 
provinces/muncipalities have their own Provincial/Municipal Intellectual Property (IP) Strategy, or an 
equivalent, which usually also contains quantitative patent-related targets. Many 
provinces/municipalities throughout China also have, or instead of the aforementioned IP strategy 
have, their own 12th Five Year Intellectual Property Plan, or science and technology plan, or 
equivalent, which usually always contains quantitative patent-related targets. Additionally, although 
not reviewed at length in this study, it appears some cities/localities also have somewhat similar 
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overarching policies to implement the provincial/municipal plans and strategies. (The “Chapter 2” 
section in the Annex provides an extensive listing of the patent-related targets from official policy 
documents reviewed for this study.) 
 
In addition to these quantitative targets, Chinese authorities and other government/quasi-
government institutions have set a range of less specific patent-related targets. For example, Part 6, 
provision 69 in the 2012 National IP Strategy, formulated by the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), 
states that “IP output targets and criteria of applying results” will be formulated for “select major 
strategic pioneering projects.” Some of the provincial/municipal plans reviewed contain non-
quantitative targets, usually in addition to, although sometimes instead of, quantitative patent 
targets.  
 
Minor concerns over details in certain targets 
 
As illustrated by statistics in Chapter 1 and the “Chapter 1” section in the Annex of this study, by no 
means are all patents filed in China actually granted (roughly less than half are), let alone turn into 
commercially viable products or processes or otherwise have notable value and remain in-force over 
an extended period of time – thus overly basing an innovation strategy on patent applications 
overlooks the serious weakness of such an indicator in China to measure innovation. Many patents 
are filed although application or other fees are not paid, and so while the patentee actually receives 
a patent application number the patent is soon invalidated.161 In fact, many patents are abandoned 
somewhere in the application process, for example a significant amount of invention patents are 
abandoned before the Substantive Examination phase as their filers realise they are based on 
unviable products or processes.162 Further, patents can be denied for any number of reasons during 
the application process prior to registration, or can be successfully challenged as infringing and 
invalidated after registration. Additionally, and very importantly, patents that are successfully 
registered are invalidated if rights owners do not properly pay patent maintenance fees. There are 
also other reasons certain patents registrations do not result in valid patents – for example, utility 
model and invention patent applications can be filed on the same solution, one can obtain the utility 
model first, and then when/if awarded the invention patent can abandon the utility model for the 
invention patent.  
 
Collectively, most of the IP plans and IP strategies (when hereafter referred to collectively, the 
reviewed IP plans, strategies, and equivalent policies and implementing measures are called 
“proposals”) 163 set targets not only for patent applications but also patents issued/granted; however, 
this is not always the case. Most of the proposals set targets for patents issued/granted and therein 
set specific targets for invention patents issued/granted in addition to the quantitative targets 
simply for patents (inferably inclusive of invention patents, utility models, and design patents). Some 
provinces/municipalities, like Tianjin, even set particularly solid targets therein (see Table 11, and 
see the “Chapter 2” section in the Annex for other solid targets set out by different 
provinces/municipalities). However, other proposals, for example Hebei’s, do not mention targets 
for granted patents, but only those for patent applications, which is problematic in so much as 
subsequent implementing measures are based on these targets rather than at least also on granting 
rates (see Table 11 for these targets). 
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A few other arguable weaknesses are present in the recent provincial/municipal IP proposals. While 
many of the proposals appear to set indicators for “patents in-force” or an equivalent, which as 
explained in the Introduction and Chapter 1 is a key indicator of how and if patents are being utilised 
and in-turn is a proxy for the value of the patents, this is not always the case in all proposals.164 
While most of the plans mention improving the dispute settlement frameworks (e.g. in terms of 
administrative enforcement and transfer of criminal cases), and some record their progress (even 
quantitatively) on completed IPR disputes/infringement cases over the past 11th Five Year Plan 
period – most do not set any type of quantitative future indicators for reducing infringement to 
supplement their other quantitative targets. Nor do the plans specifically mention potential ‘double-
counting’ of utility models later abandoned for invention patents in meeting their quantitative 
targets. These are arguably weaknesses in the plans.165  
 
Table 11: Example targets from major recent IP proposals reviewed 
Province/ 
Municipality 
Name of 
proposal 
Patent  targets 
IP Plan issued 
in 2011 
Targets by the year of 2015: 
• Annual patent applications = 25,000 
• Patent applications ≥ 12% annual growth rate 
• Annual invention patent applications = 8,000 
• Invention patent applications ≥ 15% annual growth rate 
 
 
 
 
Hebei 
IP Strategy 
issued in 
2009 
Targets by the year of 2013: 
• Patent applications ≥ 15% annual growth rate 
• Annual patent applications ≥ 20,000 
 
 
 
 
Tianjin 
IP Strategy 
issued in 
2010 
 
Targets for the following 3 years: 
• The total number of patent applications ≥ 200,000 
• The total number of valid patents ≥ 40,000, with valid invention 
patents accounting for 1/3 of the total number of valid patents 
• The proportion of valid patents to account for over 60% of total 
patents of enterprises  
• The number of enterprises owning patents to be 5,000 
• The total number of foreign patent applications to be 1,000 
Source: Author’s selection of patent targets from provincial IP plans and strategies. Note: a longer listing of 
patent targets set by provinces/municipalities can be found in the “Chapter 2” section in the Annex. 
 
Larger concerns with the targets 
 
Patent targets, if well crafted, in themselves do not necessarily undermine a strategy to build up 
patent quality. However, concern does arise depending on how stringently these targets are used 
and, in a related vein, to what extent they are emphasised, to guide policy meant to boost patent 
quality and innovation.  
 
The most fundamental problem with what appears to be a quite heavy focus on quantitative patent-
related targets in China is that it overshadows the type of benchmarking that better reflects the 
nuances that underlie creativity, which is the fundamental building block of quality patents, highest-
quality patents in particular, and innovation at large. Unlike the export-led and investment-led 
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growth model founded on lower-end products and certain targets that has to date impressively 
driven China’s economy, building highest-quality patents and breakthrough innovation requires a 
significantly different type of policy thinking. One cannot force’ creativity, but rather nurture it, 
whereas creativity leading to breakthroughs of the type that typically produce the highest-quality 
patents at best come in spurts, and are most often only realised in the mid- to long-term through a 
range of solid inputs. The risk-taking and creative development process underlying highest-quality 
patents may not provide the short-term 12-month (a target time period stipulated in annual IP work 
plans reviewed for this study, which are meant to implement the longer term IP proposals) or even 
several-year patent outputs (a target time period proposed in many IP proposals reviewed in this 
study) needed to meet these targets. As such, overly focusing on ambitious quantitative patent 
targets arguably detracts efforts needed to nurture a culture that will produce highest-quality 
patent-worthy breakthroughs and innovation at large by valuing patent quantity too highly. This of 
course does not at all mean this emphasis will not effectively boost the quantity of patents, which it 
in fact may do quite effectively.  
 
In the same vein, it is worth pointing out that absolute numbers of patents are only one indicator, 
and an imperfect one at that, of the actual economic relevance of certain solutions, and as such 
what appears to be China’s overly heavy focus on patent targets instead of a more dynamic gauging 
of a range of innovation-relevant targets may not optimally, or at worst distortedly, foster 
innovation in China. Overly focusing on patent targets overshadows measurements of certain inputs 
and other forms of creative-environment development that are essential to developing highest-
quality patents and innovations. Further, overemphasis on absolute numbers of patents does not 
appropriately capture the actual potential for patented inventions to be transformed into something 
useful and thus constitute an innovation. This is certainly not to say that China is not instituting 
parallel measures outside the patent-related measures to measure innovation inputs or other 
measures to encourage creativity, which they certainly are (for example, authorities have set R&D 
metrics, goals for educational spending, and so on, some of which are discussed in the performance 
evaluation assessments mentioned in the next section). However, in the judgment of this study, 
given what appears to be their centrality and emphasis in innovation policy at large, there is room to 
be concerned that there is an overly heavy focus on patent targets. 
 
Further, China’s approach to innovation based on what could be called a “Soviet-style” 166/highly 
state-orchestrated system of patent targets is not ideal given the still developing nature of its 
regulatory and institutional framework, which detracts from realising the policy objectives that 
underlie the targets. Introducing strict quantitative patent targets can put a type of pressure on 
implementing government ministries, as well as enterprises and others falling under the purview of 
such targets, to perform ‘no matter what’ to meet the targets. This pressure is particularly 
problematic in China, whereas given the still developing nature of its institutional and regulatory 
system, it is quite plausible for some entities to skirt appropriate monitoring and evaluation, IPR 
enforcement, and other quality control mechanisms in order to ensure they meet the 
aforementioned targets. As such, while the quantitative patent targets may ultimately be reached 
through these means, the ostensible underlying policy objectives of the targets to sustainably build 
innovation capacity and quality patents in China are undermined.  
 
Additionally, the negative consequences of not meeting the underlying policy objectives is 
compounded by the fact that, given the overemphasis on patent targets in the first place, there are 
less than adequate ‘back-up’ methods to mitigate these consequences. Herein, a more dynamic 
focus on a range of relevant innovation targets would be a better ‘back-up method,’ and is 
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contingent on the strength of other initiatives like the patent-based performance evaluation 
assessments mentioned below in Section Ⅲ.2.1.1.2. 
 
Another concern with China’s emphasis on patent targets is that they might be tied to certain 
discriminatory policies and practices to meet such targets. This may discourage foreign companies 
from using highest-quality patents and conducting certain innovation in China. (See Chapter 3 for 
details herein). 
 
It is worth noting that while some countries in the EU, for example Bulgaria, which is a developing 
country, 167  set some quantitative patent-related targets at present, neither the number, 
ambitiousness, nor the weight given to such targets in actually encouraging innovation appears to be 
anywhere near the level of that in China.168 China is comparatively quite different in this regard.  
 
 
Ⅲ.2.1.1.2 Patent-based performance evaluations for universities and research 
institutes; SOEs and other enterprises; Party officials and other individuals 
 
Details of the evaluation mechanisms  
 
A variety of patent-based indicators have been established by the Chinese government for 
evaluating the performance of Chinese research institutes and universities; SOEs and other 
enterprises; and key Party officials and other government employees. Recent national-level 
measures have set-forth IP components in performance evaluations. Also, a wide-range of major 
recent provincial/municipal IP proposals set forth a number of performance evaluation assessment 
mechanisms for a variety of actors. The analysis below briefly looks at some of these proposals. 
 
It is first worth commending certain authorities for setting forth solid patent-based performance 
indicators that are indeed likely to encourage highest-quality patent filings in China. For example, 
certain major national-level initiatives have emphasised the importance of IP quality and the market 
value of IP in performance evaluations, e.g. Part 3, Article 2 of the SC Notice on IPR in Strategic 
Emerging Industries finds that “…We shall gradually increase the weight of intellectual property 
quality and market value in related assessments and evaluation…” Also, it is clear that a number of 
provinces/municipalities have clearly set up solid performance evaluation mechanisms to build 
patent quality. For example, as illustrated in the “Chapter 2” section in the Annex, a number of 
recent provincial/municipal IP proposals reviewed for this study have particularly strong 
performance evaluation assessments for boosting patent quality given their focus on invention 
patent development; R&D investment; industrialisation, commercalisation, and transformation of 
patents; high-tech enterprise development including patents; among other components (for some 
solid examples herein see the plans of Liaoning and Zhejiang).  
 
To illustrate some of the different types of patent-related performance evaluation mechanisms set 
out in provincial/municipal IP proposals (in addition to those listed in the Annex), see Table 12 below:  
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Table 12: Example IP indicators in performance evaluations in recent IP proposals  
Province/Municipality Performance-evaluation targets 
Hainan Section 4, Part 3: “… Make the obtainment of indigenous IPR the most 
important prerequisite for the examination and acceptance of project planning 
for important science and technology project planning and innovation 
platforms. Gradually establish an IPR examination and development system 
for Hainan’s important science and technology innovation projects. 
Incorporate indigenous IPR output quantity, quality, implementation benefits, 
and IPR system construction conditions into the project evaluation index 
system and conduct supervision and management of the system.” 
 
Section 4, Part 5: “Further improve the assessment of patent work; consider 
patent work performance as one of the necessary conditions for performance 
evaluation of corporate technology centres, high-tech enterprises and hi-tech 
industrial parks. Incorporate the management performance of patent work, 
including the amount of R&D investment, the quantity and quality of patents, 
patent transformation, patent transfer and patent licensing, into the annual 
performance management assessment indicators for the relevant 
administrative departments, encouraging innovation.”  
Jiangsu Section 4, Part 2, Para 1: “Strengthening catalogued evaluation on invention 
performance of universities and institutes, and obtaining original patents 
should be the key elements of evaluation of basic research and cutting-edge 
technology research, obtaining invention patents and utility models should be 
the key elements of evaluation on applied research, developed 
research…improving the patents grant and rewards system, enacting 
‘Measures on Patent Rewards in Jiangsu Province’ to stimulate inventing and 
improve patent quality.” 
Tianjin Section 5, Article 3: “Incorporating the work performance of intellectual 
property into the performance evaluation index system of Party and 
government leading cadres and the persons in charge of SOEs.” 
Source: Author’s selection of articles from according provincial/municipal 12
th
 Five Year IP Plans (promulgated 
in 2011). Translations are from the European Chamber thus are unofficial. 
 
While, as mentioned, several of the IP proposals reviewed clearly set forth solid performance 
evaluation mechanisms to build patent quality, it is still at least worth seeking assurances from the 
many different relevant authorities across provinces/municipalities in China about the impact of 
their performance evaluation systems. Specifically, it is worth discussing if and how their 
performance evaluation mechanisms will best discourage development and subsequent filing of low-
quality patents and encourage patents of relatively higher quality that are most appropriate for their 
particular region at their current stage of development. There are worst case scenarios that deserve 
attention. Some of the patent evaluation criteria reviewed, at least if unmodified by other measures 
that would otherwise strongly boost patent quality, may overly encourage the filing of utility models 
on solutions of the lowest inventiveness as an ‘easy’ way to meet the indicators. If not crafted and 
implemented properly, some patent performance indicators may actually raise the opportunity cost 
for developing and filing highest-quality patents, making it even less costly to just develop and file 
low-quality patents. Also, if these indicators, for example those on “indigenous IPR” are linked to 
overly burdensome and/or unreasonable preconditions for participating in innovation building, for 
example as mentioned in the section in Chapter 3 on “INP IP,” they can discourage development of 
quality patents.  
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As a note, it appears that the IP proposals reviewed in this study contain limited if any repercussions, 
even generally, for poor performance or proliferation of low-quality IPR, patents included. This 
would seem to be an important disincentive to try and ‘sneak through’ performance reviews with 
low-quality patents, or at least those with less than desired thresholds of quality. While it seems 
likely that these repercussions could already be included in forthcoming implementing measures of 
the IP proposals reviewed, if not they should be included. 
 
SASAC-specific performance evaluations for SOEs 
 
As noted in Chapter 1, while on one hand it could be argued that Chinese SOEs in recent years at 
least do not file insignificant amounts of patents, they could certainly be filing more patents, 
particularly more invention patents instead of design patents and utility models. Chinese SOEs 
arguably should be producing better figures herein given the level of financial and other support 
they enjoy from the government in an attempt to make them innovative and competitive. 
 
As illustrated in the “Chapter 2” section in the Annex, the government has set patent indicators for 
SOEs, which are overseen by SASAC. While this is not the first time SOEs have been encouraged to 
file patents, as for example the Central Committee’s 1999 decision on SOE reform also encouraged 
SOEs to “develop products with their own indigenously owned IPRs,”169 today’s SOEs must meet 
what appears to be binding performance evaluation indicators for numbers of patents, including 
patent filings.  
 
It is worth pointing out that SASAC’s patent development guidance links patent performance to 
concrete developments in specific sectors. For example, several catalogues recently promulgated by 
SASAC and other ministries require development and commercialisation of products in innovative or 
otherwise high-end industries like clean and energy efficient power generating facilities and high-
precision metallurgical equipment (in addition to lower end industries).170  As listed in the “Chapter 
2” section of the Annex, measure 13 of the 2012 National IP Strategy advocates for improvement in 
SOEs’ IPR risk precaution alerts which, while not fully clear from the language, may be exclusively 
related to strategic industries.171   
 
What types of patents does the system foster? 
 
It may be difficult for all SOEs to meet the patent indicators imposed upon them given that, despite 
some exceptions, Chinese SOEs at large have historically not been structured to focus on building 
quality patented innovations, particularly breakthrough patented innovations. According to Chan 
and Daim (2011), Girma and Gong (2008a), and Girma and Gong (2008b), given top executives in 
Chinese SOEs are appointed by the government and their performance is based on building their 
political careers, SOEs’ operations in effect tend to focus on short-term performance rather than 
risky longer-term investments in R&D and innovative building.172 Further, Guan et al. (2006) and 
                                                           
169
 Fourth Plenary Session of the Fifteenth Central Committee of Communist Party of China. (1999, September 22). Decision 
of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Major Issues Concerning the Reform and Development of 
State-owned Enterprises. Retrieved from http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/64162/71380/71382/71386/4837883.html. 
170
 For example, see the Catalogue Guiding Indigenous Innovation in Major Technology Equipment for MoST, MoF, MIIT, 
and SASAC, December 2009; and MIIT, MoST, MoF, & SASAC. (2012, February 22). Indigenous Innovation Guidance 
Catalogue of Large Technical Equipment. Retrieved from 
http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11293832/n12843926/n13917042/14471328.html 
171
 Part 2, measure 13: ““Support central state-owned enterprises to search IP information and analyse patent information 
in certain fields around the burgeoning strategic industries, establish a mechanism for IPR infringement alert and risk 
precaution within the central state-owned enterprises step by step. (SASAC, SIPO)”. Note: Part 6, measure 67 of the 
measures state: “Promote central state-owned enterprises to fully implement IP strategy, improve the system for IP 
management in enterprises. (SASAC, SIPO)” 
172
 Chan and Daim (2011); Girma and Gong (2008a); and Girma, Sourafel, Gong, Yundan (2008b)  
 69 
 
OECD (2007) find that overall, despite some exceptions, Chinese SOEs are not particularly efficient in 
knowledge production. As illustrated in Chapter 1, using 2009 as a proxy year (given lack of readily 
available data for other years), 65% of patent applications from medium and large-sized Chinese 
SOEs are for utility model and design patents, whereas only 35% are invention patent applications.  
 
The aforementioned lack of innovation capacity is likely exacerbated by the lacking capacity of 
patent professionals in SOEs. Specifically, sources suggest there is a lack of patent agents, patent 
engineers and other patent-related professionals in SOEs.173 
 
Given this context, it is worth further investigation with the authorities if the patent indicator-based 
SOE evaluation criteria and related mechanisms may encourage SOEs to develop solutions and file 
patents of less-than-desired quality in an attempt to meet the indicators. This is important to ensure 
the criteria and evaluation mechanisms deter SOEs from such behaviour.  
 
In the same vein, it is also worth discussing if and how SASAC’s performance evaluation mechanisms 
are linked to certain other policies, and the impact of this linkage on patent quality. For example, it is 
worth seeking assurances from SASAC that the performance evaluation system does not in any way 
encourage the government to grant preferential access to prioritised examination of patents for 
SOEs (see Chapter 4 on green channel applications) that would mean foregoing appropriate review 
of the patents, and result in granting of some low-quality patents that would not be granted in the 
absence of such a mechanism. It is also worth investigating the exact initiatives to build “indigenous 
IPR” as mentioned in performance evaluation criteria (see the “INDP IP” discussion in Chapter 3 for 
further information on this issue.) 
 
MoST’s and government-funded S&T organisations’ performance evaluations 
 
Without more readily available information, the exact impact on patent quality of program 
evaluation methods of the Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST) and other government S&T-
promotion entities is not fully clear; however, there may be reason for concern, and thus clarity on 
these issues should be sought from the authorities. Sources suggest MoST has established patent-
based key performance indicators (KPIs),174 which by themselves are not necessarily concerning but 
might be depending on how they are linked to S&T funding and tax policies jointly promulgated by 
MoST and other agencies. It is worth exploring if and how performance evaluations instituted by the 
National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) and other official S&T-promotion agencies in 
China are structured, and if they most efficiently and effectively utilise resources to spur quality 
patents, and specifically highest-quality patents, and innovation at large. 
 
SIPO-specific performance evaluations 
 
It is widely know that SIPO has internal performance indicators linked with how many patents its 
workforce approves, and the good work of SIPO in fine-tuning its internal processes to stimulate 
better quality patents deserves to be well recognised. SIPO’s performance indicators are inferably 
organised towards meeting the NPDS and other patent-related policy indicators mentioned 
previously. Herein, patent reviewers are under significant pressure to meet certain performance 
indicators. Sources suggest SIPO is taking work performance seriously, whereas a 60 person task 
force comprising many of SIPO’s most experienced examiners has been set-up to monitor the quality 
of work of individual examiners, teams, and full departments via random checks. Poor performance 
is met with a potential salary reduction for individuals and even the group he/she works in, creating 
                                                           
173
 Gao et al. (2011), p. 74 
174
 Yeo, V. (2011, September 30). Public policy aids tech innovation but not silver bullet. ZDNet News. Retrieved from 
http://www.zdnetasia.com/public-policy-aids-tech-innovation-but-not-silver-bullet-62302301.htm 
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an important incentive to do quality work. Apparently, examiners are not awarded every time they 
approve a patent.175 Meetings with SIPO indicate that they employ 6,000 people, and realise the 
need to double the amount of staff over the next three years to keep up with the increase in patent 
applications.176 These are highly commendable management initiatives.  
 
Further discussions could be held on certain details of SIPO’s management structure. Additional 
details could be sought from SIPO on the exact workings of their performance criteria for ‘first-line’ 
and PRB examiners. It would be helpful to be privy to a presentation on how the indicators are most 
effectively discouraging examiners from approving low-quality patents that should be invalidated, 
and best rewarding those reviewers that work efficiently and effectively in approving deserving 
patents.177  
 
Performance evaluations for intermediary services   
 
It is worth discussing with the authorities the effectiveness of specific efforts to improve the 
performance of patent intermediary services in China, i.e. patent agencies and their patent 
application writers, and patent application writers not affiliated with patent agencies (all such 
individuals are external to SIPO). This is important given the well-known problems with patent 
intermediary services in China, including the poor writing of patent application documents and poor 
translations from foreign languages to Chinese therein, as well as general issues concerning the 
experience and technical level of the patent writers.178  
 
 
Ⅲ.2.1.2 Sub-section 2.2: Other targets 
 
Introduction: This sub-section briefly explores how other policy targets may, in combination with 
the patent targets and indictors mentioned in the prior sub-section, negatively impact China’s ability 
to stimulate patent quality and innovation.  
  
Ⅲ.2.1.2.1 GDP targets 
 
GDP targets imposed by provincial/municipal level governments may in some ways discourage risk-
taking needed to boost breakthrough inventions and innovation in a way that other types of 
measures might. This is due to the same concerns mentioned in sub-section 2.1 surrounding 
quantitative patent targets. While provincial/municipal GDP growth indicators for 2012 have been 
reduced in every province/municipality except Hainan,179 when compounded by the concerns 
mentioned with the patent targets imposed at the national-level and by sub-central level 
governments, they may collectively somewhat hamper initiatives that could better stimulate 
sustainable development of innovation and associated quality patents. 
 
                                                           
175
 Wild, J. (2011, January). Quality is China’s biggest patent challenge. Intellectual Assessment Management. Retrieved 
from http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog/Detail.aspx?g=e81c5421-bccc-4eb5-9895-f347443cf73e 
176
 2011, October 28- Meeting with SIPO officials and European Chamber representatives at SIPO in Beijing 
177
 It would also be useful to have an update on SIPO’s efforts to ensure their reviewers are not only technically trained, 
but also trained as necessary in law.  
178
 Also of concern is the technical writing capacity of applicants that work with the intermediary services. Note: In 2010, 
there were 779 patent agencies in China and 12,000 qualified patent agents, although only half of these agents worked for 
agencies (Source: Gao et al. (2011), p. 76) 
179
 Thirty provinces lower GDP growth target. (2012, February 23). China Daily. Retrieved from 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2012-02/23/content_14679318.htm; also see: China’s inland provinces propose 
double-digit GDP targets. (2012, February 7). Want China Times. Retrieved from http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-
subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20120207000091&cid=1102 
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Ⅲ.2.2 Summary  
 
China has emphasised a range of quantitative patent targets, which while impressive in some 
respects, may not encourage quality let alone highest-quality patents and innovation at large as 
efficiently and effectively as envisaged by policymakers; in fact, they may actually discourage 
highest-quality patents and at worst may sometimes actually encourage development and filing of 
low-quality patents. There are some weaknesses in the targets due to the absence of important 
criteria for ensuring patent quality. Moreover, the overly heavy focus on quantitative patent targets 
in China overshadows the type of benchmarking that better reflects the nuances underlying 
creativity and the actual economic relevance of inventions, which are building blocks of quality 
patents and an innovation economy. Given these risks, it is important to re-think China’s heavy 
quantitative patent target-based approach, and also essential that related performance evaluation 
systems for SOEs and other enterprises, Party officials, universities and research institutes, and other 
entities be properly crafted. 
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Ⅲ.2.3 Recommendations 
 
Ⅲ.2.3.1 Core recommendations 
 
Ⅲ.2.3.1.1 Subsection 2.1 
 
1. Consider alternative strategies and metrics for measuring the strength of Chinese 
innovativeness, and base policy more so on these approaches than quantitative patent 
targets.  
 
1.1 Consider making new policy targets less based on quantitative patent targets 
and more based on other metrics. These metrics might include sales and new 
product announcements, among other indictors like the RIS-style composite index 
mentioned below. 
 
The Chinese authorities could consider compiling a composite innovation indicator 
for different provinces/municipalities in China similar to the EC’s Regional 
Innovation Scoreboard (RIS), which could be used to monitor performance and 
inform policymaking.
180 An exchange could be organised between the Directorate 
General of Enterprise and Industry of the EC in charge of overseeing compilation of 
the EIS, and relevant Chinese entities, include SIPO, the National Bureau of Statistics, 
and MoST, on establishing a similar type of metric. 
 
2. Recommendation: Relevant authorities should review SASAC’s performance review of SOEs to 
ensure that any patent-based performance review process best stimulates quality patents. 
Issues/possible reforms herein include:  
 
2.1 If it is insisted that patent targets be maintained, provide higher points in the 
performance review to successfully granted and not subsequently invalidated 
invention patents or perhaps even require these invention patents to meet a 
superlative threshold for inventiveness. For example, a SOE would be awarded X 
points after being granted a patent, and additional Y points after the statute of 
limitations expires for challenging the patent if no successful challenges have been 
brought. The aforementioned level of inventiveness and patent quality at large 
would be determined by technical specialists and patent experts within SIPO, who 
would coordinate with SASAC. (Note: Due to inevitable time lags, this performance 
                                                           
180
 RIS indicators include (data sources in parenthesis): (1) Population with tertiary education (ISCED 5-6) per population 
aged 25-26 (Eurostat); (2) Participation in life-long learning per population aged 25-64 (Eurostat); (3) Public R&D 
expenditures (R&D expenditures in the government sector (GOVERD) and the higher education sector (HERD) as a 
percentage of GDP (Eurostat); (4) Share of households with broadband access (Eurostat); (5) Business R&D expenditures 
(BERD) as a percentage of GDP (Eurostat); (6) Non-R&D innovation expenditures of SMEs as a percentage of turnover 
(Eurostat); (7) SMEs innovating in-house as a percentage of all SMEs (Eurostat CIS); (8) Innovative SMEs collaborating with 
others as a percentage of all SMEs (Eurostat CIS); (9) Number of patents applied for at the EPO per million population 
(Eurostat); (10) SMEs introducing product or process innovations as a percentage of all SMEs (Eurostat CIS); (11) Number of 
SMEs that are innovating who replied in surveys that their product or process innovation had a highly important effect on 
reducing labour costs per unit of output as a percentage of all SMEs (Eurostat CIS); (12) Number of SMEs that are 
innovating who replied that their product or process innovation had a highly important effect on reducing materials and 
energy per unit of output as a percentage of all SMEs (survey); (13) employment in medium-high & high-tech 
manufacturing (% workforce) (Eurostat); (14) Employment in knowledge-intensive services (% of workforce) (Eurostat); (15) 
new-to-market sales of all SMEs as a percentage of turnover (Eurostat CIS); and (16) new-to-firm sales of all SMEs as a 
percentage of turnover (Eurostat CIS). (Source: Hollanders, H., Tarantola, S., & Loschky, A. (2009). Regional innovation 
scoreboard (RIS) 2009. Inno Metrics.)          
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evaluation methodology may result in negative performance statistics being 
registered in a different year [e.g. 2014] or quarter than the negative performance 
[e.g. the invalidation of a patent] was actually executed [e.g. 2013], thus potentially 
less than optimally rewarding positive performance in the latter year. Likewise, it 
may reward positive performance in a different year or quarter than the positive 
performance [e.g. time the patent was granted would be after the time its 
underlying solution was developed]. Nonetheless, this approach arguably provides 
necessary incentives to make sure SOEs are careful in their filings, and creates 
incentives to file legitimate invention patents.) 
 
2.2 Ensure that SOEs with patents that are successfully challenged as infringing do 
not count such patents as positive statistics in their performance review. 
Successfully challenged patents should count as a negative statistic in an SOE’s 
performance review.  
 
2.3 Ensure that when utility model patents are abandoned for a simultaneously 
filed and later granted invention patent, that only one patent filing is counted (the 
invention patent) in the performance review. To be sure, any indicator of the 
awarding of the prior utility model should not be counted in performance indicators 
or at least be noted as later being abandoned for an invention patent. 
 
2.4 Consider using a performance indicator of the ratio of an SOE’s invention 
patents in-force to their filings of utility and design patents. 
 
3. Recommendation: In addition to adopting a structure similar to that for SASAC’s performance 
review for SOEs as mentioned in Recommendation 2, ensure an appropriate patent-based 
performance review process for all entities evaluated by the government. 
 
3.1 MoST can give research institutes demerits that will have an effect on their 
funding if they poorly perform on patent-quality based indicators. 
 
3.2 Seek more details from SIPO about how exactly its performance evaluation 
system best stimulates quality patents and discourages low-quality patents.  
 
3.3 Review other entities performance review systems and ensure all patent-based 
criteria therein are effectively centered on quality metrics.  
 
4. Recommendation: Establish a forum involving government, academics, and competitive 
domestic companies for best-practice sharing on how to best craft patent strategies for SOEs 
and other government-funded entities. This should include a discussion on what should be 
patented vs. protected as a trade secret, when a solution should be abandoned rather than 
continuing with the patent application process, among other related considerations. 
5. Recommendation: the central-level, led by the State Council, should set-up an incentive 
system and monitoring mechanism whereby departments that implement the best systems for 
encouraging patent quality are given certain recognitions/awards. It should be noted that at 
the same time performance indicators would need to be changed for ministries whose 
performance is overly tied to absolute numbers of patents.  
 
6. Recommendation: Establish a formal program and forum aimed at discussing and deciding on 
better tools to screen and monitor patent quality. Chinese ministries, in partnership with think-
tanks and industry experts should adopt new methodologies to monitor patent quality and 
 74 
 
adjust policies accordingly. For example, if upon scrutiny of the methodology of the IPDRC’s 
patent strength ranking (which does not appear to be possible due to lack of publically available 
information on the methodology at the time of publication of this study), it is determined the 
ranking is solid, than incorporate it as part of this program. 
 
Ⅲ.2.3.2 Other recommendations 
 
Ⅲ.2.3.2.1 Sub-section 2.2 
 
7. Recommendation: Reassess economic indicators imposed by provincial/municipal 
governments that may not most efficiently and effectively spur innovation in the near-term, 
and replace them as necessary with new indicators.  
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Ⅲ.3 Chapter 3: Other policies meant to promote patents  
 
Ⅲ.3.1 Analysis  
 
Ⅲ.3.1.1 Sub-section 3.1: Patent-specific measures 
 
Introduction: This sub-section investigates how a myriad of significant Chinese measures (hereafter 
“policies” and “measures” are used interchangeably) specifically mentioning IP (patents inclusive), 
most of which are also at least partially meant to stimulate patents, can sometimes discourage 
quality patents and innovation. As illustrated in the Introduction section, the Chinese government 
has promulgated a wide variety of patent-specific policies that likely effectively build patent quality 
in China; yet, there are also concerning components of a variety of other measures that likely do not 
result in similar outcomes. These measures are the subject of this section. 
 
Ⅲ.3.1.1.1 Financial and other incentives for patent development and/or with 
patent-related requirements 
 
Ⅲ.3.1.1.1.1 Subsidies specifically for patent filing 
 
For some time now, regional governments have been tasked with providing subsidies for entities 
filing IPR, the most common of which are subsidies for patent applications that cover official 
processing fees and even attorney fees. These subsidies have been extended to all types of patents: 
design, utility model, and invention patents. Many subsidies focus on domestic filings. Some 
subsidies focus on certain types of patent filings abroad, for example via the PCT.181  
 
The main problem with current patent filing subsidies is that they are largely awarded in a manner 
that not only wastes resources, but otherwise does not necessarily most effectively support the 
building of highest-quality patents and related innovation. Gao et al. (2011) notes that this 
deficiency is manifested in repeated patent applications, splitting inventions into smaller inventions 
just to boost the number of applications, filings for products that are already published or disclosed 
for a significant amount of time and are not patentable, filing an application to get an application 
number but not paying fees, and so on.182 This is an unnecessary waste of resources. In the same 
vein, it does not result in channelling resources effectively and efficiently to build the highest-quality 
patents and related innovation that China desires.    
 
While the government is commendably already taking steps to reform the patent subsidy system, it 
appears that notably more needs to be done. Policy statements like the NPDS 183 and 2012 National  
                                                           
181
 See the Administrative Measures on Special Funds for Subsidising Foreign Patent Applications issued by MoF on April 
14th 2012. Among others, see the Provisional Measures on the Administration of Special Patent Funds for Subsidising Filing 
Patents Abroad, issued by MoF on September 15
th
 2009. Related provincial/municipal-level regulations, for example those 
focusing on invention patents include, among others, the 2012 Jinan Standards on Financial Support for Patents, effective 
March 6th 2012. 
182
 Gao et al. (2011), pp 86-89 
183
 For example, see Part IV, Section 4, para. 1 of the NPDS which calls policymakers to “Optimise patent subsidy policy and 
further define the orientation to enhance patent quality…” 
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IP Strategy
184 have made the need for reforming the patent subsidy system apparent. Many Chinese 
government bodies reportedly now only pay subsidies when the patent is granted as opposed to at 
the application stage.185 Some provinces/municipalities, for example, Shanghai, are reforming their 
systems to only grant subsidies for invention patents.186 Nonetheless, it appears that a number of 
specific initiatives could be undertaken to more fully improve the subsidy system that do not appear 
to be currently discussed, at least publically. As such, these initiatives deserve to be considered by 
the authorities (see Recommendation 8 for further details). 
 
Ⅲ.3.1.1.1.2 IP ownership and restricted licensing provisions in currently effective 
indigenous innovation policies: an overview 
 
Background 
 
The concept of “indigenous innovation,” also sometimes translated as “independent innovation,” 
(whereas the Chinese equivalent of both terms is zìzhǔ chuàngxīn/自主创新), form the basis of what 
has become known as China’s “indigenous innovation policy” (IIP). Many observers now generally 
consider China’s IIP to also be the name for its innovation strategy at large. The S&T MLP, which has 
often been pointed to as establishing the main framework for the concept, defines “indigenous 
innovation” as “enhancing original innovation, integrated innovation, and re-innovation based on 
assimilation and absorption of imported technology, in order to improve our national innovation 
capability.”187 The plan further states that “…one should be clearly aware that importation of 
technology without emphasising assimilation, absorption, and re-innovation is bound to weaken the 
nation’s indigenous R&D capability, which in-turn widens the gap with world advanced levels.”
188  
 
It is worth noting that although the S&T MLP does not explicitly emphasise “breakthrough” 
innovation by name, it is nonetheless clear from some subsequent policy statements that 
breakthrough innovation, and indigenous breakthrough innovation specifically, is one goal of China’s 
innovation strategy. For example, this goal is in part reflected in China’s recent focus on cutting-edge 
strategic industries, for example in China’s 12th Five-Year Plan and the SC Notice on IPR in Strategic 
Emerging Industries, and in other initiatives in other measures cited throughout this study. 
 
Several central and local-level implementing regulations from MoST, the National Development and 
Reform Commission (NDRC), Ministry of Finance (MoF) and their sub-central-level equivalents soon 
followed issuance of the S&T MLP, creating enacting IIP product catalogues, financing programs, and 
other IIP initiatives. The Trial Measures for the Administration of the Accreditation of National 
Indigenous Innovation Products (“2006 IIP Trial Measures”), issued on December 31st 2006 by MoST, 
NDRC, and MoF contain highly controversial requirements herein: specifically, requirements in 
Article 4.2 that products must be produced by a company with full ownership of the IPR on relevant 
products via its own activities or (by legal means) otherwise obtained ownership or usage rights for 
IP that is legally owned in China by a Chinese company, organisation, or citizen (and Article 4.3 that 
trademarks have to be owned by a Chinese company and originally registered in China, Article 4.4 
and 4.6 that contain certain requirements on certifications and quality of qualifying products, and 
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 See Part 1, measure 5: “Improve the monitoring and settlement of abnormal patent applications, regulate local patent 
subsidy, promulgate in due time further opinions on regulating patent subsidy. (SIPO)”  
185
 The patent quality challenge facing China and its businesses. (2011, January 20). IAM Magazine. http://www.iam-
magazine.com/issues/article.ashx?g=64724577-cf28-4cb1-bad6-c012264ee060 
186
 2012, April 24- Consultations with Lin Xu, Vice Chair of IPR Working Group 
187
 Part II, Section 1, para. 2 S&T MLP. Retrieved (in Chinese) from http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2006-
02/09/content_183787.htm (one English translation available here: 
http://www.etiea.cn/data/attachment/123%286%29.pdf)  
188
 Part II, Section 1, para. 3, S&T MLP 
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Article 4.7 that contains import substitution requirements).189 These provisions again appeared in 
the Measures on the Interpretation of National Indigenous Innovation Products, issued by MoST on 
February 26th 2007. 190  Several measures in 2006 and 2007, including provincial/municipal 
implementing measures, created controversy by linking indigenous innovation to government 
procurement preferences. 191  And once implementing measures for central-level government 
procurement product catalogues were issued in late 2009 and January 2010,192 foreign businesses 
actively banded together to complain against such IIPs.  
 
Recent reforms 
 
Commendably, the Chinese government has recently made firm policy statements that prior IIP 
policies will be delinked from government procurement preferences. As of July 1st 2011, the Chinese 
authorities agreed to nullify and void three regulations linking controversial IP requirements to 
preferential government procurement,193 and a formal notice was issued on July 4th 2011 nullifying 
the 2006 IIP Trial Measures.194 And on November 17th 2011, the State Council issued a notice stating: 
“Any mention of linkage between innovation policy and government procurement incentive measures 
within regulatory documents from all levels of local people's governments and related departments 
must without exception stop implementation from December 1
st
 2011.”
195
 While there are still some 
concerns over the actual implementation of these aforementioned measures, they are at least clear 
and indisputably positive in their own right. 
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 Concerns as raised in, among other sources, US-China Business Council [USCBC]. (2011, March). Issues brief: China’s 
domestic innovation and government procurement policies, pp 3-5. Retrieved from 
https://www.uschina.org/public/documents/2011/innovation_procurement_brief.pdf; Review of according articles in the 
Trial Measures for the Administration of the Accreditation of National Indigenous Innovation Products retrieved from 
http://big5.mofcom.gov.cn/gate/big5/im.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/subject/zsjm/localcc/201012/20101207305384.html. 
Note 1: depending on the secondary source reviewed, some or all of these issues may be listed as concerns, for example, 
USCBC (March 2011), Appendix 6, provides a detailed list of indigenous innovation requirements that explicitly require 
import substitution as part of indigenous innovation development.  
190
 Para. 5 of the Measures on the Interpretation of National Independent Innovation Products retrieved from 
http://www.most.gov.cn/ztzl/cxqygzhy/cxqyhydt/200702/t20070226_41506.htm  
191
 See Article 23 of the S&T MLP; Article 13, 14 and 24 of the 2007 Evaluation Measures on Indigenous Innovation Products 
for Government Procurement; among other measures listed on p. 8-9 and Appendix 6 of USBC  (March 2011) . Note: Many 
of the sub-central level indigenous innovation accreditation/management measures listed in Appendix 6 of USCBC (March 
2011) require IPR ownership requirements as distinct from licensing, or require exclusive licensing of IPR fully owned by a 
China-based entity. 
192
 In November 2009, MoST, NDRC, and MOF released two circulars, one on application procedures and a notice 
describing provincial duties for the proposed central-level indigenous innovation catalogue. On December 29
th
 2009, a 
catalogue of industrial equipment products was released containing stipulations for accrediting national indigenous 
innovation products. On January 11
th
 2010, the Regulations of Government Procurement Law nationally set-forth 
preferential government procurement for indigenous innovation products. A variety of other controversial IIP rules were 
passed at the same time that did not only focus on government procurement preferences, for example, see Accreditation 
Rules for National Indigenous Innovation Products, November  2009, among other regulations as detailed in USBC (March 
2011), p. 19. 
193
 Lubman, S. (2011, July 22). Changes to China’s ‘indigenous innovation’ policy: Don’t get too excited. Wall Street Journal. 
China Realtime Report. Retrieved from http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2011/07/22/changes-to-chinas-indigenous-
innovation-policy-dont-get-too-excited/ 
194
 Notice on Voiding “Trial Measures for the Administration of the Accreditation of National Indigenous Products (2006)” 
issued on July 4
th
 2011 by MOST, NDRC and MOF. Retrieved from 
http://www.jskw.gov.cn/FileUpload/%E5%85%B3%E4%BA%8E%E5%81%9C%E6%AD%A2%E6%89%A7%E8%A1%8C%E3%80
%8A%E5%9B%BD%E5%AE%B6%E8%87%AA%E4%B8%BB%E5%88%9B%E6%96%B0%E4%BA%A7%E5%93%81%E8%AE%A4%
E5%AE%9A%E7%AE%A1%E7%90%86%E5%8A%9E%E6%B3%95%EF%BC%88%E8%AF%95%E8%A1%8C%EF%BC%89%E3%80
%8B%E7%9A%84%E9%80%9A%E7%9F%A5.pdf  
195
 A State Council Notice Directing All Government Entities To Remove Any Mention of Linkages Between Indigenous 
Innovation Policy and Government Procurement Within Regulatory Documents, which the Chongqing Legislative Affairs 
Office published on their own website: http://www.cqfzb.gov.cn/Pro_General/ContentShow.aspx?ProID=49&myid=8655  
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It is important to note that before the aforementioned delinking took place, a number of other 
policy statements changed the IIP framework, most notably the April 2010 Draft Notice Regarding 
the Launch of the National Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation Work for 2010 (hereafter the 
“April 2010 Draft Notice”). Article 2.2 of the April 2010 Draft Notice relaxed the provision on IPR 
ownership to allow indigenous innovation accreditation on IP licensed for use in China without 
specifying where the entity that owns the original IP (and is doing the licensing) must be located; 
Article 2.3 stipulated that trademarks no longer have to be originally registered in China (but must at 
least have the right to use the trademark in China); and Article 2.4 set new technology quality 
requirements (e.g. to be proven effective in conserving energy, or “substantially” improve on an 
original product’s quality, performance, structure, material, or craftsmanship to be eligible for such 
accreditation).196  
 
These policies were ostensibly changed due to pressure from foreign governments and industry 
associations. 197  These organisations, including the European Chamber, argued on behalf of 
companies saying they would prefer to license technology, particularly their most important and 
innovative/higher-end technologies, instead of transferring it via full-on ownership transfer 
agreements (or even exclusive licensing), and in many cases this technology would need to be 
licensed from abroad (as it is owned by parent companies registered abroad). Thus it was argued the 
previous IIP policies would push companies to intentionally pursue less-IP-intensive operations in 
China.  
 
Existing concerns 
 
Despite some positive changes, significant concerns surround the April 2010 Draft Notice in 
particular. Most importantly, outside a number of concerns over specific provisions in the notice,198 
it does not appear a final version of the April 2010 Draft Notice was ever even finalised, despite a call 
for comments deadline on the measure, and thus the measure remains unbinding.199 And no other 
measures appear to have subsequently taken the notice’s place in making allowances for IP licensing 
from abroad as a core part of China’s IIP system. As such, it appears China’s IIP framework is not 
legally bound to only instituting the type of IP requirements that were present in the April 2010 
Draft Notice. In fact, the type of controversial IP requirements the April 2010 Draft Notice was 
supposed to amend appear to be presently embodied in the term “indigenous intellectual property 
rights,” which is defined in Box 5 below.  
 
                                                           
196
 Other criteria also apply. See the April 2010 Draft Notice, issued on April 9
th
 2010 for public comments (till May 10
th
 
2010), by MoST, NDRC and MoF, retrieved from http://www.most.gov.cn/tztg/201004/t20100409_76710.htm  
197
 Ernst (2011) (p. 4 suggests that lobbying by foreign business associations “possibly” created these changes) 
198
  Linton et al. (2010) notes that some have worriedly interpreted this measure to mean that indigenous innovation 
products must be locally researched and developed (including requiring licensing of IP usage rights in China), and the R&D 
should be led by a Chinese entity. This could exclude wholly foreign-owned enterprises (WFOEs), JVs where the foreign 
party has a majority holding, and perhaps Chinese entities with R&D centres abroad. Also there is concern over the 
requirement to comply with unspecified “national industrial and technology policies” (Article 2.1); as well as concern about 
the requirement that the IPR involved cannot be subject to dispute (Article 2.2.), whereas without further clarity this may 
include unsubstantiated allegations raised by a third party (Source: Linton, K. et al. (2010). China: Intellectual property 
infringement, indigenous innovation policies, and frameworks for measuring the effects on the U.S. economy. US 
International Trade Commission [USITC]. Investigation No. 332-514. p. 5-11. Retrieved from 
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4199.pdf) 
199
 USTR (2011) confirms that the draft measure has not been finalised to date, although notes that the Chinese authorities 
“have not requested or accepted applications for accreditation.” (Source: USTR. (2011). 2011 National trade estimate 
report on foreign trade barriers: China. United States Trade Representative. p. 88. Retrieved from 
http://www.ustr.gov/webfm_send/2694) 
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Box 5: Note on usage of the term “indigenous intellectual property rights” 
 
The term “indigenous intellectual property rights,” which one might also translate as “independent 
intellectual property rights” (whereas the Chinese equivalent for both is: zìzhǔ zhīshì chǎnquán/自主
知识产权) is frequently found in a number of measures reviewed in this study. Consultations suggest 
that the term originated in the mid-1990s in policy advice to build domestic IPR in the Chinese 
automobile industry.200 At the turn of the new millennium, the term was used in important policy 
guidance, which is still in effect, from state leader Jiang Zemin at an April 2nd 2000 conference on the 
Exhibition on China's Fifteen-Year Achievements in Patent Work. 201  
 
There is solid evidence (see below) that the term typically means IP ownership, including acquired 
ownership, by a Chinese entity, which in some cases expressly is said to exclude entities with a 
majority foreign ownership. While not the norm, the term is defined somewhat differently in the 
HNTE tax scheme (see below section for details); and in some cases, includes an option for restricted 
licensing of IP fully owned by a Chinese entity.202 These concepts of “indigenous intellectual property 
rights” are collectively hereafter referred to in this study as “IND IP” conditions. 
 
Some key sources defining “indigenous intellectual property rights” 
 
Official government measures and policy advice 
 
 The below listed measures are just a few examples of clear government policy advice that 
indigenous intellectual property rights mean IPR owned by a Chinese entity: 
 
• Guidance for Enlarging Exports with Indigenous Intellectual Property Rights issued on May 
11th 2004 by the Anhui MOFCOM sets forth guidance, which appears to still be in effect, on 
indigenous intellectual property rights: 
Part 2: “The definition of indigenous intellectual property rights is invented in China; there is 
no corresponding concept in the international arena. Administrations such as Ministry of 
Science and Technology and the IPR Bureau have not provided clear definitions of indigenous 
intellectual property rights. In this document, indigenous intellectual property rights refer to 
IPR legally owned, invented or designed by Chinese citizens; or Chinese legal persons or other 
organisations without legal personality (referring to those entities whose original capital 
formation is not majority foreign held). It also includes those IPR bought from other Chinese 
citizens, legal persons, or other organisations without legal personality.”
203
 
 
• Notice on What is a Product With Independent Intellectual Property Rights?, issued on July 
3rd 2007 by the Tianjin Intellectual Property Office, which appears to still be in effect, defines 
indigenous intellectual property rights as: 
“...In China, the term ‘Indigenous Intellectual Property Rights’ refers to independent technical 
knowledge assets lawfully owned by Chinese citizens, legal persons, or organisations without 
legal personality, or leading research or creative design conducted by those entities, or the 
patents or copyrights purchased from other Chinese citizens, legal persons or other 
organisations without legal personality.  
                                                           
200
 2012, August 2 - Consultations with a member of the European Chamber in Shanghai 
201
 “We must energetically promote the long-term development of our economy by supporting the nation's patent 
undertaking, enhancing the role of the patent system and furthering growth of high-tech products with self-owned 
independent intellectual property rights and market prospects.”(Source: Jiang, Z. China’s Intellectual Property Rights 
Protection in 2000. Retrieved from http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=dbref&id=94) 
202
 The definitions used in the April 2010 Draft Notice (which again, does not look like it was even ever in-force) are herein 
not considered to constitute IND IP requirements. 
203
 Retrieved on August 1, 2012 from http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/difang/anhui/200508/20050800293317.html. 
Note: Translation from the European Chamber thus is unofficial. 
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1. The term ‘Chinese legal persons or organisation without legal personality’ means those 
entities whose original capital composition is not dominated by foreign capital.  
2. The term ‘leading research or creative design’ includes the research or designs conducted 
through self-innovation or through those cooperation projects that are led by the party 
who declares the ownership of the research or design result.  
3. The term ‘intellectual property rights’ includes invention patents, design of new 
technological products, proprietary technology possessing scientific and technological 
achievements, computer chips (include database, multimedia and internet products), 
layout-design of IC chips, new animal and plant species, and protection of traditional 
Chinese medicine.”
204
 
 
• Several Indigenous Innovation Accreditation/Management Measures define indigenous 
intellectual property rights. For example, the Hebei Province Indigenous Innovation Product 
Accreditation Management Rules (Provisional) (2007), jointly issued by the provincial MoST, 
NDRC, and MoF on September 28th 2007 (hereafter the “Hebei IIP Rules”), which appears to 
still be in effect (see below for further explanation on this point) defines indigenous 
innovation products as those meeting the following conditions: 
 Article 6: “Indigenous innovation products applying for accreditation should meet the 
following basic conditions…” 
Article 6.2: “Products have obtained indigenous IP rights and have indigenous brands. 
Products that have obtained indigenous intellectual property rights are defined as those 
where the applying unit owns IP products through its own innovative activities, or gain 
ownership of IP rights that were acquired by the applying unit through assignment by 
Chinese enterprises, institutions, or citizens who own such IP rights. Products with indigenous 
brands are those where the applying unit owns the right to the registered trademark of the 
product.”
205
 
 
 Several Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation/Management Measures include in their 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
204
 Retrieved on August 2, 2012 from http://www.tjipo.gov.cn/fwz/zspj/zscq/200903/t20090324_14802.html. Note: 
Translation from the European Chamber thus is unofficial. 
205
 Retrieved on August 11, 2012 from http://www.zjkfgw.gov.cn/Project/ShowArticle.asp?ArticleID=537. Translation is 
from the European Chamber thus is unofficial. Note: The Hebei Province Department of Finance Measure on Stopping the 
Implementation of the Independent Innovation Products by Government Procurement Preferences, issued by the Hebei 
Province Department of Finance on July 12, 2011, nullifies Hebei’s government procurement preferences as linked to 
indigenous innovation products accreditation (measure retrieved on August 11, 2012 from 
http://www.hebgp.gov.cn/upnews/upfiles/zfcg_zcfg/TS_LX20111222162415jg@ng.htm) 
206
 See Appendix 6 of USCBC (2011) for a helpful listing of these measures. 
207
 A variety of sources, including WIPO, use the term “indigenous intellectual property rights,” but this refers to rights on, 
for example, cultural works produced by indigenous (i.e. a particular ethnic group of) peoples. 
208
 As such, while it appears that the aforementioned definitions are those used when interpreting the term, to be 
completely sure of exactly how the term is applied in practice across all Chinese measures mentioning the term deserves 
clarification with all Chinese authorities that use the term. This should be considered when reviewing the measures 
mentioning indigenous intellectual property rights analysed in this study. 
209
 SIPO and Peking University Intellectual Property Institute. (2005, October 31). Study on Major IPR Cases with External 
Dimensions since China joined the WTO, p.11. Retrieved on August 12, 2012 from 
http://stlaw.pku.edu.cn/UploadFiles/200941714515938.doc  
210
 “…independent intellectual property rights in China mean that it [the protected invention] is researched, developed, run, 
and produced by Chinese citizen or Chinese corporation/organisation independently and eventually enjoys the ownership of 
the intellectual property….Non-independent intellectual property rights mean that it [the protected invention] is researched, 
developed, run and produced by natural persons, corporations or other organisations from abroad, and who enjoy the 
ownership of the intellectual property rights. The main legal bodies holding non-independent IPR can consist of one foreign 
enterprise, or a combination of a Chinese enterprise and foreign corporations, whereas the eventual proprietary rights 
belong to an entity abroad, or mainly belong to the foreign side.” (Source: Zhonggu Law Online (2011). The contrasting 
relationship between independent intellectual property rights and non-independent intellectual property rights. Retrieved 
on August 14, 2012 from http://news.9ask.cn/zclaw/zczs/smzc/201105/1210223.shtml) 
211
 Consultations with three individuals, one based in Beijing and the other two based in Shanghai, on August 2
nd
, August 
8
th
, and August 11
th
 2012 respectively. 
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definition of “indigenous IPR” an option for restricted licensing of IP fully owned by a 
Chinese entity in addition to the option of ownership of the IPR.206  
 
 The definition of indigenous IPR including ownership of IPR registered in China or the option 
of “an exclusive worldwide license for five years or more” appear to be particular to several 
measures underpinning the HNTE tax scheme. These measures are discussed further in 
section below on that scheme.  
 
For context, a number of government measures using the term “indigenous intellectual property 
rights” conspicuously do not define the term. As noted in the Guidance for Enlarging Exports with 
Indigenous Intellectual Property Rights, the term as used in China is unique to China207 and in fact the 
central level, for reasons one could speculate about, does not appear to have promulgated an official 
definition of the term mandated to apply across all ministries and levels of government.208  
 
Other sources 
 
Key Chinese policy studies and Chinese legal commentaries define indigenous IPR. SIPO & PKU 
(2005), a policy study commissioned by SIPO to Beijing University, finds that “Indigenous intellectual 
property rights refer to the intellectual property legally owned by Chinese citizens, legal persons, or 
other organisations through their leading research or creative design.”209 Zhonggu Law Online 
(2011), among others, notes there is a clear distinction between “indigenous” IPR and “dependent” 
IPR, finding that indigenous IPR is that owned by domestic entity in China on an invention whose 
R&D and production was completed in China; and further notes that dependent IPR refers to all IPR, 
including that jointly held by a foreign and Chinese entity “…belong to an entity abroad, or mainly 
belong to the foreign side.”
210  
 
Additionally, consultations with two Chinese lawyers and an ex-government official based in China 
provide some useful insights into the term. The consultations confirm the term in practice is meant 
to refer to IPR on core technology owned by a Chinese entity that in no way is reliant on a foreign 
entity/influence. The consultations also suggest that the term is widely used in a variety of 
secondary sources and government interpretations as fitting this same definition; and that domestic 
Chinese companies that those consulted have talked with also interpret the concept in this same 
way. Additionally, one of those consulted said that while there might conceivably be a few examples 
of instances where the government has allowed IPR from an entity with majority foreign ownership 
to constitute indigenous IPR, this will only be to create the veneer of non-discrimination, while most 
all application of the term intentionally excludes even China-based entities with majority foreign 
ownership. 211 
 
Different types of IIPs with IND IP requirements 
 
Sub-central level Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation/Management Measures  
 
While many of the provincial/municipal Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation/Management 
Measures that were promulgated in 2006 and 2007 have since clearly been invalidated, other 
measures, or to be more precise – the provisions of several measures that are not directly related to 
government procurement preferences – do not appear to be invalidated through a publically 
available notice(s). Indeed, some measures were fully invalidated at some point in 2011. However, 
other measures do not appear to be officially invalidated, as while they are flanked by measures that 
specifically invalidate the government procurement preferences linked to indigenous innovation 
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product accreditation, they do not invalidate the entire institution of the indigenous product 
accreditation/management system as set up in the original measures.212  
 
For those provincial/municipal Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation/Management Measures 
that appear to be still valid, it is particularly concerning that some contain IPR ownership 
requirements (as distinct from licensing of IPR owned by a Chinese entity, let alone licensing of IPR 
owned abroad). By way of one example, the Hebei IIP Rules, mentioned above in Box 5, sets forth 
clear preconditions for ownership of IP rights.  Although the rules are flanked by a measure that 
invalidates government procurement preferences linked to indigenous innovation product 
accreditation, the rules do not appear invalidated in their entirety by any readily available 
invalidation notice. The indigenous product accreditation/management system established by the 
rules also does not appear invalidated. 
 
While the existence of these types of measures are not per se concerning given they are delinked 
from government procurement preferences, it is reasonable to seek assurances that they are not 
currently being linked to financial incentives outside government procurement preferences, and that 
they will not be linked to any financial incentives in the future. In fact, these concerns are made even 
more real given evidence presented in below sections within this Chapter that 
provinces/municipalities are already linking IND IP requirements to certain financial incentives. 
Generally, IND-IP-based IIPs warrant a number of concerns, the most significant of which are 
discussed in-depth below. Even at a very minimum, if Indigenous Innovation Product 
Accreditation/Management Measures have been invalidated through a non-publicly disclosed notice, 
it is disconcerting they are still published online with no such notification. 
 
In addition to the abovementioned measures, it is worth noting that several provinces in China have 
Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation/Management Measures including INDP requirements 
linked to government procurement preferences for which no invalidation notice, for the government 
procurement preferences specifically or otherwise, appear to be publically available. These include, 
for example, measures from Liaoning, Qinghai, and Sichuan.213 
 
                                                           
212
 As a general point worth highlighting in this section, given the sustainability of certain government procurement-related 
policies is scrutinised, requirements in government procurement policies that may be controversial in some respects 
require objective analysis to determine if they in fact might sustainably contribute to innovation and an economy’s 
development at large. (For example, although not directly tantamount to IND IP requirements, an investigation herein may 
look into a sometimes controversial tool used to build technology capacity that is linked with government procurement 
preferences: “offsets.” Offsets, which can include technology licensing requirements, are sometimes proposed to build 
innovation, and an analysis on these as tools to build innovation should be based on questions like those posed in Bleser, 
Prud’homme et al. (2011) Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) on the Comprehensive Economic and Trade 
Agreement (CETA) between the EU and Canada: Final Report. European Commission Trade Assessments, pp 289-290, and 
pp 304-306. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/september/tradoc_148201.pdf. If crafted properly, government 
procurement policies can be used to build industries in ways that can contribute to economic, social, and environmental 
progress.) 
213
 Liaoning Province Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation Management Rules (Provisional) issued on August 29
th
 
2009 by the Liaoning Province Department of Finance, and Liaoning Province Department of Science and Technology 
(retrieved on August 17, 2012 from http://www.lninfo.gov.cn/kjzx/show.php?itemid=11867); Qinghai Province Indigenous 
Innovation Product Accreditation Management Rules issued on May 27
th
 2010 by Qinghai Province Department of Science 
and Technology (retrieved on August 17, 2012 from http://www.qhppc.com/html/zhengcefagui/20100527/409.html); and 
Sichuan Province’s Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation Implementing Management Rules (Provisional) issued in 
2009 by Sichuan Province Department of Science and Technology, Sichuan Province Development and Reform Commission, 
Sichuan Province Economy Commission, and Sichuan Province Department of Finance (retrieved on August 17, 2012 from 
http://jscx.scst.gov.cn/NewsContent.aspx?current=%E6%94%BF%E7%AD%96%E6%96%87%E4%BB%B6&NewsID=240) 
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Also, while not necessarily as concerning as the central-level and provincial/municipal measures 
given they may involve comparatively lower value contracts,214 it is at least worth noting there are 
Chinese city-level management/accreditation guidelines for indigenous innovation products that 
currently do not appear to be officially invalided nor are flanked by measures invalidating 
government procurement preference components of the measures. One example is the Qingdao City 
Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation Management Rules (Provisional), issued by the Qingdao 
Science and Technology Bureau on August 1
st
 2008, stated to be in effect till December 31
st
 2012 and for 
which no readily available invalidation notice appears available. The measures set forth clear IND IP 
requirements linked with government procurement preferences.
215  
 
Other measures 
 
In addition to the provincial/municipal IIP accreditation catalogues that do not appear to be 
publically invalidated, this study presents a number of Chinese measures that, in some instances in 
addition to other concerns mentioned in those sections, clearly make support in the form of 
subsidies and other financial assistance contingent on IND-IP-based requirements. A non-exhaustive 
list of examples of these measures includes:  
 
 Sub-central level plans from 2011 that precondition subsidies from S&T and invention-
focused funds on enterprises meeting IND IP requirements (see Section “Ⅲ.3.1.1.1.4 Sub-
central level incentives for IP development” for more details).  
 Several measures mentioned in Section “Ⅲ.3.1.1.1.3 CFTDF and similar subsidies” that 
stipulate IND-IP-based requirements as an exclusive precondition for qualifying for subsidies 
from a foreign trade fund that, according to even old data, as a whole is worth over RMB 37 
billion.  
 Measures mentioned in Section “Ⅲ.3.1.1.2 Standardisation policies” that stipulate IND IP 
requirements and building of certain standards as a precondition from receiving grants up to 
1 million RMB.  
 Measures mentioned in Section “Ⅲ.3.1.1.1.6 HNTE status” underpinning the HNTE tax 
scheme.  
 While not yet explicitly linked to IPR ownership requirements, there are a wide range of 
recent Chinese policies that promote the future (e.g. by 2015) development of IPR 
ownership, inclusive of patent ownership, by China-based entities in a way that is worth 
seeking assurances that these policies will not be implemented via IND-IP-based measures. 
The “Chapter 3” section (as well as the “Chapter 2” section) in the Annex provides an 
overview of some of these policies. 
 
                                                           
214
 Note: City-level procurement is often of comparatively lower monetary value (this said, in China, these amounts are still 
quite sizeable given the size of its cities), and it is not unusual for it to be excluded from the commitments of parties to the 
WTO’s Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) (to which China has not even yet acceded). 
215
 Part 4: “Accredited Indigenous Innovation Products will be listed and published in Qingdao City Indigenous Innovation 
Product Catalogue… When the municipal government organs, institutions and group organisations use fiscal fund for 
government procurement they should therein prioritise products that are included in the Qingdao City Government 
Procurement Indigenous Innovation Product Catalogue….” 
Part 6: “To qualify as an accredited indigenous innovation product, a product needs to meet the following requirements:” 
Part 6, Article 2: “Products possess independent intellectual property rights, and have a clear equity situation. That is to say, 
through dominant technological innovative activities, applicant units own intellectual property rights in China by law; or 
through legal transfer or permit, Chinese enterprises, institutions or citizens obtain the ownership or the right of use for 
intellectual property rights in China by law.” (Measure retrieved on August 15, 2012 from 
http://china.trade2cn.com/news/NX70ltD355S0sv0-1.html). Translation is from the European Chamber thus is unofficial. 
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Assessing the contribution of IND-IP-based IIPs to innovation and patent quality  
 
It is important to assess if rewarding enterprises according to IND-IP-based criteria as listed in the 
aforementioned IIPs is a useful incentive to build patent quality and innovation. (While all such 
references do not necessarily mention “patents” specifically, given the context of the measures, it is 
clear that the provisions are intended to encompass patented products.) From one vantage point, 
the aforementioned IND-IP-based IIP schemes indeed seem to help to build domestic enterprises: 
indeed self-owned brands and self-owned patents (or other forms of IP) collectively can be a metric 
of the innovation capacity and competitiveness of an entity. However, this viewpoint deserves 
further analysis, particularly in terms of what factors determine transfer of IPR ownership vs. IP 
licensing in China, and if China’s preoccupation with IND-IP-based IIPs, at least the type that appear 
to be currently conceived, is the best way to stimulate innovation and related quality patents. These 
issues are briefly discussed in Box 6 and Box 7 below, and the text following those boxes. 
 
Box 6: Why might China be preoccupied with IND-IP-based IIPs? 
 
Why the preoccupation with IND-IP-based policies? 
 
It is quite clear from its IND-IP-based IIPs that China wants to build-up Chinese entities’ ownership of 
IPR, and that policymakers believe IND IP IIPs a useful way to do so. Within this drive to build up 
ownership of IPR, Chinese policymakers inferably view IND IP IIPs as important for a number of more 
specific, sometimes inter-related reasons. Among potentially other rationales, such policies might be 
argued by the government to create exogenous incentives for Chinese entities to:  
 Build indigenous innovation strength which in turn strengthens the perception of China as 
an innovator, which creates spillovers in terms of building reputation abroad which can 
translate into various economic gains; 
 Build  indigenous innovation strength which in turn stimulates nationalism at home which 
further stimulates domestic innovation; and 
 Contribute to China’s national economic security by ensuring a strong foundation of 
domestically-owned patents. 
 
The policies might also be argued by the government to supplement the incentives endogenous to 
building IP ownership experienced by Chinese entities, namely the ability to: 
 Enjoy protection on inventions which encourages further investment in R&D and other 
inputs of innovation to create other inventions in China;  
 Enjoy higher royalties that must be paid when the technology is licensed and/or otherwise 
strengthen bargaining with competitors; 
 Avoid paying the aforementioned royalties to another (e.g. foreign) entity;  
 Use litigation grounded on an owned patent to  drain competitors’ resources and thus put 
them at a competitive disadvantage;  
 Deter litigation by threatening to countersue with an owned patent; and 
 Block competitors’ development in a certain field by monopolising patent ownership in that 
field.  
 
Are these solid policy arguments for why IND-IP-based IIPs as currently conceived will best create 
quality patents and related innovation? 
 
The general idea that IND-IP-based IIPs may optimally encourage patent quality and related 
innovation, particularly breakthrough innovation, in China is questioned in the text following this 
box. In short, to the extent IND IP requirements are linked to discriminatory practices, for example 
subsidies, as mentioned in subsequent sections in this Chapter, they may hamper the end goal of 
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building patent quality and related innovation.  
 
In addition to this analysis, some of the more specific abovementioned reasons for IND-IP-based-
based IIPs in China deserve scrutiny. For example, it should at least be noted that IP royalties are not 
necessarily always a very significant part of profit for certain companies, although are certainly 
important in some cases.216 It is also apparent that Chinese entities’ overuse of patents as 
“weapons” in litigation has caused waste of public resources and hampers innovation and building of 
quality patent in China (these issues are further discussed in Chapter 4 hereto).  
 
 
Four reasons why China’s IND-IP-based IIPs as currently conceived may not stimulate breakthrough 
innovation and patent quality as well as envisaged by policymakers: 
 
This section must be premised by again saying, as mentioned above, that a desire to boost 
indigenous intellectual property rights and indigenous Chinese innovation is by no means a negative 
policy objective, and in fact in principle goes hand-in-hand with the larger objective of boosting 
innovation and patent quality in China; however, the devil is in the details in terms of the exact types 
of efforts undertaken to achieve this goal. As such, it is important to critically assess if China’s IND-IP-
based IIPs as currently conceived will actually best stimulate innovation, particularly breakthrough 
innovation, and related patent quality. Although there is an absence of detailed studies empirically 
assessing these dynamics, and some ambiguity in the exact legal requirements of some IND IP IIPs,217 
this study posits a number of potential problems with China’s current IND-IP-based IIPs showing they 
very well might not stimulate breakthrough innovation and associated patent quality as well as 
perhaps envisaged by policymakers. 
 
First, overemphasis of what could be termed ‘IND IP thought’ in Chinese IIP can indoctrinate the 
policymaking system in a way that prevents creation and implementation of other domestic Chinese 
innovation polices that could be more helpful for building-up quality patent filings and related 
innovation. The preoccupation with IND IP can overly indoctrinate the policy formulation process, in 
effect steering policy in only one direction (the IND IP-related direction). This would not necessarily 
be a problem in the IND IP criteria plus financial incentives formula was a rigorously proven (e.g. via 
empirical economic analysis) approach towards optimally stimulating innovation; however, it does 
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 Note: For example, in 2010 royalty revenue as a share of total revenue for Philips was only 1.86%, for Ericsson was only 
2.26%, and for Astra Zeneca was only 1.61%. That said, there are other firms where royalty revenues make up a 
significantly higher share of their total revenue, and it is likely that such royalties would be very important for SMEs. 
(Source: WIPO [2011], p. 64) 
217
 Of note, it is not fully clear on paper to what extent Chinese entities need to own all IPR (or be licensed IPR from 
Chinese entities owning such IPR) on specified products to qualify under many of the indigenous innovation product 
accreditation programs that were reviewed. There does not appear to be clear requirements across all measures on the 
exact extent of ownership (or licensing) of products required, for example all the measures do not clearly require 
ownership for 100% of all IP relevant to specified products. Although certain measures reviewed say “ownership and 
interest shall be clear and ‘stable’” and “a product can have more than one invention patents, utility patents, software 
copyrights and innovated brands,” it is not fully clear, on paper at least, about the handling of an instance where one 
product is indeed associated with more than one related patent with different ownership structures. In the absence of 
such requirements, a Chinese entity could theoretically qualify under the IIPs as having “indigenously innovated” products 
if they only own (or are licensed) one (or a few) patents from Chinese entities (perhaps of dubious value) on specified 
products, whereas there are other patents on that product owned or licensed by entities based abroad. And further, 
therein the company’s real competitive advantage (even in terms of the product in question) could in fact be derived from 
other factors.  
 
However, all of this said, drawing from the more specific definitions of “indigenous intellectual property rights” in other 
measures outside the product accreditation IIPs reviewed, and upon review of secondary sources and consultations with 
experts in China, it seems likely that in practice an entity with an ideal “indigenous innovation product” would meet typical 
IND IP requirements, i.e. the entity would be Chinese (without foreign majority ownership) and have 100% ownership of all 
IPR associated with that product.   
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not appear to be. Thus, if alternative views were better heeded and different, more proven, policies 
crafted and implemented, at least in addition to these IND-IP-based policies, this could very well 
more optimally stimulate domestic innovation and patent quality in China. Allowing licensed IP from 
entities abroad would in itself be a more positive policy approach than the IND IP approach, the 
same, well-recognised conclusion manifested in the April 2010 Draft Notice. Other alternative 
approaches could be considered, for example, criteria for substantial and productive investments in 
R&D (which do not appear to be criteria in many of the IND-IP-based IIPs measures reviewed218). 
 
The comparative power of certain personalities in ministries making innovation policy, e.g. MoST 
above MOFCOM, might exacerbate genuine collegial creation of the best innovation policies herein, 
whereas a more collegial approach is likely ideal given the multi-faceted nature of innovation 
policymaking which requires expertise in S&T issues, patents, investment, tax, among other areas. 
And even herein, on one hand although there is indeed evidence of an ostensible dialogue between 
the ministries, on the other hand the policies produced therein may still reference potentially 
disconcerting IIPs. For example, albeit not explicit, there is a potentially concerning link between 
financial incentives and “IP rights obtained from indigenous innovation activities” in the latest 2012 
National IP Strategy.219  
 
Second, given decision-making of foreign enterprises, it seems unlikely that IND-IP-based policies will 
effectively push (or pull) competitive foreign firms at large to increasingly transfer ownership of IP to 
Chinese entities, particularly quality IP, and in fact may encourage them not to transfer ownership of 
IP or even license IP (exclusively or otherwise) to Chinese entities. While the obvious objective of 
such IND-IP-based policies is to build indigenous innovation capacity as distinct from that built upon 
foreign innovation, it seems highly unlikely that the policies intend to discourage foreign companies 
from transferring much needed know-how to and developing much needed know-how in the 
Chinese market. To be sure, it is well-recognised by the Chinese government, as reflected in a wide 
variety of policy statements mentioned throughout this study, that foreign know-how, if utilised 
properly, is one crucial building block for innovation in China.  
 
IND-IP-based policies will likely not stimulate further foreign ownership or licensing transfers of 
quality IP to Chinese entities because, despite the occasional anecdotal examples to the contrary, 
empirical evidence over the last 20 years presented in Chapter 1 suggests that foreign enterprises at 
large avoid transferring breakthrough technology via licensing let alone transferring ownership to 
China or otherwise developing world-class technology in China. (For context, a variety of studies 
note that multinational companies use different methods of technology transfer, which may include 
licensing and ownership transfer, depending on the level of IPR protection in a host country.220) This 
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 There are exceptions. For example, requirements in the Indigenous Innovation Product Accreditation Management 
Rules of Dalian, in Liaoning Province, issued on Dec. 2008, Dazhengban Fa [2008] No.203 by Dalian Municipality, in Article 2 
(2) find: “The proportion of funding input for high-technology and products R&D in the enterprise last year should account 
for more than 5% of annual sales revenue.” Of note, Hebei, in its annex, generally states that enterprises which are 
recognised as the manufacturer of independent innovation products should report their R&D funding each October. 
219
 While they do not explicitly reference IP “ownership,” the focus on “IP rights obtained” as linked to indigenous 
innovation activities in  S&T projects is mentioned in Part 1, measure 1 and 2 of the latest 2012 National IP Strategy, to 
which 28 government bodies contributed, and should at least be monitored. Part 1, measure 1: MoST: “Revise the 
Assessment Index System of National Technology Invention Awards, enhance the assessment on patent quality, increase the 
rewards to significant technological inventions and IP rights obtained through indigenous innovation activities.” Part 1, 
measure 2: MIIT: “…give priority and assistance to projects which obtained IP rights through indigenous innovation 
activities, specify the acceleration of indigenous innovation capacity building…” (emphasis added) 
220
 Maskus (2000) notes there are three ways to transfer technology across international borders: trade through goods; 
foreign direct investment (FDI) within enterprises (multinationals, in particular); and contractual licensing of technology 
among unaffiliated firms, subsidiaries and/or joint ventures. The same study finds that FDI, often a main method of patent 
ownership transfer, rises only when patent rights are strengthened to levels with which enterprises are comfortable, 
otherwise licensing agreements are preferred. (Source: Maskus, K. E. (2000). Intellectual property rights and economic 
development. Paper for “Beyond the Treaties: A Symposium on Compliance with International Intellectual Property Law” at 
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is due to fears over China’s IPR protection environment and given these firms' market power. 
Consultations within the European Chamber find that this generally represents decision-making of 
some of the biggest and most competitive multinationals, most of who have been operating in China 
for decades.221 The aforementioned IND-IP-based IIPs do nothing to alleviate the fear about the 
quality of the IPR environment in China, and given their discriminatory nature in fact worsen foreign 
enterprises’ perception of the friendlessness of the innovation environment at large in China. And 
this likely holds even with the economic downturns in the rest of the world and the comparative 
attractiveness of the Chinese market acting as a pull factor. 
 
To be sure, this trend will also apply to foreign SMEs as well as multinationals. INSME (2011) notes 
that to-date European firms most commonly transfer their technology to Chinese firms via licensing 
agreements as opposed to transferring ownership, adding that many of these technology transfers 
are not even in the areas of high-technology but in low technology, or consumer or industrial 
products.222 And even for new SMEs with highest-quality patents looking to take advantage of 
opportunities in the Chinese market, there is a strong reluctance, given IPR enforcement concerns 
among other issues, to establishing any operations in China, let alone transfer ownership of 
technology to Chinese entities.223 The aforementioned INP IP IIPs do nothing to improve foreign 
SMEs’ perception of the IPR enforcement environment in China, and in fact worsen their perception 
on the innovation environment at large in China.  
 
As a note, this trend is further reinforced by the fact that even if “worldwide rights to exclusive use” 
is allowed in some measures as an option in meeting IIP IPR requirements, this option cannot be 
practically met, as current Chinese law effectively prohibits an owner/licensor from retaining IP 
usage rights in a foreign jurisdiction, and also prohibits any other person, including a subsidiary of a 
foreign enterprise from receiving a sublicense from the China licensee.224 This further undermines 
the ability of IIP IPR requirements to spur patent quality and related innovation. (For more on this 
specific point see the later section in this Chapter on the HNTE scheme.) 
 
Third, and in a related vein to the second point, China’s IND-IP-based IIPs may even have some push 
effect of encouraging some companies to develop certain initiatives in alternative regions where 
they can contribute to quality patents and local innovation. Innovation investments by companies in 
EU Member States in particular may be increasingly pushed away from China towards India, the US 
and Canada, Eastern Europe, Japan, other EU Member States, among other places. Obviously this 
decision-making is based on a wide range of pull factors, but when also compounded with the push 
factors mentioned in the Introduction to this study and other places throughout (e.g. IPR 
enforcement concerns, lack of access to credit, shortage of talent in certain areas) may ultimately 
create a more notable drag on innovation and related development of quality patents in China than 
if such polices were replaced with more palatable ones.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Case Western Reserve University. Retrieved from University of Colorado, Department of Economics. Web site: 
http://www.colorado.edu/Economics/mcguire/workingpapers/cwrurev.doc). McDaniel (1999) finds that in large markets 
with both high potential returns on investment (ROI), although firms prefer to utilise FDI despite its comparatively higher 
fixed costs, as opposed to licensing which has lower fixed costs but also a lower ROI, if uncertainty surrounds security of 
patent rights (even in countries with a high market potential, as in Japan in the 1980s and 1990s), IPR licensing is used as 
an alternative to patent transfer via FDI given too much IPR leakage in the latter. (Source: McDaniel, C. (1999). Inventing 
around and impacts on modes of entry in Japan: A cross-country analysis of U.S. affiliate sales and licensing. Office of 
Economics Study, USITC. Retrieved from http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/working_papers/EC9911A.PDF). Among 
other sources discussing related phenomena, see Maskus (1998).  
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 13 March 2012 - Consultations with several European Chamber members in Shanghai 
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  INSME. (2011).Technology transfer to China: Guidance for businesses. Retrieved from http://insme.org/insme-
newsletter/2011/file-e-allegati/newsletter_documents/Technology_transfer_to_China_FINAL.pdf 
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 2012, March 23- Consultations on SMEs’ internationalisation in China with a DG Enterprise representative  
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 Orrick. (2010, January). China income tax preferences for high/new-tech enterprises (HNTE). Orrick Tax Law Update. 
Retrieved from http://www.orrick.com/fileupload/2420.pdf 
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As noted in Box 4 in Chapter 1, Chinese and EU companies suggest that access to government-
sponsored sources of finance is critical in allowing them to boost patent creation and utilisation. 
Survey data from EU companies suggests that outside access to key talent, access to public grants, 
fiscal incentives, and public loans and guarantees are some of the most important factors affecting 
EU companies’ innovation plans and activities.225 Consultations also suggest that access to the 
aforementioned types of financial support is a key factor affecting many private Chinese companies’ 
(including those using IPR sometimes licensed from foreign entities) innovation plans and 
activities.226 As such, in order to better attract certain innovators from the EU (particularly those that 
are not as well-funded as others), and also to fully stimulate many private Chinese enterprises, 
China’s innovation policies should be crafted in a way that does not unnecessarily exclude potential 
innovators; however, IND-IP-based IIPs do not appear to most objectively reflect these policy 
considerations. 
 
Further, to the extent that other countries have policies that do not overemphasise IND-IP-based IIP-
style polices which in effect may ‘crowd out’ licensing from abroad, they may pull in some licensed 
IPR that China could have otherwise realised without its IND IP IIPs. This may arise to the extent that 
IND-IP-based IIPs overly discourage IPR licensing, whereas IPR licensing is one important method to 
build innovation, and such an approach would discourage licensing spillovers that could lead to 
development of quality patents. There is solid potential for more licensing from foreign firms in 
China as well as those not yet in China but looking to expand there, whereas Giuri and Torrisi (2011) 
find there is still a significant potential for firms from high-income countries to license their patents 
in China, as gauged by their current plans to do so or lack of utilising such options as of yet. Amongst 
European firms in particular, roughly 24% have patents they apparently would be willing to license 
(although the data does not say to whom exactly) but have not yet done so.227  
 
The overemphasis conundrum also applies to the extent that IND-IP-based-IIPs might overly 
discourage policies stimulating “open innovation,” the concept that firms can share/use internal and 
external ideas and paths to advance their technology, which is sometimes considered to be hindered 
by less than optimal IPR regimes.228 Open innovation in some circumstances may better enable 
building breakthrough innovation and in the longer term also lead to quality patent filings.229  
 
Additionally, given the globalised nature of production chains at present, which are dispersed 
throughout a variety of countries and will likely inevitably continue to be dispersed to take 
advantage of comparative advantages, China’s justification for IND IP policies based on national 
economic and technological security may be less convincing than otherwise assumed. Specifically, 
licensing of technology and other forms of knowledge-sharing outside that necessitated by IND IP 
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 European Commission, (2010), p. 17  
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 2012, April 17- Consultations with several members of the European Chamber in Shanghai 
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 Giuri, P., & Torrisi, S. (2011). The economic uses of patents. Munich, Final Conference of the InnoS&T project “Innovative 
S&T indicators for empirical models and policies: Combining patent data and surveys”; and WIPO (2011), p. 65 
228
 Among others see: Lee, N., Nystén-Haarala, S., & Huhtilainen, L. (2010). Interfacing intellectual property rights and open 
innovation. Retrieved from http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/wipo_ipr_ge_11/wipo_ipr_ge_11_topic6.pdf 
229
 Note: Herein, it should be considered that open innovation and other public disclosure of inventions are important for 
building-up innovation and leading to future quality patent filings. Baldwin and Von Hippel (2010) use empirical evidence 
to suggest that ownership of IPR is not as essential to innovation as perhaps assumed, whereas open source innovation can 
very much lead to key innovations. (Source: Baldwin, C. Y., & Von Hippel, E. A. (2010). Modeling a paradigm shift: From 
producer innovation to user and open collaborative innovation. Harvard Business School Finance Study, No. 10-038. 
Retrieved from http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1502864). WIPO (2011) also suggests that there can 
be a place for open innovation, for example, among research institutes and universities, to spur important innovations. 
Also, it is well-known that a significant amount of information used to build future patents is taken from publicly available 
information on already granted patents. As a result, an entity can benefit from open innovation and others’ patent filings in 
creating its own innovation.  
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requirements are increasingly underpinning much of the global operations of many entities of many 
nationalities. 
 
Fourth, IND-IP-based IIPs may be in violation of WTO rules, particularly Article 3 (on national 
treatment) of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement, and thus 
if effectively challenged will need to be replaced by a strategy that less discriminatorily attempts to 
promote innovation.230 It may be prudent for alternative strategies for boosting innovation and 
quality patents to already start taking the places of these type of IIPs rather than allowing them to 
exist as a core part of China’s innovation policy and thus preempting any lags in efficiency that might 
result between required nullification of the policies and crafting more appropriate new ones.   
 
Side note: So what policy tools might encourage IP transfers? 
 
As IP transfers were mentioned earlier in this section, it should be noted that promoting trade gains 
may be one alternative to encourage IP transfers. Galasso et al. (2001) finds that patents with higher 
potential gains from trade are more likely to experience a change in ownership.231 As such, there is 
at least some indication that if the authorities can build the economy in a way that provides further 
trade gains, foreign companies then could increasingly transfer IP ownership to China-based entities. 
This said, it is important to contextualise Galasso et al. (2001) with the findings of Hu (2008) and the 
other innovation trend-related background information in Chapter 1 of this study.232  
Ⅲ.3.1.1.1.3 CFTDF and similar subsidies 
 
There is concerning evidence of large Chinese subsidy funds that are built on discriminatory IND-IP-
based requirements as well as continent on export performance. Some of these subsidies fall within 
China’s Central Foreign Trade Development Fund (CFTDF), a large fund investigated in this study 
which has surprisingly seemed to fly under the radar of most observers.233 According to a Chinese 
government-supported audit report, it appears that up until 2004 the income from quota bidding (a 
typical funding source for China’s subsidy programs) channelled into the CFTDF reached RMB 37.7 
billion, among which RMB 29.5 billion had been allocated to enterprises qualifying for the fund. Only 
RMB 3.5 billion, or 12% of the amount allocated to enterprises qualifying for the fund, was 
distributed in the form of loans, whereas RMB 25.7 billion of the fund was very likely given in the 
form of grants. These monies were given to 247 projects, and out of those projects 103 (41.7% of the 
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 For one analysis of a potential WTO case herein see: An, S., & Peck, B. (2011). China’s indigenous innovation policy in 
the context of its WTO obligations and commitments. Georgetown Journal of International Law. Retrieved on March 30, 
2012 from http://gjil.org/wp-content/uploads/archives/42.2/ChinasIndigenousInnovation.pdf. (pp 437-442 of that paper 
note that certain IP-specific provisions in China’s IIPs appear to be in violation of Article 3 as well as Article 27.1 of the 
TRIPS Agreement). Note: In the opinion of this study, IND IP requirements may conceivably conflict with Article 3 of TRIPS, 
which stipulates national treatment of “protection” of IPR (however, an argument based upon Article 27.1 seems less 
convincing). As a very important caveat, however, it would be absolutely necessary to fully investigate how Footnote 3 in 
Article 3 of TRIPS is intended to be applied, whereas that footnote defines “protection” of IPR as: “For the purposes of 
Articles 3 and 4, "protection" shall include matters affecting the availability, acquisition, scope, maintenance and 
enforcement of intellectual property rights as well as those matters affecting the use of intellectual property rights 
specifically addressed in this Agreement.” A further analysis of these dynamics is well beyond the scope of this study.   
231
 Galasso, A., Schankerman, M., & Serrano, C. J. (2011). Trading and enforcing patent rights. Retrieved from 
http://www.economics.utoronto.ca/serrano/papers/GSS_paper.pdf 
232
 Note: Recall Hu (2008) finds that patent filing trends in China do not follow the market covering hypothesis; however, 
Hu (2008) focuses on IP filings, whereas the findings in Galasso et al. (2001) relate to IPR ownership transfer (post-filings). 
As such, Hu (2008) does not necessarily challenge the aforementioned findings. 
233
 See Prud’homme, D. (2012, forthcoming). The biggest subsidy scheme nobody’s heard of: China’s Central Foreign Trade 
Development Fund. European Chamber Working Paper. Note: many subsidies herein are clearly discriminatory and violate 
WTO obligations in the SCM Agreement, namely Article 3 on prohibited subsides and Article 5 on actionable subsidies, and 
as related to export subsidies in some cases conflicts with Paragraphs 166 and 167 of the Report of the Working Party on 
the Accession of China. 
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projects which received loans) did not even repay their fund loans on time (thus the amount of un-
repaid loans to the CFTDF totalled RMB 980 million, which was 27.66% of the total funds distributed 
for loans).234  
 
Some examples of these discriminatory subsidies are listed below: 
 
 Administrative Measures for Research and Development Fund of Export Products issued by 
MOF and the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (former version of 
MOFCOM), which is one of the earliest relevant measures found during research for this 
study, and is still effective:235 
 
Article 2: “The term export R&D funds in this measure means the government funds 
drawn from the Central Foreign Trade Development Fund as a subsidy that does not 
need to be repaid to support research and development of export products.” 
 
Article 8:  “The export R&D funds will as a matter of priority provide subsidies for 
enterprises and projects meeting the following conditions: 
(1) According to Customs statistics, last year’s export volume accounts for more than 
50% of the total sales revenue or exports are worth more than 15 million U.S. 
dollars… 
(5) Have indigenous intellectual property rights…”
236
 
 
 Application Guidance for Fund for the Optimisation of Import & Export of Machinery & 
Electrical Product and High-Tech Products, issued on September 3rd 2007 by MOFCOM and 
MoF, which provides free financing of labor costs, equipment costs, fuel and power costs, 
rental fees, testing fees, material fees, “commissioned development fees”, and “appraisal 
and acceptance fees.” The main IND-IP-based and export restrictions for qualifying for these 
funds are: 
 
Part 4, Article 4: “an R&D project must…generic technology programs should have 
indigenous intellectual property and related entities should have clear intellectual 
property rights.” 
 
Part 2, Section 2, criteria 2: “…last year’s exports accounted for more than 50% of 
the total sales revenue or enterprise exports more than 15 million U.S. dollars.
 
 
 
Part 2, Section 4: “Special funding support includes: 
Article 4.1: Free financing; 
Article 4.5: The amount of subsidy for construction programs for base public service 
platforms average no more than 10 million RMB, significant programs no more than 
20 million RMB, and the amount of subsidies for single enterprise programs average 
no more than 3 million RMB. 
Article 4.7: Funds will be appropriated in two stages: first for 60% of funds after 
approval, and the other 40% funds will be given after programs are accomplished 
and qualifications are verified.”
237
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 Shandong Institute of Internal Audits. (2005, November 4). Audit shows the disadvantages of Foreign Trade Funds. 
Beijing News. Retrieved on April 15, 2012 from http://www.sdiia.gov.cn/yznews/showdetail.apx?id=4543 
235
 No readily available notice appears to be issued nullifying or superseding the measure when last checked on August 17, 
2012. 
236
 Promulgated on November 27, 2002, last retrieved on April 30, 2012 from 
http://www.zwgk.suzhou.gov.cn/dpt/show.asp?ID=18598 Note 1: Translation from the European Chamber thus is 
unofficial. Note 2: There is no definition of the term “indigenous intellectual property” in the measure itself. 
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 Notice on Good Performance of the Construction Fund for Guangdong Export Bases of 
Agricultural, Light Industry and Textile Products for the year of 2011 issued on June 14th 2011 
by the Department of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation of Guangdong Province and 
Department of Finance of Guangdong Province: 
 
Section 1, Part 1: “The source of the fund for agricultural, light industry and textile 
products is the Guangdong Foreign Trade Development Promotion Fund according to 
the new provincial financial arrangements of Guangdong….”  
Section 1, Part 2: “The fund is implemented and managed by programs and the fund 
is used as a grant…” 
Section 1, Part 3, Para. 1: “….The support scope of the funding includes covering the 
expenditure for instruments and equipment (not for production use), software, 
expert advice and information and certification needed for R&D, design, quality 
control, and product testing of export enterprises as well as the expenditure such as 
venue rental costs for activities.” 
 
Section 3, Para. 3: “The enterprises that apply for the public technology platform 
program for agriculture, light industry and textile product export should have 
indigenous intellectual property rights…”
238 
 
As mentioned, the above list is non-exhaustive. In fact, research for this study has uncovered a 
variety of other policies existing under the CFTDF that include IND-IP-based requirements, as well as 
export and other preconditions for receiving subsidies.239  
 
Further, it is worth further investigating if such subsidies, or related subsidies, are linked or will be 
linked to targets in certain recent provincial IP plans and strategies (e.g. Provincial/Municipal 12th 
Five Year IP Plans reviewed in this study, different components of which are mentioned in the 
“Chapter 2” and “Chapter 3” sections in the Annex).240 In fact, this link would not necessarily be a 
new policy initiative. For example, although less than 100% explicit, it appears to still be relatively 
clear from a number of recent past measures, like the below-mentioned measure, that Chinese policy 
targets for IND IP and export growth have a history of being linked to CFTDF subsidies:  
 
 Opinions on Accelerating the Transformation of the Export Growth of Electromechanical 
Products within the period of Eleventh Five Year, issued on May 27th 2006 by MOFCOM, 
NDRC, MoST, MoF, MIIT, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC), General Administration of 
Customs (GAC), State Administration of Taxation (SAT), and General Administration of 
Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ): 
 
Section 1, Article 2: “…by 2010 the export volume of high-tech electromechanical 
products to account for 55% of the total export…the proportion of export 
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  Retrieved on April 22, 2012 from http://www.smes-tp.com/Article_Show.asp?ArticleID=32448 Notes: Translation from 
the European Chamber thus is unofficial. This measure was only intended to be effective in 2007. There is no definition of 
the term “indigenous intellectual property rights” in the measure itself. 
238
 Retrieved on April 30, 2012 from http://www.gddoftec.gov.cn/admin/UploadFile/2011621161019379.pdf Notes: 
Translation from the European Chamber thus is unofficial. This measure was only intended to be effective in 2011. There is 
no definition of the term “indigenous intellectual property rights” in the measure itself. 
239
 Note: While these aforementioned criteria may be concerning, it is important to note that some of these measures 
include criterion for R&D output, which as mentioned in the IND-IP-based IIPs section and related Recommendations in this 
Chapter in fact is, in the view of this study, a useful criterion for innovation funding. 
240
 For example, among others, an indicator in Hunan’s Provincial Intellectual Property Strategies Outline of February 26, 
2009 sets forth an objective that “indigenous intellectual property rights and indigenous brands’ exports to 
reach ≥ 20% and ≥ 50% respectively of total export volume.” (see the “Chapter 2” section in the Annex for further indicators 
from provincial IP proposals.) 
 92 
 
electromechanical products which own indigenous brands and indigenous 
intellectual property rights to account for 20% of the total export volume of 
electromechanical products.” 
 
Section 5, Article 18: “Continue to annually withdraw a sum of money from the 
Central Foreign Trade Development Fund to mainly support the R&D and subsidised 
loans of technical transformation of export electromechanical products, and when 
conditions permit, localities should also be given financial support.”
241 
 
From one vantage point, the aforementioned subsidy schemes indeed might help to build domestic 
enterprises, given self-owned brands, self-owned patent rights, and sales records collectively can be 
a metric of the competitiveness of an entity. So rewarding enterprises meeting such criteria might 
seem like an obviously useful incentive. 
 
However, for the same four reasons mentioned in the previous IND-IP-based IIPs section, with some 
supplemental details to those reasons, it appears that the abovementioned subsidy approaches will 
not necessarily best encourage quality patent filings and related innovation in the ways ostensibly 
envisaged. Regarding the differences in details, in terms of the fourth reason from the IIPs section on 
WTO conflicts, the subsidies mentioned in this section not only potentially contradict the TRIPS 
Agreement but are also clearly in contradiction with Article 3 of the WTO’s Subsidies and 
Countervailing Duties (SCM) Agreement, among other provisions in China’s WTO commitments.242 
(And note that the above cited measures were not specifically mentioned in the apparently resolved 
case filed against China on its China World Top Brand Programme and Chinese Famous Export Brand 
Programme.243) Thus, replacement strategies will need to be put in place by the Chinese authorities 
if these and related subsidy policies and their implementing measures are effectively challenged.244  
 
Additionally, requiring patent-ownership-related criteria for high-exporting enterprises may be 
unnecessary as it may not establish innovation and competitiveness-building incentives in the most 
efficient and effective ways. Specifically, empirical evidence across a range of countries suggests that 
export capacity is already one of the most statistically significant indicators of patent filings.245 As 
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 Retrieved on May 16, 2012 from http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/aarticle/difang/ningxia/200609/20060903039965.html 
Notes: Translation from the European Chamber thus is unofficial. Although there appears to be no readily available notice 
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 Specifically, DS387, initiated by the US on December 19
th
 2008 and joined by Australia, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, the 
European Communities, Guatemala, Mexico, New Zealand and Turkey in January 2009. The press reported the USTR signed 
an agreement with China to remove “numerous subsidies” mentioned in the DS387 case (source: China resolves WTO case 
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 Note: The reason such subsidies are not allowed under the WTO framework is not necessarily that they do not “work at 
all” in building-up enterprises, although some certainly argue this, rather that countries have agreed to mutually limit 
discriminatory rules with a view to allowing market forces and more ‘neutral’ support mechanisms to determine the most 
competitive industries. 
245
 Note 1: Blind (2006) looks at patent applications at the European Patent Office (EPO) and finds an upsurge in patent 
activities cannot be explained by expansion in R&D expenditures, but rather the most powerful indicator of international 
patent applications is export volumes. (Source: Blind, K. (2006). Chapter 5: Driving forces of patent applications at the 
European Patent Office: a sectoral approach. In Hingley, P., & Nicolas, M., Forecasting innovations: Methods for predicting 
numbers of patent filings, pp. 73-94. Heidelberg, Germany. Springer.) Note 2: Encaoua et al. (2000) also finds that 
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such, firms that export already have the incentive to protect their patents (and trademarks, and 
other forms of IP) abroad without such CFTDF subsidies. This said, perhaps surprisingly, it is apparent 
that some Chinese firms, for example some SMEs, that export knowledge-intensive goods and 
services abroad do not actually register their IPR abroad.246 Either way, given the previously 
mentioned drawbacks in the specific subsidies, such funds might better be used to build-up 
innovative enterprises and support patent quality in different ways not necessarily based on IND IP 
export criteria.247 
Ⅲ.3.1.1.1.4 Sub-central level incentives for IP development 
 
Just based upon the recent IP proposals reviewed for this study, it is clear that many provinces in 
China have set-forth special award programs and are intent on utilising a number of financial 
incentives to spur development of quality patents. Many of these initiatives seem commendable. For 
example, Anhui sets out an Anhui Patent award “to improve patent quality” and Hebei notes the 
need to calibrate financial funding for patent initiatives based upon differences in enterprises size, 
location and stage of development. Jiangsu looks into establishing a “Patent Bank;” sets out an 
initiative that registered patent intermediary service organisations engaged in patent technology 
development and other practices can be exempted from the business tax (BT) and education 
surcharge; notes that financial investment in developing IP should outpace immediate ROI; among 
others. Liaoning promotes a 500,000 RMB Gold Award for China Patents and a 200,000 RMB China 
Patent Excellence Award. Ningxia promotes similar awards to Liaoning, and mentions setting-up 
special funds to stimulate invention patents. A number of provinces provide funding specifically for 
registering patents abroad. Other IP proposals reviewed also have seemingly relatively well-aimed 
financial funds to build patent quality. (Note: these award programs are not concerning if they do 
not include IND IP-type criteria.) 
 
There are also provinces/municipalities that while setting out some commendable initiatives in the 
provincial/municipal IP proposals reviewed in this study also set out potentially concerning 
provisions. For example, on one hand, Tianjin’s 12th Five Year IP Plan (from 2011), sets forth a variety 
of interesting financial plans, including a “Tianjin Patent Award,” “Worker Inventor Award,” “Women 
Inventor Award,” and “Juvenile Inventor Award,” and promotes the “One Award, Two 
Remuneration” system.248 However, on the other hand, the Tianjin plan also sets out advice that 
funding from specific government funds from the key technology invention project fund, science and 
technology invention fund, and technology invention fund for SMEs should “tilt towards enterprises 
with indigenous intellectual property rights.” Table 13 below illustrates these financial incentives. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
propensity to patent solutions rises as exports rise, whereas exporting firms face more competition and thus increasingly 
need to protect knowledge-based resources (Source: See Encaoua, D., Hall, B. H., Laisney, F., & Mairesse, J. et. (2000). The 
economics and econometrics of innovation. Dordrecht, Netherlands. Kluwer Academic Publishers.) 
246
 Consultations with several Chinese companies in the nutrition and machinery industries on April 12
th
 2012 and April 18
th
 
2012. Note: Without government consultations it is unclear how much this phenomenon plays into the rationale behind 
the aforementioned subsidy policies. 
247
 To be sure, for the reasons mentioned, this is despite the fact that, as found in Girma et al. (2009), export subsidies at 
large (although not necessarily those in the CFTDF specifically) could indeed boost exports of Chinese firms in capital-
intensive industries that may see certain levels of innovativeness. (Source: Girma, S., Gong, Y., Gorg, H., & Yu, Z. (2009). 
Can production subsidies explain China’s export performance? Evidence from first-level data. The Scandinavian Journal of 
Economics, Issue 4, 863-891. Retrieved from http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9442.2009.01586.x/full) 
248
 Note: this system appears grounded in the Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Rules for Implementation of the 
Patent Law, the revised version of which was issued on January 9
th
 2010 by the State Council and took effect on February 1, 
2010. Specifically, see Part 6, Article 76, 77, and 78 (as well as Article 16 of the Patent Law). For an English translation of 
the measures see: http://www.ccpit-patent.com.cn/references/Implementing_Regulations_Patent_Law_China.htm   
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The IND-IP-based funding approaches in such types of proposals may raise the types of concerns 
discussed in the previous IND-IP-based IIPs section.249  
 
Table 13: Example financial incentives for patent development from recent IP proposals reviewed 
Province/Municipality Financial incentives for patent development 
Tianjin • From IP Plan issued in 2011:  
Section 4, Part 6, Article 1: “Improving patent quantity and quality…enacting the 
‘Tianjin Implementation Measures on the Ownership and the Bonus and 
Payment System of Service Invention-Creations.’ Implement the ‘One award, 
Two remunerations’ system and other relevant regulations. Encourage annual 
growth rates of enterprise patent applications up to 20%.” 
 
Section 5, Article 3: “Greatly publicise and recognise the institutions and 
individuals who contribute outstandingly to the field of intellectual property, 
strengthening the influence of awards such as the Tianjin Patent Award, Worker 
Inventor Award, Women Inventor Award, and Juvenile Inventor Award. Setting 
forth a wide distribution of awards including taking shares in the form of 
intellectual property rights; accelerating the forming of a new distribution 
system which will stimulate inventions and the implementation of patent 
transformation.” 
 
Section 5, Article 4: “…Strengthen the significance of intellectual property in 
science and technology awards …Special funds such as the key technology 
invention project fund, science and technology invention fund, technology 
invention fund for technological SMEs, and government financial funds should 
tilt towards enterprises with indigenous intellectual property rights. ” 
Source: Author’s selection of articles from provincial/municipal 12
th
 Five Year Intellectual Property Rights Plans 
and IP Strategies. A non-exhaustive list of other articles from provincial/municipal 12
th
 Five Year IP Plans, IP 
Strategies, and equivalent/related policies that mention financial incentives for IPR development are listed in 
the “Chapter 3” section in the Annex. Translations are from the European Chamber thus are unofficial. 
 
Additionally, while not necessarily overtly concerning, per se, there are a range of incentives, 
including but not limited to financial incentives, often offered at the municipal and local levels to 
spur inventions, directly and indirectly intended to encourage patent applications, the usefulness 
and workings of which deserve further investigation with their implementing authorities. For 
example, according to regulations like the 2012 Grading Policy for Non-Shanghainese College 
Graduates of Obtaining Employment in Shanghai, issued in May 2012 during the Joint Meeting on 
the Employment of Shanghai College Graduates, students and workers who file patents are more 
likely to earn a hukou, a Chinese residence permit which restricts workers from moving to cities they 
are not originally from.250 Sources find that professors who own patents are more likely to win 
tenure.251 Applicants to research universities and institutes are given preference in admission if they 
file more patents.252 Companies with patents are more likely to win big government contracts.253 
                                                           
249
 Note: While the Tianjin 12
th
 Five Year IP Plan does not explicitly define the term “indigenous intellectual property 
rights,” this term is defined by the Tianjin IPO (see Box 5). 
250
 Under the measure, there is a standard score for non-Shanghainese college graduates, whereas if the score of the 
graduate has surpassed the standard score the graduate can apply for a Shanghai hukou, and if the score does not surpass 
the standard score the graduate can only apply for a “Shanghai Residence Permit for Talents.” The measure sets forth the 
following criteria within this scoring system: Section 2, Part 4: “Has an invention patent certificate: 5 points; has a utility 
model patent certificate: 1 point; has a design patent certificate: 1 point; has a design patent certificate and is employed by 
a unit in the creative design industry: 3 points.”            
251
 Innovation in China: Patents, yes; ideas, maybe. (2010, October 14). The Economist. Retrieved from 
http://www.economist.com/node/17257940 
252
 Gao et al. (2011), p. 87 
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Governments offer individual patent filers incentives such as housing support, 254  and 
provincial/municipal governments may offer land and rental subsidies for certain companies in 
“innovative” industries.255 According to national-level law, prisoners, even those with life sentences, 
can commute their sentences if they produce “inventions or major technological renovations” and 
there is evidence sub-central levels have created implementing measures for this allowance.256  
 
Without a comprehensive assessment on how all financial incentives of all provinces/municipalities 
in China are actually implemented and working in practice, if they have even been implemented yet, 
it is not possible to fully assess if they are most efficiently and effectively using government 
resources to stimulate patent quality more so than quantity. However, it appears a variety of 
incentives deserve to be better linked with patent quality metrics in order to be most sustainable, i.e. 
adopt higher thresholds for which only quality patents are rewarded. It is worth exploring related 
dynamics herein with the authorities. As a small part of this discussion, it is worth exploring if more 
sustainable approaches than some of those set out at present might be adopted to make employers 
offer incentives to their employees to invent not just for the sake of producing patents but to also 
better contribute to the overall competitiveness of their company, or university or research institute, 
and China at large.  
 
Ⅲ.3.1.1.1.5 Large funds from MoST, NSFC, and other S&T-focused bodies 
 
Background  
 
China provides massive government funding for S&T, which in part is used to develop patents. As 
estimated in McGregor (2010), in 2008 China spent RMB 912 billion on S&T, accounting for 1.54% of 
GDP that year, whereas 21% of this was from government funding, divided roughly 50-50 among 
local and central levels; 70% was Chinese “enterprise” money; around 4% was loans from financial 
institutions; and the remaining expenditures were attributed to several other miscellaneous 
organisations. 257 It appears that from 2000-2006 61-73% of all government funding for science and 
technology was given to manufacturers of communication equipment, electronic equipment, 
transport equipment (including aerospace), and machinery (general purpose, special purpose and 
electrical).258  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
253
 The Economist (2010) 
254
 Lohr, S. (2011, January 1). When innovation, too, is made in China. New York Times. Retrieved from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/02/business/02unboxed.html?_r=2&partner=TOPIXNEWS&ei=5099 
255
 For example, see Chengdu HTDZ Investing in China – Government Policies. Retrieved from 
http://www.chengduhitech.co.uk/Guide/Government_Policies.asp  
256
 This allowance is grounded in Article 78, para. 1 of Criminal Law of the P.R.C which states “A criminal element who is 
sentenced to control, criminal detention, fixed-term imprisonment or life imprisonment may have his sentence reduced if, 
during the period his punishment is being executed, he earnestly observes prison regulations, accepts reform through 
education, truly repents, or performs meritorious service. The sentence shall be reduced if any of the following meritorious 
services are performed: ….(3) making inventions or major technological renovations...For those sentenced to control, 
criminal detention, or fixed-term imprisonment, the term of the punishment actually to be executed may not, after 
reductions of sentence, be less than half of the term originally decided; for those sentenced to life imprisonment it may not 
be less than 10 years.” (emphasis added) As an example of implementation of this provision, the Gansu Prisons Bureau and 
Gansu Intellectual Property Department issued the Measures for the Rewards and Recognition of the Invention, Creation 
and Technical Innovation of Prisoners within the Period of Execution (Trial) on October 1
st
, 2009 (Source: news article on 
measure, although a copy of the actual measure could not be readily located, retrieved from 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/mtjj/2009/200908/t20090803_471159.html) 
257
 McGregor, J. (2010). China’s drive for ‘indigenous innovation’: A web of industrial policies. US Chamber of Commerce; 
APCO Worldwide. p 17 and Annex 2, p. 44. Retrieved from 
http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/reports/100728chinareport_0.pdf 
258
 Calculations using data from the 2004-2009 China Statistical Yearbook, 2007 China Statistical Yearbook on High 
Technology Industry, and 2000-2007 China Statistical Yearbook on Science & Technology. Note: “Government Funds” refer 
 96 
 
A range of financial support that makes-up China’s public S&T funding overall appears, while there 
are exceptions, to be quite closed to foreign participation. Key S&T development programs overseen 
by MoST include the Key Technologies Program, 863 Program, 973 Program, Torch Program, and 
National Key Laboratories program. There are a variety of MoST spin-off programs from these 
programs. 259 The National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC), Chinese Academy of Sciences 
(CAS), and China Scholarship Council (CSC) all also have funding programs for research 
collaboration.260 Sources suggest most of these programs are in fact not open to foreign participation 
and have largely not been utilised much by foreign enterprises.261  
 
Issues with distribution requirements for such funding  
 
In some cases the aforementioned programs appear to be linked to patent-based criteria, which may 
be difficult for foreign entities (individuals, research institutes, or enterprises) to meet and which 
may not best stimulate quality patents and related innovation from any nationality of entity. For 
example, the Innovation Fund for Small Technology-based Firms (“Innofund”) is a main component 
of the Torch Program, and is linked to IND-IP-based requirements262 and is also contingent on an 
entity qualifying under the HNTE scheme,263 raising the concerns over these requirements as 
mentioned in the next section on HNTE status. By way of another example, the 973 program’s 
official government website indicates the program emphasises building “original innovations and 
indigenous intellectual properties in China’s research.”264 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
to those “obtained from government agencies at all levels to be used for S&T activities, including funds for scientific 
undertakings, funds for capital construction and scientific research, science fund, funds from education expenditures by 
education departments for S&T activities, and extra-budgetary funds from government agencies for S&T activities.” And 
“Science and Technology Activities” refers to “organised activities in the fields of natural sciences, agricultural science, 
medical science, engineering and technological sciences, humanities and social sciences, aimed to generate, develop and 
disseminate knowledge and technology. These activities can be divided into R&D, its subsequent outcome and 
application.” (Source: 2009 China Statistical Yearbook) 
259
 For one resource on national funding programs see: ChinaAccess4EU National Funding Programs in Mainland China, 
retrieved from http://www.access4.eu/China/274.php. Also for some information on provincial/municipal plans see NSD 
Bio Group. (2009). Research report on Chinese high-tech industries. US China Economic and Security Review Commission. 
Retrieved from http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2009/Research_Report_on_Chinese_High_Tech_Industries.pdf 
260
 Note: much of the funding from these entities is not given to private enterprises, whether Chinese or foreign. 
261
 2012, March 6- Consultations with several R&D managers of large multinational companies involved in the European 
Chamber suggest they have not tapped into these funds. Discussions with the Chamber’s R&D Forum Chairs and Shanghai 
government authorities on May 17
th
 2012 suggest that foreign companies find ways of working effectively with Chinese 
universities and research institutes, and thus can sometimes access such funding through those cooperation activities. 
However, foreign companies typically find it very difficult to cooperate with Chinese enterprises – particularly SMEs – on 
S&T projects, and thus are not able to use that form of cooperation to access government S&T funding. Consultations with 
members of different working groups of the European Chamber on June 27
th 
2012 also confirm these findings. 
262
 Notes: The Innofund is one of the main components of the Torch Program, and the fund provides financial grants in the 
forms of interest-subsidised loans and equity investment, among other subsidies. The Innofund is aimed at supporting 
technology innovation activities of small technology-based firms, facilitating transfer of research achievements, nurturing 
certain small technology-based firms and expediting the industrialisation of “new and high technology” enterprises. (For 
more information on this fund in English see: http://168.160.200.181/eng/ejym/MainContents.htm.) Article 6 of the 
Regulations on the Innovation Fund for Small Technology-based Firms (Provisional), issued by MoST and MoF on May 21
st
 
1999, which is still effective, states that indigenous intellectual property will be a core component in providing prioritised 
funding from the Innofund. This is the only place where intellectual property was mentioned in this Innofund measure. 
(Retrieved from http://www.innofund.gov.cn/innofile/se_02.asp.) Also see information on the Torch Hi-tech Industry 
Development Center of MoST at http://www.chinatorch.gov.cn/index.html and Recognition of Hi-tech Enterprises at 
http://www.innocom.gov.cn/web/(http://www.innocom.gov.cn/web/static/articles/catalog_3/2009-07-
28/article_2820410421c5bfc50121c7e174b90054/2820410421c5bfc50121c7e174b90054.html 
263
 See Notice Regarding Lists of Companies Recognised as Key High-and-New Technology Enterprises (HNTEs) of the 
National Torch Program in 2010 issued on December 8
th
 2010 (effective till 2013), retrieved from 
http://www.innocom.gov.cn/web/static/articles/catalog_2/2010-12-
09/article_282041042cb0ab79012ccaa9706c000f/282041042cb0ab79012ccaa9706c000f.html 
264
 The Implementation Results of the 973 Program, retrieved from http://www.973.gov.cn/English/Index.aspx  
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There are a number of other restrictions on Chinese government-funded S&T projects that in some 
cases lessen the effectiveness of such projects’ ability to build quality patents. Article 20 of the Law 
on Scientific and Technological Progress, amendments on which were effective as of January 2008, 
plainly stipulates the Chinese government must own technology resulting from research 
partnerships that tap into government S&T funds and are relevant to “national interests,” a concept 
distinguished from national security and public interests.265 Sources suggest that government 
approval is required before one can exclusively license IPR resulting from government-funded S&T 
projects to foreign entities. Further, there is concern that money or other support from SOEs or 
universities used to fund research projects may also be considered in certain circumstances as 
“government funding” and thus be subject to the aforementioned restrictions.266 While some of the 
aforementioned requirements may be grounded in good-intentioned policy rationales, they are 
arguably overly broad and thus create regulatory/business planning uncertainties, business 
transaction costs, and, generally, somewhat worsen the perception of the IPR protection 
environment in China.  
 
In contrast, under the EC’s rules for funding research and technological development and 
demonstration, project partners are entitled to own the knowledge produced from the projects. 
Beyond this, it is only required that the project partners reach an agreement among themselves on 
IP ownership and licensing, whereas IP ownership transfer and licensing is explicitly allowed under 
the EC rules.267 This difference of treatment in research and technological development programs in 
the EU vs. China appears to be in conflict with several provisions in the Agreement for Scientific and 
Technological Cooperation Between the European Community and the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China.268 Generally, the aforementioned restrictions likely to some degree explain why 
many foreign enterprises and perhaps a range of domestic enterprises are not utilising the Chinese 
programs more, and thus why such programs are in some ways not as efficient and effective in 
contributing to development of quality patents and related innovation in China as they might be 
without such restrictions. 
 
Several other concerns likely further explain why China’s S&T technology funding programs are not 
most efficiently or effectively contributing to the development of quality patents. Some sources 
suggest that if an R&D partner (e.g. a university) is not just working on a service invention but 
                                                           
265
 Text of Article 20: “With respect to the invention patent, computer software copyright, exclusive right to layout design of 
integrated circuits and new variety right of plants that is formed through a project supported by the science and technology 
foundation or the science and technology program sponsored by treasury money, the project undertaker may obtain 
relevant intellectual property rights except those concerning national security, national interests or important public 
interests. [para.2] The project undertaker shall implement the intellectual property rights stipulated in the preceding 
paragraph according to law, simultaneously adopt protective measures, and submit an annual report on implementing and 
protecting relevant intellectual property rights to the department in charge of the project; if the project undertaker fails to 
implement intellectual property rights, the state may implement them free of charge or may license others to implement 
them with charge or free of charge.[para.3] With respect to the intellectual property rights obtained by the project 
undertaker according to Paragraph 1 of this Article, for the purpose of national security, national interests or important 
public interests, the state may implement them free of charge or license others to implement them with charge or free of 
charge...” (emphasis added). For one English translation of the amended law see: 
http://www.china.org.cn/china/LegislationsForm2001-2010/2011-02/11/content_21899295.htm.  
266
 Wang, B. (2012, February 13-14). Working with Chinese Universities – IP issues in agreements. [Presentation]. 3rd 
Advanced China IP Counsel Forum, Shanghai; and Lutze, O., Wang, B., Xu, C., & Carnabuci, C. (2012, February 13-14). 
Collaborative research with Chinese Universities: How to create a win-win working relationship. [panel discussion]. 3rd 
Advanced China IP Counsel Forum, Shanghai 
267
 European Commission [EC]. Guide to intellectual property rules for FP7 projects (Version 3). Retrieved from 
ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/fp7/docs/ipr_en.pdf 
268
 For example, see Article 3 (b) “reciprocal access to the activities of research and technological development undertaken 
by each Party”; and Annex: Intellectual Property Rights -- Part II, Article 3 (c) “non-discriminatory treatment of participants 
from the other Party as compared with the treatment given to its own participants.” (Source: Agreement as published in 
the Official Journal of the European Communities on January 11
th
 2000, retrieved from 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/downloadFile.do?fullText=yes&treatyTransId=784) 
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performing other technological inventing, it can be difficult for one’s company to enjoy exclusivity on 
the resulting invention(s).269 Collectively, this and the aforementioned restrictions, help explain why 
China’s government-funded S&T programs are in some ways not as efficient and effective in 
contributing to development of quality patents as they might be without such restrictions. This is 
compounded by a variety of other factors, for example difficulties companies face when navigating 
partner university/research institutions’ internal restrictions on profit-sharing and IP ownership and 
licensing agreements with external partners; and ensuring that the appropriate entities are 
identified that can legitimately sign a contract on behalf of the university/research institute targeted; 
and lack of visible and condensed information in European languages on all China’s state-funded S&T 
programs.270 
 
Lastly, and more generally, some sources find that China’s S&T system has overly prioritised 
commercalisation in a way that hurts development of basic research and research otherwise chiefly 
intended for the public good, which in turn hampers the development of quality patents. Chen and 
Kenney (2007) and Zhong and Yang (2007) find that application-oriented research institutes in China 
have benefitted most from changes in China’s innovation policy, whereas those engaged in basic 
research find it far more difficult to obtain government funding and attract top-level researchers.271 
 
Some recent revisions to the system? 
 
It is worth noting that some recent policy statements, in particular the 2012 National IP Strategy, 
appear to at least realise China’s current S&T funding system needs more reform, although it 
remains to be seen how these policies will be implemented in a way that better stimulates 
innovation and patent quality. In particular, provisions of relevance herein include Part 6, measure 
58 from SIPO on pilot assessments for IP in major S&T activities; Part 6, measure 60 from MoST on 
formulating specific regulations on IP management in major S&T projects; Part 6, measure 61 from 
MoST on reviewing and improving measures on managing IP in national S&T projects; and Part 6, 
measure 64 from MoST, MIIT, and SIPO for improving supervision, assessment and guidance on 
major S&T projects. It remains to be discussed with the authorities if some reforms to S&T funding 
systems proposed in Part 1, measure 1 and 2 of the 2012 National IP Strategy link obtainment of IP 
rights and indigenous innovation preferences together. (See the “Introduction” section in the Annex 
for full text of provisions.) 
Ⅲ.3.1.1.1.6 HNTE status 
 
The High and New Technology Enterprise (HNTE) status scheme is perhaps the most controversial 
set of tax rules also directly related to patent-quality issues. Under the HNTE scheme, qualifying 
enterprises pay a mere 15% tax rate (a 10% saving given the otherwise 25% Enterprise Income Tax 
[EIT] rate), receive a 150% ‘super’ deduction for R&D expenses, and a potential business tax (BT) 
deduction.272  The Administrative Measures for the Recognition of Hi-tech Enterprises273 and the Key 
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 Wang (2012); and Lutze et al. (2012)  
270
 As well as a lack of awareness of the programs, although certain projects, such as ChinaAccess4EU provide helpful 
information on a variety of these plans.  
271
 Chen, K., & Kenney, M. (2007). Universities/research institutes and regional innovation systems: the cases of Beijing and 
Shenzhen. World Development, Vol. 35, 1056-74. Retrieved from 
http://www.mendeley.com/research/universitiesresearch-institutes-and-regional-innovation-systems-the-cases-of-beijing-
and-shenzhen/; Zhong, X., & Yang, X. (2007). Science and technology policy reform and its impact on China's national 
innovation system. Technology in Society, Vol. 29, 317-25. 
272
 Chan and Liu (2012).  Also, it is worth noting there are tax preferences under the Technically Advanced Service 
Enterprises (TASE) status scheme, whereas those qualifying receive a 10% reduction on the EIT, up to 8% deduction on 
taxable income instead of the normal 2.5% allowance, and can carry forward unused deductions. 
273
 Retrieved from http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2008-04/24/content_953215.htm  
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High-tech Fields With State Support, both issued on April 14th 2008 by MoST, MoF, and SAT 274 along 
with the Working Guidance on the Recognition of Hi-tech Enterprises, from MoST, MoF, and SAT 
promulgated on July 8th 2008,275 controversially define high-tech enterprises in need of key support 
as referred to in Article 28 of the Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(hereafter the “EIT Law”). Specifically, Part V, Section I, para. 4 of the Appendix to the Working 
Guidance on the Recognition of Hi-tech Enterprises (the “HNTE Guidance”) stipulates qualifying 
enterprises must own “core” IP in China or have “worldwide rights to the exclusive use” of IP for 
five or more years.276 The guidance explicitly states that “No enterprise that does not have any 
independently developed core intellectual property will be recognised as a high-tech enterprise.”
277 
Further, the HNTE Guidance and application form therein stipulates that on a 100 point scale for 
assessing enterprises for HNTE status, IP is worth 30 points with a minimum score of 70 needed.278  
These provisions on IP ownership and restricted licensing are overly burdensome. 
 
The HNTE regime may discourage patent development in China by denying foreign firms access to 
financial incentives on the basis of rational business decision-making. Foreign companies may prefer 
to license technology from abroad, and not only provide exclusive worldwide licenses, instead of 
transferring it via full-on ownership transfer agreements or exclusive worldwide licensing 
agreements. As such, the HNTE scheme requirements may in effect limit the ability of operations of 
foreign enterprises to produce quality patents that could ultimately spillover into benefiting China 
and further encouraging Chinese innovation and patents given they are denied access to financial 
incentives on the basis of rational business decision-making.  
 
Further, in practice, these clearly restrictive IP-related conditions are even more restrictive. 
Specifically, as also mentioned in the IND IP section, while "worldwide rights to exclusive use" is 
stipulated in the measures as a substitute for ownership of IP, this exception cannot be practically 
met because current Chinese law effectively prohibits an owner/licensor from retaining IP usage 
rights in a foreign jurisdiction and also prohibits any other person, including a subsidiary of an HNTE, 
from receiving a sublicense from the China licensee.279 This has led some, for example Deloitte 
(2008), to conclude it will be difficult for most China affiliates of multinational companies to obtain 
HNTE status.280 
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 Retrieved from http://www.wjkc.gov.cn/E_ReadNews.asp?NewsID=485  
275
 Retrieved from http://www.most.gov.cn/gxjscykfq/wj/200810/t20081029_64626.htm  
276
 Part V, Section I, para. 4: (i) Independently developed core intellectual property: “The term ‘exclusive license’ as used in 
the Working Guidance means the licensee enjoys the worldwide rights to the exclusive use of the intellectual property 
(patents, software copyrights, proprietary rights to integrated circuit layout designs, new varieties of plants, and other 
rights) stipulated in the agreement for five years or more, during which period neither the licensor nor any third party shall 
be entitled to use such intellectual property.  (ii) Independently developed core intellectual property as referred to in the 
recognition of high-tech enterprises shall be owned rights registered within the territory of China, or shall represent an 
entitlement to an exclusive worldwide license for five years or more (the term for the relevant high-tech enterprise shall fall 
within the period of five or more years for which the exclusive license remains effective) and be within the period protected 
by Chinese law.” (emphasis added) 
Also, the Application for Recognition of Hi-tech Enterprises (in Annex 2 of the Appendix to the HNTE Guidance) clearly 
includes indigenous innovation-type definitions in its instructions for determining what constitutes high-tech 
enterprises: See Article 7: “The term ‘technology source’ refers to enterprises’ self-owned technology, other enterprises’ 
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Moreover, according to Part V, Section I, para. 1 of the Application for Recognition of Hi-tech 
Enterprises (in Annex 2 of the HNTE Guidance), utility models and design patents (and other types 
of IPR) can be used to meet the IPR requirements of HNTE status, which appear to overly encourage 
filing of these patents.281 There are certain restrictions on the aforementioned types of IPR in 
achieving HNTE status, and criterion in the Application Form in Annex 4 of the HNTE Guidance has 
been found to say that six non-invention patents (e.g. utility model patents) constitute one invention 
patent for the purposes of applying for HNTE status.282 However, the effectiveness of these criteria 
and the actual vetting process to ensure highest quality patents are used to apply for the HNTE 
program is dubious, as there is evidence that the system, while perhaps to some degree building 
quality patents, still favours less-than-highest-quality patents. For example, Chinese government 
consultations suggest that many enterprises simply use utility models instead of invention patents 
the purposes of applying for HNTE status.283 As such, the HNTE scheme at present very well may 
encourage filings of less-than-highest quality patents, whereas if reformed it could better stimulate 
highest-quality patents and related innovation. 
 
Ⅲ.3.1.1.2 Standardisation policies  
 
Discriminatory standard-making procedures, withholding information on standards, and 
discriminatory de jure standards and de facto application of standards have long been used to 
promote Chinese innovation; however, these initiatives stifle competition, potentially denying the 
Chinese market certain quality patents and sharing of know-how from foreign and domestic firms. 
Some key examples of these policies are listed below: 
 
 Restrictions on standard-making exclude enterprises from patent pools: Foreign-invested 
enterprises (FIEs) often do not have access to the Technical Committees in which 
standardisation is decided, and therefore cannot join patent pools.284  
 
 Information restrictions on patent-related requirements needed for implementing 
standards: For example, FIEs are unable to obtain information on the scope and 
requirements of patents to implement the standards which are frequently used in 
mandatory certification schemes. 285 
 
 Intentionally developing national standards based only on the capabilities of Chinese SOEs: 
By way of example from the ICT sector, specifically in the value-added telecoms and 
information security industries, standardisation is frequently and increasingly being used to 
promote patented Chinese technologies by developing national standards exclusively 
reflecting the capabilities of SOEs and certain private Chinese companies.286   
 
 Refusal of certain Chinese entities to license “essential patents”: Further on this particular 
point is discussed below. 
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 Direct competitors have unnecessary access to IP submitted in application documents for 
chemical projects: The approval process for a chemical project in China above $300 million 
USD and also certain other projects involves local experts to evaluate the project and advise 
on its oversight. Expert selection is not transparent, whereas direct competitors of an 
applicant are often requested to join the advisory panel, thereby gaining access to 
confidential and proprietary information submitted in application documents. Compounding 
this is the fact that the high level of detail required in the process is well beyond the 
information released during a similar process in OECD countries.287 As such, it is not 
uncommon in this process that there is leakage of trade secrets and sometimes patented 
information to Chinese competitors who employ or have close relations with those experts 
on the aforementioned panels.288  
 
 Direct competitors have unnecessary access to IP submitted for approval of 
pharmaceuticals, and can delay approval of pharmaceuticals: Direct competitors of a firm 
applying for approval of a pharmaceutical sit on the State Food and Drug Administration 
(SFDA)’s approval panel for that pharmaceutical. These competitors thus have access to the 
wide range of IP-related information required to be submitted as part of the approval 
process, which raises obvious concerns about IP leakage. Additionally, it is reported that 
these direct competitors leverage their positions on the panel to delay approval of a 
pharmaceutical while they themselves push a similar or the same pharmaceutical through 
the approval process.289 
 
 IP leakage during CCC Mark accreditation:  China Compulsory Certification (CCC) Mark 
accreditation is a safety certification program covering a variety of product categories that is 
mandatory for such products to be sold in China. For years, foreign industry, particularly 
software encryption companies, have been required to disclose IP source codes in order be 
granted a CCC Mark.290 Although certain CCC Mark-related rules have been revised in recent 
years, for example in 2009, concerns persist over proprietary IPR leakage due to the fact that 
the changes still do not adequately reform the system.291 
 
 Domestic IP requirements in the MLPS: A variety of sources identify the Multi-Level 
Protection Scheme (MLPS) as problematic in that it includes domestic IP requirements that 
do not allow foreign companies to build a variety of Chinese infrastructure, whether as part 
of government procurement or commercial initiatives.292 In a related vein, sources complain 
that certain commercial encryption regulations do not allow foreign vendors to sell, produce 
or carry out R&D on encryption-related technology in China.293 
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 Potentially disconcerting requirements involving TCM chips: China has developed its own 
Trusted Cryptography Module (TCM), a chip in computers to control security functions, and 
some worryingly suggest these may be required in products in China.294  
 
At large, the aforementioned approaches to Chinese standards impact patent quality by excluding 
many foreign and even Chinese companies that may or could be competitive in industries relying on 
related standards. The policies deny the market know-how, patents, and related innovations that 
would have been otherwise diffused or newly developed without such practices.  
 
Worse, the aforementioned approaches to Chinese standardisation may actively encourage 
initiatives that will ultimately fail domestically and/or fail during international expansion attempts, 
thus wasting resources, whereas this might have been avoided if standards were subject to more 
transparency and fuller consultation and otherwise more inclusive development. For example, this 
phenomenon clearly played out in the often cited case of China’s WLAN Authentication and Privacy 
Infrastructure (WAPI).295  
 
While there are inferably security and economic rationales for the aforementioned standardisation 
policies, these need not justify the level of discrimination in the policies that ultimately hinders 
developing quality patents and related innovation in China. On one hand, to some extent, 
reasonable Chinese security rationales underlie certain standards like the MLPS. Also, there are 
economic rationales that the aforementioned standards are needed to limit license fees paid to 
developers of international standards, provide an avenue for Chinese firms to earn IP-related 
revenues for making their own products and processes, among the other rationales mentioned in 
Box 6 in the IND-IP-based IIPs section. However, on the other hand, it could be argued that these 
similar objectives can be achieved, and in fact achieved more sustainably, through less 
discriminatory policies. 
 
Unwillingness of certain Chinese entities to license “essential patents” 
 
Further to the above discussion, it is important to note that China is increasingly seeking to develop 
what are often termed “essential” patents: patents containing one or more claims that are critical to 
the implementation of a technical specification or standard.296 For context, amongst members of 
standards-development/setting organisations (“SDOs” or “SSOs”), for example the European 
Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI), an owner of essential patents containing one or more 
claims that are essential to the implementation of a technical specification or standard should 
declare this relation and provide licenses on “fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory” (FRAND) 
conditions and terms, subject that the beneficiary also provides reciprocal access on essential 
patents he/she owns.297 Similarly, China has regulations stipulating that owners of essential patents 
should report if their patents are part of standard-setting or if their patents are otherwise involved 
in standards being developed; and such patents are required to either be licensed free-of-charge or 
below normal royalty rates.298 
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It is sometimes difficult form firms to acquire licenses to essential patents in China, which is a 
particularly pronounced problem hindering innovation and patent quality in industries with patent 
thickets. “Patent thickets,” the inter-relation between patents across of number of areas (e.g. among 
telecoms, semiconductors, and computing) are particularly prevalent in certain industries, for 
example the ICT industry, where implementation of even a single standard may require licenses of 
dozens or even hundreds of patents owned by multiple licensors.299 Despite a regulatory framework 
in place for licensing essential patents in China, in practice there are sometimes difficulties in 
accessing these patents. For example, European IP holders have continued to experience great 
difficulties in engaging the Chinese telecommunications industry in licensing discussions, while the 
latter has even made a coordinated effort recently to jointly delay or deny such 
discussions.300 Access to essential patents is critical in order for firms to operate in certain industries, 
particularly in those with patent thickets, and difficulties in accessing such patents hinder 
competition which can hamper development of quality patents and related innovation.  
 
On a related issue, there is an increasing acquisition of patents in China through non-practicing 
entities (NPEs), which in part means more standards will be owned by entities motivated only by the 
desire to monetise acquired patents.301 Improved Chinese regulation of NPEs may be needed to keep 
this concerning trend in check. These trends in some ways create an environment that alienates 
innovative firms, and therein can hamper China’s initiatives to build quality standards and patents. 
 
International standard-building regulations with IND IP requirements and subsidy components 
 
There are Chinese measures in place that encourage standardisation via potentially concerning IND-
IP-based requirements linked to significant subsidies. For example, the  Beijing Administrative 
Measures of the Special Subsidiary Funds for the Formulation (Revision) of Technology Standards, 
issued on November 13th 2006, by the Beijing MoF and Beijing Municipal Bureau of Quality and 
Technical Supervision, which still appears to be effective, states: 
 
Section 3, Article 6: “Article 6 allowance programs should be qualified for one of the 
following conditions…6.2 in line with Beijing key industries development; 6.3 taking 
advantages of advanced research results; 6.4 possessing indigenous intellectual property, 
beneficial for the forming of competitive industries and striving for the top within industry…  
 
Article 7: According to the innovation level of the standard initiative, individual subsidy 
awards for qualified standard projects are as follows:…  
 (6) Significant standard initiatives of great significance that are authorised and published 
could surpass the subsidies stipulated in Article 7.1-5 to be subsidised up to 1 million 
Yuan.”
302  
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The aforementioned measure may unintentionally drag down patent quality for the same reasons 
mentioned in the earlier section on standards, and the severity of this drag is compounded by the 
measure’s link to subsidies. The IND IP requirement as linked with subsidies, while indeed perhaps a 
useful way to encourage domestic enterprises’ unilateral development of standards, ultimately may 
limit the quality of the standards produced through an otherwise more competitive funding process. 
Also, for other reasons similar to those mentioned in the IND-IP-based IIPs discussion earlier in this 
Chapter, this approach can have a negative impact on patent quality and related innovation.  
 
Ⅲ.3.1.1.2.1 Raw deals involving patent ownership in closed sectors 
 
Sources suggest that in closed sectors (often de facto rather than de jure closed) where the only way 
of entry is through JVs with Chinese companies that dominate therein (usually SOEs), these 
dominant companies may leverage low quality patent portfolios in creating what is termed hereafter 
‘raw deals.’ For example, Chinese firms may leverage patent portfolios of dubious quality to get a 
better financial deal via demanding royalties while using their superior negotiating position to block 
due diligence on the contents of these patents.303 In the worst case scenario, the portfolio might be 
significantly composed of low-quality patents.  
 
This phenomenon is compounded by “forced” disclosure of know-how in raw deals. Foreign 
companies find themselves in weak negotiating positions when entering a closed sector, whereas 
their prospective Chinese JV partner may require they transfer key patented technology as a 
precondition to entering the JV.304 Also, sources suggest that Chinese partners may, among other 
tactics, require foreign partners open an R&D centre in China as a precondition for entering a JV.305 
Sources suggest that foreign firms, and perhaps private Chinese firms, often enter into these raw 
deals to win big projects, or in other instances certain authorities may pressure firms into 
transferring core technology by precluding them from enjoying preferential policies otherwise 
extended to enterprises engaging in certain business operations. For example, Atkinson (2012) cites 
an instance where a foreign firm was not allowed to qualify for alternative fuel vehicle purchase 
subsidies unless it transferred its electric motor, complex electronic controls, or power storage 
devices to a JV with a Chinese automaker.306  
 
According to some sources, the Chinese public procurement market is hotbed for raw deals involving 
quality patents. For example, Atkinson (2012) cites an instance where the Chinese government 
offered market access to a high-speed railway procurement project contingent on exchange for 
technology transfer, whereas the winning company was required to (ostensibly unreasonably) share 
its entire know-how and catalogue of technologies with Chinese engineers working on the project. 
To compound these concerns, sources suggest it is not uncommon for Chinese SOEs, after they 
acquire foreign technology through such raw deals, to utilise preferential government support to 
strategically displace foreign firms from the market. Specifically, Chinese firms may displace foreign 
competitors from the Chinese market via drawing on favorable government regulatory decisions, 
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and utilising what some alleged to be a depressed currency and other forms of subsidies to 
strategically displace the same (and other) firms in procurement bids overseas.307  
From one perspective, the raw deal approach might look sustainable as it could be argued that the 
Chinese market is ‘just too good to ignore/give-up’ for some companies’ business operations and 
thus they must agree to deals they would not have in other less promising markets. Indeed, there 
are clear examples of some of the most well-known multinational companies capitulating to these 
raw deals to take advantage of the market.308 After all, one might argue, ‘this is business, and this is 
China.’  
 
However, at large, the raw deal approach does not appear to be a sustainable for building 
innovation operations which involve patents. Forcing technology transfer has made Chinese firms 
more reliant on foreign technology. Worse, in the automobile industry for example, it has 
sometimes even made such Chinese firms lose the independent innovation capacity they may have 
once had.309 It is possible that the raw deal phenomenon creates a perverse incentive for Chinese 
companies to continue registering less-than-highest quality patents, and, at worst, low-quality 
patents. Prevalence of raw deals can make foreign entities in particular less likely to enter the 
Chinese market at all, pull out of the market, decide against transferring ownership or even licensing 
quality patents to Chinese entities, invest less in building-up highest-quality patents within JVs then 
they would have without the raw deals, and so on.  
 
The raw deal phenomenon also may very well increase the perceived urgency to protect techno-
economic security in foreign nations as further fanned by the flames of the current economic crisis. 
This could lead to further closing off and otherwise avoiding technology transfer to China. And some 
could consider the fact that market access for technology conditions like the type embodied in the 
aforementioned raw deals appear to be in conflict with WTO commitments in Article 7(3) of China’s 
Protocol of Accession and Paragraph 203 of its Working Party Report310 to be an additional argument 
for supporting stricter techno-economic security policies in response to such deals.  
 
Ⅲ.3.1.1.3 Ambiguities in technology import and export rules 
 
Rules governing improvements on technology  
 
The Regulations on Technology Import and Export Administration (hereafter “TIER”), adopted at the 
46th Executive Meeting of the State Council and publicly issued on December 10th 2001 and effective 
as of January 1st 2002, are discriminatory in requiring subsequent improvements on technological 
development in a contractual relationship be owned by the party making the improvements. 
Specifically, Article 27 thereto finds:  
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Article 27: “Within the term of validity of a contract for technology import, an achievement made 
in improving the technology concerned belongs to the party making the improvement.” 
311
 
 
The wording of Article 27 of the TIER creates notable ambiguity for firms working with others to 
innovate, particularly foreign firms working with Chinese entities, resulting in a drag on patent 
quality. As stated in the European Chamber’s forthcoming 2012/2013 IPR Working Group Position 
Paper, in general, while a licensor shall not restrict the licensee from conducting further research on 
the licensed technology and acquiring ownership rights on such improvements, Article 27 has been 
found to be problematic in areas where the licensor is the owner of core technology and has only 
granted the right to use it in a specific context of outsourcing R&D activities or toll manufacturing.312 
 
As a side note, while some companies have skirted the requirement in Article 27 with certain 
provisions in contracts, it is unclear if such contracts are legally valid under that article.313 These 
regulations create ambiguity for firms innovating with other entities, potentially raising the 
transaction costs and thus damping the efficiency and effectiveness with which patented products 
and processes underpinning innovation are ultimately developed in China.314  
 
Overly broad definitions of technology import and export  
 
The TIER is also unclear as to what technologies are covered under the category of “restricted” 
technology it sets forth. This makes it notably difficult for companies to assess if the 
imported/exported technology falls into the category, making international companies hesitate to 
import certain technology into China.315   
 
Moreover, it is unclear what technologies are covered under the category of “prohibited” 
technology in the TIER, as their listing in the measure is not exhaustive and there is in fact a non-
published list for “prohibited” products. This becomes particularly problematic when a product is 
claimed to be on this non-published list, and this is used as justification to not authorise transferring 
or selling of patents (whereas transferring or selling a patent to a foreigner is considered “export of 
technology”).316 This in turn complicates technology transfer and free usage of patents in a way that 
hampers innovation and building of patents. 
 
Further, the definition of “technology import and export” as defined in Article 2 of the TIER is overly 
broad, creating uncertainty that may indirectly jeopardise patent quality. It is unclear whether the 
definition employed in Article 2 covers experimental data at an early stage of research, and thus 
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what types of research needs approval from MOFCOM.317 As such, entities face uncertainty over 
how they need to report to the authorities on certain research activities which creates unnecessary 
transaction costs that somewhat hamper innovation activities and thus the efficiency and 
effectiveness with which such activities can lead to quality patents. If the restrictions turn-out to be 
applied to an overly wide range of activities, this would constitute an overly burdensome restriction, 
likely to some extent discouraging development of quality patents and related innovation. 
 
Overly strict requirements on liability 
 
As noted in the European Chamber’s forthcoming 2012/2013 IPR Working Group Position Paper, Article 
24 of the TIER sets overly burdensome requirements in mandating foreign technology licensors to 
bear liability for any accusation of infringement that may be brought against the importer in relation 
to the use of the licensed technology. In areas with patent thickets and where the licensed 
technology is still not fully developed, such obligation often creates an undue burden on the licensor 
and makes some technology transfers unacceptable if there is no flexibility to share risks.318 This in-
turn is a drag on patent quality and related innovation in these areas. 
 
Ⅲ.3.1.1.4 Uncertainty in inventor remuneration rules 
 
There is some uncertainty over legal liability for “reasonable” inventor remuneration in China, which 
might in the future hamper patent development. As illustrated in the European Chamber’s 
2011/2012 Position Paper, Chinese regulations require, in the absence of a specific agreement or 
relevant company policies, “the entity to which the patent is granted” to pay a minimum level of 
inventor remuneration. Research activities in China are performed by local Chinese companies under 
contract or by a foreign-invested R&D centre, and the right to apply for patents on solutions 
developed therein typically belongs to the company providing the investment or those foreign 
entities who invest in the R&D centre. The concern is thus that a foreign company might be 
unnecessarily liable for remuneration contracts even if the foreign company actually has no 
contractual relationship with an employee doing the inventing.319 To the extent that this ambiguity 
could prevent enterprises from signing contracts and investing in certain other parties’ R&D 
operations this is a drag on quality patent development and related innovation in China.  
 
Some measures have recently been proposed to shape the inventor remuneration system in China, 
although these do not appear to have fully addressed the aforementioned concerns. 
Provincial/municipal 12th Five Year on Plans on Intellectual Property, for example, Sichuan’s and 
Tianjin’s, recognise the need to improve the inventor remuneration system.320 As a publication of 
this study, SIPO was conducting “internal” consultations on the Regulations on the Remuneration for 
Inventor-Employee's Invention. 321  In general, regulations on inventor remuneration remain 
unsatisfactorily reformed throughout China. 
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Ⅲ.3.1.1.5 Ambiguities in the Measures on Compulsory Licensing 
 
There are a number of ambiguities in the Measures on Compulsory Licensing.322 For example, as 
listed in European Chamber IPR Working Group (Nov. 2011), the measures could at least be 
generally more clear about the requirements for granting a compulsory license; could remedy the 
fact government proposals for a compulsory license do not require evidential support; the 
patentee’s right to request a hearing is restricted, and there are no legal sanctions in cases where a 
licensee’s activities overextend the scope of the granted compulsory license; among other 
concerns. 323  Such uncertainties complicate business planning, which can hamper innovation; 
although in fairness, in practice these regulations do not seem to be applied in an extreme way as of 
yet. 
 
Ⅲ.3.1.2 Sub-section 3.2: Less patent-specific, but still patent-related, measures 
 
Introduction: This sub-section investigates how variety of significant Chinese policies and practices 
that while not necessarily patent-specific do relate closely to patent development and do not 
necessarily stimulate patent quality and related innovation in China.  
 
Ⅲ.3.1.2.1 General IIPs that encourage assimilation, absorption, and/or re-
innovation 
 
In addition to the IND-IP-specific issues discussed in the former sub-section, China’s overarching 
encouragement of “assimilation, absorption and re-innovation” as a fundamental approach to foreign 
firms’ patented products (and trade secrets, and knowledge otherwise covered under the Unfair 
Competition Law
324
) is in some ways concerning. Certain policies herein are concerning even though 
they do not explicitly set-forth the concepts of indigenous innovation contingent on IND IP or other 
IPR preconditions like those in the Trial Measures for the Administration of the Accreditation of National 
Indigenous Innovation Products (2006). Example measures used to explain the different dynamics of 
these IIPs are listed below: 
 
 Part 7, Chapter 27, para. 3 of China’s nationwide 12th Five Year Plan, which focuses on efforts 
to “enhance the original innovation, integrated innovation and the introduction of digestion 
and absorption of re-innovation…” 
325  
 
 Section IV, Part 2 of the NPDS sets forth the following advice: “Encourage enterprises to 
acquire patent rights through innovation on the basis of digesting and absorbing imported 
                                                           
322
 Draft most recently released for public comments in October 2011. Note 1: Recent procedures rules relating to 
compulsory licensing came into effect on May 1
st
 2012 via that Notice on Patent Compulsory Licensing issued on March 15
th
 
2012: http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zwgs/ling/201203/t20120319_654876.html (Note 1: link working when last checked on 
August 1st 2012). Note 2: Mention of compulsory licensing measures was left out of the Executive Summary of this study 
due to its relatively lesser importance compared with other issues mentioned therein. Note 3: In some ways, these 
measures are of course not intended to “promote” patents.  
323
 See the European Chamber’s IPR Working Group Response to the Call for Comments on Measures for Compulsory 
Licensing, submitted to SIPO on November 13
th
 2011 (European Chamber IPR Working Group [Nov. 2011]). Measure 
retrieved from http://www.sipo.gov.cn/tz/gz/201110/P020111012508894173220.doc  
324
 Unfair Competition Law of P.R China, issued on Sep. 2
nd
 1993, passed at the 3
rd
 Meeting of 8
th
 National People’s 
Congress Standing Committee, Zhuxi Ling (1993) No.10, retrieved from 
http://www.saic.gov.cn/fldyfbzdjz/zcfg/fv/200909/t20090928_71369.html  
325
 Note: More generally, the term “indigenous innovation” is mentioned throughout the plan, and is reflected in the plan’s 
specific policies to build-up specific sectors.  
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patented technology.” Part IV, Section 4 of the NPDS mentions developing “self-relied” upon 
innovation and turning this into property rights. 
 
 The "Innovation Promotion Regulations of Guangdong Province (the “2012 Guangdong 
Ordinance”), promulgated by the Guangdong People’s Congress Standing Committee on 
November 30th 2011 and effective on March 1st 2012, “considering the dilemmas of overly 
emphasising importing, rather than absorbing and re-innovating,” supports “establishing 
and improving the re-innovation policy.”326  
 
 Part 2, Article 3 of Hunan’s Outline on Constructing an Innovative Province, effective on 
March 7th 2012 sets forth the following policy objectives: “…improve the capability of 
indigenous innovation as the core for enhancing original innovation, integrated innovation, 
the introduction of digestion and absorption in re-innovation, and collaboration for 
innovating...”
 327 
 The Opinions of the Supreme People's Court on Giving Full Play to the Functional Role of 
Intellectual Property Trials in Advancing the Great Development and Prosperity of Socialist 
Culture and Promoting Independent and Coordinated Economic Development (Fa Fa [2011] 
No. 18), issued by the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) and effective on December 16th 2011 
(hereafter the “December 16th 2011 SPC Opinion”) contains the following: 
Part 1, para. 1: “The Central Economic Work Conference requires that we…keep 
strengthening capabilities of integrated innovation, introduction, digestion, 
absorption and re-innovation; should comply with the innovation drive and 
strengthen intellectual property protection; should cultivate and develop strategic 
emerging industries…”  
 
Part 3, para. 12: “…focus on improving China's original innovation capacity, 
integrated innovation capacity and capabilities of introduction, digestion, absorption 
and re-innovation as important goals…intensify the protection of key core 
technologies, basic and frontier fields, and emerging strategic industries, promote 
technical breakthrough and technical innovation…”
328
  
 
Approaches to incremental innovation in an economic context 
 
It is first important to recognise that while the simple mention of the terms “assimilation,” 
“absorption” and “re-innovation” in policies (hereafter, for simplicity, collectively referred to as 
incremental innovation policies) raise eyebrows in IPR circles, in fact such an approach to innovation 
has been promoted by a variety of economists for over 20 years. As noted in the Introduction to this 
study, it is indisputable that incremental innovation, which is based upon exploitation of existing 
solutions, has solid value. 
 
Within the concept of incremental innovation, one could theoretically distinguish “import-based” 
incremental innovation from “domestic-based incremental innovation, whereas “import-based” 
incremental innovation focuses specially on imported foreign technologies rather than on 
                                                           
326
 For a summary of the policymaking process for the measure see Guangdong Provincial People’s Congress News 
Conference on Promulgation and Implementation of Provincial Independent Innovation Regulation (2010, February 29). 
Retrieved from http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/dfrd/guangdong/2012-02/29/content_1693676.htm. Regarding text 
of the measure, see Chapter 2, Article 6, Article 9(1), and Article 10. 
327
 Retrieved from http://www.hunan.gov.cn/zwgk/hndt/zwdt/201203/t20120308_457488.htm 
328
 December 16
th
 2011 SPC Opinion retrieved from Westlaw China: http://www.westlawchina.com/index_en.html While 
full of several examples of disconcerting rhetoric, it is worth noting that the December16
th
 2011 SPC Opinion also contains 
some provisions that may indirectly have a positive impact on innovation and the IP framework in China. 
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domestically-created products. An emphasis on incremental innovation based on outside solutions 
appears to have started with Cohen (1989) and Levinthal (1990), who promoted “absorption,”  an 
awareness of new information and enhanced ability to assimilate and utilise existing information 
and ideas developed elsewhere to improve one’s own innovation capacity.329 Other sources find that 
countries that are able to develop a sufficient absorption capacity are more likely to maximise usage 
of foreign technologies and may possibly develop their own new technologies.330  
 
Some sources argue that certain innovation approaches related to incremental innovation have 
value. Some have suggested that the shānzhài (山寨) culture in China, a term referring to the 
imitation of goods (often electronics in particular), sometimes with small “improvements” on the 
original product, is in fact an example of incremental innovation that can be a stepping stone 
towards more substantive innovation. 331 As another approach, sources describe “reverse 
engineering” as a legitimate building block for innovation,332 which while not tantamount to 
incremental innovation can be based upon incremental innovation.  
 
There are studies that discuss how IPR protection specifically fits into this system of incremental 
innovation. As one example, also cited in the Introduction of this study, Lee and Park (2006) 
explicitly find that the utility model patent system has a positive influence on developing countries’ 
innovation and growth as it protects incremental inventions and is more conducive to innovation, 
diffusion of technology, and economic growth in those countries given the make-up of their 
economic systems.  
 
Why these IIPs have the propensity to hurt patent quality and related innovation in China 
 
While it is important for the government to carefully consider the aforementioned economic logic 
and find an appropriate balance in IIPs to stimulate innovation and related patent quality, the 
current IIP framework likely needs reform. The reasons for this are discussed below. 
 
Choosing between current policy thinking when outside-the-box thinking is needed instead 
 
While recognised by economists as important stepping-stones for developing countries to better 
innovate, it is also clear that an overly heavy focus on incremental innovation policies is negative. At 
worst, an overly heavy focus on import-based incremental innovation policies makes enterprises so 
reliant on foreign technologies that they become unable to “independently” innovate and develop 
highest-quality patents in the short-, mid-, and long-term. And this assertion is not clearly challenged 
by the aforementioned economic literature: in fact certain academic sources, for example Hu and 
                                                           
329
 Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. A. (1989). Innovation and learning: The two faces of R&D. The Economic Journal, 99, 569-
596; and Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. A. (1990). Absorptive capacity: A new perspective on learning and innovation. 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Special Issue: Technology, Organizations, and Innovation, 35(1), 128-152. 
330
 Nelson, R.R. (Ed.) (1993). National innovation systems: A comparative analysis. New York: Oxford University Press;  
 Kim, L. (1997). Imitation to Innovation: The Dynamics of Korea's Technological Learning. Boston: Harvard Business Press; 
Yu, T.F.-L. (1998) Adaptive Entrepreneurship and the Economic Development of Hong Kong. World Development, 26(5), 
897-911; World Bank (2001). Intellectual property: Balancing incentives with 
competitive access. Global Economic Prospects. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 129-150; and Lall, S. (2003). Indicators of 
the Relative Importance of IPRs in Developing Countries. Research Policy, 32(9), 1657-1680. 
331
 Thos phenomenon has received an increasing amount of media attention recently, and its merits are subject of some 
debate in both China and abroad. 
332
 For example, where products developed via reverse innovation in developing countries are sold in developed countries 
at low prices, creating new markets and uses for the solutions. See: Govindarajan, V., & Trimble, C. (2012). Reverse 
innovation: Create far from home, win everywhere. USA: Harvard Business Press. 
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Matthews (2008), caution against countries like China getting caught in the trap of being a perpetual 
imitator rather than evolving to sustain “genuine” innovation.333  
 
Also, an overly heavily focus on incremental innovation policies, even if they are focused increasingly 
or more so on domestic-based incremental innovation than import-based incremental innovation, 
can be negative as they retard healthy development that may have otherwise happened with a more 
appropriate balance of policies also encouraging breakthrough innovation. To be sure, this latter 
assertion need not conflict nor should in any way be negated by recent suggestions in Breznitz and 
Murphee (2011), that China should not overemphaise policies to build-up “novel-product 
innovation” (roughly tantamount to the concept of breakthrough innovation used in this study) and 
that China can support its economy in the next decade or so (mid-term) through “secondary 
innovation” (roughly tantamount to the concept of incremental innovation used in this study).334 
This said, it is admittedly difficult to decide at exactly which point this overemphasis significantly 
threatens mid- to- long-term innovation, patent quality, and resulting economic development. 
 
In some instances, overemphasis on currently conceived IIPs can indoctrinate the policymaking 
system in a way that prevents creation and implementation of other domestic Chinese innovation 
polices that would be more helpful for building up innovation and quality patents realised in the 
longer-term. By way of illustration, it is clear that some provinces, as illustrated in the 
abovementioned 2012 Guangdong Ordinance, are concerned about moving too quickly towards an 
approach to innovation based too heavily on importing technologies and want to instead improve 
their approach to incremental innovation. As such, it appears that simply recycling existing 
approaches to innovation will limit Guangdong-based companies’ ability to develop domestically, let 
alone internationally. While Guangdong is taking action to revise its own problems in this regard, it is 
worth further investigating if other provincial/municipal authorities across China are ‘trapped’ in 
deciding among the IIP approaches passed down for further implementation by national authorities 
or previous provincial authorities to date, whereas they would be better served to think outside this 
policy box in revising their individual innovation policies.  
 
In summary, in the opinion of this study, while some may debate if China is focusing too much on 
breakthrough-innovation policies, it is perhaps more exigent to acknowledge that breakthrough 
innovations are indeed important for the Chinese economy (even if more so in the medium- to long-
term) and scrutinise areas where current IIPs should evolve to better foster both incremental and 
breakthrough innovation. None of this should be mistaken as saying the government should 
necessarily further use more of the types of IIPs currently promulgated to stimulate incremental 
innovation instead of breakthrough innovation or vice versa; rather, it is to say that there are 
instances where either or both types of IIPs as currently understood should be revised and better 
implemented on-the-ground to more effectively meet the ultimate goal they both share: building 
China into a powerhouse with solid innovation in the future.   
 
                                                           
333
 Hu, M. C., & Mathews, J. A. (2008). China's national innovative capacity. Research Policy, Volume. 37, 1465-79. 
Retrieved from http://nthur.lib.nthu.edu.tw/handle/987654321/61675 
334
 Breznitz, D., & Murphree, M. (2011, May). Run of the red queen: Government, innovation, globalization, and economic 
growth in China. New Haven: Yale University Press. Also see the following quote: “Our fear is that by focusing too much on 
producing novel-product innovation, the central government will harm a key pillar of China’s sustained economic growth – 
second-generation production and process innovation. In time, China will come to master novel-product innovation, 
especially in new industries for which the competitive and standards environment has not yet been defined. But instead of 
forcing itself to copy foreign models developed within different economic systems, China should follow its own development 
path. There is no urgency for China to master novel-product innovation, especially since the interdependencies fostered by 
the fragmented global production system make concerns over national technological security largely irrelevant. China’s 
position at the heart of global production means that the Run of the Red Queen model of development is secure for the next 
decade or so.” (Source: Breznitz, D., & Murphree, M. (2011, September). Innovation in emerging economies: China’s run of 
the red queen. World Financial Review. Retrieved from http://www.worldfinancialreview.com/?p=848) 
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Potentially enabling infringement 
 
Even if unintentional, it is not difficult to envisage a situation where Chinese IIPs built on the 
principles of “assimilation,” “absorption,” and “re-innovation” can encourage infringement given the 
still underdeveloped respect for IPR in China. Given many consumers, businesspeople, and even 
some government representatives335 in China still have a generally underdeveloped respect and 
knowledge of the importance of IPR, IIPs that tout “assimilation,” “absorption” and “re-innovation” 
as fundamental methods of innovation and patent development may very well be used to justify, or 
actually interpreted to encourage, development of products, services and processes in a way that 
nearly outright encourages infringement.  
 
Such policies may to some extent unintentionally increase administrative actions, arbitration, and/or 
litigation, tying up resources of the state that otherwise should have been preserved for more 
‘appropriate’ cases. More appropriate cases herein are those that would arise in a more ‘neutral’ 
regulatory environment, and/or channeled into more appropriately strengthening the IPR system 
and otherwise fostering quality patents in China.  
 
Moreover, it is concerning that such policies are explicitly at the heart of judicial approaches to 
future patent cases as is reflected in the December 16th 2011 SPC Opinion (see Part 1. para 3, and 
Part 3 para. 12 as quoted above), which deserves clarification to ensure it does not discriminatorily 
favour right-holders in infringement cases. For one, it deserves clarification as to if the opinion might 
be used in certain circumstances to favor an alleged infringer if he/she was acting in the name of 
such IIPs. It also deserves clarification if the opinion could possibly create a situation where 
infringement cases involving products, services, and processes in strategic emerging industries 
specifically are dealt with different than other cases, creating a discriminatory adjudication 
environment.  
 
Amidst this, it is important to note that the school of economic thought supporting incremental 
innovation policies (whether import-based or domestic-based) first mentioned in this section need 
not be connected with a logic supporting IPR infringement, whereas other strong academic studies 
suggest China need not rely on full-fledged imitation to build-up its innovative capacity. For example, 
Maskus, Dougherty, and Mertha (2005) finds inward technology transfer is the main source of new 
information creating technological advancement and structural transformation in China, and thus 
imitation of IPR, including patents, does not necessarily need to be a phase of China’s industrial 
development.336  This touches upon an important point that may be easily lost in the translation of 
IIPs into action in China. 
 
Ⅲ .3.1.2.2 Megaprojects vs. more effective models of innovation-building 
projects 
 
A notable concern in China’s innovation drive is that its massive funding/commissioning of 
“megaprojects,” large-scale expensive projects run by only a few entities, is not the most effective 
way to foster key innovations and likely in-turn hinders the quality of patents that could have been 
produced if the projects were more effectively commissioned. As McGregor (2010) explains, these 
megaprojects, for example those commissioned by MoST, are meant to build up industries in China, 
including via creating innovation infrastructure. McGregor (2010), citing the opinions of a wide range 
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 For example, although not due to shortage of recent efforts from the government to change this trend, a number of 
government offices throughout the country still use IP-infringing products. 
336
 Maskus, K. E., Dougherty, S. M., & Mertha, A. (2005). Intellectual property rights and economic development in China. In 
Fink, C., & Maskus, K. E. (Eds.) Intellectual property and development: Lessons from recent economic research (pp. 295-332). 
New York: Co-publication of World Bank, Washington D.C. and Oxford University Press. Retrieved from 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/Pubs/IPRs-book.pdf 
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of scientists, finds the weakness of such megaprojects is that innovation best comes from individuals 
or comparatively smaller teams working on particular projects that they are passionate about and 
for which their qualifications, proposals, and work have undergone solid examination.337 These flaws 
in the megaproject approach as an optimal strategy to produce higher quality patents in the short-, 
mid-, and long-term are compounded with those mentioned in the earlier section in this Chapter on 
IPR ownership prerequisites for participation in such programs.  
 
As mentioned previously, it is worth noting that some recent measures appear to at least realise 
MoST’s approach to S&T projects needs reforming, although it does not appear that they 
fundamentally challenge the size composition of S&T megaprojects. With the exception of Part 6, 
measure 61, other provisions from the 2012 National IP Strategy, i.e. Part 3, measure 17; and Part 6, 
measures 58, 60, and 64 all continue to use the keywords “major projects” in a way that may 
indicate a lack of reform to the megaproject approach to MoST projects but rather only more 
peripheral reforms (see the “Introduction” section of the Annex for translated text of these 
provisions). Additionally, Part 3, Section 4, Article 1 of the SC Notice on IPR in Strategic Industries 
mentions initiatives for IP strategy for building IPR in “major technology projects.”338  
 
Ⅲ.3.1.2.3 Financial incentives not directly linked to IP, but still closely impacting 
patent quality 
 
Ⅲ.3.1.2.3.1 “National champion” logic embedded in EIDF subsidies 
 
Further to the above discussion on megaprojects, the structure of some funding in the Electronics and IT 
Development Fund (EIDF) raises some concerns in relation to patent quality given its focus on large 
companies. The EIDF was first developed in 1986 and is believed by some to have helped China 
generate a significant number of patents. For example, Stewart (2007) notes sources consider the 
EIDF helped generate 2,456 patents. The same source notes that as of 2004, the fund had invested 
more than 3.9 billion RMB in 1,859 projects via direct finance and other forms of support to the 
electronics and information technology industries.339 It is notable that some EIDF funds seem to be 
focused on large companies (dà gōngsī, 大公司); for example, the Opinion on Accelerating the Large 
Company Strategy in the Electronics and Information Industry, issued by MIIT on January 28th 2005, 
and which is still effective, states: 
 
Section 5, Article 1.2: “Provide support to the leading large companies. Within government 
procurement, for key projects (such as new internet, 3G, digital TV, software, automobile 
electronic product projects, and so on),[those in] the EIDF, the scientific fund… preference will 
given to these large companies.”
 340
   
 
While is it standard for governments to establish minimum threshold requirements in government 
procurement, it is different to stipulate that “large companies” full-stop be given preference in 
government procurement tendering. As such, it is worth considering that even if the EIDF has 
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 McGregor (2010). (Note: Although on the other hand, one may argue the approach is in fact effective for building up 
certain large scale infrastructure which is best commissioned to a limited amount of people so it relatively seamlessly links 
up. Also there may be additional near-term employment-based rationale behind such large scale projects.) 
338
 Part 3, Article 2: “We shall promote the planning and implementation of intellectual property rights strategy of major 
technology projects with a focus on industry development…” 
339
  Stewart, T. (2007). China’s industrial subsidies study: High technology. Trade Lawyers Advisory Group. Retrieved from 
http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2008/TLAG%20Study%20-
%20China%27s%20Industrial%20Subsidies%20High%20Technology.pdf 
340
 Retrieved on March 20, 2012 from http://www.chinabaike.com/law/zy/bw/gw/xcb/1355307_2.html Note: Translation 
from the European Chamber thus is unofficial.  
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contributed to a significant number of patents in China, if administered in a way that better fosters 
competition amongst all types of qualified companies it may better contribute to raising patent 
quality and related innovation in China. Herein, one area to investigate is the evidence behind 
government statements touting the achievements of the “Large Company Strategy,” inclusive of the 
aforementioned measure and six specific companies it has been used to support.341 
 
In an increasingly competitive market, sources argue that the “national champion” models once 
used by nations like South Korea no longer are as relevant for the Chinese government to follow.342 
As such, pushing development of these Chinese behemoths is not only an antiquated approach to 
building innovation and economic competitiveness but may result in spending that could have been 
better channeled through different more merit-than-size-based attempts at building innovative and 
competitive enterprises.  
Ⅲ.3.1.2.3.2 Other subsidy funds  
 
A variety of requirements in subsidies not specifically discussed thus far, while less directly related to 
IND-IP-based requirements, may also create somewhat of a drag on balanced innovation and patent 
quality given their blatantly discriminatory/WTO-inconsistent nature. In particular, there is evidence 
of a variety of subsidies offered on the basis of export performance, import substitution, and to 
domestic companies in specifically defined industries.343  
 
Ⅲ.3.1.2.4 Lack of transparency in policy formulation and implementation 
 
An often repeated issue, the lack of transparency and uncertainty as to what rules are being drafted 
and implemented; limited time to comment on these measures before enactment; and lack of 
translated measures in one or more of the official languages of the WTO also pushes companies to 
be more reluctant to innovate and contribute to the building of highest-quality patents and related 
innovation in China. This is a longstanding problem and is not fully aligned with China’s WTO 
commitments on transparency.344  
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 Note: Interestingly, MIIT’s Report for the 60
th
 Anniversary of the PRC, issued by MIIT on September 18
th
 2009 implies the 
Opinion on Accelerating the Large Company Strategy in the Electronics and Information Industry has had a positive impact. 
Specifically, Part II, Section 2, Para 4 of the measure finds: “The ‘Large Company Strategy’ has remarkable achievement. 
The ‘Large Company Strategy’ was developed in 1993 when the new MIIT was established. SVA, Changhong, Caihong, 
Panda, Lenovo and Hualu have been selected as 6 key companies to support. During this time, MIIT issued the 
‘Implementation Measures on Large Company Strategy in Electronics and Information Industry.’ MIIT’s ‘Opinion on 
Accelerating the Large Company Strategy in the Electronics and Information Industry’ has accelerated this strategy. Industry 
integration is rising and production is concentrated in large companies and groups. Leading companies’ image and brands 
are becoming prominent.” (Measure retrieved on August 15, 2012 from 
http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11293877/n12511031/n12511106/12693827.html)  
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 Breznitz and Murphee (2011, September) 
343
 Prud’homme (forthcoming 2012)  
344
 See GATT Article X, GATS Article III, TRIPS Agreement Article 63, as well as China’s WTO plus commitments in its Report 
of the Working Paper on the Accession of China to the WTO (e.g. Part VII Other Issues, Section 3. Transparency, Article 334: 
“The representative of China confirmed that China would make available to WTO Members translations into one or more of 
the official languages of the WTO all laws, regulations and other measures pertaining to or affecting trade in goods, 
services, TRIPS or the control of forex, and to the maximum extent possible would make these laws, regulations and other 
measures available before they were implemented or enforced, but in no case later than 90 days after they were 
implemented or enforced.  The Working Party took note of these commitments.”). Note: lack of transparency is not 
necessarily intentionally meant to try and “promote” patents and innovation, although sometimes in fact is, and either way 
can discourage quality patents and innovation.  
 115 
 
Ⅲ.3.1.2.5 Less than optimal coordination of industry park initiatives 
 
It is arguably difficult for many industrial parks in China to best build innovation and produce 
highest-quality patents given their less than optimal coordination with each other (this situation also 
more generally applies to different economic-related zones in China at large, not only industrial 
parks within these zones). Provincial/municipal and local governments often afford industrial parks 
within their purview a range of tax incentives outside R&D Centre-specific incentives to attract 
certain companies and industries, for example, among others, refunds on VAT, BT, and EIT paid by 
companies’ value-added operations which while not exclusively tied to R&D operations could be in 
part used to encourage innovation and in turn quality patent filings. A variety of industrial parks 
within provinces seek to attract certain types of industries using the aforementioned financial tools 
as well as certain outreach strategies, but in many cases go about this largely unilaterally whereas 
several industry parks within one province/municipality could be seeking to boost the exact same 
niche industry.  
 
This situation hampers patent quality and related innovation in China that likely could otherwise be 
realised through improved coordination among industrial parks. On one hand, some might argue 
that industry parks need not coordinate among themselves to best stimulate innovation and 
resulting patents as the forces of competition would naturally lead to efficiency optimisation therein. 
On the other hand, this viewpoint does not fully consider the fact that China does not operate in the 
hands-off fashion that would perhaps in another country allow this approach to work, whereas 
China’s provincial and local governments are bound by a centrally-promulgated innovation policy 
that they need to implement, albeit in many cases with decent room for discretion in 
implementation. For example, provincial and local governments are tasked with building up strategic 
emerging industries as outlined in China’s national 12th Five Year Plan (see the Introduction section 
for a full listing of these industries); however, the fact remains that not every industry park within a 
province/municipality is capable, nor is it necessarily economically wise, for them to all attempt to 
build these particular industries. And there is questionable economic utility in, for example, multiple 
industry parks in a province trying to build their own biomedical engineering equipment industry 
when they could likely better stimulate other competitive industries. As such, one could argue that if 
local and/or provincial/municipal governments in partnership with the industrial parks’ management 
were to provide improved management of what an industrial park, given its strengths as measured 
by an assessment, should focus on as distinct from another industrial park, this may ultimately lead 
to more mid- to long-term innovation efficiency gains. However, without this improved coordination, 
the current situation creates inefficiencies and ineffectiveness that likely somewhat hamper 
development of quality patents and related innovation in China.  
 
Ⅲ.3.1.2.6 A range of other policies 
 
A variety of other policies are likely in some ways inhibiting the development of the highest-quality 
patents in particular and related innovation in China. A list of policies not discussed in this study that 
may more indirectly inhibit efficient and effective innovation and development of quality patents 
can be found in the European Chamber’s Annual Position Paper, among other sources.345 
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 For example, see Atkinson (2012). Note: one important issue herein is China’s increasing industry consolidation of the 
market for rare earth elements, which are key inputs in highly innovative and patented technologies, which in some 
circumstances has enabled monopolies to not honor contracts of supply with private businesses, which in-turn may inhibit 
important R&D efforts already in China (Source: 2012, January 19 – Consultations with a member of the European 
Chamber) 
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Ⅲ.3.2 Summary:  
 
China has a wide-range of patent-specific and other patent-related policies in-place, many of which 
are at least partially meant to encourage patents, although some of these policies in effect can 
actually discourage quality patents, and highest-quality patents in particular, and related innovation. 
The most concerning of these policies are explored in this Chapter. 
 
 
Ⅲ.3.3 Recommendations 
 
Ⅲ.3.3.1 Core recommendations 
 
Sub-section 3.1  
 
8. Recommendation: Revise the award criteria in the patent filing subsidy application process, and 
improve oversight of the patent filing subsidy program. This system should be codified at the 
central-level and mandatorily executed in all provinces/municipalities although with flexibility for 
these provincial/municipal levels to cater the system to their own needs. 
 
8.1 A well-equipped appraisal committee should be set-up to oversee the patent filing 
subsidy awarding process. The unit should be staffed with technical and legal experts 
who will provide a formal evaluation of a patent application. The appraisal committee 
may set forth a standard ranking for these applications. The unit might also be staffed 
with other experts that would optimally help evaluate how much subsidy monies to 
provide an applicant based on the aforementioned evaluation. Only those patent 
applications approved by the appraisal committee would be provided subsidies (see 
recommendation below for further details).  
 
Patent filing subsidies should be focused more so if not completely on invention 
patents as opposed to utility models or design patents, and therein subsidies might 
be geared more so on patentees whose solution has particularly high inventiveness.  
 
A mechanism should be established to ensure an appropriate awarding of patent 
fees after the subsidy appraisal committee vets prospective patents for 
subsidisation. Some governments are already only granting subsidies to patents that 
are granted, although this does not appear to be the case across all of China. In 
order to prevent unintended stifling of innovation in SMEs with little money to 
spend up-front on the patenting process, subsidies should not necessarily be only 
provided after the patent is granted, but could be structured in a way that they are 
appropriately provided to patents that are ultimately granted. Any one, or a 
combination of, the examples described hereafter are mechanisms that could be 
used to ensure that subsidies are provided to patents that are granted while also not 
overly discouraging applicants from applying for subsidies: 
 
Method A1: (1) Applicants can apply for patent filing subsidies for a set of patent-
related fees (hereafter the “Patent Fee”). Initially, the Patent Fee is waived. (2) If the 
patent is granted by SIPO, the applicant then pays a non-refundable fee to then have 
the application sent to an appraisal committee for consideration for subsidisation of 
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the Patent Fee. If the patent is approved by this committee, the applicant need not 
pay any of the Patent Fee (outside the aforementioned non-refundable appraisal 
committee review fee). However, if the patent is rejected by the appraisal 
committee, the applicant must pay back the Patent Fee at a to-be-determined, non-
subsidised, interest rate under a defined payment plan.  
 
Method A2: (1) An applicant should pay for a patent Search Report from an external 
agent accredited by SIPO, and SIPO should regulate the fees such agents can charge 
for these reports. (2) The applicant then applies to the appraisal committee directly, 
paying a non-refundable fee and enclosing the aforementioned completed Search 
Report in their application, for their Patent Fees to be subsidised. (3) (a) If approved 
by the appraisal committee, the applicants’ Patent Fee (outside the aforementioned 
non-refundable appraisal committee review fee) is waived, and the cost of the initial 
Search Report is reimbursed. The applicant’s application is then automatically 
submitted to SIPO examiners for a patentability review. The aforementioned waiving 
of the Patent Fee and reimbursement of the Search Report remains as such 
regardless of whether the patent is subsequently granted by the examiners. (b) 
However, if rejected by the appraisal committee, the applicant is only reimbursed 
for the Search Report fee, or a portion of the Patent Fee is deducted when the 
applicant applies (if they choose to apply) for SIPO examination of the application, 
and the applicant must pay the rest of the Patent Fee. 
 
Method B: (1) An applicant should pay for a patent Search Report from an external 
agent accredited by SIPO, and SIPO should regulate the fees such agents can charge 
for these reports. (2) The applicant then applies to the appraisal committee directly 
(for free) for their patent to be subsidised, enclosing the aforementioned completed 
Search Report in their application. (3) (a) If approved by the appraisal committee, 
the applicant is issued a formal certificate saying they do not have to pay X% portion 
(e.g. 75%) of the Patent Fee, including the Search Report fee. In the instance that a 
patent that is approved for subsidisation by the patent subsidy appraisal committee 
is not actually granted by SIPO examiners, several steps should be undertaken. First, 
the application should undergo automatic re-examination with the PRB. Pending the 
reasons for not granting the patent in the first review (and thus the need for re-
examination), the re-examination fees should be covered by the appraisal 
committee rather than the applicant. If deemed fully valid after re-examination, the 
appraisal committee could pay the applicant an additional amount towards the 
Patent Fee (e.g. the remaining 25% of the Patent Fee, meaning 100% of the Patent 
Fee and the Search Report fee would have been ultimately subsidised by the 
government). If the patent is partially invalidated or fully invalidated by the PRB, 
pending the reasons, the appraisal committee could still pay the applicant the 
aforementioned additional amount of the Patent Fee, or instead require the 
applicant pay this amount. (b) If rejected by the appraisal committee, the applicant 
would only be reimbursed for the Search Report, or instead a portion of the Patent 
Fee would be deducted when the applicant applies (if they choose to apply) for the 
first SIPO examination of the patent. The applicant must pay the rest of the Patent 
Fee. 
 
Note: To ensure integrity in the review process within Method A1, A2 and B, it might 
be prudent not to indicate on the patent application subject to the first SIPO 
examination whether the application is involved in the patent filing subsidy program. 
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In the instance a set of roughly ‘equally inventive’ patent applications are vying for 
limited subsidy funds, one might consider a ‘tie-breaker’ criteria for deciding how 
to grant patent subsidies. For example, the government might support smaller and 
less well-funded entities applying; however, a thorough policy assessment should be 
run before any such approach is adopted as a matter of policy. Additionally, one 
might not only consider the quality of the patent reviewed, but the performance of 
the patent applicant in terms of serving as a losing defendant in certain IPR 
infringement cases, among other criteria.  
 
8.2 A supervision committee should be set-up to oversee an opposition mechanism 
and post-granting monitoring and evaluation. This committee would solicit written 
opposition comments from third-parties, via a notice in a gazette, on if a patent selected 
for subsidisation should in fact be subsidised or if an already subsidised patent should 
remain subsidised. Also, a database with subsidy-related information should be 
maintained. Through review of this database and the opposition process, patents to 
receive or already receiving subsidies should be scrutinised, particularly in the instance a 
patent application procedure is deliberately terminated by the applicant. 
 
Several components should be added to the mechanism to oppose and revoke 
subsidies. First, the grounds for opposing subsidation should be clearly stipulated 
before this process is initiated. Second, to prevent abuse of the opposition process, 
if opponents abuse the opposition process with unreasonable oppositions, they will 
be warned/receive a certain type of warning(s) and other punitive action may be 
taken. Third, a formal and well-functioning mechanism should collate relevant 
information from State Administration for Industry and Commerce (SAIC), GAC, SIPO, 
the Ministry of Public Security (MPS)/police, procurators, and other IPR 
administrative enforcement bodies; arbitration committees; and the judiciary; as 
well as rights holders and other parties relevant for challenging a particular patent’s/ 
applicant’s access to subsidisation.  
 
In a proven instance of bad faith filings, filing subsidies should be repaid with 
interest and additional fines imposed. In this instance, the government should (1) 
ensure any subsidies given for patent filing and development are repaid with 
interest, and (2) additional fines that become increasingly steep per number of 
invalidations by a single filer should be considered for repeat offenders (for example, 
those who file more than X bad faith filings are fined between X-Y RMB, those who 
file more than Y are fined between Y-Z RMB, and so on). Monies must be repaid to 
the granting institution based on a repayment system developed by SIPO. As 
relevant, and pending the Method used as suggested above, the appraisal 
committee member who approved such a patent for subsidies should be penalised 
in his/her performance review. 
 
9. Recommendation: IIPs premised exclusively on IND-IP-based requirements (as opposed to also 
on IP licensing from abroad) that are linked to subsidies and other financial incentives should 
be clearly nullified. This should be required in the absence of publically available, rigorous 
analyses (including empirical analyses) that support the idea that IND IP requirements as 
currently conceived and linked to financial incentives best enable economic, environmental, 
and/or social progress in China in a way a less discriminatory policy approach cannot. To be sure, 
“best” herein should be based on solid scientific, economic, and legal rationales.  
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9.1 If any measure, for example an IIP rule mentioned within this study, has in fact 
been invalidated/made null but is still published online, either remove the regulations 
from online government sources or require clear indication on the actual text of the 
measures posted that they have been nullified. 
 
10. Recommendation: Amend the requirements in current IND-IP-based IIPs to instead include 
different, arguably better, determinants of the success of an enterprise in building quality 
patents. For example, criteria could be set in terms of high and productive investments in R&D 
(e.g. measured via R&D returns), invention patents in-force for longer than 6 years or an 
otherwise appropriate period of time, products or services with high value-added and 
commercial value, among other criteria. 
 
11. Recommendation: Policy advice should focus less on certain current patent-based incentives 
reviewed in this study and encourage more sustainable incentives to boost innovation and 
competiveness.  
 
11.1 Set forth policy advice that mandates all incentives specifically for patent 
development set out by provincial/municipal and local levels – whether this support is 
for patent filings, transformation of patents, monetisation of patents, or other forms 
of patent development – first meet certain verified patent quality thresholds.  
 
11.2 Consider requiring an assessment on the social impact of certain incentives. 
 
11.3 Policy advice should be revised as necessary to better encourage employers to 
offer incentives to their employees to innovate not just for the sake of producing 
patents but to also optimally contribute to the overall competitiveness of the 
company, research institute, or university.  
 
12. Recommendation: Consider elevating the role of MOFCOM in innovation policymaking to be 
more on par with MoST and NDRC. In addition to other mechanisms, more formal 
development of the responsibilities within the Inter-Ministerial Joint Conference could 
be used as one mechanism to monitor this power-sharing.  
 
13. Recommendation: Include foreign and Chinese business and industry associations and other 
experts in the formulation process for specific regulations on IP management in line with the 
Provisional Regulations on Intellectual Property Management of the Major National Scientific 
and Technological Projects (as mentioned in Part 6, measure 60 of the 2012 National IP 
Strategy Plan), and other related measures. 
 
14. Recommendation: Conduct an audit or series of audits, led by China’s National Audit Office, on 
the workings of all major innovation-related funding programs and other key innovation 
policies in China. This report could form the basis for improving related programs and policies 
as discussed among SIPO, MoST, and other relevant bodies involved in patent and innovation 
strategy and implementation. 
 
15. Recommendation: Relevant government bodies should keep transparent websites that track 
government funding according to a variety of specific reporting criteria.  
 
15.1 Consider consolidating information on all major innovation-specific funding 
programs in a concise manner in English or another WTO language on relevant 
government websites. The EC-funded project China Access4EU has already compiled 
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this for many government funding programs at a helpful level of detail, although some 
major programs appear not to be covered, and the full details of subsidies at provincial 
and local levels are not clearly outlined. 
 
15.2 Relevant government bodies should keep transparent websites which provide a 
listing of those entities actually awarded government funding, in addition to other key 
details. Specifically, the site should present the disaggregated scores for project awards 
on a set of clearly listed criteria for qualifying for such funding; in addition to details of 
projects they are working on; and any other relevant information necessary to ensure 
transparency and foster competition. 
 
16. Recommendation: IND IP IIPs linked to subsidies and any other financial preferences (inclusive 
of those based on WTO inconsistent provisions) should be nullified. Financial incentives should 
be revised to be less discriminatory and better promote innovation and patent quality.  
 
16.1 All WTO inconsistent subsidies with IND IP provisions should be clearly nullified 
and voided. And all relevant subsidies should be reported to the WTO’s Committee on 
Subsidies and Countervailing Duties.  
 
16.2 All subsidies and other financial support that are not necessarily WTO 
inconsistent but are not awarded equitably to qualified enterprises, including support 
that is solely innovation-focused, should be opened up equally de facto to both foreign 
and domestic entities. 
 
16.3 As a replacement for IND IP criteria in export subsidies, perfect an outreach 
program where export-intensive Chinese enterprises are better informed of the need 
to register their IPR abroad, and are better provided guidance on how to do so. This 
might, for example, be modelled off of the China IPR SME Helpdesk, a project funded by 
the EC for EU companies operating or looking to operate in China, and which the 
European Chamber has been implementing for several years now.  
 
17. Recommendation: Enact specific revisions to the criteria for HNTE status. 
 
17.1 Revise Part V, Section I, para. 1 of the Application for Recognition of Hi-tech 
Enterprises and reform the actual approval process to notably raise the threshold for 
the quality of utility models accepted as meeting the IPR requirements for HNTE status.  
 
17.2 Consider adding the preconditions for receiving HNTE status that enterprises are 
not frequently a losing defendant in patent infringement cases, nor are repeatedly 
convicted of bad faith filings. These conditions might also be binding while receiving 
recognition of HNTE status, whereas in certain extreme cases HNTE status might be 
revoked if the conditions are not met.  
 
17.3 Revise Part V, Section I, para. 4 of the Working Guidance on the Recognition of Hi-
tech Enterprises to state that qualifying enterprises need not have IP owned in China, 
but the China affiliate can qualify for HNTE status if possessing appropriate R&D 
personnel and funding so that it can reasonably be expected that these resources will 
lead to creation of quality patented solutions in the future.  
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17.4 Consider revising current Chinese law to, subject to reasonable conditions, state 
that an HNTE shall own the IP from its research in China but may freely license it to 
foreign-affiliated companies or third parties without effect on its HNTE status.   
 
17.5 Fully contingent on the above recommendations first being implemented, then 
consider phasing out the option to use utility models to qualify for HNTE status, 
instead exclusively requiring filings of quality invention patents. The Application for 
Recognition of Hi-tech Enterprises could be revised accordingly.  
 
 
18. Recommendation: Open at least partially more of China’s government-sponsored S&T funding 
programs to foreign entities, and revise IPR restrictions therein to allow project partners to 
own the knowledge produced from the projects, and beyond this simply require that the 
project partners reach an agreement among themselves on IPR ownership and licensing and 
explicitly allow IPR ownership transfer and licensing. This should include replacing the term 
“national interest” (and perhaps “important public interest”) in Article 20 of the Law on 
Scientific and Technological Progress with language that provides a more reasonable and 
precise scope for exclusivity claims. 
  
19. Recommendation: Open a draft of MoST’s 12th Five-Year Special Plan on IP Work of Science 
and Technology Innovation (mentioned in Part 6, measure 59, of the 2012 National IP Strategy 
Plan) for public comments for at least 60 days.  
 
20. Recommendation: Provide full transparency into the makeup of MoST’s Patent Assessment 
Index System of National Technology Invention Awards and how that might be revised in the 
future to better foster patent quality.  
  
21. Recommendation: Revise several components of the TIER: 
 
21.1 Revise Article 27 to clearly allow negotiation on ownership of improvements on 
technology (as this may be fundamentally needed in case of technology transfer 
related to toll manufacturing and service R&D). 
 
21.2 Revise Article 2 to indicate that experimental data at an early stage of research or 
derived from pure service R&D is excluded from the approval requirements set forth in 
that article. 
 
21.3 MOFCOM and other relevant government ministries should create a working 
group with industry and other experts to improve the clarity of the coverage of 
technologies in the current category of restricted and prohibited import/export 
technology.  
 
21.4 Revise the TIER Measures provisions on liability of the technology transferor or 
licensor in an infringement claim raised by a third party. These revisions should more 
fully consider instances where current obligations create an undue burden on the 
licensor, e.g. in areas with patent thickets and where licensed technology is still not fully 
developed. 
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22. Recommendation: Ensure all overly discriminatory de jure and de facto restrictions on foreign 
entities accessing the Technical Committees in which standardisation is decided are removed, 
and more reasonable access is granted to patent pools and essential patents. The European 
Chamber, among other industry associations, should be consulted to provide a specific list of 
barriers to be removed herein.  
 
23. Recommendation: Reform the CCC Mark accreditation process in line with recent 
recommendations provided by foreign governments.  
 
24. Recommendation: Establish a Working Group with topical sub-groups made up of 
government officials, SSOs, experts, and industry representatives (foreign and domestic) to 
investigate and provide recommendations on improving standard-development and oversight 
policy in China. Policies reviewed would include information security regulations, including the 
MLPS, that may unnecessarily discourage R&D by foreigners; information restrictions on 
patent-related requirements needed for implementing standards; intentional development of 
national standards based only on the capabilities of Chinese SOEs; intentional lack of licensing 
essential patents to foreign enterprises, particularly those in the telecom industry; potentially 
disconcerting requirements involving TCM chips; IP disclosure to competitors during the 
chemical project approval process; IP leakage and other issues surrounding SFDA’s approval 
process for pharmaceuticals; and all other standardisation policies flagged as a drag on patent 
quality. Among those needed to address the aforementioned issues, recommendations to be 
considered by the Group include Key Recommendation #5 from the European Chamber’s 
2012/2013 PCR Working Group Position Paper regarding chemical plant approval, and Key 
Recommendation #6 from the European Chamber’s Standards and Conformity Assessment 
Working Group 2011/2012 Position Paper. The Group could be expanded to cover other 
concerning standardisation polices not necessarily related to patent quality. 
 
25. Recommendation: A taskforce should be created among industry associations in China 
(Chinese and foreign) to conduct an audit of all raw deals and other forms of forced-
disclosure of know-how their members have experienced. Complainants should provide solid 
evidence as to how the instances harm patent quality and innovation in China. Only the 
strongest cases should be included in a final report. The report should be published with 
recommendations and discussed with the MOFCOM, among other ministries.  
 
26. Recommendation: Implement Key Recommendation #3 in the European Chamber Position 
Paper 2011/2012 (2011) on clarifying the rules governing inventor remuneration. That 
recommendation suggests the SPC or SIPO develop and interpretation on how certain general 
questions on inventor remuneration will be handled in a dispute. Specifically, clarification is 
needed that the direct employer of the inventor under a contract bound by Chinese labour law is 
the only one liable for inventor remuneration, and that labour contracts and company 
regulations should only be challengeable in extreme cases of willful neglect of the rights of the 
inventor. 
 
27. Recommendation: In line with the European Chamber’s submission on this topic, consider at 
least very broadly clarifying certain issues with the Measures on Compulsory Licensing. 
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Ⅲ.3.3.2 Other recommendations 
 
Sub-section 3.2  
 
28. Recommendation: A taskforce of scholars, government officials, and other experts should be 
commissioned to conduct a rigorous review of the progress thus far and expected future 
results of China’s IIP polices on assimilation, absorption, co-innovation and re-innovation. The 
report should be published with recommendations and discussed with the government. 
29. Recommendation: Continue, with renewed vigor, discussions in the WTO on including non-
violation complaints in the TRIPS Agreement, with a view to removing the moratorium on use 
of these provisions. 
 
30. Recommendation: Delink EIDF and any other subsidies from preferential policies that without 
mention of procurement threshold requirements full-stop give preference in government 
procurement tendering to “large enterprises.” 
 
31. Recommendation: MoST to re-consider its current approach to innovation and patent filing 
through megaprojects. As feasible, consider having at least some of these initiatives more 
focused on basic research and key fields via highly competitive and smaller scale, peer-
reviewed projects. 
32. Recommendation: Ensure transparency regulations as stipulated in China’s WTO commitments 
are enforced, including on comment periods and notifications of measures, and ensure 
relevant measures are published in an Official Journal and in a WTO language.  
 
33. Recommendation: A formal relationship should be developed between provincial technology 
transfer centres and the European Chamber, as well as with the European Chamber and 
industrial parks in those regions, with a view to better facilitating matchmaking activities with 
European businesses and Chinese counterparts.  
34. Recommendation: Set forth guidance, with some form of penalties for non-compliance, that 
provinces/municipalities, and more so industrial parks and larger zones within a 
province/municipality, when possible and appropriate should coordinate with one another in 
determining their respective competitive advantages and developing accordingly specific plans 
to attract distinct industries/sets of companies to their industry parks. 
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Ⅲ.4 Chapter 4: Rules and procedures for reviewing patent 
applications and those for enforcing patents 
 
Ⅲ.4.1 Analysis 
 
Ⅲ.4.1.1 Sub-section 4.1: Patent application review  
 
Introduction: This sub-section investigates how some aspects of the patent application review 
process in China can stifle patent quality and related innovation. 
 
Ⅲ.4.1.1.1 Overly burdensome “Confidentiality Review” required before filing 
patents abroad 
 
China’s Patent Law (“Patent Law (2008)”), the third revision on which was issued on December 27th 
2008 by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, and its implementing rules set 
forth an overly burdensome Confidentiality Review process (also often called a “Confidentiality 
Assessment” or “Confidentiality Examination”) for all foreign patent filings for inventions made in 
China’s territory. Article 20 of the Patent Law (2008) states that when an owner of an invention or 
utility model “completed in China,” i.e. for which the substantive part of the technical solution is 
completed in China, wants to file that patent abroad they must request a Confidentiality Review 
from SIPO before doing so.346 Article 8 and 9 of the Implementing Rules of the Patent Law, as 
amended in January 2010, provide details on this Confidentiality Review procedure whereas Article 9 
stipulates if it is determined that the solution “may relate to the security or vital interest of the State 
and is required to be kept secret,” a confidentiality notice is sent to the applicant with which they 
have to comply,347 and the patent will not be published (even if approved in China) and it cannot be 
filed in a foreign country.  
 
The level of ambiguity as to what constitutes a solution that “relates to the security or vital interest 
of the State” opens up the possibility that a wide-range of solutions might fall within this category 
and thus face complications. This puts a damper on entities’ ability to internationalise and may 
directly discourage development of a wide variety of patents that could conceivably fall within this 
area of regulation.  
 
Further, even if the Confidentiality Review reveals no problem for first filings abroad, as should be 
the case in most instances, the requirements for this review create a burden because the texts for 
the review need to be translated or a costly PCT application has to be filed with SIPO by external 
counsel in order to comply with SIPO’s request.348 At the very least, these requirements cost 
companies more time and money to develop and commercalise or otherwise productively transform 
certain solutions into productive assets, which in turn discourages certain innovation and patent 
filing. And particularly disconcertingly, the requirements may discourage competitive companies 
with quality patents that are more likely than those with the lowest quality patents to seek to 
internationalise in the first place. 
 
                                                           
346
 Measure retrieved from http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=7289 
347
 Measure retrieved from http://www.ccpit-
patent.com.cn/references/Implementing_Regulations_Patent_Law_China.htm 
348
 2012, May 9- Consultations with Dr. Oliver Lutze in Shanghai 
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Even more troublesome is that additional Confidentiality Reviews are burdensomely required on 
patent applications amended during the priority filing period even if such amendments are within 
the scope of the original claims. It is usual practice that patent applicants in certain fields (e.g. 
chemical arts) amend patent applications shortly before foreign filings in many countries within the 
12 month priority period. Such amended texts, according to SIPO, need another Confidentiality 
Review as the amendments need to be checked even if in the scope of the original claims. In most 
cases, this additional Confidentiality Review is not possible anymore at a time so close to the end of 
the priority period. This puts the resulting Chinese patents at risk that they can be invalidated if no 
security check has been performed on the amendments. This discourages the innovation activities of 
those who conduct R&D in China with a view to filing patents in China and abroad on such R&D.349  
 
Ⅲ.4.1.1.2 Concerns over regulations on the green channel for patents  
 
Uncertainties in the application of expedited examination of patents via what is often referred to as 
“green channel” approval may inhibit patent quality. As noted in the European Chamber’s January 
13th 2012 response to SIPO’s Call for Comments on the Administrative Measures on Prioritised 
Examination of Patent Applications (Draft), while these measure are welcome in general, there are 
uncertainties as to whether the measures will translate into a less rigorous examination process for 
patents, both in terms of Substantive Examinations for invention patents and other review for utility 
models. This would be concerning and may jeopardise necessary patent quality reviews. Also, in 
absence of assurances as to how the process will play out in practice, there are concerns that 
application requirements for prioritised examinations may be implemented in a less than egalitarian 
manner.350  
 
Elliot Papageorgiou, Executive and Partner at Rouse in Shanghai, further explains some of the most 
serious concerns surrounding China’s approach to expedited examination of patents: 
 
“The most pressing concern would be how SIPO would keep track of and take account of the 
pending applications which have not been prioritised but of course may still constitute 
relevant prior art for any expedited application. This problem is magnified as a result of the 
large volume and growth in patent filings in China. If this potential issue is not managed 
appropriately, situations could arise where expedited applications lead to grants despite 
existence of novelty-destroying prior art contained in prior-filed but later examined non-
expedited applications.”351 
 
The Administrative Measures on the Priority Examination of Invention Patent Applications, issued on 
June 19th 2012 by SIPO, may address some of these concerns regarding the assessment of prior art 
for expedited examination of invention patents. For example, Article 7 of the measures requires a 
Search Report be conducted and submitted as part of an application for prioritised patent 
examination on invention patents.352  
 
However, there are still a number of ambiguities in the rules surrounding the expedited patent 
review process in China. It is will also be helpful to seek assurances as to how the green channel for 
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 2012, May 9-  Consultations with Dr. Oliver Lutze  
350
 European Chamber’s response to SIPO’s Call for Comments on Administrative Measures on Prioritised Examination of 
Patent Applications, submitted to SIPO on January 13
th
 2012.  
351
 2012, June 12 - Consultations with Elliot Papageorgiou in Shanghai 
352
 Measure retrieved from http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zwgs/ling/201206/t20120621_712805.html 
 Article 7: “To go through the priority examination formalities, the applicant should submit the following materials…the 
search report in prescribed format provided by the unit that is qualified to conduct patent searches, or the search report, 
examination report and the Chinese translated version for the search report and examination report provided by the patent 
examination institutes in other countries or regions.” (Translation from European Chamber thus is unofficial.) 
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prioritised patent examination in strategic sectors, e.g. those in the 2012 National IP Strategy, will be 
implemented,353  whereas there may be potential for these examinations to be implemented in an 
overly discriminatory manner and disconcertedly provide favourable review to lesser than highest-
quality patents, and at worst low-quality patents, just because they are in an industry defined as 
strategic. As mentioned in Chapter 2, it is also worth seeking assurances from SASAC in particular 
regarding how this system is currently and will be applied to patents filed by SOEs. The requirement 
in Article 4 of the Administrative Measures on the Priority Examination of Invention Patent 
Applications that priority review will concentrate on “patents of great significance to national or 
public interests” does not allay these concerns.354 These factors may potentially create a patent 
review environment that may jeopardise an import filter of patents, or otherwise inappropriately 
favour lower quality patents over higher quality ones.  
 
Ⅲ.4.1.1.3 Genetically modified plants and other genetic material are unreasonably 
excluded from patentability 
 
There are restrictions on core inventions in the agro-sciences, whereas a notable amount of 
genetically modified plants are excluded from patentability as clarified by SIPO’s Patent Examination 
Guidelines (2010 revision). Genetically modified plants can only enjoy plant variety protection (PVP) 
because wider protection on plants regardless of variety is excluded in China. This is compounded by 
the fact that China has not ratified the International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties 
of Plants as revised in 1991 (“UPOV ‘91 version”)355 for PVP protection. Patent protection for whole 
plants, regardless variety, or plant cells, would better foster R&D activities in the field in China.356  
 
Also, important claims for genetic material, like DNA, are only allowed in a very narrow scope, thus 
not giving the applicant sufficient protection on such materials. Further, the claims that are allowed 
can be easily circumvented by using slightly modified homologous genetic material. This reduces the 
motivation to patent inventions in related fields, thus to a large degree denying China quality 
patents and related innovation.357 
 
Ⅲ.4.1.2 Sub-section 4.2: Patent-specific enforcement issues 
 
Introduction: This sub-section investigates how certain patent-specific enforcement issues 
individually, and more so collectively, contribute to negative perceptions about the strength of the 
IPR protection environment in China, which in turn can somewhat stifle innovation and linked patent 
quality in China.  
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 For example, Part 2, measure 15 in the 2012 National IP Strategy sets forth an initiative to “improve the green channel 
for patent examination, accelerate the acquirement of IPRs by burgeoning strategic industries from their innovations. (SIPO, 
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Ⅲ.4.1.2.1 “Abuse of patent rights,” including “abuse of right of action” and “malicious 
prosecution actions” 
 
In light of the well-known Chint vs. Schneider case, among other recent cases, Chinese companies 
have seen that they can successfully litigate against foreign adversaries to earn significant 
compensation.358 As a result, there have been a number of high-profile patent litigation cases 
brought by domestic firms against foreign firms. Some of the most concerning cases involve patents 
filed with the sole purpose of being used in litigation.  
 
As detailed in Gao et al. (2011), the concept of “abuse of patent rights” deserves to be clarified in 
the Patent Law as at present it is overly general. Given weaknesses in application of the specific 
principles of “abuse of right of action” and “malicious prosecution actions” (which can be broadly 
thought of as filing a lawsuit solely intended to harm the defendant) in cases involving complex 
patents and ambiguity in the scope of patent claims, complainants in some cases, albeit not the 
majority of cases, can force accused infringers to undertake overly strong liability.359 This results in 
overly strict liabilities and provides a perverse incentive for litigation.  
Sources suggest that many patents in China are filed for the sole purpose of being used for 
retaliation and/or to first initiate litigation. As cited in McGregor (2010), low-quality patents are 
often used in China to retaliate against foreign companies inside China that have filed cases outside 
China against Chinese companies. As mentioned in Chapter 1, some sources go as far as to suggest 
that more than 50% of the patents filed with SIPO “are of foreign innovations with the sole intention 
of suing the same for patent infringement.” 360 This concern, where patents are used as first-attack 
and/or tit-for-tat weapons, discourages business from setting-up and/or expanding operations in 
China, especially IP-reliant operations, and thus creates barriers in the way of China’s move to 
develop quality patents and related innovation.  
As also mentioned in the Introduction and Chapter 1, given utility models are cheaper and easier to 
obtain than invention patents, in principle it makes the most sense for applicants to apply for utility 
models if they indeed intend to utilise their patents for the sole purpose of malicious prosecution 
actions. Bai and Cheng (2011) confirm that there have been concerning cases in China where utility 
models patents in particular were filed on solutions that are already part of the prior art, and these 
were used as “harassment tools.”361 Such patents also can be used as “barriers to entry or 
restrictions on Freedom-to-Operate.”362 Box 7 below provides two sample case studies on the usage 
of low-quality utility model patents in malicious prosecution actions in China.  
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 Chint Group Corp. and Schneider Low-Voltage (Tianjin) Co. have been suing one another over patent infringement since 
1999. Over the years, Chint lost a variety of cases that Schneider filed in Europe. Litigation in China spanned several years, 
whereas the most recent case was decided by the Wenzhou Intermediate People’s Court on September 29
th
 2009, finding 
that Schneider and its authorised distributor, Star Electric Equipment Co. Ltd. in Zheijiang, were guilty of patent 
infringement. The ruling was based upon Chint’s claim that Schneider had infringed upon a utility model Chint had 
registered in China. Schneider was ordered to cease patent infringement and pay 330 million RMB to Chint, although 
eventually settled to pay 157 million RMB. Even though reduced from the initial amount awarded, this was the largest 
compensation ever awarded in China in an IP dispute.  
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 Concern mentioned in Gao et al. (2011), pp 90-104; 2012, May 17- Consultations with Lin Xu suggest that these cases 
are not the majority of cases. 
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Retrieved from http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/Pages/Chinese-Supreme-Court-brings-about-sea-change-
for-patent-litigation-in-China.aspx 
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Box 7: Case studies: low-quality utility model patents used in malicious prosecution actions in 
China
363
 
 
The Forced Marriage  
 
An international escalator company (“Company”) was approached by a former Chinese supplier 
upon having commenced its own production of an item of equipment which it formerly drew from 
that supplier. The former supplier gave the Company a choice, either to continue/recommence the 
prior supply arrangements (which the Company had terminated due to reliability problems) or it 
could pay a royalty for the licensing of a utility model that the former supplier had filed covering the 
product which the Company had formerly instructed the supplier to manufacture on its behalf. Upon 
the Company’s refusal to recommence the commercial relationship, the former supplier issued 
utility model infringement proceedings against the Company. The Company was faced with a difficult 
choice of recommencing now commercially unfavourable commercial relations with the former 
supplier and paying a license fee on a product that the supplier did not develop in the first place, or 
invalidating the relevant utility model and/or facing utility model patent infringement proceedings. 
The Company decided to pursue invalidation proceedings against the utility model and succeeded 
but only partially (which is not an unusual occurrence), thus having to run the risk of potentially 
infringing the remaining part of the utility model.  
 
Patents as Barriers to Entry 
 
A European specialty manufacturer of construction materials was importing machines into China 
utilising technology contained in their expired European patents. Their Chinese competitor derived a 
number of utility models from the European company’s expired patents by adding some immaterial 
improvements (which in fact were devised by the European company but it did not file for them as 
these improvements failed to meet the patentability threshold for inventiveness in Europe). Upon 
the European company’s market success in China, the Chinese competitor sought to draw upon 
those utility models to stop the European company’s advance in China’s burgeoning construction 
market. While the European company was successful in showing that the bulk of the utility model 
lacked inventiveness, the remaining, insignificant, improvements were held to be valid and 
enforceable. As such, the European company had a choice: cease to use the improvements in its 
products in China or pay the Chinese company what was an unreasonable royalty fee.  
 
 
The trend of low-quality patents being used for malicious prosecution actions is compounded by a 
number of interconnected Chinese policies, practices and other trends. For one, it is exacerbated by 
the proliferation of NPEs in China mentioned in the section of Chapter 3 on standardisation policies. 
It is also compounded by, among other issues, ambiguities surrounding application of the anti-
monopoly rules which are further discussed later in this chapter.  
 
Light at the end of the tunnel? 
 
All this said, it deserves to be recognised that there is commendable recent focus by the Chinese 
government on addressing the phenomenon of abuse of patent rights. The concept of abuse of 
patent rights was proposed for inclusion in the most recent (third) amendment to the Chinese 
Patent Law (2008), although not ultimately included therein; however, subsequent SPC opinions 
specifically mention the concept. For example, Article 18 of the SPC’s Judicial Interpretation on Some 
Issues Concerning the Application of Laws to the Trial of Patent Infringement Disputes, which came 
into effect on January 1st 2010, allows for declarations of non-infringement to bring declaratory 
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judgment in their home courts, meaning patentees should be cautious about sending warning letters 
or making other threats of action unless they are prepared to sue.364 Moreover, Article 16 of the 
December 16
th
 2011 SPC Opinion finds “If anyone is fully aware that his/her patent falls within the 
category of prior arts or prior designs, however, still maliciously issues infringement warnings to or 
abuses its right of action against any party who legally uses such prior art or prior design and the 
trade partners thereof, courts may uphold the victims' request for damages in light of actual 
situations.” 365 In addition to the SPC, SIPO officials have set forth in policy statements like the NPDS 
and otherwise publicly announced intentions to limit abuse of patent rights.366  
 
Given the recentness of some of the SPC and SIPO initiatives mentioned, it is not possible to 
determine the full extent to which the abuse of patent rights is still playing out and is not ideally 
being addressed in China. However, given the extreme importance that abuse of patent rights in 
China are effectively curtailed as soon as possible and the notable potential that more still needs to 
be done to achieve such a result, the issue was raised in this section. In assessing this issue further in 
the near future, the actions of utility model filers in China in particular warrant close attention,367 
and jurisprudence from the courts should be monitored to see if penalties being granted and other 
judgments in cases of abuse of patent rights are appropriately deterring such abuses. Further, it is 
possible that changes to the Patent Law (2008) might be a useful way to ensure that the 
aforementioned intentions of the SPC and SIPO are effectively heeded. 
 
Ⅲ.4.1.2.2 Difficulties invalidating utility models given limits on submission of prior art 
Sources suggest that under the Patent Examination Guidelines issued by SIPO on January 21st 2010 
and effective on January 1st 2010 (“Guidelines for Patent Examination [2010]”), a petitioner is 
sometimes restricted to presenting too few pieces of prior art in an attempt to prove lack of 
inventiveness in a utility model invalidation case.
368
 According to Part IV,  Chapter 6, Section 4, Sub-
Section 2 of the guidelines, under “normal circumstances” petitioners are allowed to submit “one or 
two” pieces of prior art in a case involving a utility model patent; whereas petitioners can submit, 
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 Clark, D. (2011). Patent litigation in China. New York: Oxford University Press, p. 101 
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 Article 16: “It is imperative to properly handle the relations between patent protection and prevention of abuse of rights, 
and regulate abuse of patent right and abuse of the preliminary injunction system according to law. While protecting 
patent rights and safeguarding the right of action of the parties involved, courts shall also pay attention to preventing 
patentees from exercising their rights in obvious violation of the purpose of law, causing damage to their competitors by 
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within the category of prior arts or prior designs, however still maliciously issues infringement warnings to or abuses its 
right of action against any party who legally uses such prior art or prior design and the trade partners thereof, courts may 
uphold the victims' request for damages in light of actual situations. Courts shall apply legal conditions strictly, strengthen 
procedural protection, and be careful in taking measures for stopping patent infringement prior to litigation...” Also note 
Article 13 in the December 16
th
 2011 SPC Opinion finds: “[we]…shall adhere to the principle of eclectic interpretation for the 
scope of right of invention patents and utility model patents, and accurately define the scope of patent right protection.” 
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 Among other references, see Part II, Section 2 of the NPDS. 
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 Note 1: As a side note, rights-holders in China are increasingly being advised by attorneys to file for both utility model 
patents and invention patent protection on the same solution. This is because utility model patents are awarded much 
quicker than invention patents and when/if an applicant is awarded the invention patent they can just abandon the utility 
model for the invention patent.  While certainly not the only reason this type of legal advice is heeded, in the instance that 
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because they feel it necessary to protect themselves against malicious patent litigation and/or bad faith filings in China, 
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reform the system without ridding it of the aforementioned ‘dual filing’ option. Note 2: Given the different nature of what 
they protect and the arguably lesser necessity of such models to innovation, this concern may apply less to design patents. 
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 Measures retrieved from http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zlsqzn/sczn2010.pdf   
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“one, two, or more” pieces of prior art in an invention patent proceedings.
369
 While, depending on 
the circumstances of the utility model case, more pieces of prior art can theoretically be submitted, 
practice suggests this is by no means the usual occurrence, i.e. it is only for exceptional cases. As 
explained by Elliot Papageorgiou, Executive and Partner at Rouse in Shanghai, this restriction on 
pieces of admissible prior art for utility model invalidation cases makes it more difficult to invalidate 
utility models, as it effectively requires one or two pieces of “knock-out prior art” to show that the 
utility model has been anticipated. Papageorgiou suggests this is difficult to find unless the utility 
model in question merely copies a single prior registered right in its entirety and does not go beyond 
such right.
370
  
While one could argue that it is dangerous to allow too many submissions of prior art, given a broad 
scope of solutions can be sufficiently covered by “mosaicing” individual items of prior art, this does 
not negate the fact that normally only allowing one or two pieces of prior art may be an 
unreasonably low restriction that makes it difficult to challenge utility models. As such, the 
requirements in the Guidelines for Patent Examination (2010) actually make it often more difficult to 
fairly determine a utility model dispute than even an invention patent dispute. This is particularly 
concerning when considering that, during their maintenance, a valid utility model enjoys the same 
powerful legal protection rights as an invention patent.371    
 
This situation further enables proliferation of low-quality utility model patents in particular in China. 
If in practice China’s enforcement system allowed (or better, required) a greater number of pieces of 
prior art to be considered by examiners in utility model invalidation proceedings, patent invalidation 
rates in the country would likely be higher. This supports the view that China has more low-quality 
patents than those gauged only by current patent invalidation rates. 
 
 
Ⅲ.4.1.2.3 Overly narrow consideration of prior art for utility models in pre-enforcement 
searches 
 
In a related vein to the previously mentioned issue, sources suggest that in infringement cases SIPO’s 
“Patent Evaluation Report” assessing prior art for utility models is currently overly limited to the art 
in the identical technical field. With China’s technological progress, borrowing or referring to 
technologies in similar areas is becoming usual practice for inventors to make technological 
improvements. As such, not widening the range of technical fields for assessment of prior art on a 
utility model does not decrease incidence of trivial and low-quality patents in China, and may in fact 
enable the proliferation of such patents. 372 This is further compounded with the phenomenon that 
SIPO’s patent examiners unfortunately do not have easy access to information on the larger amount 
of prior art disclosed by use or other methods that are not part of patent litigation materials.373  
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Ⅲ .4.1.2.4 Patent Evaluation Reports are not given appropriate weight in judicial 
infringement proceedings 
 
A "Patent Evaluation Report" is the current form of the less comprehensive “Original Search Report” 
once used to assess the patentability of utility patents in China. The introduction of the Patent 
Evaluation Report in the latest revision of China’s Patent Law (2008), was in part an attempt to 
address the fact that the invalidation rate of utility models in China around that time was considered 
high. It was suggested that the creation of an examination process similar to the Substantive 
Examination required for invention patents might be a constructive way of solving this problem. At 
present, there is an office in SIPO designated to perform these Patent Evaluation reports, staffed by 
several examiners transferred from the Substantive Examination Department of SIPO, who are 
ostensibly well-qualified to execute examinations. The Patent Evaluation Report they produce is 
issued after a utility model is actually granted, and is similar in several ways to an “Office Action” 
required during the Substantive Examination of an invention patent.374  
 
Consultations suggest that in an infringement proceeding the Patent Evaluation Report for utility 
models is not necessarily considered as legally binding, but rather is only considered evidence, 
whereas although in some cases a judge may give appropriate weight to the report, in others he/she 
may consider such evidence along with other evidence in making a ruling or, worse, give the report 
very little consideration.375 This is significantly problematic as it undermines the expert Evaluation 
Report of SIPO examiners, which while facing some limitations (as discussed above) is still arguably 
one of the best tools assessing patentability of a utility model, in favour of different types of 
potentially dubious evidence in patent enforcement cases. 
 
It is also worth pointing out that if China’s adjudication system mandated more weight be given to 
Patent Evaluation Reports, utility model invalidation rates might be higher. This further supports the 
view that China has more low-quality patents than those gauged only by current invalidation rates. 
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 An Office Action is always issued by a SIPO examiner of an invention patent application during the Substantive 
Examination period for that patent. In an Office Action, the examiner will perform a search to see whether they can find 
any documents/information that would challenge the patentability of the solution in the patent application; provide their 
comments regarding whether the claims in the according application are supported by the descriptions therein; determine 
whether the technical solutions in the descriptions are sufficiently disclosed; determine whether the draft of the claim is 
clear; among other elements. The patent applicant is required to respond to this report. Usually there are three to seven 
Office Actions during the Substantive Examination of an invention patent. (Source: 2012, February 20- Consultations with 
an expert at the EU IPR SME Helpdesk) 
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 Note 1: Article 61 of the revised Patent Law states “….Where any dispute over patent infringement involves a patent for 
utility model or design, the people's court or the patent administrative department may require the patentee or the 
interested parties to present a patent assessment report issued by the patent administrative department of the State 
Council, after the retrieval, analysis and assessment of the pertinent utility model or design, as a proof for trying and 
settling the dispute over patent infringement.” (LawinfoChina translation). Note 2: other translations of the law, e.g. from 
IPR2, are different in a way that can lead to a different interpretation of the article. The relevant selection of the Article in 
Chinese is “…专利侵权纠纷涉及实用新型专利或者外观设计专利的，人民法院或者管理专利工作的部门可以要求专
利权人或者利害关系人出具由国务院专利行政部门对相关实用新型或者外观设计进行检索、分析和评价后作出的专
利权评价报告，作为审理、处理专利侵权纠纷的证据。” Note 3: 2012, March 20 consultations with Lin Xu in Shanghai 
suggest that herein to be “used as evidence” is different from a “binding decision.”  If a patent is invalidated through an 
invalidation procedure, this is binding in court, but if the Evaluation Report is only considered evidence by the judge then 
he/she may consider such evidence along with other evidence in making a ruling. In practice, the judge might consider the 
Evaluation Report as powerful evidence, but still this is still different from a binding decision. Note 4: A variation of this 
phenomenon is described in Gao et al. (2011) (p. 121), where even if an Evaluation Report for a utility model is conducted 
and it finds that a patent should be invalidated, SIPO may still not actively initiate an invalidation procedure on its own.  
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Ⅲ.4.1.2.5 Lack of mandatory suspension of utility model infringement cases pending the 
outcome of validity proceedings 
 
While most judges require utility model patent infringement cases in court be suspended or 
adjourned pending the outcome of validity proceedings at SIPO, this is not universally applied. 
However, this should be necessary unless the utility model patent in question has already been 
shown to be valid in separate/other proceedings.376 Such a requirement would help strengthen the 
perception of China’s IPR protection environment, which would have spillovers in terms of further 
encouraging development of quality patents and related innovation. 
 
Ⅲ.4.1.2.6 Anti-monopoly Law concerns, including regulation of patent pools 
 
There is continued uncertainty over how the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML), which underwent major 
revisions effective in August 2008, specifically Article 55 377  which discusses regulation of 
monopolistic behavior based on intellectual property rights, will be implemented in practice, and 
this in-turn somewhat creates a drag on development of quality patents. Anti-monopoly 
enforcement is important in breaking-up monopoly-building resulting from certain types of patent 
pools (although in some circumstances patent pools can in-fact create positive impacts on patent 
quality378), related behavior stemming from the discriminatory standardisation process mentioned in 
Chapter 3, amongst other practices. Anti-monopoly rules are also important to monitor issues that 
might present themselves in implementation of a range of practices and policies (e.g. like the 2012 
National IP Strategy’s plan to build up to 30 “patent alliances among burgeoning strategic 
industries”).379 Herein, given the ambiguity in AML regulation of IPR at present, it is unclear how it 
can be used to actually appropriately regulate patent pools and other issues that can evolve into 
monopoly behavior and thus ultimately harm patent quality and related innovation in China.  
 
Although they have by no means resolved the aforementioned concerns, it is worth noting that the 
government is continually investigating how to approach IP-related issues under the AML. For 
example, Part IV, Section 1 of the NPS states “In accordance with relevant provisions of the Anti-
monopoly Law, we will study and actively promote the development of standards and procedures to 
determine whether the abuse of patent right constitutes monopolistic behavior.” (See the entry in 
this Chapter on “abuse of patent rights” for related issues.)       
 
Ⅲ.4.1.2.7 Difficulty enforcing process patents 
 
It is very difficult for right-holders to prove infringement of process patents (which are only granted 
under invention patents), and thus adequately protect such patents, given the lack of access to 
evidence/appropriate evidence preservation protocols in patent process cases. 380 This said, there 
have been some positive developments herein, such as Article 15 of the SPC’s December 16th 2011 
Opinion, which provides further guidance to reverse the burden of proof in process patent cases.381 
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 Article 55 of the AML states: “This law shall not apply to the conduct of business operators to exercise their intellectual 
property rights according to the laws and relevant administrative regulations on intellectual property rights; however, this 
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 2012, March 23- Consultations with Doug Clark, Vice Chair of the IPR Working Group, Shanghai. Importantly, Article 61 
of the Patent Law (2008) stipulates a reversal of burden of proof for process patents on new products.  
 133 
 
Difficulties enforcing process patents clearly drag down patent quality, as protection of process 
patents is important to stimulate not just process innovation but also subsequently related product 
and service innovation. Further, the importance of process patent protection in China as a basis to 
stimulate innovations will likely grow in importance in the future. 
 
Ⅲ.4.1.2.8 Potentially overly strict limitations on granting preliminary injunctions in patent 
cases 
 
Dr. Oliver Lutze, Chair of the Shanghai Chapter of the European Chamber’s IPR Working Group, and 
Head of IPR at Bayer China, notes that Article 16 of the December 16th 2011 SPC Opinion may 
encourage reluctance in granting of preliminary injunctions (PIs) in IP cases, which could particularly 
harm development of quality patents in the pharmaceutical industry. The first-granted compound 
patents in China will expire in the next two years as compound protection was first allowed in 1993, 
and as such generics may increasingly enter the market prior to patent expiration. Considering 
Article 16 of the December 16th 2011 SPC Opinion, Lutze notes that: 
 
“With a Bolar exemption and no strong patent linkage, the pharmaceutical industry may 
need to rely on preliminary injunctions if generics enter the market well before patent expiry. 
If PI’s are  rejected because the simple chemical analysis for determining the content of a 
patented compound is considered to be ‘technically complex,’ generics will not be estopped 
from sale and prices may be influenced significantly even before patent expiry. This already 
happens in India.”
382
 
 
Difficulties in obtaining a PI in patent cases in China are not only specific to the pharmaceutical 
sector or the abovementioned concern. While the abovementioned concern reflects a challenge to 
the development of quality innovations in the pharmaceutical sector in particular, they also can have 
a larger impact on patents and linked innovation in China in other fields if even simple technical 
cases are denied PIs in practice.383 Additionally, sources note the difficulty industry in China 
experiences in obtaining a PI before a potentially infringing good enters the market as well as the 
burdensome threshold for obtaining a PI.384 
 
Ⅲ.4.1.3 Section 4.3: Other factors 
 
Introduction: This sub-section investigates how variety of significant factors, which while not 
necessarily patent-specific are closely related to patent enforcement, can somewhat stifle 
innovation and linked patent quality in China.  
 
Ⅲ.4.1.3.1 Lack of publication of patent case decisions 
 
A lack of published IP decisions, including those related to patent disputes, prevents entities from 
fully feeling comfortable with developing and filing quality patents in China as it reinforces concerns 
over the lack of transparency in China’s environment for enforcing IPR. Out of tens of thousands of 
cases decided annually, including patent cases, only a few are published in a timely manner, and 
some may not be published. This lack of publication of IPR cases, patent cases inclusive, conflicts 
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with publication requirements in Article 63 of the TRIPS Agreement.385 Doug Clark’s book Patent 
Litigation in China provides a comprehensive review of patent litigation trends in China with readily 
available information on the subject,386 but more openness is needed from the government to allow 
observers to further review trends in unpublished cases and assess their impact on patent quality in 
China.  
 
Ⅲ.4.1.3.2 Concerns surrounding non-compliance with evidence preservation orders 
 
European Chamber members are highly concerned about the ineffectiveness of evidence 
preservation orders in China.  In the absence of discovery, an evidence preservation order is the only 
avenue by which IP owners can obtain crucial evidence that is required to enforce their rights in 
China, e.g. in order to prove the process of manufacture for patent infringement, or to substantiate 
damages claims with the  defendants' sales figure. IP owners would not otherwise be able to collect 
this type of evidence by themselves. In practice, however, defendants often refuse to co-operate 
with the request to produce documents even after an evidence preservation order is granted by the 
Court. There is limited recourse for the IP owner to deal with this situation. First, although the 
executing judge could invoke provisions under the Civil Procedure Law to impose a fine or other 
criminal penalties on the non-complying party, it is unclear under what circumstances such power 
could be or would be exercised. Second, statements signed by the defendants during evidence 
preservation are not provided by the court to the IP owners. This lack of transparency has prevented 
IP owners from investigating whether any false statements are provided by the defendants with the 
aim to dismiss the evidence preservation action. 387  These problems with the enforcement 
environment for IP, patents inclusive, discourage patent building and related innovation in China.  
 
Ⅲ.4.1.3.3 Concerns about the PSB’s acceptance of cases for criminal prosecution of IPR 
infringement, high thresholds for such prosecution, and too small penalties therein 
  
A long-standing problem dragging down the development of IP in China, inclusive of quality patents, 
is the country’s overly high value and volume thresholds to start a criminal prosecution of IPR 
infringement, which in effect creates a “safe harbor” for commercial-scale infringers. This conflicts 
with obligations under Article 61 of the TRIPS Agreement. 388  
 
Moreover, sources suggest that the Public Security Bureau (PSB)’s reluctance to acknowledge when 
criminal thresholds have been reached and accept cases therein is an even bigger factor inhibiting 
criminal prosecution of IPR infringement.389 This significantly undermines the ability of patent 
holders to properly enforce their rights.  
 
These concerns are compounded by the often small fines and limited administrative injunctions 
imposed upon IPR infringers.390  Such fines are not significant enough deterrents for patent 
infringement, creating a patent enforcement environment offering weak protection that deters 
development of certain quality patents and related innovations otherwise encouraged by a stronger 
enforcement system. 
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Ⅲ.4.1.3.4 Overly burdensome notarisation and legalisation requirements on evidence and 
other materials 
 
While not exclusively related to IPR, China has set forth requirements in a variety of SPC opinions 
and other rules on notarisation and legalisation of evidence and other materials that are often 
essential in IPR cases and enforcement actions.391 Evidence taken from outside China is required to 
be notarised and legalised. Notarisation and legalisation are also required on counterfeit goods at 
point-of-sale or at trade fairs in order to make the evidence usable. There are requirements to 
notarise the original trademark certificate prior to taking an enforcement action. Powers of attorney 
and company registration information are also required to go through a notarisation and legalisation 
process. 
 
These requirements are time consuming, sometimes costly, and otherwise burdensome and 
arguably unnecessary. Non-Acceptance of un-notarised and un-legalised documents delays 
preliminary injunctions. Non-acceptance of un-notarised and un-legalised evidence limits right 
holders’ ability to enforce IPR violations, whereas it has been reported that administrative and 
judicial authorities refuse to accept cases with un-notarised evidence (whereas the act of 
administrative and judicial processing herein is called lì'àn [立案]). Moreover, notarising and 
legalising the evidence and other materials mentioned herein in no way provides an attestation that 
these materials are accurate; rather, it only confers that the materials exist and were notarised or 
legalised at a certain point-in-time. Collectively, these restrictions appear to conflict with Article 41.2, 
41.22, 44 and 50 of the TRIPS Agreement. They make it particularly difficult to adjudicate cases, which 
exacerbate the image of China’s IPR enforcement environment, which in-turn may somewhat hamper 
patent quality and related innovation in China.  
 
Ⅲ.4.1.3.5 Overly burdensome requirements for acting against repeat IPR offenders at trade 
fairs 
 
Patent owners are sometimes estopped from enforcement against repeat infringers due to the 
regulations and de facto practices of some local intellectual property bureaus that require, as a 
prerequisite before action can be taken, a decision from a prior infringement lawsuit (or in some 
cases, administrative action) be obtained against the repeat infringer. This is an unreasonable 
requirement that makes it difficult for rights holders to enforce patent rights at trade fairs. This in 
part enables companies to offer manufacturing of infringing products well before patent expiry, and 
otherwise enables patent infringement at trade fairs, which contributes to the perception that 
China’s IPR enforcement environment is less than desirable392 and thus in-effect somewhat hampers 
patent development and related innovation in China. 
                                                           
391
 For example, among others, see: Article 11 of the Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Evidence in Civil 
Procedures; Article 11 of Several Provisions Regarding Civil Litigation Evidence of the Supreme People’s Court; Article 27 of 
the Procedures for Imposition of Administrative Punishment of Administrative Departments for Industry and Commerce; 
Article 67 and 240 of the 2007 Civil Procedure Law of the PRC; and Article 36 of the Notarisation Law. 
392
 European Chamber, IPR Working Group Position Paper 2012/2013. Note: Trade fair organisers have reportedly 
interpreted the Implementing Measures for the Administration of Shanghai’s Exhibition Industry (particularly Article 7), 
issued by the Shanghai Intellectual Property Rights Bureau on May 23
rd
 2005, in a way that the fair will not accept new 
complaints against old targets at Shanghai fairs unless the complainant has received a final court decision against the 
alleged infringer. (Source: Consultations with members of the IPR Working Group, May 17th 2012. Measures retrieved 
from http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/shanghai/node2314/node3124/node3164/node3172/userobject6ai1415.html; date and 
promulgation authority listed at: http://www.docin.com/p-383391561.html).
392
 Reports from members of the IPR Working 
Group find that enforcement authorities have reportedly interpreted the Measures for Complainants and Settlements of 
Infringements of Intellectual Property Rights issued during the 91
st
 Canton Fair in 2002 by China Import and Export Fair 
organiser in Guangdong (the Canton Fair), particularly Article 10, in a similar fashion. (Source: 24 May 2012 - Consultations 
with members of the IPR Working Group; Canton Fair measures retrieved from: 
http://www.cantonfair.org.cn/cn/service/ipp/detail.aspx?oid=11062) 
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It is worth noting that the central-level regulation, Protection Measures for Intellectual Property 
Rights During Exhibitions (“Trade Fair Protection Measures”), issued on January 10th 2006 by 
MOFCOM, SAIC, NCAC, and SIPO, provides a general regulatory framework for trade fairs.393 
However, the provisions therein do not appear strict enough to sufficiently address the 
aforementioned concerns.394  
 
Ⅲ.4.1.3.6 Other enforcement concerns 
 
A number of additional issues involving IPR enforcement, patents inclusive, in China can hamper 
innovation and related development of quality patents. For example, some issues not discussed at 
length in this study but mentioned in USPTO (2012)395 appear to warrant further investigation as 
they may not only be anecdotal.   
 
Ⅲ.4.2 Summary 
 
There are a variety of concerning rules and procedures for patent application review and 
enforcement of patent rights in China that hamper patent quality. These range from inadequate 
review systems to requirements and practices that generally weaken the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the patent enforcement environment, which in-turn ultimately somewhat discourage building of 
quality patents and related innovation in China.  
 
 
Ⅲ.4.3 Recommendations 
 
Ⅲ.4.3.1 Core recommendations 
 
Ⅲ.4.3.1.1 Chapter 4 – Sub-Section 4.1 
 
35. Recommendation: Create a taskforce to determine how the Confidentiality Review process 
can be reformed to still protect national security interests but also not overly burden 
innovators looking to register their patents abroad.  
 
36. Recommendation: Set forth several reforms to ensure reliability and compliance with 
patentability requirements within the prioritised patent examination process. 
 
36.1 Address the comments provided in the European Chamber’s Call for Comments 
on the Administrative Measures on Prioritised Examination of Patent Applications 
submitted to SIPO on January 13
th
 2012. Comments to be considered herein include 
concern that the measure might potentially create a less rigorous examination for 
patents in terms of Substantive Examinations for invention patents.  
 
                                                           
393
 Retrieved from http://english.ipr.gov.cn/ipr/en/info/Article.jsp?a_no=2040&col_no=121&dir=200603 
394
 European Chamber, IPR Working Group Position Paper 2012/2013 
395
 US Patent and Trademark Office [USPTO]. (2012). Patent enforcement in China: Summary chart of industry views. 
Retrieved from http://www.uspto.gov/ip/global/enforcement/Summary_Chart_of_Issues_and_Recommendations_9-1-
11.pdf 
 137 
 
36.2 Suggested that SIPO and MoST confirm a green channel for patent examination 
for strategic industries will not be applied in a discriminatory manner against 
otherwise qualified foreign and private domestic companies.  
 
36.3 At least broadly clarify the meaning of Article 4 of the Administrative Measures 
on the Priority Examination of Invention Patent Applications that priority review will 
concentrated on “patents of great significance to national or public interests.”  
 
36.4 A special record of prioritisation of patent applications could be disclosed 
regularly on the website of SIPO, including applicant name, type of application, 
submission date and approval date, etc.  
37. Recommendation: Remove restrictions on the patentability of plants in the Guidelines for 
Examination by applying the same rationale as the European Patent Office that allows claims 
for patent protection of plants and plant cells where there is no overlap with plant variety 
protection. Furthermore, the allowable scope of patents with regard to homology claiming 
genetic material (like DNA) should be reviewed with a view to providing more suitable 
protection to the inventor.
396 
 
 
Ⅲ.4.3.1.2 Chapter 4 – Sub-section 4.2 
 
38. Recommendation: Set-up a taskforce to monitor jurisprudence from the courts to see if 
penalties being granted and other judgments in cases of abuse of patent rights are 
appropriately deterring such abuses in China. Also, mull revisions to the Patent Law that 
better define and explicitly include protection against “abuse of patent rights.” 
 
38.1 The “white-listed clauses,” “grey-listed clauses,” and “black-listed clauses” found 
in the European Commission Regulation on the Application of Article 85(3) of the 
Treaty Establishing the European Community to Certain Categories of Technology 
Transfer Agreements might serve as a model herein for defining abuse of patent 
rights.
397
  
 
38.2 Also, in a parallel initiative, pursue international cooperation initiatives with the 
EU and other foreign institutions on regulatory and other tools to limit patent trolling. 
 
39. Recommendation: Create better disincentives meant to discourage bad faith patent filings or 
otherwise infringing patents. Create better disincentives meant to discourage repeated 
attempts to enforce a patent filed in bad faith or an otherwise infringing patent. 
 
39.1 For example, institute better disincentives meant to discourage the filing of 
“abnormal” and bad faith patents.  SIPO could consider penalties for applicants 
filing   abnormal applications (Fēi zhèngcháng zhuānlì shēnqǐn/ 非 正 常 专 利 申
请). Meanwhile, patentees who are found obtaining their patents in bad faith can be 
ordered to cover all or part of the fees related to the invalidation proceedings.  And, 
further to the recommendations in Chapter 3 hereto, any subsidies and tax benefits the 
                                                           
396
 2012, May 8- Consultations with Dr. Oliver Lutze in Shanghai 
397
 Recommendations to use these clauses as a model to define abuse of patent rights are suggested in Gao et al. (2011), p. 
112 
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wrongdoer has received for patent development and filing should be refunded to 
government.398  
 
40. Recommendation: When an applicant has submitted more than one or two pieces of prior art 
in the course of a utility model invalidation proceeding, the PRB should be explicitly required 
to consider such prior art when assessing patentability of the utility model.
399 
This requires 
revising the Guidelines for Patent Examination (2010 revision). 
 
41. Recommendation: Require prior art is more appropriately considered in wider technical fields 
when conducting pre-enforcement searches for utility model patents, and better develop the 
mechanisms to conduct such searches. 
 
42. Recommendation:  Develop a number of tools to improve patent screening. At a minimum, 
seek assurances from the authorities that this area is being adequately addressed. For 
example, consider developing an improved patent monitoring system modeled off of the EU’s 
EPOQUE2 and USPTO’s PAIR database. The database could include details on patents pending 
approval or already approved (including in terms of rejections [“final” and “non-final”], 
appeals from the inventor, non-patent literature, accounts of the examiner’s search strategy, 
and receipt of fees).  
 
43. Recommendation: Mandate that Patent Evaluation Reports (for utility models) are presumed 
as fully valid in all court infringement proceedings and moreover are given substantial weight 
in such proceedings, unless, through a formal process, a judge demonstrates deviation from 
this requirement is necessary to appropriately adjudicate the case. 
 
43.1 Regarding this deviation, if a judge has a strongly justifiable reason for wanting to 
deviate from this requirement, then a SIPO expert must at least be consulted 
regarding such a deviation. A formal mechanism for this exception should be 
established.
400 
 
 
44. Recommendation: Explicitly require utility model patent infringement cases be suspended or 
adjourned pending the outcome of validity proceedings, unless the utility model patent in 
question has already been shown to be valid in separate/other proceedings. 
 
45. Recommendation: Develop appropriate guidelines on the application of the AML’s Article 55 
to patent pools, “patent alliances,” and other IPR-related activities that may risk producing the 
equivalent of a monopoly. Ensure the guidelines appropriately meet the objectives of avoiding 
abuse of IPR and monopolistic behavior generally advocated in Part IV, Section 1, para. 2 of the 
NPS. 
 
46. Recommendation: Enact clarifications to the adjudication rules surrounding process patents. 
 
46.1 Request the SPC provide further guidance to assist both patentees and alleged 
infringers to understand how Article 15 of the December 16
th
 2011 SPC Opinion is to be 
applied in practice to patents.401  
 
                                                           
398
 2012, May 8 - Consultations with Qu Xiaoyang 
399
 2012, July 14- Consultations with Elliot Papageorgiou 
400
 2012, June 11 - Consultations with Dr. Oliver Lutze  
401
 2012, March 23- Consultations with Paul Ranjard, Doug Clark, and Dr. Oliver Lutze 
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46.2 Current Chinese rules and practice governing evidence preservation in patent 
cases could be brought more in line with the French “Saisie contrefacon” or German 
“Besichtigungsanspruch,” especially in relation to process patents.
402
 A formal 
exchange mechanism with French and German experts could be set-up to facilitate 
experience sharing herein. Judges could be trained on these aforementioned principles, 
and other necessary topics, through mechanisms like the EUCTP STIS project or an IPR3. 
 
47. Recommendation: Revise Article 16 of the December 16
th
 2011 SPC Opinion to clarify if 
circumstances where a claimed compound is easily confirmed or even mentioned as an active 
ingredient as part of the accused infringer’s product constitutes an infringement and therefore 
preliminary injunctions are obtainable.
403
 Also, develop guidance encouraging judges to grant 
more necessary preliminary injunctions in patent cases. 
 
Ⅲ.4.3.2 Other recommendations 
 
Ⅲ.4.3.2.1 Chapter 4 – Sub-section 4.3 
 
48. Recommendation: Fully publish all IP disputes in a timely manner, including those related to 
patent disputes. 
 
49. Recommendation: Reform the procedures surrounding treatment of non-compliance of 
evidence preservation orders. 
 
49.1 Allow legal representatives from the IP owner to be present at the execution 
of an evidence preservation order, provided that suitable confidential undertakings 
are given. 
 
49.2 Establish an appropriate protocol for the manner in which an evidence 
preservation order is executed (e.g. empowering the executing judge to search 
computer records and documents). 
 
49.3 Provide the IP owner with a copy of the statement signed by the defendants after 
the execution of an evidence preservation order. 
 
49.4 Establish a protocol that sets out the specific criteria for the judge to impose a 
fine or other penalty if the defendants refuse access to documents, or provide 
statements which are subsequently found to be false.
404
 
 
50. Recommendation: Ensure that provisions relating to criminal IPR infringement are 
implemented, including more substantial penalties and custodial sentences, thereby actually 
acting as a deterrent to IPR infringement.  
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 2012, March 31– Consultations with Dr. Oliver Lutze 
403
 2012, March 31 – Consultations with Dr. Oliver Lutze 
404
 2012, July 13 - Consultations with Christine Yiu 
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51. Recommendations: Bring China’s notarisation and legalisation regime better in line with 
Article 41.2, 41.22, 44 and 50 of the TRIPS Agreement by simplifying and/or omitted the number 
of overly burdensome requirements in a variety of SPC opinions and other rules. 
 
52. Recommendation: Set-forth specific revisions to the 2006 Protection Measures for Intellectual 
Property Rights During Exhibitions. The measures should specify in a new article that actions 
against repeat infringers are allowed unless the infringer is able to justify that he/she has filed a 
request for declaration of non-infringement on the offered product after receiving a warning 
letter, or has started an invalidation proceeding against the patent in question.405  
 
                                                           
405
 2012, May 23– Consultations with Dr. Oliver Lutze 
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Ⅳ Conclusion 
 
The Chinese government clearly desires to stimulate innovation in China and has already undertaken 
many commendable initiatives to try and improve the country’s innovation system, inclusive of its 
patent quality situation. Still, it is essential to realise that China’s patent quality problem is systemic: 
it goes far beyond the often cited reasons of patent filing subsidies and occasional tax incentives, 
having roots in a wide range of policies and other measures, as well as administrative and 
enforcement approaches, that do not seem to be effectively addressed at present, nor on course to 
be effectively addressed, and in some cases are not even discussed at all. Individually, and much 
more so collectively, these dulling devices create a vicious cycle which inhibits patent quality and 
innovation at large in China. Only when these effects are recognised to be a product of a large 
network of patent-related issues can China’s institutional and regulatory environment for innovation 
be understood and systematically improved.  
 
This study is intended as a discussion piece about certain practical ways to in the near future (as 
distinguished from certain changes to the educational system, culture of risk-taking, and credit 
system which are arguably less practical in the near term) maximise China’s innovation and related 
patent quality potential. To be sure, it is clear that China possesses great innovation potential; 
however, overall, China still lags behind many developed countries in terms of innovation at large 
and quality patents in particular, let alone breakthrough innovation and highest-quality patents. 
While China may indeed be able to largely sustain its economy in the mid-term, i.e. the next five to 
ten years, through incremental innovation, the efficiency and effectiveness of certain policies, other 
measures, and practices meant to stimulate such innovation and the quality of patents produced 
therein deserve notable improvement. Moreover, it is clear that policymakers want to increasingly 
build breakthrough innovation capacity as distinct from incremental innovation, realising that in the 
long-term this type of innovation is essential to grow the economy. However, the efficiency and 
effectiveness of a variety of Chinese policies, other measures, and practices intended to stimulate 
breakthrough innovation and the highest-quality patents produced therein deserve serious 
improvement. This study attempts to flag many of these areas needing improvement and provide 
practical recommendations for doing so.  
 
The European Union Chamber of Commerce in China looks forward to a productive discussion with 
Chinese officials on the issues and suggestions presented in this study. It is hoped that these efforts 
will help sharpen China's patent and larger innovation ecosystem into one that will sustainably drive 
its economy and provide for its people, as well as attract European businesses.  
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Ⅴ About the European Union Chamber of 
Commerce in China 
 
About the European Chamber  
 
The European Union Chamber of Commerce in China (“European Chamber”) was founded by 51 
member companies based in China on October 19th 2000. The rationale for establishing the 
European Chamber was based on the need of the European Union and European businesses to find a 
common voice across the various business sectors where they are operating in China. 
 
The European Chamber now has a total of more than 1,700 member companies and operates from 
seven chapters: Beijing, Chengdu (Chengdu and Chongqing), Nanjing, Pearl River Delta (PRD) 
(Guangzhou and Shenzhen), Shanghai, Shenyang and Tianjin. Of these, the Shanghai Chapter is the 
biggest in terms of member companies, with over 600.  
 
The European Chamber is recognised by the European Commission and the Chinese authorities as 
the official voice of European business in China. Its lobbying activities are maintained through the 
efforts of Working Groups that actively participate in the legislative process. 
 
About the European Chamber’s IPR Working Group 
 
The European Chamber’s IPR Working Group, which has operated for over 10 years, represents a 
range of European interests in lobbying for improvement of the IP regulatory and enforcement 
environment in China. Around half of the group’s 200 plus members are from outside the 
‘professional services’ industry, for example high-end consumer product industries, whereas the 
remaining members are from law and consulting firms. The group holds member meetings every 
two months; frequently holds lobby meetings with the Chinese and European authorities on 
important IPR matters; provides members regular updates on relevant Chinese policy, law and 
regulations; provides a forum for members to share experiences and best practices; and organises 
and informs members about a number of IPR-related events outside the Working Group. There are 
Beijing and Shanghai Chapters of the group, which function as one unit and are led by one Chair and 
two Vice Chairs in Beijing, a co-Chair and two Vice Chairs in Shanghai, as well as an internal European 
Chamber staff manager/policy analyst; there is also a PRD Chapter of the group. 
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Table 14: Comparison chart: Citations for major recent provincial/municipal IP plans and strategies 
reviewed  
Province/M
unicipality  
12
th
 Five Year IP Plan/equivalent 
plan** (citation)  
Time period: 2011-2015 
IP Strategy/equivalent strategy** (citation) 
Anhui Anhui’s 12th Five Year Plan on 
Intellectual Property (Patent) 
Development issued on  November 
17th 2011 by the  Anhui Intellectual 
Property Office 
 
Link: 
http://www.ahipo.gov.cn/dt21111
11175.asp?DocID=2111116610 
  
No multi-year plan, 
Major Tasks Regarding Anhui’s Patent 
Development for 2012 issued on March 28th 
2012  
 
Link: 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/dtxx/gn/2012/2012
03/t20120327_659916.html  
Beijing Notice on Launching  Beijing’s 12
th
 
Five Year Plan on Intellectual 
Property (Patent) Development 
issued on August 24th 2011 by 
Beijing Intellectual Property Bureau 
and Beijing Development and 
Reform Commission 
Advice on Implementation of the Beijing 
Intellectual Property Strategy Compendium 
by the Beijing People’s Government issued 
on May 6th 2009 by the Beijing People’s 
Government 
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Link: 
http://www.bjipo.gov.cn/zcfg/zlgh/
201202/t20120207_25714.html. 
 
 
 
 
 
Link: 
http://www.gov.cn/gzdt/2009-
05/06/content_1305629.htm 
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Beijing’s IP Strategy issued on May 4th 2012 
under the National Intellectual Property 
Strategy 
Link: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=14242  
Chongqing Chongqing’s 12
th
 Five Year Plan on 
Intellectual Property (Patent) 
Development issued on October 
27th 2011 by the general office of 
Chongqing Municipal People’s 
Government 
 
Link: 
http://www.cqipo.gov.cn/templet/
default/ShowArticle.jsp?id=5421 
 
None 
Fujian None Advice on Implementation of the National 
Intellectual Property Strategy Compendium 
by the Fujian Province People’s Government 
issued on January 30th 2010 by the Fujian 
Province People’s Government 
 
Link: 
http://baike.baidu.com/view/3357924.htm 
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Fujian’s IP Strategy issued on April 12th 2012 
under the National Intellectual Property 
Strategy 
 
Link: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=13601          
Gansu Gansu’s 12
th
 Five Year Plan on 
Intellectual Property (Patent) 
Development issued on March 22nd 
2011 by the Gansu Intellectual 
Property Office 
 
Link: 
http://www.gsipo.gov.cn/zcfg/deta
il.php?n_no=38287&dir=/%D5%FE
%B2%DF%B7%A8%B9%E6/%C6%E4
%CB%FB 
Notice  on Launching Gansu  Intellectual 
Property Strategy Compendium by the Gansu 
Province People’s Government (2010) No.49 
issued on June 18th 2010 by the Gansu 
Province People’s Government 
 
Link: 
http://www.gsipo.gov.cn/zscqzl/detail.php?
n_no=36798 
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Gansu’s IP Strategy issued on April 12th 2012 
under the National Intellectual Property 
Strategy 
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Link: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=13587  
Guangdong Guangdong’s 12
th
 Five Year Plan on 
Intellectual Property (Patent) 
Development issued on August  10th  
2011 by the General Office of 
Guangdong Province’s People’s 
Government 
 
Link: 
http://zwgk.gd.gov.cn/006939748/
201108/t20110823_269558.html 
Intellectual Property strategy compendium 
of Guangdong Province (2007-2020) issued 
on March 27th 2012 by the Guangdong 
Intellectual Property Office 
 
Link: 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/twzb/gdyjbkbys/bjzl
/201203/t20120327_659900.html 
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Guangdong’s IP Strategy issued on April 12th 
2012 under the National Intellectual-
Property Strategy 
 
Link: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=13595  
Guangxi Guangxi Autonomous Region’s 12
th
 
Five Year Plan on Science and 
technology Development issued on 
August 8th  2011 by the 
Development and Reform 
Commission of Guangxi 
Autonomous region and the 
Science and Technology Office of 
the Guangxi Autonomous Region 
 
Link: 
http://gov.gxsti.net/zwgk/zxtz/613
832.shtml 
Notice on Advice for Launching the Guangxi 
Autonomous Region Intellectual Property 
Strategy Compendium by the Guangxi 
Autonomous Region People’s Government
〔2009〕No.109 issued on December 23th  
2009 by the Guangxi Autonomous Region’s 
People’s Government 
 
Link: 
http://www.gxipo.net/zcfg/zl/554850.shtml 
 
Guizhou Guizhou’s 12
th
 Five Year Plan on 
Intellectual Property (Patent) 
Development issued on October 
13th  2011 by the Guizhou 
Intellectual Property Office 
 
Link: 
http://www.chinagzpp.cn/Article/S
howArticle.asp?ArticleID=1110 
Intellectual Property Strategy Compendium 
of Guizhou Province (2006-2015) issued on 
February 14th 2009 by the Guizhou 
Intellectual Property Office 
 
Link: 
http://www.jsip.gov.cn/news/ztbd/ztbdcs/zt
bdpd9/200902/20090214_51568.html 
 
Hainan Hainan’s 12
th
 Five Year Plan on 
Patent Development issued on 
December 27th  2011 by the Hainan 
Intellectual Property Office 
 
Link 
http://www.hipo.gov.cn/list.asp?id
=3165 
Intellectual Property Strategy Compendium 
of Hainan Province issued on July 6th 2010 by 
the Hainan Intellectual Property Office 
 
Link: 
http://www.hipo.gov.cn/list.asp?id=2883 
 
 
 
 
Hebei Hebei’s 12
th
 Five Year Plan on Advice on Implementation of the National 
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Patent Development issued on June 
10th  2011 by the Hebei Intellectual 
Property Office 
 
Link: 
http://218.12.44.17/content.jsp?co
de=40170382-3/2011-
00104&name 
 
Intellectual Property Strategy Compendium 
by the Hebei Province People’s Government 
issued on June 22th 2009 by the Hebei 
Province People’s Government 
 
 
Link: 
http://2010.hebstd.gov.cn/?thread-64-
1.html 
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Hebei’s IP Strategy issued on April 12th 2012 
under the National Intellectual Property 
Strategy 
 
Link: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=13609  
Heilongjiang None Notice  on Launching the Heilongjiang  
Intellectual Property Strategy Compendium 
by Heilongjiang Province People’s 
Government (2011-2020) issued on May 22nd 
2011 by the Heilongjiang Province People’s 
Government 
 
Link: 
http://baike.baidu.com/view/7153606.htm 
 
**Plan to Put Forward Implementation of  
Heilongjiang’s 2012 IP Strategy issued on 
February 23rd 2012  
 
Link: 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/twzb/2012hljzscq/2
012hljzscqbjzl/201202/t20120223_646396.h
tml  
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Heilongjiang’s IP Strategy issued on June 4th 
2012 under the National Intellectual 
Property Strategy 
 
Link: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=14235 
 
 
Henan Henan’s 12
th
 Five Year Plan on 
intellectual Property Development 
issued on December 20th  2010 by 
the Henan Intellectual Property 
Office 
 
Intellectual Property Strategy Compendium 
of Henan Province (2008) No.59 issued on 
November 23rd 2008 by the Henan 
Intellectual Property Office 
 
Link: 
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Link: 
http://hnszscqzlw.cn/ArticleShow.a
sp?id=89 
http://www.hnpatent.gov.cn/patentwebsite
/show.do?method=show&id=3577 
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Henan’s IP Strategy issued on April 12th 2012 
under the National Intellectual Property 
Strategy 
 
Link: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=13599  
Hubei Hubei’s 12
th
 Five Year Plan on 
Intellectual Property (Patent) 
Development issued on July 29th  
2011 by the Hubei Intellectual 
Property Bureau 
 
Link: 
http://www.hbipo.gov.cn/upfile/20
100729011527652.doc 
Intellectual Property Strategy Compendium 
of Hubei Province  by Hubei Province 
People’s Government issued on August 11th  
2010 by the Hubei Province People’s 
Government 
 
Link: 
http://www.xinhuanet.com/chinanews/2010
-08/25/content_20711850.htm 
http://www.hbipo.gov.cn/upfile/201103071
62744906.doc 
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Hubei’s IP Strategy issued on April 12th 2012 
under the National Intellectual Property 
Strategy 
 
Link: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=13598  
Hunan Hunan’s 12
th
 Five Year Plan on 
Patent Development issued on May 
7th  2012 by the Hunan Intellectual 
Property Office and Development 
and Reform Commission of Hunan 
Province 
 
Link: 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/dtxx/zlgzd
t/2012/201205/t20120507_687187
.html 
 
Intellectual Property Strategy Compendium 
of Hunan Province  by the Hunan  Province 
People’s Government issued on March 27th  
2010 by the Hunan Province People’s 
Government 
 
Link: 
http://news.163.com/09/0327/11/55DK0BO
K000120GU.html 
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Hunan’s IP Strategy issued on April 12th 2012 
under the National Intellectual Property 
Strategy. 
 
Link: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=13596  
Inner 
Mongolia 
None Key points in the Implementation of the Inner 
Mongolia Autonomous Region 2012 
Intellectual Property Strategy issued on June 
4th 2012 
 
 166 
 
 
Link: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=14238 
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region’s IP 
Strategy issued on June 4th 2012 under the 
National Intellectual Property Strategy 
 
Link: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=14238   
Jiangsu Jiangsu’s 12
th
 Five Year Plan on 
Patent Development issued on 
November 2nd  2011 by the 
Intellectual Property Office of 
Jiangsu Province 
 
Link: 
http://www.jsip.gov.cn/laws/bmgf
xwj/201112/20111216_70465.html 
Notice on Launching the Intellectual Property 
Strategy Compendium of Jiangsu Province  
by Jiangsu Province People’s Government 
issued on January 5th  2009 by the Jiangsu 
Province People’s Government 
 
Link: 
http://www.jsip.gov.cn/news/ywdtnews/20
0901/20090112_50874.html 
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Jiangsu’s IP Strategy issued on June 4th 2012 
under the National Intellectual Property 
Strategy. 
 
Link: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=14233  
Jiangxi None Call for comments on the Jiangxi Province 
Intellectual Property Strategy Compendium 
by the Intellectual Property Office of Jiangxi 
Province on April 6th 2011 
 
Link: 
http://zl.ncinfo.gov.cn/readnews.asp?id=229
2 
Jilin None **2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Jilin’s IP Strategy issued on June 4th 2012 
under the National Intellectual Property 
Strategy. 
 
Link: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=14236  
Liaoning Liaoning’s  12
th
 Five Year Plan on 
Patent Development issued on 
November 15th 2011 by the 
Intellectual Property Office of 
Liaoning  
 
Link: 
http://www.lnipo.gov.cn/zscqjweb
Intellectual Property Strategy Compendium 
of Liaoning  Province  by the Liaoning 
Province People’s Government issued on 
June 8th 2011  by the Intellectual Property 
Office of Liaoning 
 
Link: 
http://www.lnipo.gov.cn/zscqjweb/zsweb/in
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/zsweb/informationShow.jsp?secto
rId=yewgh&infoId=bb45458632fb1
d2c0133a58bdb5901b8 
formationShow.jsp?sectorId=zscqzlgy&infoId
=bb4545863068d15001306d2df5070046 
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Liaoning’s IP Strategy issued on April 12th 
2012 under the National Intellectual 
Property Strategy 
 
Link： 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=13606  
Ningxia None Notice on Launching the Intellectual Property 
Strategy Compendium of Ningxia Huizu 
Autonomous Region by Ningxia Huizu 
Autonomous Region People’s Government 
issued on September 27th  2011 by the 
Ningxia Huizu Autonomous Region People’s 
Government 
 
Link: 
http://govinfo.nlc.gov.cn/nxfz/zfgb/201120/
201111/t20111124_1144182.html?classid=4
23 
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Ningxia Huizu Autonomous Region’s IP 
Strategy issued on April 12th 2012 under the 
National Intellectual Property Strategy 
 
Link: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=13585  
Qinghai None Notice of Advice on Implementation of the 
National Intellectual Property Strategy 
Compendium by the Qinghai Province 
People’s Government issued on November 
19th  2008 by the Qinghai Province People’s 
Government 
 
Link: 
http://www.qhys.gov.cn/html/42/21102.ht
ml 
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Qinghai’s IP Strategy issued on April 12th 
2012 under the National Intellectual-
Property Strategy 
 
Link: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=13586  
Shaanxi Shaanxi’s 12
th
 Five Year Plan on 
Intellectual Property (Patent) 
Development issued on May 20th  
Notice on Launching the Shaanxi  Intellectual 
Property Strategy Compendium (2008-2020) 
and Shaanxi  Intellectual Property Strategy 
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2011 by the Shaanxi Intellectual 
Property Office 
 
Link: 
http://www.snipo.gov.cn/ReadNew
s.asp?NewsID=11091&BigClassNam
e=%D6%AA%CA%B6%B2%FA%C8%
A8%B9%A4%D7%F7%A1%B0%CA%
AE%B6%FE%CE%E5%A1%B1%B9%E
6%BB%AE&SmallClassName=%B9%
A4%D7%F7%B6%AF%CC%AC 
Implementation Plan (2008-2010)  by the 
Shaanxi Province People’s Government 
issued on November 14th  2008 by the 
Shaanxi Province People’s Government 
 
Link: 
http://www.shaanxi.gov.cn/0/103/6295.htm 
 
Shandong Shandong’s 12
th
 Five Year Plan on 
Patent Development issued on July 
15th  2011 by the Shandong 
Intellectual Property Office 
 
Link: 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/dfzz/shan
dong/zcfg/sjwj/201107/t20110715
_611387.htm 
Key points on the Implementation of the 
Shandong Intellectual Property Strategy 
issued on May 26th 2011  
 
Link: 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/dtxx/zlgzdt/2011/2
01105/t20110526_605561.html 
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Shandong’s IP Strategy issued on April 12th 
2012 under the National Intellectual 
Property Strategy 
 
Link: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=13600  
Shanghai Shanghai’s 12
th
 Five Year Plan on 
Intellectual Property Development 
issued on November 19th 2011 by 
the Shanghai Intellectual Property 
Administration (officially published 
on Shanghai Intellectual Property  
Administration’s website on April 
16th 2012) 
 
 
Link: 
http://www.sipa.gov.cn/gb/zscq/n
ode2/node23/userobject1ai9309.h
tml 
 
Link 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/dtxx/gn/2
011/201111/t20111109_629911.ht
ml 
Notice on Drafting the Shanghai Intellectual 
Property Strategy Compendium (2011-2020) 
issued on April 8th 2011 by Shanghai 
Intellectual Property Administration 
 
Link: 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/dtxx/gn/2011/2011
04/t20110408_595729.html 
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Shanghai’s IP Strategy issued on June 4th 
2012 under the National Intellectual 
Property Strategy 
 
Link: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=14234  
Shanxi **A general notice by Shanxi 
Intellectual Property Office: 
Shanxi’s 12
th
 Five Year Plan on 
Intellectual Property (Patent) 
Development issued on December 
26th  2011 by the Shanxi Intellectual 
Notice on Drafting the Shanxi Intellectual 
Property strategy Compendium issued on 
August 13th 2009 by the Department of 
Science and Technology in Shanxi 
 
Link: 
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Property Office 
 
Link: 
http://218.26.227.183:8000/zscqj/s
jdt/1451.htm 
http://www.shanxigov.cn/n16/n1611/n3539
/n7299/n20244/8365727.html 
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Shanxi’s IP Strategy issued on June 4th 2012 
under the National Intellectual Property 
Strategy 
 
Link: 
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=14239  
Sichuan None Notice on Launching the 2012 
Implementation Plan of Sichuan Intellectual 
Property Strategy by the Sichuan Province 
People’s Government (2012) No.14 issued on 
February 6th 2012 by Sichuan Intellectual 
Property Office 
 
Link: 
http://www.sc.gov.cn/zt_sczt/2012zscq/201
2zscq/201202/t20120206_1170226.shtml 
 
**Major Tasks Regarding Sichuan’s Patent 
Development for 2012 issued on February 5th 
2012 by the Sichuan Intellectual Property 
Office  
 
Link: 
http://www.sc.gov.cn/zt_sczt/2012zscq/201
2zscq/201202/t20120206_1170227.shtml 
Tianjin Tianjin’s 12
th
 Five Year Plan on 
Intellectual Property  Development 
issued on December 23rd2011 by 
the Tianjin Intellectual Property 
Office 
 
Link: 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/dfzz/tianji
n/tzgg/201112/P020111222635593
820156.pdf 
 
Notice on Launching Tianjin’s 12
th
 
Five Year Plan on Patents issued on 
December 23rd 2011 by the Tianjin 
Intellectual Property Office 
 
Link: 
http://zc.k8008.com/html/tianjin/s
hizhichanju/2011/1223/131829.ht
ml 
Notice on Launching the Intellectual Property 
Strategy Compendium of Tianjin  issued on 
March 15th  2010 by the Tianjin People’s 
Government 
 
Link: 
http://www.tj.gov.cn/zwgk/wjgz/szfwj/2010
03/t20100324_115195.htm 
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
Tianjin’s IP Strategy  issued on June 4th 2012 
under the National Intellectual Property 
Strategy 
 
Link:  
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=14241 
 
Tibet None Science and Technology Development Plan of 
the Tibet Autonomous Region 12
th
 Five Year 
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Plan for Further Enacting the Intellectual 
Property Strategy (2012) No.53 issued on 
May 25th 2012 by the Tibet Autonomous 
Region People’s Government 
 
Link: 
http://www.tibetsti.gov.cn/Item.aspx?id=25
62 
 
Great Progress Made Towards Protecting 
Intellectual Property Rights in the Xizang 
Autonomous Region issued on May 29th 2011  
 
Link: 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/mtjj/2011/201105/t
20110526_605517.html 
Xinjiang None Notice on Launching the Intellectual Property 
Strategy Compendium of the Xinjiang Uygur 
Autonomous Region issued on April 19th 
2010 by the government of Xinjiang Uygur 
Autonomous Region 
 
Link: 
http://www.akss.gov.cn/childsite/kjj/index.p
hp?option=com_content&view=article&id=3
60:2010-05-10-09-03-45&catid=46:2009-04-
21-01-31-28&Itemid=77 
 
The Implementation Plan on the Intellectual 
Property Strategy Compendium of the 
Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (2011-
2015) issued on August 7th 2011 by the 
Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region 
 
Link: 
http://www.xinjiang.gov.cn/xxgk/gwgb/zfwj
/2011/81616.htm 
 
**2012 Major Tasks on Implementation of 
the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region’s IP 
Strategy issued on April 12th 2012 under the 
National Intellectual Property Strategy 
 
Link:  
http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=13584 
Yunnan Yunnan’s 12
th
 Five Year Plan on 
Intellectual Property (Patent) 
Development issued on March 24th  
2011 by the Intellectual Property 
Office of Yunnan Province 
 
Notice on Advice for Implementation of the 
National Intellectual Property Strategy 
Compendium by Yunnan Province People’s 
Government〔2008〕No.18 issued on 
August 7th  2009 by the Yunnan Province 
People’s Government 
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†Note: readily available 2012 patent and IP development plans included in chart to provide an idea of the one year 
initiatives of provinces/municipalities ostensibly meant as an additional method of implementing the multi-year plans and 
strategies set out. ** Refers to annual (for one year) implementing measures only. 
Link: 
http://www.ynipo.gov.cn/newsvie
w.aspx?id=3074 
 
 
Link: 
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/dfzz/yunnan/zcfg/zc
/200908/t20090807_471689.htm 
 
**Summary Report for the 2011 IP Work and 
Major Tasks for 2012 IP Work by the Yunnan 
Intellectual Property Office issued on 
February 15th 2012 by Yunnan Intellectual 
Property Office 
 
Link: 
http://www.ynipo.gov.cn/newsview.aspx?id
=3075  
Zhejiang Zhejiang’s 12
th
 Five Year Plan on 
Patent Development issued on 
February 1st   2012 by the Zhejiang 
Provincial Department of 
Technology 
 
Link: 
http://www.zjkjt.gov.cn/news/nod
e01/detail0101/2012/0101_28641.
htm 
 
Notice on Advice for Implementation of the 
National Intellectual Property Strategy 
Compendium by Zhejiang Province People’s 
Government〔2009〕No.189 issued on 
December 22th  2009 by the Zhejiang 
Province People’s Government 
 
Link: 
http://www.zjpat.gov.cn/details.aspx?newsI
d=c644de29-7495-4cda-b341-2bc9b51beeb6 
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Ⅶ Annexes406 
 
Introduction: 
 
I: Explicit mentions of IP and/or patent quality in major recently promulgated Chinese policy 
documents 
 
 
Table 15: Example patent quality references in China’s Provincial/Municipal 12th Five Year IP Plans 
and recent IP Strategies, and equivalent plans and strategies 
                                                           
406
 Special thanks to both Ruben Moen, Working Group Assistant at the European Chamber, for his help in compiling some 
of the statistics in this Annex; and to Linjia Dai, Working Group Assistant at the European Chamber, for her help in double-
checking many of the statistics and some translations provided in this Annex and the body of this study.  
 
Province/ 
Municipality
/Autonomo
us Region  
From 12
th
 Five Year IP Plans and/or equivalent 
plans** 
From  IP Strategies and/or other 
equivalent strategies 
Anhui IP Plan issued in 2011 
 
Section 4, Part3, Article 9:   
“Increase support for the industrialisation of 
patented technologies. Strive to establish 
special funds for patent application 
and industrialisation, to establish the patent 
award in Anhui Province, and to improve the 
province’s patent output quality and level of 
industrialisation. Set up 
the patent industrialisation pilot base, and to 
carry out the patent business-
support pilot projects to promote non-service 
invention and patent ventures for SMEs.” 
Section3, Part3: 
The “three shift” work-focus of the Anhui 
Provincial IP strategy: First, shift the work focus 
from quantity increase to quality improvement; 
Second, shift the work focus from intellectual 
property applications for grants to support of 
the transformation of patents; Third, shift the 
work focus from the popularity of awareness to 
the improvement of the intellectual property 
environment.” 
“Basic principles: government guidance, 
highlighting the main points: incremental 
stability, improving quality, encouraging 
innovation, and focusing on conversion and 
enhanced protection, to create a new 
environment.” 
None 
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Beijing  IP Plan issued in 2011 
 
Section 3, Part 4, Article 2: “Centered on 
hundreds of Zhongguancun pilot businesses; on 
the basis of industry alliances, guide the 
establishment of enterprises in the 
demonstration area and complete the IPR 
management system to improve the quantity 
and quality of the intellectual properties in 
enterprises in the area. 
Section 3, Part 5, Article 1: “…Optimise the 
incentive policies for intellectual property, 
explore and take the quantity and quality of 
intellectual properties as important criteria for 
ascertaining key laboratory and key research 
bases and as vital requirements for determining 
technical or professional titles and respective 
promotion. Strengthen practical construction 
bases of examiners, better ensuring the services 
of examiners and enterprises.” 
Section 3, Part 7, Article 1: “ … Ensure the 
funding of patent applications, regulate the 
patent applications of enterprises, and improve 
the quality of the patent applications by 
enterprises…” 
IP Strategy issued in 2009 
 
Section 3, Part 3, Paragraph 1: 
“…Optimise incentive policies for 
intellectual property, explore and take 
the quantity and quality of intellectual 
property as important criteria for 
listing key laboratories, key scientific 
research bases, evaluation of 
professional titles and promotion.” 
Section 3, part 4, Paragraph 1: 
“Further strengthen the overall ability 
to develop intellectual property of the 
Park…Encourage enterprises to have 
larger quantity and better quality of 
intellectual property, focus on 
strengthening the layout of intellectual 
property, and try hard to enact an 
intellectual property strategy.” 
Chongqing IP Plan issued in 2011 
 
Section 4, Part 3, Paragraph 2: 
“Explore and establish patent, trademark, and 
copyright, rights of new plant varieties and 
other intellectual property development and 
economic development of statistical quality 
monitoring system.” 
Section5, Part1, Paragraph5: 
“….Intellectual property rights and industry 
development, intellectual property rights and 
the development of the national economy 
statistical quality monitoring and other 
significant propositions to carry out study and 
to provide reference for government sectors in 
formulating industry development planning and 
policy. Set up a research center for industrial 
intellectual property.” 
None 
Fujian None IP Strategy issued in 2010, targets for 
the following 5 years: 
Section1, Part1, Paragraph1: 
“By 2020, the development index for 
intellectual property of Fujian Province 
to rank front tier in the country, the 
quantity and quality of intellectual 
property should improve 
significantly….” 
Gansu IP Plan issued in 2011 
 
IP Strategy issued in 2010 
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Section3, Part3, Paragraph6: 
“…The quantities of patent applications and 
authorisation have an average yearly 
improvement of over 20%, and the quality of 
the patents has evidently improved….The 
conversion rate of the patented technology in 
the province has soared; the contribution rate 
of patents toward economic development has 
been further improved.” 
Section5, Part6, Paragraph2: 
“Perfecting the evaluation system: 
Ensure good statistical monitoring. Put the 
quantity, quality, and benefit from 
implementation of intellectual property, and 
the development conditions of the intellectual 
property management system into the 
evaluation index system...” 
No explicit mention of patent quality 
Guangdong IP Plan issued in 2011 
 
Section 3, Part 1, Article 1: 
 “…Guide the intellectual property 
rights from the emphasis on 
quantity to improve the quality change.” 
 
 
IP Strategy issued in 2007, targets by 
the year of 2010 
 
Section2, Part4: 
“Guiding ideology: 
Take improving the quality of 
intellectual property right as the 
theme.” 
Section2, Part6: 
 “Development Goals: 
 Set up intellectual property creation 
system in accordance to the 
development patterns of the 
communist market, set up a multi-
layer and omni-directional protection 
system for intellectual property, multi-
functional service system for 
intellectual property, to realise 
correspondent indigenous intellectual 
property rights, quantity and quality of 
independently developed brands and 
the level of economic and social 
development, and the ability of 
indigenous innovation and 
competitiveness of the industry make 
significant progress.” 
Section2, Part7, Paragraph1: 
“Strategic focus: 
Further improve the quality of 
development. Promote indigenous 
innovation, develop intellectual 
property rights, further expand the 
number of intellectual property rights, 
improve the quality of IPR, and 
optimise the structure of IPR.” 
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Guangxi IP Plan issued in 2011 
 
No explicit mention of patent quality 
IP Strategy issued in 2009, targets by 
the year of 2020: 
 
Section1, Part3： 
“Strategic goals: raise public 
awareness of intellectual property 
rights, conquer a number of key 
technologies and form indigenous 
intellectual property in major industry 
areas with local advantages; the 
quantity and quality of indigenous 
Intellectual Property Rights can 
effectively carry the goal of building an 
innovative Guangxi, the promotional 
effect of IPR on the economic and 
social development to be significantly 
enhanced.” 
Guizhou IP Plan issued in 2011 
 
No explicit mention of patent quality 
IP Strategy issued in 2006, targets for 
every year from 2006 to 2015 
 
No explicit mention of Patent quality 
Hainan IP Plan issued in 2011 
 
Section 4, Article 3:  
“…Indigenous intellectual property rights of 
output quantity, quality...” 
Section 4 Article 5: 
 “Management performance of patent work, 
including the amount of R&D investment, the 
patent owner, the quantity and quality 
of patent transformation, transfer, and 
licensing to be in the annual 
performance management assessment 
indicators to encourage innovation and excel.” 
IP Strategy issued in 2010, targets for 
the following 5 years: 
 
No explicit mention of Patent quality 
Hebei IP Plan issued in 2011 
 
Section 3, Part 1 Paragraph2: 
“To carry out “Major Patented Technology 
Industrialisation Action”; to actively promote 
the industrialisation of patents, and cultivate to 
form a certain number of patented technology 
projects that sustain a yearly sales income of 
over ten million and a hundred million yuan in  
selected invention patents in the province that 
have market potential, high efficiency and high 
quality...” 
Column5: 
IP Strategy issued in 2009 
 
No explicit mention of Patent quality 
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“During the 12
th
 five year plan, select 300 high 
quality patented inventions, through cultivation 
and support, to form 10 patented technology 
projects that have a yearly sales income of over 
a hundred million yuan, to form 50 projects of 
over ten million yearly sales income. Select 100 
SMEs with indigenous intellectual property 
though support and guidance, to form 50 SMEs 
that have yearly patented products sales’ 
income of over ten million yuan.” 
Section 3, Part 9: 
“…introduce intellectual property innovative 
achievement to attract high level research and 
development institutions and innovation talents 
to settle inside the province. Actively introduce 
and gather good quality intellectual property 
resources from both within the country and 
abroad. Reinforce the import, digestion, 
absorption and innovation of patented 
technology….” 
Heilongjiang None IP Strategy issued in 2011, targets for 
the following 5 years 
 
Section 2, Part 3, Article 7:  
“…The patent level of per unit of GDP 
that substantially increases in the 
quantity and quality which can 
effectively support innovative 
development in the province and 
strategic emerging industries by leaps 
and bounds.” 
Henan IP Plan issued in 2010 
 
No explicit mention of patent quality 
IP Strategy issued in 2008 
 
Section2, Part8,Paragraph1: 
“Five-year Goal: 
The quantity and quality of intellectual 
property to increase substantially.” 
Section3, Part10, Paragraph1: 
“Strategic tasks for intellectual 
property rights of major industries:  
1) Strategic supporting industries. 
Promote innovation of intellectual 
property in equipment manufacturing, 
motor vehicles and parts, chemical 
energy, Non-Ferrous Metals, food and 
other industries. Improve the quantity 
and quality of products from 
intellectual property innovation, and 
form a number of core technologies 
with indigenous intellectual property.” 
Section5, Part21, Paragraph2 
“Take the quantity, quality, 
management and application of 
owned intellectual property as major 
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guidelines for rating innovation 
abilities and evaluating performances 
of enterprises, institutions of higher 
learning and scientific research 
institutions; take the achieved quantity 
and quality of intellectual property as 
criteria for the evaluation index system 
of appointment, assessment and 
promotion of professional titles.” 
Hubei IP Plan issued in 2011 
 
Section1, part1, Article 2: 
“…Enhance patent awareness, increase the 
number of patents, and patent structure, 
significantly 
improve the quality of patents; to promote pate
nt industrialisation, the formation of a number 
of patent competitive industries and a group of 
enterprises…” 
Section 4 Part 3: 
“Improve the intellectual property created by 
the drive mechanism to further improve patent 
quality.” 
IP Strategy issued in 2011 
 
No explicit mention of patent quality 
Hunan  IP Plan issued in 2011 
No explicit mention of Patent quality 
IP Strategy issued in 2009, targets by 
the year of 2015 
No explicit mention of Patent quality 
Inner 
Mongolia 
None Publicly announced that a strategy is 
being drafted, but is not currently 
available 
Jiangsu IP Plan issued in 2011 
Section 2, Part 2, Paragraph 3:  
“Pay attention to patent the 
mix and distribution structure of the 
coordinated development 
of different industries, focusing on the 
coordinated development of patent quantity 
and quality...” 
Section 4, Part 2, Paragraph 1: 
“Strengthening catalogued evaluation on 
invention performances of universities and 
institutes…invention patent and utility models 
should be the key elements of evaluation on 
applied research, developed 
research…improving patent grants and rewards 
system, enacting the ‘Measures on Patent 
Rewards in Jiangsu Province’ to stimulate 
inventing and improve patent quality.” 
IP Strategy issued in 2009,targets for 
every year from 2009 to2013 
Section2,Part2, Article5: 
“Increase the number of intellectual 
properties substantially, and improve 
their quality.” 
Section3,Part1,Article6: 
“…accelerate the effective 
combination of innovations on 
technology and intellectual property 
as well as the effective combination of 
intellectual property rights and the 
realisation of their market values to 
improve the created quality and 
operational benefit of intellectual 
property.” 
Section3, Part1, Article7: 
“Deepen the reform of the scientific 
research system; take the quantity and 
quality of indigenous intellectual 
property as important criteria for 
assessment of professional titles, 
promotion and rating key laboratories, 
key scientific research bases and other 
technological innovation platforms.” 
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Jiangxi None IP Strategy issued in 2011, targets by 
the year of 2015 
 
Section2, Part1 Paragraph: 
“Establish the province to become one 
that has a desirable environment for 
innovation, increasing quantity and 
improving quality of intellectual 
property...”    
Section 2, Part 3, Article 7:  
“A short-term goal for 2015 is to focus 
on the following objectives: (1) the 
number of indigenous intellectual 
property rights to grow steadily, the 
quality has improved significantly.” 
Section 3, Article 8:  
“Patents: Further improve the laws 
and regulations, and support policies, 
and actively promote the creation and 
application of balanced development. 
Continuously improve the quantity and 
quality of patent applications.” 
Section5, Part2, Article28: 
“Focus on the key fields of Jiangxi’s 
industrial development, help to 
produce a number of high technology 
products…push forward patent 
products with high added value and 
quality to realise their ultimate 
industrialisation.” 
Jilin None None 
Liaoning IP Plan issued in 2011 
 
Section2 Article 2: 
“First, the steady improvement 
of the ownership and quality of the indigenous 
intellectual property rights. The average 
annual growth rate of the province of invented 
patent applications and grants to 
maintain the 10% level, increasing year by 
year compared to foreign patent applications, a 
considerable number of inventions in the high-
tech fields has reached the 
international leading level and international 
advanced level.” 
Section3, part2:  
“We shall support colleges and universities, 
research institutes to include the quantity, 
quality and application of the obtained 
intellectual property rights to the job 
classification, rank promotion and other 
evaluation index systems of staff and 
researchers, increasing the weight of the 
intellectual property rights in research 
IP Strategy issued in 2011 
 
Section6, Part2, Article47: 
“Uphold the policy that takes quantity, 
quality and application of intellectual 
properties achieved by institutions of 
higher learning, scientific research 
institutions as important criteria in the 
evaluation index system for faculty, 
staff, and scientific research personnel 
to be appointed, assessed and 
promoted, increase the leverage of 
intellectual property on scientific 
research performances.” 
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performance.” 
Ningxia None IP Strategy issued in 2011, targets by 
the year of 2015: 
 
Section 2, Part2, Article 5: 
“Long-term goal: By 2020…a 
substantial increase in the quantity 
and quality of indigenous intellectual 
property rights...” 
Section 5, Part 4, Article 34:  
“…To strengthen the institutions of 
higher learning, scientific research 
institutions intellectual property 
management will be made to focus on 
the quantity, quality and 
transformation of the intellectual 
property rights to use the situation to 
include science and technology 
awards...” 
Section3, Part1, Article 11: 
“To form a number of high quality 
invention patents and PCT patents in 
stem cells and stem cell product 
development areas.” 
Qinghai None IP Strategy issued in 2008 
No explicit mention of Patent quality 
Shaanxi IP Plan issued in 2011 
No explicit mention of patent quality 
IP Strategy issued in 2008, targets for 
the following 5years: 
Section4, Article19: 
“Increase the output of high 
technology patents, improve the 
quality of patent applications in 
Shaanxi Province, optimise the 
structure of patent applications” 
Section5, Part1, Article25: 
“Take the quantity and quality of 
intellectual property rights as an 
important criteria for rating colleges, 
universities, scientific research 
institutions, and the assessment of 
professional titles, promotions and 
ascertaining key laboratories and key 
scientific research bases.” 
Section5, Article 39: 
“… Set up a patent information 
database or patent information service 
station to form a large scale, high 
quality, and professional patent 
information database series...” 
Shandong IP Plan issued in 2011 
No explicit mention of patent quality 
Publicly announced that a strategy is 
being drafted, but not available at 
time of research 
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Shanghai
407
 IP Plan issued in 2011 
No explicit mention of patent quality 
Publicly announced that a strategy is 
being drafted, but not available at 
time of research 
Shanxi Publicly announced that a plan is being drafted, 
but not available at time of research 
Publicly announced that a strategy is 
being drafted, but not available at 
time of research 
Sichuan None 
 
IP Strategy issued in 2009, targets for 
the following 5 years: 
No explicit mention of Patent quality 
Tianjin IP Plan issued in 2011 
 
Section 4, Part 6, Article 1  
“To further improve the quality of the number 
of patents… Further improve the patent subsidy 
policy to focus on competitive industries and 
strategic emerging industries, patent 
applications, improve patent quality, and move 
to expand  foreign patent applications. ” 
Section4,part7, Article 2: 
“We shall expand the number of valid patents 
and improve patent quality, optimise patent 
structure, significantly increasing patent 
creation, conversion, protection, and 
application capabilities.” 
IP Strategy issued in 2010, targets for 
the following 3 years: 
Section2, Article7: 
“The number of indigenous intellectual 
property owned has substantially 
increased, the quality has significantly 
improved, and the effect of 
implementing transformation is 
evident.” 
Section3, Article9: 
“Improve the quantity and quality of 
intellectual property. Try to make the 
ratio of intellectual properties in 
Coastal Urban Areas to the quantity of 
intellectual properties of the province 
correspond to its proportional 
occupancy in terms of GDP, and to 
improve the quality of intellectual 
property.” 
Section3, Article11: 
“Take advantage of the resources for 
innovation, creation and pioneering 
work in downtown Tianjin, to create a 
number of high quality intellectual 
properties, and form a hotspot for 
creating intellectual property.” 
Section4, Article19: 
“Formulate and implement patent 
work development plan and related 
industries to coordinate development 
strategy, promote innovation, increase 
the quantity and quality of patents, 
optimise the structure of the patents, 
and obtain a number of core patents 
on core technology and key technology 
to support advantage industries and 
the development of emerging 
industries.” 
Section5, Part2, Article28: 
“Improve the innovation ability of 
indigenous intellectual property of 
enterprises…improve the quantity and 
quality of intellectual property….” 
Section5, Part2, Article29: 
“Improve the indigenous intellectual 
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property quality of universities, 
colleges and scientific research 
institutions.Take the achieved quantity 
and quality of intellectual property as 
important criteria for assessment of 
professional titles...” 
Section5, Part6, Article43: 
“Improve the public service platform 
for intellectual property. Focus on the 
development needs of Tianjin’s 
advantage industries, and emerging 
industries, establish high quality and 
professional patents, trademarks, 
copyrights, standards and other 
information databases and platforms 
for analysis usage.” 
 
Tibet None Publicly announced that a strategy is 
being drafted, but is not currently 
available 
Xinjiang None IP Strategy issued in 2010, targets for 
the following 5 years: 
 
Section 2, Article 6, paragraph 4: 
“Adhere to increase the quantity and 
improve the quality of the 
combination. Strengthen indigenous 
innovation…effectively improve the 
quality of intellectual property 
creation, and enhance core 
competitiveness.” 
Section2, Article7 
“By 2020, overall ability of intellectual 
property rights on the main market 
strengthened remarkably; the quantity 
and quality of intellectual property are 
improved to a large extent.” 
Section2, Article8 
“Goal for the upcoming five year: 
continuously improve the quantity and 
quality of intellectual property.” 
Section4, Part1, Article20: 
“Patents. Make great effort to 
promote the technological innovation 
during the conversions of resources, to 
improve the quantity of patent 
applications, patent authorisation, 
patent quality and profit.” 
Section 5, Part 3, Article 38: 
 “… The departments concerned 
should obtain the quantity and quality 
of intellectual property rights, 
and conversion of use into the Science 
and Technology Award, job 
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Source: Review of 12
th
 Five Year Intellectual Property Rights Plans, recent IP Strategies, and equivalent plans and strategies. 
Note: Other articles not cited may contain provisions in some ways related to patent quality (e.g. whereas more indirect 
references to patent quality measures, for example provisions that discuss boosting build invention patents but that do not 
in the same provision mention “quality” of IPR, are not mentioned in this chart). Translations are from the European 
Chamber thus are unofficial. 
 
Table 16: Patent quality-related references in the Promotion Plan for the Implementation of the 
National Intellectual Property Strategy in 2012  
 
Article Text 
Part 1 “I. Enhance Quality of Intellectual Property (IP)  
Mission:  
Improve IP appraisal and assessment system, enhance IP examination and 
management of various intellectual property rights, including patent, 
trademark, copyright, and new varieties of plant, guide inventors to shift the 
focus on IP quantity to IP quality, and boost IP value….” (emphasis  added) 
Part 1, measure 1 (1) Revise the Assessment Index System of National Technology Invention 
Awards, enhance the assessment on patent quality, increase the rewards to 
significant technological inventions and IP rights obtained through indigenous 
innovation activities.(MOST)” (emphasis added) 
Part 1, measure 2 “(2) In the process of deploying major projects which are dedicated to 
industrialisation and technology reform, give priority and assistance to projects 
which obtained IP rights through indigenous innovation activities, specify the 
acceleration of indigenous innovation capacity building while drafting industrial 
policies, develop craft equipments, technology and products that have their 
own IPRs. (MIIT)” 
Part 1, measure 3 “(3) Construct an appraisal and assessment system with reference to "the 
number of invention patents per 10,000 people", and carry out a pilot program 
accordingly. (SIPO)” 
classification, and rank promotion 
evaluation.” 
 
Yunnan IP Plan issued in 2011 
Section 3, Article 2:  
“ Development Goals: The 
overall goal: by 2015…significantly 
improve the quantity and quality of the 
indigenous intellectual property rights… 
he proportion of indigenous intellectual 
property goods is constantly increasing...” 
IP Strategy issued in 2008, targets for 
the following 5 years from 2009 
No explicit mention of patent quality 
Zhejiang  IP Plan issued in 2012 
Section2, Part2, Paragraph1: 
“During the 12
th
 five year plan…further realise 
the improvement on the quantity and quality of 
patents, gradually improving the patent work 
mechanism and public service system. The 
patent system has fully illustrated its support 
for improving the capability of indigenous 
innovation via the transformation of economic 
development modes...” 
IP Strategy issued in 2009 
No explicit mention of patent quality 
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Part 1, measure 4 “(4) Improve the system for assessing the quality of patent examination, 
establish an examination steering system, identify the responsibilities of 
examination quality management, improve channels for public 
feedback/comments on the quality of patent examination. (SIPO)” (emphasis 
added) 
Part 1, measure 5 “(5) Improve the monitoring and settlement of abnormal patent application, 
regulate local patent subsidy, promulgate in due time further opinions on 
regulating patent subsidy.(SIPO)” 
Part 1, measure 8 “(8) Improve the examination and management of new varieties of plant, 
formulate test guidance on new varieties of plant, revise and publish rules for 
examining and approving new varieties of plant, improve the quality of granted 
varieties. (MOA, SFA)” 
Part 1, measure 9 “(9) With regard to major projects dedicated to national defense, provide 
guidance to relevant bodies that undertake the projects on how to protect IP 
rights, increase the quality of patent application; recruit more examiners for 
patent in national defense, improve examination quality control, enhance 
capacity of examining patents involving national defense. (PLA GAD)” 
Part 2, measure 13 “(13) Support central state-owned enterprises to search IP information and 
analyse patent information in certain fields around the burgeoning strategic 
industries, establish a mechanism for IPR infringement alert and risk precaution 
within the central state-owned enterprises step by step. (SASAC, SIPO)” 
Part 2, measure 14 “(14) Advance the establishment of patent alliances among burgeoning 
strategic industries, guide and set up 30 or so such alliances. (SIPO, MOST)” 
Part 2, measure 15 “(15) Improve the green channel for patent examination, accelerate the 
acquirement of IPRs by burgeoning strategic industries from their innovations. 
(SIPO, MOST.)” 
Part 3 “III. Promote IP Application 
Mission:  
With IP as a link among industry, academia and research community, improve 
the transferring and utilising mechanisms for innovative results, promulgate 
policies that will promote IP transference and utilisation, propel the translation 
of IP from laboratory to market as well as the commercialisation and 
industrialisation of IP.”  
Part 3, measure 16 “(16) Promulgate the Several Opinions on Further Intensifying the Protection of 
Legal Rights and Interests of Inventor or Creator of Service Inventions and 
Promoting IP Application and Implementation. (SIPO, MOE, MOST, MIIT, MOF, 
MHRSS, MOA, SASAC, SAIC, NCAC, SFA, PLA GAD)” 
Part 3, measure 17 “(17) Conduct research on the establishment of a science and technology 
reporting system, propel the transformation and application of IP from major 
national science and technology projects and other science and technology 
projects, take into account the level of IP protection and the effects brought 
about by IP transference and transformation, which shall be adopted in the 
criteria of administrative permission, appraisal, and acceptance check of the 
projects. (MOST)” 
Part 3, measure 18 “(18) Draft the policy related to IP disposition in technical standards, the patent 
assessment and implementation, increase the proportion of China's IP in major 
international technical standards. 
(MIIT, MOST, AQSIQ)” 
Part 3, measure 19 “(19) Further improve the criteria for assessing IP, intensify quality inspection 
on IP-related business provided by asset assessment bodies, improve the 
mechanism for IP assessing services for SMEs. (MOF, SIPO)” 
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Part 3, measure 22 “(22) Draft the Regulations on Service Invention (Draft), promote the 
commercialisation and utilszation of service inventions. (SIPO, MOST)” 
Part 4, measure 30 “(30) Draft the Opinions on Several Issues Concerning the Trial of Disputes 
Involving Patent Infringement, the Opinions on Several Issues Concerning the 
Trial of Administrative Cases Involving Patent Licensing and Confirmation….” 
(Supreme Court)” 
Part 6,  measure 57 “(57) Give more guidance to local governments on strategy implementation, 
formulate and promulgate key points for implementing local IP strategy, launch 
the pilot assessment on the implementation of the local IP strategy, 
promulgate in due time the Guidelines on Conducting Assessment on the Local 
IP Strategy Implementation. (SIPO,SAIC,NCAC)” 
Part 6, measure 58 “(58) Conduct in-depth pilot assessment on IP contained in major local 
economic and science and technology activities, formulate guidelines on 
assessing IP in line with local situations. (SIPO, MOST)” 
Part 6, measure 59 “(59) Formulate and promulgate the 12th Five-Year Special Plan on IP Work of 
Science and Technology Innovation. (MOST)” 
Part 6, measure 60 “(60) Formulate specific regulations on IP management for each major project, 
taking into account the characteristics of each major project and also the 
Provisional Regulations on Intellectual Property Management of the Major 
National Scientific and Technological Projects. (MOST)” 
Part 6, measure 61 “(61) Review and improve measures on managing IP in national science and 
technology projects. (MOST)” 
Part 6, measure 64 “(64) Promote IP strategy analysis in major science and technology projects, 
formulate IP work plans in line with characteristics of each specific major 
project, improve systems of major projects on the registration, collection and 
assessment of IP information, intensify supervision, assessment and guidance 
on IP management in each major project. (MOST, MIIT, SIPO)” 
Part 6, measure 67 “(67) Promote central state-owned enterprises to fully implement IP strategy, 
improve the system for IP management in enterprises. (SASAC, SIPO)” 
Part 6, measure 69 “(69) Select major strategic pioneering projects under application category and 
major science and technology projects involving equipment R&D and 
manufacturing as pilot projects so as to conduct IP management throughout 
the projects and in formulating IP output targets and criteria of applying 
results. (CAS)” 
Part 7, measure 75 “(75) Give practical support and services within industry bases, such as tracing 
IP information and analysing patents. (MIIT)” 
Source: Author’s selection of text from the Promotion Plan for the Implementation of the National Intellectual Property 
Strategy in 2012. English translation from SIPO. Note: Other articles not cited may potentially contain provisions in some 
ways related to patent quality issues.   
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Box 1: Patent quality references in China’s National Patent Development Strategy (2011-2020) 
• China will rank among the top two in the world in terms of the annual number of patents for 
inventions granted to the domestic applicants, and the quality of patents filed will further 
improve  
 
• China will rank among the top two in the world in terms of the annual number of patents for 
inventions granted to the domestic applicants, and the quality of patents filed will further 
improve. 
 
• We will accelerate cultivating and training a large number of patent talents with optimum 
structure, reasonable distribution and high quality. The quantity and quality of patent talents in 
enterprises will improve significantly. 
 
• Optimise patent subsidy policy and further define the orientation to enhance patent quality, 
increase the number of patent ownership in foreign countries and promote transformation of 
self-relied innovations into property rights. 
 
 The following references also mention building up the quality of mechanisms to improve patent quality: 
o The examination efficiency will be greatly raised and the examination quality will be further 
improved…. 
o The public’s satisfaction with the examination quality will steadily improve.  
o Establish efficient and scientific operation and management system for examination business 
and constantly improve examination efficiency and quality. 
 
Source: Author’s review of the NPDS 
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Chapter 1 
 
Ⅶ.1.1  Select patent application statistics for China 
 
Table 17:  Invention patent applications in China (1996-2011), by filer, with ratios 
  
Year Domestic Foreign Total Ratio domestic  
to foreign* 
Ratio domestic 
apps. to total* 
Ratio foreign 
apps. to total* 
1996 11,471 17,046 28,517 0.7 : 1 0.4 : 1 0.6 : 1 
1997 12,713 20,953 33,666 0.6 : 1 0.4 : 1 0.6 : 1 
1998 13,726 22,234 35,960 0.6 : 1 0.4 : 1 0.6 : 1 
1999 15,596 21,098 36,694 0.7 : 1 0.4 : 1 0.6 : 1 
2000 25,346 26,401 51,747 1 : 1 0.5 : 1 0.5 : 1 
2001 30,038 33,166 63,204 0.9 : 1 0.5 : 1 0.5 : 1 
2002 39,806 40,426 80,232 1 : 1 0.5 : 1 0.5 : 1 
2003 56,769 48,549 105,318 1.2 : 1 0.5 : 1 0.5 : 1 
2004 65,786 64,347 130,133 1 : 1 0.5 : 1 0.5 : 1 
2005 93,485 79,842 173,327 1.2 : 1 0.5 : 1 0.5 : 1 
2006 122,318 88,172 210,490 1.4 : 1 0.6 : 1 0.4 : 1 
2007 153,060 92,101 245,161 1.7 : 1 0.6 : 1 0.4 : 1 
2008 194,579 95,259 289,838 2 : 1 0.7 : 1 0.3 : 1 
2009 229,096 85,477 314,573 2.7 : 1 0.7 : 1 0.3 : 1 
2010 293,066 98,111 391,177 3 : 1 0.7 : 1 0.3 : 1 
2011 415,829 110,583 526,412 3.8 : 1 0.8 : 1 0.2 : 1 
Source: SIPO statistics database; calculations.*Ratios are approximations. 
 
Table 18: Utility model applications in China (1996-2011), by filer, with ratios 
  
Year Domestic Foreign Total Ratio domestic  
to foreign* 
Ratio domestic 
apps. to total * 
Ratio foreign 
apps. to total * 
1996 49,341 263 49,604 188 : 1 1 : 1 0 : 1 
1997 49,902 227 50,129 220 : 1 1 : 1 0 : 1 
1998 51,220 177 51,397 289 : 1 1 : 1 0 : 1 
1999 57,214 278 57,492 206 : 1 1 : 1 0 : 1 
2000 68,461 354 68,815 193 : 1 1 : 1 0 : 1 
2001 79,275 447 79,722 177 : 1 1 : 1 0 : 1 
2002 92,166 973 93,139 95 : 1 1 : 1 0 : 1 
2003 107,842 1,273 109,115 85 : 1 1 : 1 0 : 1 
2004 111,578 1,247 112,825 89 : 1 1 : 1 0 : 1 
2005 138,085 1,481 139,566 93 : 1 1 : 1 0 : 1 
2006 159,997 1,369 161,366 117 : 1 1 : 1 0 : 1 
2007 179,999 1,325 181,324 136 : 1 1 : 1 0 : 1 
2008 223,945 1,641 225,586 136: 1 1 : 1 0 : 1 
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2009 308,861 1,910 310,771 162 : 1 1 : 1 0 : 1 
2010 407,238 2,598 409,836 157 : 1 1 : 1 0 : 1 
2011 581,303 4,164 585,467 140 : 1 1 : 1  0 : 1 
Source: SIPO statistics database; calculations.*Ratios are approximations. 
 
 
Table 19: Design patent applications in China (1996-2011), by filer with ratios 
  
Year Domestic Foreign Total Ratio domestic  to 
foreign* 
Ratio domestic 
apps. to total* 
Ratio foreign 
apps. to total * 
1996 21,395 3,219 24,614 6.6 : 1 0.9 : 1 0.1 : 1 
1997 27,456 2,957 30,413 9.3 : 1 0.9 : 1 0.1 : 1 
1998 31,287 3,345 34,632 9.4 : 1 0.9 : 1 0.1 : 1 
1999 37,148 2,905 40,053 12.8 : 1 0.9 : 1 0.1 : 1 
2000 46,532 3,588 50,120 13 : 1 0.9 : 1 0.1 : 1 
2001 56,460 4,187 60,647 13.5 : 1 0.9 : 1 0.1 : 1 
2002 73,572 5,688 79,260 12.9 : 1 0.9 : 1 0.1 : 1 
2003 86,627 7,427 94,054 11.7 : 1 0.9 : 1 0.1 : 1 
2004 101,579 9,270 110,849 11 : 1 0.9 : 1 0.1 : 1 
2005 151,587 11,784 163,371 12.9 : 1 0.9 : 1 0.1 : 1 
2006 188,027 13,295 201,322 14.1 : 1 0.9 : 1 0.1 : 1 
2007 253,675 13,993 267,668 18.1 : 1 0.9 : 1 0.1 : 1 
2008 298,620 14,284 312,904 20.9 : 1 1 : 1 0 : 1 
2009 339,654 11,688 351,342 29.1 : 1 1 : 1 0 : 1 
2010 409,124  12,149  421,273 33.6 : 1 1 : 1 0 : 1 
2011 507,538   13,930 521,468 36.4 : 1 1 : 1 0 : 1 
Source: SIPO statistics database; calculations.*Ratios are approximations. 
 
Ⅶ.1.2 Growth rates for patent applications in China (average annual growth 
rate) 
 
Table 20: Invention patent applications: AAGR (%) of domestic and foreign applications 
 
Year AAGR domestic apps.  AAGR foreign 
apps. 
AAGR domestic + foreign apps. 
1997 11 23 18 
1998 8 6 7 
1999 14 -5 2 
2000 63 25 41 
2001 19 26 22 
Total (%) 23 15 18 
2002 33 22 27 
2003 43 20 31 
2004 16 33 24 
2005 42 24 33 
2006 31 10 21 
Total (%) 33 22 27 
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2007 25 5 17 
2008 27 3 18 
2009 18 -10 9 
2010 28 15 24 
2011 42 13 35 
Total (%)  28 5  21  
Source: SIPO statistics database; calculations. Percentages are rounded. 
 
 
Table 21: Utility model applications: AAGR (%) of domestic and foreign applications 
 
Year AAGR domestic apps. AAGR foreign apps. AAGR domestic + 
foreign apps. 
1997 1 -14 1 
1998 3 -22 3 
1999 12 57 12 
2000 20 27 20 
2001 16 26 16 
Total (%) 10 15 10 
2002 16 118 17 
2003 17 31 17 
2004 4 -2 3 
2005 24 19 24 
2006 16 -8 16 
Total (%) 15 32 15 
2007 13 -3 12 
2008 24 24 24 
2009 38 16 38 
2010 32 36 32 
2011 43 60 43 
Total (%) 30  27  30  
Source: SIPO statistics database; calculations. Percentages are rounded. 
 
 
Table 22: Design patent applications: AAGR (%) of domestic and foreign applications 
 
Year AAGR domestic apps. AAGR foreign apps. AAGR domestic + 
foreign apps. 
1997 28 -8 24 
1998 14 13 14 
1999 19 -13 16 
2000 25 24 25 
2001 21 17 21 
Total (%)  21 7 20 
2002 30 36 31 
2003 17 31 19 
2004 17 25 18 
2005 49 27 47 
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2006 24 13 23 
Total (%) 27  26 28* 
2007 35 5 33 
2008 18 2 17 
2009 14 -18 1 
2010 21 4 20 
2011 24 15 24 
Total (%) 22   2 19  
Source: SIPO statistics database; calculations. Percentages are rounded. *Reminder: number due to rounding.  
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Ⅶ.1.3  Select patent filing statistics for select EU countries 
 
Table 23: Germany: Patents - types and filers, ratios (’96 – ’98) 
Source: WIPO statistics database; calculations.*Ratios are approximations 
 
Table 24: Germany: Patents - types and filers, ratios (’08 – ’10) 
Country Year Invention 
Patent 
(Domestic) 
Invention 
Patent 
(Foreign) 
Ratio* 
(Invention 
Patent 
Domestic vs. 
Foreign) 
Total 
Invention 
Patent 
(Domestic + 
Foreign) 
Ratio* (Total 
[F+D] Invention 
Patents vs. 
Total Utility 
Models) 
2008 49,240 13,177 3.7 : 1 62,417 
2009 47,859 11,724 4.1 : 1 59,583 
2010 47,047 12,198 3.9 : 1 59,245 
Year Utility 
Model  
(Domestic) 
Utility 
Model 
(Foreign) 
Ratio*(Utility 
model 
Domestic vs. 
Foreign) 
Total 
Utility Model  
(Domestic + 
Foreign) 
2008 14,047 3,020 4.7 : 1 17,067 
2009 14,242 3,064 4.7 : 1 17,306 
Germany 
2010 13,694 3,311 4.1 : 1 17,005 
 
 
 
2008 - 3.7:1 
2009 - 3.4:1 
2010 - 3.5:1 
Source: WIPO statistics database; calculations.*Ratios are approximations 
 
Country 
Year Invention 
Patent  
(Domestic) 
Invention 
Patent 
(Foreign) 
Ratio* 
(Invention 
Patent 
Domestic vs. 
Foreign) 
Total 
Invention 
Patent 
(Domestic + 
Foreign) 
Ratio* (Total 
[F+D] Invention 
Patents vs. Total 
Utility Models) 
1996 42,322 9,511 4.4:1 51,833 
1997 44,438 11,291 3.9:1 55,729 
1998 46,523 10,843 4.3:1 57,366 
Year Utility 
Model  
(Domestic) 
Utility 
Model 
(Foreign) 
Ratio* 
(Utility 
Model 
Domestic vs. 
Foreign) 
Total Utility 
Model 
(Domestic + 
Foreign) 
1996 19,697 2,579 7.6:1 22,276 
1997 20,152 2,910 6.9:1 23,062 
Germany 
1998 19,887 2,654 7.5:1 22,541 
 
 
 
1996 - 2.3:1 
1997 - 2.4:1 
1998- 2.5:1 
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Table 25: Denmark: Patents – types and filers, ratios (’08 – ’10) 
 
Country 
Year Invention 
Patent  
(Domestic) 
Invention 
Patent 
(Foreign) 
Ratio*(Invention 
Patent Domestic 
vs. Foreign) 
Total 
Invention 
Patent 
(Domestic + 
Foreign) 
Ratio* (Total 
[F+D] Invention 
Patents vs. 
Total Utility 
Models) 
2008 1,634 195 8.4 : 1 1,829 
2009 1,518 131 11.6 : 1 1,649 
2010 1,626 142 11.5 : 1 1,768 
Year Utility 
Model  
(Domestic) 
Utility 
Model 
(Foreign) 
Ratio* (Utility 
Model Domestic 
vs. Foreign) 
Total Utility 
Model 
( Domestic + 
Foreign) 
2008 218 23 9.5 : 1 241 
2009 181 26 7 : 1 207 
Denmark 
2010 198 37 5.4 : 1 235 
 
 
 
2008 - 7.6:1 
2009 - 8.0:1 
2010 - 7.5:1 
Source: WIPO statistics database; calculations.*Ratios are approximations 
 
 
Table 26: Austria: Patents – types and filers, ratios (’08 – ’10) 
Country Year Invention 
Patent  
(Domestic) 
Invention 
Patent 
(Foreign) 
Ratio*(Invention 
Patent Domestic 
vs. Foreign) 
Total Invention 
Patent 
(Domestic + 
Foreign)  
Ratio* (Total 
[F+D] Invention 
Patents vs. Total 
Utility Models) 
2008 2,298 329 7 : 1 2,627 
2009 2,263 292 7.8 : 1 2,555 
2010 2,424 249 9.7 : 1 2,673 
Year Utility 
Model  
(Domestic) 
Utility 
Model 
(Foreign) 
Ratio* (Utility 
Model Domestic 
vs. Foreign) 
Total Utility 
Model 
( Domestic 
+Foreign)  
2008 682 179 3.8 : 1 861 
2009 717 209 3.4 : 1 926 
Austria 
2010 678 204 3.3 : 1 882 
 
 
 
2008 - 3.1:1 
2009 - 2.8:1 
2010 - 3.0:1 
Source: WIPO statistics database; calculations.*Ratios are approximations 
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Table 27: Industrial design for selected countries 
Country Year Industrial 
Design 
(Domestic) 
Industrial 
Design 
(Foreign) 
Via The 
Hague 
Total 
Germany 2008 5,025 677 239 5,941 
 2009 5,220 540 140 5,900 
 2010 5,553 588 144 6,285 
      
Austria 2008 805 227 - 1,032 
 2009 629 87 - 716 
 2010 694 288 - 982 
      
Denmark 2008 183 65 - 248 
 2009 172 26 12 210 
 2010 162 27 21 210 
Source: WIPO statistics database; calculations.*Ratios are approximations 
 
Note on data sources in Tables 23 - 27: Intellectual property data cited in above charts in this annex 
are taken from the WIPO Statistics Database, which is primarily based on information provided to 
WIPO by national/regional IP offices and data compiled by WIPO during the application process of 
international filings through the PCT, the Madrid System, and the Hague System. Those statistics 
only cover patents filed in the domestic patent applications offices of the countries listed. They do 
not necessarily cover patent applications filed by residents of those countries with the EPO.  
 
  Table 28: EPO filing data 2002-2011 per country of residence of the applicant 
Country/Y
ear 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Austria 1,151 1,240 1,327 1,459 1,564 1,784 1,797 1,940 2,218 2,351 
China 1,137 1,455 1,881 2,687 4,213 5,835 6,490 8,270 12,75
0 
16,94
6 
Denmark 1,173 1,295 1,375 1,567 1,627 1,759 2,080 2,044 2,156 2,236 
Germany 26,507 27,21
1 
28,22
7 
29,15
2 
30,67
0 
32,12
8 
33,40
5 
30,48
6 
33,14
6 
33,18
1 
Source: EPO statistics 
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Ⅶ.1.4 Patent applications by entities’ registration status 
 
Table 29: Invention patent applications by entities’ registration status (large- and medium-sized 
enterprises only*) (2006-2010)   
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 Registration Status 
Invention 
patent 
apps. 
Invention 
patent 
apps. 
Invention 
patent 
apps. 
Invention 
patent 
apps. 
Invention 
patent 
apps. 
Sum 
Total 72,523 63,230 43,773 36,074 25,685 241,285 
Domestic Funded 
Enterprises 
49,909 45,694 33,507 27,741 19,000 175,851 
State-owned 
Enterprises 
5,280 4,285 2,951 1,921 1,488 15,925 
Collective-owned 
Enterprises 
738 669 698 680 549 3,334 
Cooperative 
Enterprises 
231 153 86 72 91 633 
Joint Ownership 
Enterprises 
21 17 12 45 19 114 
State Joint Ownership 
Enterprises 
6 10 6 38 9 69 
Limited Liability 
Corporations 
17,000 16,487 13,986 9,605 9,690 66,768 
State Sole Funded 
Corporations 
2,644 2,163 1,635 1,305 1,130 8,877 
Share-holding 
Corporations Ltd. 
17,915 17,588 11,540 13,073 5,257 65,373 
Private Enterprises 8,659 6,343 4,177 2,312 1,885 23,376 
Other Enterprises 65 152 57 33 21 328 
Enterprises with 
Funds from Hong 
Kong,Macao, Taiwan 
7,245 6,171 4,332 3,299 3,425 24,472 
Joint-venture 
Enterprises 
3,521 2,489 1,724 972 933 9,639 
Cooperative 
Enterprises 
83 57 26 53 481 700 
Enterprises with Sole 
Fund 
3,220 3,203 2,305 2,039 1,823 12,590 
Share-holding 
Corporations Ltd. 
421 422 277 235 188 1,543 
Foreign Funded 
Enterprises 
15,369 11,365 5,934 5,034 3,260 40,962 
Joint-venture 
Enterprises 
4,787 4,227 3,369 2,346 1,679 16,408 
Cooperation 
Enterprises 
59 70 29 148 31 337 
Enterprises with Sole 
Fund 
10,001 6,567 2,148 2,247 1,341 22,304 
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Share-holding 
Corporations Ltd. 
522 501 388 293 209 1,913 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, National Bureau of Statistics; calculations. * Data only available for large- and medium-
sized enterprises, thus inferably excludes smaller enterprises. 
 
Table 30: Patent filings by domestic Chinese entities’ registration status (large- and medium sized 
enterprises only*) (2009) 
Chinese 
Domestic- 
Funded 
Enterprises 
Total 
patent 
apps. 
Patent apps 
per entity as 
% of total 
applications 
of all large 
and medium 
sized entities 
Inventio
n apps. 
Invention 
apps per 
entity % 
of total  
invention 
apps. 
Utility 
and 
design 
patent 
apps. 
Utility and 
design 
apps per 
entity % of 
total  
utility and 
design 
apps. 
Utility and 
design 
patents as 
% of each 
entities' 
total apps. 
State-owned 
Enterprises   
12,135 10% 4,285 9% 7,850 10% 65% 
Collective-
owned 
Enterprises  
1,411 1% 669 1% 742 1% 53% 
Cooperative 
Enterprises   
573 0% 153 0% 420 0% 73% 
Joint 
Ownership 
Enterprises         
99 0% 17 0% 82 0% 83% 
State Joint 
Ownership 
Enterprises 
72 0% 10 0% 62 0% 86% 
Limited 
Liability 
Corporations       
39,642 31% 16,487 34% 23,155 31% 58% 
State Sole 
Funded 
Corporations          
6,754 5% 2,163 5% 4,591 5% 68% 
Share-
holding 
Corporations 
Ltd. 
36,400 29% 17,588 37% 18,812 29% 52% 
Private 
Enterprises      
29,398 23% 6,343 13% 23,055 23% 78% 
Other 
Enterprises        
648 1% 152 0% 496 1% 77% 
TOTAL 127,132 100% 47,867 100% 79,265 100% 62% 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, National Bureau of Statistics, calculations. Note 1: Due to data limitations, 2009 
selected as a proxy year, as all data is at least available for that year. Note 2: SOEs are distinguished from “state-joint 
ownership enterprises, “state sole funded enterprises,” and it is not obvious from the statistics which, if any, other 
corporations are controlled by the state in terms of 50/50 ownership or majority ownership). *Note 3: Data only available 
for large- and medium-sized enterprises, thus inferably excludes smaller enterprises. 
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Ⅶ.1.5 Rates of patent applications “not granted” (by type, by country) 
 
Methodology 
 
A proxy-based approach was taken to measure the average rates of patents not being granted 
relative to average patent application rates. The yearly number of each type of patent applications 
minus the yearly number of each type of patents granted was used to create that year’s patents 
applied for but “not granted” figure for each type of patent. This was then taken as a percentage of 
each type of patents’ applications for that year. This was taken over the period of 2006-2011 (for 
Chart 12 below), and from 2006-2010 for Charts 13 and 14 below (whereas 2011 was not included in 
the latter two charts given the lack of data for some countries reviewed). Then, the average of the 
averages for these years was taken to create one time period average. For simplicity/readability the 
study presents the aforementioned figures as rates of patents “not granted.” 
 
It should be recognised that this methodology is only intended to very roughly estimate the average 
rates of patents “not granted” because it has notable limitations. The methodology does not 
measure the actual rate of patents for which an application is filed but is ultimately not granted. This 
is because a patent can be filed in year X but not granted in that year but instead in year Y; this is 
particularly the case for invention patents given the length of their review procedure, but could 
apply to certain design patent and utility model filings depending on the timing of their review. As 
such, the figures below are inevitably skewed, although it is uncertain to what extent or direction. 
Also, for context, it is worth recalling the discussion in Chapter 2 of this study that there are many 
reasons why a patent application may ultimately not turn into a granted patent.408 Additionally, it 
should be noted that the data used for the European countries sampled is from filings at domestic 
patent offices not EPO filings.409 
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Figures 
 
Chart 12: Avg. % of patent applications in China “not granted” per year (2006-2011) 
 
Source: SIPO statistics; calculations 
 
Char 13: Avg. % of invention patents applications “not granted” 2006-2010, by select countries 
 
Source: WIPO and SIPO statistics; calculations. Note: Data was not available from the WIPO source used for Austria’s 2008 
rates of invention patent filings and granting rates, so the grant reflects its average for 2006-2007 plus 2009-2010. 
 
Char 14: Avg. % of utility model applications “not granted” 2006-2010, by select countries 
 
Source: WIPO and SIPO statistics; calculations 
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Ⅶ.1.6 Methodology for estimating patent filings in 2015 (by type) 
 
 
Approach A 
 
The estimates presented in Charts 6 - 8 are based on SIPO data presented earlier in this Annex and 
calculations using the following functions: 
 
Uapp2015 = Uapp2011 X (1 + AGRtuα)
n 
 
Dapp2015 = Dapp2011 X (1 + AGRtdα)
n 
 
Iapp2015 = Iapp2011 X (1 + AGRtiα)
n 
 
Whereas: 
 Uapp = utility model applications 
 Dapp = design patent applications 
 Iapp = invention patent applications 
 app2011= number of applications in 2011 
 app2015 = predicted number of applications in 2015 
 AGRtuα= avg. growth rate of total (foreign + domestic) utility model applications in 
time period (2009-2011) 
 AGRtdα= avg. growth rate of total (foreign + domestic) design patent applications in 
time period (2009-2011) 
 AGRtiα= avg. growth rate of total (foreign + domestic) invention patent applications 
in time period (2009-2011) 
 n = number of years from 2011-2015 
 
These patent filing estimates were then presented in chart form, and the according percentage of 
total patent applications was calculated.  
 
“Upper bound” estimates: The average growth rate from 2009-2011 (i.e. growth 2009 to 2010, and 
2010 to 2011) of patent applications for each of the types of patents was used in the projections. 
This rate was used given it is taken from the most recent few years, and thus arguably is the most 
representative and factual indicator of patent growth in the near future. A longer period of time, for 
example from 2006-2011 was not used given this period would include patent filings in the middle of 
the global financial crisis, which may have at least some impact that would cause skewing of the 
estimates (although using figures from 2009 onwards admittedly does not completely avoid shocks 
of the financial crisis).  
 
It is possible that using the growth rate from 2009-2011 will result in an upper bound estimate in 
patent growth given the particularly high rates of application growth in those years, which may or 
may not necessarily be sustained; however, even when using the compound annual growth rate 
over five years (see Approach B below), the results are similar. In general, given the continuous 
growth of total patent applications in China over the last decade, it appears reasonable to use a 
sampling of recent growth rates to at least roughly predict future patent application growth in China.  
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Approach B 
 
“Lower bound” estimates: An alternative “lower bound” estimate is provided herein as a way of 
providing another approach to estimating the composition of patents in China in 2015 that might at 
least avoid some of the ‘over-estimating’ possible in the aforementioned upper bound estimates. 
The lower bound estimate is built upon a very similar approach to the upper bound estimate with 
some small modifications, namely (1) that the compound annual growth rate (CAGR) is used instead 
of the AGR, and (2) different years are used to calculate this rate. The functions for this approach are 
as follows: 
Uapp2015 = Uapp2011 X (1 + CAGRtuα)
n 
 
Dapp2015 = Dapp2011 X (1 + CAGRtdα)
n 
 
Iapp2015 = Iapp2011 X (1 + CAGRtiα)
n 
 
 CAGRtuα= CAGR of total (foreign + domestic) utility model applications in time period 
(2006-2011) 
 CAGRtdα= CAGR of total (foreign + domestic) design patent applications in time 
period (2006-2011) 
 CAGRtiα= CAGR of total (foreign + domestic) invention patent applications in time 
period (2006-2011) 
 
The results from this approach are illustrated below. They differ, but not dramatically, from the  
“upper bound” results. 
 
Chart 15: Estimated domestic patent applications in China in 2015 
 
Source: Methodological Approach B  
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Chart 16: Estimated foreign patent applications in China in 2015 
 
Source: Methodological Approach B  
 
Chart 17: Estimated total (foreign + domestic) patent applications in China in 2015 
 
 
 
Source: Methodological Approach B  
 
Additional notes 
 
As mentioned in the body of this study, both methodologies presented herein face limitations in 
their projection capacity. First, they are built upon a necessary assumption of holding all else 
constant, whereas this obviously does not account for dynamic effects that take place in the real 
economy. Second, they are based upon past growth rates, which obviously may change in the future 
given any number of factors.  
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Ⅶ.1.7 Rates of patents granted and not granted in China (2006-2011) 
 
 
Table 31: Number of total patents granted in China, by type (2006-2011) 
   
Year Invention patents Utility models Design patents All applications 
2006 57,786 107,655 102,561 268,002 
2007 67,948 150,036 133,798 351,782 
2008 93,706 176,675 141,601 411,982 
2009 128,489 203,802 249,701 581,992 
2010 135,110 344,472 335,243 814,825 
2011 172,113 408,110 380,290 960,513 
Source: SIPO statistics 
 
Table 32: % of patent applications in China not granted (2006-2011) 
 
Year Invention patents Utility models Design 
patents 
% of all apps. not 
granted 
2006 73 33 49 53 
2007 72 17 50 49 
2008 68 22 55 50 
2009 59 34 29 40 
2010 65 16 20 33 
2011 67 30 27 41 
Avg. 67 25 38 45 
Source: SIPO statistics; calculation 
 
 
Ⅶ.1.8 Patents in-force in China (2006-2011) 
 
 
Table 33: Foreign patents in-force by type  
  Total patents Invention 
patents 
Utility models Design patents 
2006 178,467 145,981 4,291 28,195 
2007 227,634 176,239 4,779 46,616 
2008 271,399 209,619 6,387 55,393 
2009 326,913 257,994 7,013 61,906 
2010 390,679 306,867 8,514 75,298 
2011 436,891 345,651 10,638 80,602 
Source: SIPO statistics 
 
 201 
 
 
Table 34: Domestic patents in-force by type  
  Total patents Invention patents Utility models  Design patents 
2006 548,758 72,941 288,032 187,785 
2007 622,409 95,678 294,463 232,268 
2008 923,797 127,596 463,342 332,859 
2009 1,193,110 180,042 558,791 454,277 
2010 1,825,403 257,893 849,454 718,056 
2011 2,383,617 351,288 1,109,958 922,371 
Source: SIPO statistics 
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Ⅶ.1.9 R&D expenditures by entities’ registration status (large- and medium-
sized enterprises) 
 
Table 35: R&D expenditures by entities’ registration status (large- and medium-sized enterprises*) 
(2006-2010) 
 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
Registration 
Status 
Expenditur
e on R&D 
(10,000 
yuan) 
Expenditur
e on R&D 
(10,000 
yuan) 
Expenditur
e on R&D 
(10,000 
yuan) 
Expenditure 
on R&D 
(10,000 
yuan) 
Expenditure 
on R&D 
(10,000 
yuan) 
Avg annual 
exp. 2006-
2010 (10,000 
yuan) 
Total 40,153,965 32,115,692 26,813,110 21,124,561 16,301,909 27,301,847 
Domestic 
Funded 
Enterprises 
29,671,163 23,449,930 19,520,725 14,972,444 11,857,649 19,894,382 
State-
owned 
Enterprises 
3,922,823 3,222,891 2,691,952 1,820,905 1,649,808 2,661,676 
Collective-
owned 
Enterprises 
463,524 436,754 386,658 390,744 382,390 412,014 
Cooperative 
Enterprises 
209,568 96,938 107,765 113,940 62,517 118,146 
Joint 
Ownership 
Enterprises 
82,453 73,116 109,447 118,524 137,099 104,128 
State Joint 
Ownership 
Enterprises 
73,863 66,431 107,211 110,254 130,032 97,558 
Limited 
Liability 
Corporation
s 
13,533,642 10,793,313 8,734,622 7,095,938 5,648,069 9,161,117 
State Sole 
Funded 
Corporation
s 
3,696,351 3,111,622 2,363,456 2,501,971 1,945,024 2,723,685 
Share-
holding 
Corporation
s Ltd. 
7,269,785 5,510,394 5,070,523 3,777,023 2,916,028 4,908,750 
Private 
Enterprises 
4,124,654 3,218,079 2,339,685 1,476,612 1,052,648 2,442,336 
Other 
Enterprises 
64,714 98,446 80,075 178,758 9,090 86,217 
Enterprises 
with Funds 
from Hong 
Kong, 
3,574,987 3,123,358 2,235,951 1,833,414 1,456,934 2,444,929 
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Macao & 
Taiwan 
Joint-
venture 
Enterprises 
1,479,475 1,433,202 987,193 766,590 560,266 1,045,345 
Cooperative 
Enterprises 
44,994 37,646 14,817 38,314 36,221 34,398 
Enterprises 
with Sole 
Fund 
1,595,856 1,424,288 1,022,192 809,004 700,728 1,110,414 
Share-
holding 
Corporation
s Ltd. 
454,662 228,222 211,750 219,506 159,719 254,772 
Foreign 
Funded 
Enterprises 
6,907,815 5,542,403 5,056,433 4,318,703 2,987,327 4,962,536 
Joint-
venture 
Enterprises 
3,582,738 2,909,361 2,966,218 2,363,226 1,498,878 2,664,084 
Cooperation 
Enterprises 
81,526 57,509 25,508 51,672 23,088 47,861 
Enterprises 
with Sole 
Fund 
2,652,860 2,031,581 1,649,379 1,467,684 1,096,495 1,779,600 
Share-
holding 
Corporation
s Ltd. 
590,692 543,952 415,328 436,121 368,866 470,992 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, National Bureau of Statistics; calculations.*Note: Data only available for large- and 
medium-sized enterprises, thus excludes smaller enterprises. 
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Ⅶ.1.10  Number of R&D personnel in entities in China by registration status 
(large and medium-sized enterprises) 
 
Table 36: Number of R&D personnel in entities in China by registration status (large and medium-
sized enterprises*) (2006-2010) 
Equivalent of R&D Personnel (man-year) Registration 
Status 
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 
Avg. number of 
R&D personnel 
employed 
(annually (2006-
2010) 
Total 1,369,908 1,306,179 1,014,223 857,650 695,668 1,048,726 
Domestic 
Funded 
Enterprises 
970,605 952,103 767,296 657,374 553,558 780,187 
State-owned 
Enterprises 
138,539 141,029 115,427 101,793 93,889 118,136 
Collective-
owned 
Enterprises 
7,256 9,748 8,157 8,127 8,206 8,299 
Cooperative 
Enterprises 
5,120 4,508 3,111 3,506 3,220 3,893 
Joint Ownership 
Enterprises 
2,730 1,901 1,423 1,793 2,394 2,048 
State Joint 
Ownership 
Enterprises 
1,782 1,636 1,262 1,414 1,921 1,603 
Limited Liability 
Corporations 
423,951 418,484 349,231 312,422 273,193 355,456 
State Sole 
Funded 
Corporations 
111,268 116,775 89,299 96,537 98,853 102,546 
Share-holding 
Corporations 
Ltd. 
235,926 238,715 190,748 156,206 119,909 188,301 
Private 
Enterprises 
154,404 134,941 97,150 68,324 52,040 101,372 
Other 
Enterprises 
2,678 2,778 2,047 5,204 707 2,683 
Enterprises 
with Funds 
from Hong 
Kong, Macao & 
Taiwan 
149,554 136,209 85,512 71,602 49,583 98,492 
Joint-venture 
Enterprises 
61,466 56,697 36,766 27,856 20,177 40,593 
Cooperative 
Enterprises 
1,994 1,993 946 1,968 1,481 1,676 
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Enterprises 
with Sole Fund 
74,147 66,530 40,331 35,125 22,991 47,825 
Share-holding 
Corporations 
Ltd. 
11,947 10,990 7,469 6,654 4,934 8,399 
Foreign Funded 
Enterprises 
249,750 217,866 161,415 128,673 92,527 170,046 
Joint-venture 
Enterprises 
100,614 95,067 74,980 57,537 39,863 73,612 
Cooperation 
Enterprises 
1,995 1,613 1,192 1,149 760 1,342 
Enterprises 
with Sole Fund 
130,259 100,758 67,818 56,353 39,507 78,939 
Share-holding 
Corporations 
Ltd. 
16,882 20,428 17,425 13,633 12,397 16,153 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, National Bureau of Statistics; calculations. *Note: Data only available for large- and 
medium-sized enterprises, thus excludes smaller enterprises. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Ⅶ.2.1 Quantitative patent targets from major recently-promulgated Chinese 
policy documents 
 
Note: The provisions translated in this Annex are meant only to discuss patent-specific targets. This 
Annex does not include an illustration of different closely but more indirectly related quantitative 
targets that may be in some of the policy statements referenced.410  
 
Ⅶ.2.1.1 Box 8: Key patent targets from the S&T MLP 
 
• By 2020, China to be among the top five countries in the world in terms of 
annual invention patents granted to Chinese nationals 
 
Source: China’s S&T MLP 
 
Ⅶ.2.1.2 Box 9: Key patent targets from China’s nationwide 12
th
 Five Year Plan 
 
• Invention patents owned should be increased from 1.7 to 3.3 per ten thousand 
people by 2015 
 
Source: China’s nationwide 12
th
 Five Year Plan 
 
Ⅶ.2.1.3 Box 10: Key patent targets from China’s NPDS (2011-2020) 
• 2 million annual patent filings by 2015 
• Approximately double the patent examiner workforce to 9,000 
• Number of invention patents per every one million people and the number of patent 
applications in foreign countries will quadruple 
• Market entities will be much better at the creation, utilisation, protection and 
administration of patents 
• The proportion of patent applications in industrial enterprises above the designated size 
will reach 10% 
• China will rank among the top two in the world in terms of the annual number of 
patents for inventions granted to the domestic applicants, and the quality of patents 
filed will further improve  
• The number of patents owned per every one million people and the number of overseas 
patent applications filed by Chinese applicants will double  
• The proportion of patent applications in industrial enterprises above the designated size 
will reach 8% and the quantity owning patent rights will significantly rise 
• 10 model cities that can comprehensively utilise the patent system and have excellent 
intellectual property market environment will be established 
• For reference although not a quantitative target: a large number of core patents will be 
acquired in some key fields of emerging industries and in key technological fields of 
traditional industries 
Source: Author’s review of NPDS 
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Ⅶ.2.1.4 Box 11: Key patent targets in the SC’s Notice on IPR in Strategic Emerging 
Industries 
  
• By 2015, triple the number of the invention patents owned in strategic emerging industries 
compared to the number in 2010 
• By 2015, triple the number of international patent applications in strategic emerging 
industries compared to the number in 2010 
Source: SC’s Notice on IPR in Strategic Emerging Industries. Note: Translations are from the European thus are unofficial. 
 
 
Ⅶ.2.1.5 Table 37: Patent targets from major and recently promulgated sub-national IP 
plans and strategies 
Province/ 
Municipal-
ity/ 
Autonom-
ous Region  
12
th
 Five Year IP Plans and/or equivalent 
plans 
Provincial IP Strategies and/or other 
equivalent strategies 
Anhui IP Plan issued in 2011, targets for every 
year from 2011 to 2015: 
• Patent applications = 20% annual 
growth rate 
• Patent applications granted = 
20% annual growth rate 
By the year of 2015: 
• Annual patent applications ≥ 
80,000 
• Annual patents granted ≥ 40,000 
• Invention patents owned = 3.4 
per ten thousand people 
• The proportion of enterprises 
patent applications accounts for 
over 60% of total patent 
applications 
 
Targets for the year of 2012 (from 2012 
patent implementation measure):†† 
• Patent applications granted = 
30% full-year growth 
• Invention Patent applications 
granted =40% full-year growth 
 
 
No publicly available strategy 
Beijing  Beijing’s IP Plan issued in 2011, targets by 
the year of 2015: 
• Patent applications issued 
respectively reach up to 
approximately 37 and 17 per ten 
thousand people  
• Invention patent applications and 
granted patents respectively will 
reach 20 and 8 per ten thousand 
*General targets only 
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people, keeping the top position 
nationwide 
Beijing’s 12th Five Year Blueprint, targets 
by the year of 2015 
 Invention patent applications ≥ 
22 per ten thousand people 
• Invention patents granted up to 8 
per ten thousand people 
• PCT international patent 
applications up to 0.55 per ten 
thousand 
Chongqing IP Plan issued in 2011, targets by the year 
of 2015: 
• Annual patent applications ≥ 
70,000 
• Annual patents granted ≥ 37,000 
• Annual invention patents granted 
≥ 4,000 
• Invention patent owned = 3.8 per 
ten thousand people 
• Total output value of patented 
products worth ≥ 1 trillion yuan 
• Over 50% of the emerging 
strategy industries own key 
patent technologies 
No publicly available strategy 
Fujian No publicly available plan IP Strategy issued in 2010, targets for the 
following 5 years: 
• Patent applications and granted ≥ 
12% annual growth rate 
• Invention patent applications and 
granted ≥ 15% annual growth rate 
• The proportion of foreign patent 
applications account for over 2% of 
the total annual patent applications  
 
Gansu IP Plan is issued in 2011, targets for every 
year from 2011 to 2015: 
• Patent applications ≥ 20% annual 
growth rate 
• Patent applications granted ≥ 
20% annual growth rate 
• Over 70% of the enterprises in 
the high-tech development 
zones, economic and 
technological development zones 
and industrial parks own patents 
*General targets only 
Guangdong IP Plan issued in 2011, targets by the year 
of 2015: 
IP Strategy issued in 2007, targets by the year 
of 2010: 
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• Patent applications ≥ 10% annual 
growth rate 
• Patent applications = 2,200 per 
million people 
• Invention patent applications ≥ 
13% annual growth rate 
• Invention patent applications = 
700 per million people 
• Number of patents granted ≥ 
13% annual growth rate 
• Number of invention patent 
granted ≥ 15% annual growth 
rate 
• Double PCT international patent 
applications  
• Patent applications ≥ 13% annual 
growth rate 
• Patent applications = 1,250 per 
million people 
• Invention patent applications = 200 
per million people 
• Invention patent applications ≥ 15% 
annual growth rate 
• Foreign patent applications ≥ 20% 
annual growth rate
411
 
 
General long-term targets by the year 2020 
are also included 
 
 
Guangxi Technology and Science Development 
Plan is issued in 2011, targets by the year 
of 2015: 
• Invention patents owned up to 
3 per ten thousand people 
IP Strategy issued in 2009, targets by the year 
of 2020: 
• Patent applications ≥ 20% annual 
growth rate 
• Invention patent applications ≥ 25% 
annual growth rate 
• The number of major invention 
patents in the key competitive 
industries ≥ 500 
Guizhou IP Plan is issued in 2011, targets by the 
year of 2015 
• Patent applications ≥ 35% annual 
growth rate 
• Number of patent applications 
granted ≥ 30% annual growth 
rate 
• Service invention-creation 
applications = 60% 
• 100 international patent 
applications 
IP Strategy issued in 2006, targets for every 
year from 2006 to 2015 
• Patent applications and granted ≥ 
15% annual growth rate 
By the year of 2020 
• The proportion of invention patents 
accounts for over 35% of total patent 
applications  
• The proportion of service invention-
creations accounts for 60% of total 
invention patent applications  
 
Hainan IP Plan issued in 2011, targets by the year 
of 2015: 
• Patent applications ≥ 15% annual 
growth rate 
• Simultaneous increase in 
patents applications and those 
granted 
• Annual patent applications 
granted ≥ 600 
• Proportion of invention patent 
applications ≥ 40% of total patent 
applications 
• Significantly increase foreign 
patent applications  
IP Strategy issued in 2010, targets for the 
following 5 years: 
• The total number of patent 
applications accounts for 16,000 
• Patent applications ≥ 15% annual 
growth rate 
• Invention patent applications ≥ 1/3 of 
total patent applications 
• Industrial 
enterprises’ patent conversion rate 
≥75% 
 
 210 
 
Hebei IP Plan issued in 2011, targets by the year 
of 2015: 
• Annual patent applications = 
25,000 
• Patent applications ≥ 12% annual 
growth rate 
• Annual invention patent 
applications = 8,000 
• Invention patent applications ≥ 
15% annual growth rate 
IP Strategy issued in 2009, targets by the year 
of 2013:
 412
 
• Patent applications ≥ 15% annual 
growth rate 
• Annual patent applications ≥ 20,000 
 
Heilongjian
g 
No publicly available plan IP Strategy issued in 2011, targets for the 
following 5 years 
• Patent applications = 20% annual 
growth rate 
 
By the end of the 12
th
 5 years 
• Invention patents owned ≥ 2.1 per 
ten thousand people 
• Number of patent-competitive 
companies able 
to use the intellectual property 
rights to participate in market 
competition ≥ 200 
 
Targets for the year of 2012 (from 2012 IP 
implementation measure):†† 
• The number of patent applications ≥ 
20,000 
• The number of enterprises patent 
applications = 5,000 
• The number of patent applications of 
universities and research institutes = 
4,200 
 
 
 
Henan IP Plan issued in 2010, targets by the year 
of 2015: 
• Annual patent applications 
≥30,000 
• Annual patent applications 
granted ≥20,000 
• Proportion of invention patent 
applications ≥30% of total patent 
applications 
• Proportion of service invention-
creation applications ≥ 60% of 
total patent applications 
*General targets only 
Hubei IP Plan issued in 2011, targets for every 
year from 2011 to 2015: 
• Annual growth rates of patent 
applications and patents granted 
to be ≥ 15%  
*General targets only 
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By the year of 2015 
• Invention patent applications and 
granted patents to be one time 
more than the amount of those 
in 2010 
• Invention patents granted to 
reach up to 0.5 per ten thousand 
people 
Hunan IP Plan issued in 2012, targets by the year 
of 2015: 
• Annual patent applications ≥ 
40,000 
• Average annual patent 
applications growth ≥12% 
• Dominant regions ≥ 20% of 
Hunan Province 
• Annual patents granted = 3.5 per 
ten thousand people 
• Invention patents granted to 
reach up to 1.6 per ten thousand 
people, with 3.3 in dominant 
regions 
IP Strategy issued in 2009, targets by the year 
of 2015 
• Annual patent applications ≥ 30,000 
• Patent applications ≥ 12% annual 
growth rate  
• Dominant regions ≥ 20% of Hunan 
Province 
• The percentage of patents owned by 
enterprises in industrial zones ≥ 90%  
• Industrial 
enterprises’ patent conversion rate 
≥70% 
• All high-tech enterprises and 
backbone enterprises own patents 
• Industrial enterprises above designated 
size with indigenous intellectual 
property products output value as 
accounted for in GDP ≥ 30% 
• Independent intellectual property 
rights and indigenous 
brands’ exports ≥ 20% and ≥ 50% of tot
al export volume 
Inner 
Mongolia 
No publicly available plan  
Publically announced that a multi-year 
strategy is being drafted, but is not 
currently available (mention of 
strategy in 2012 work plan)413 
 
Jiangsu IP Plan issued in 2011, targets by the year 
of 2015 
 
• Invention patents owned = 6 per 
ten thousand people 
• Invention patents granted to 
employers in high-tech parks ≥ 
100 
• Number of patents issued = 400 
per ten billion RMB GDP 
• PCT international patent 
applications ≥ 1,000 
• Double the number of the 
effective patents owned and 
the total number of invention 
patent granted compared with 
IP Strategy issued in 2009,targets for every 
year from 2009 to2013 
• Patent applications and granted ≥ 
15% annual growth rate 
• Invention patent applications ≥ 20% 
annual growth rate 
• Foreign patent applications ≥ 30% 
annual growth rate 
• The proportion of enterprises patent 
applications accounts for 55% of total 
patent applications 
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those of “11th 5year Plan” 
Jiangxi No publicly available plan IP Strategy issued in 2011, targets by the year 
of 2015 
• Patent applications ≥ 20% annual 
growth rate 
• The total number of invention patents 
owned ≥13,932  
Jilin No publically available province-
wide plan (although a city plan for 
Changchun, Jilin, for example, is 
available)414 
 
No publically available multi-year 
strategy (although a 2012 strategy, with 
no quantitative targets, exists)415 
Liaoning IP Plan issued in 2011, targets by the 
year of 2015: 
• Invention patent applications 
and invention patents granted = 
14% annual growth rate 
• Invention patents owned- no 
less than 3.3 per million people 
 
IP Strategy issued in 2008, targets for the 
following 5 years: 
• Invention patent applications and 
invention patents granted = 10% 
annual growth rate 
Ningxia No publicly available plan IP Strategy issued in 2011, targets by the 
year of 2015: 
• Patent applications and granted 
≥ 15% annual growth rate 
• Invention patent applications and 
granted ≥ 30% annual growth rate 
• Industries with advantages 
locally to apply for ≥ 2000 invention 
patents 
• Quadruple the number of invention 
patents owned per ten thousand 
people 
Qinghai No publicly available plan *General targets only
416
 
Shaanxi IP Plan is issued in 2011, targets for every 
year from 2011 to 2015: 
• Patent applications = 18% annual 
growth rate 
• Invention patent applications = 
20% annual growth rate 
• PCT international patent 
application = 25% annual growth 
rate 
By the year of 2015 
• The total patent applications ≥ 
50,000 in 2015 
• Number of invention patent 
granted = 2.5 per ten thousand 
people 
• Number of invention patent 
IP Strategy issued in 2008, targets for the 
following 5years: 
• Annual patent applications ≥ 15,000 
• Annual patent applications granted ≥ 
6,000 
• Invention patent applications 
accounts for ≥ 40% of total patent 
applications 
• Service patents applications accounts 
for ≥ 60% of total patent applications 
• Industries patent applications 
accounts for ≥ 40% of total patent 
applications 
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owned = 3.3 per ten thousand 
people 
Shandong IP Plan issued in 2011, targets by the year 
of 2015: 
• 80% of the industrial 
enterprises above the 
designated size have patent 
applications 
• Double the number of annual 
invention patents applications 
granted per ten thousand 
people 
• Double the number of the 
annual valid invention patents 
owned per ten thousand people 
 
Other more general targets
417
 
         Publically announced that a strategy is 
being drafted, but is not currently 
available 
 
Shanghai IP Plan issued in 2011, targets by the year 
of 2015 
• Invention patents granted = 600 
per million people 
• Invention patents owned = 30 per 
ten thousand people 
• Greatly increase PCT 
international patent applications  
Publically announced that a 
strategy is being drafted, but is not 
currently available 
 
Shanxi Publically announced that a plan is 
being drafted, but is not currently 
available418 
 
Publically announced that a 
strategy is being drafted, but is not 
currently available 
 
Sichuan  
No publicly available plan 
IP Strategy issued in 2009, targets for the 
following 5 years: 
• Patent applications and granted 
≥12% annual growth rate 
• Invention patent applications ≥15% 
annual growth rate 
• The proportion of patent applications 
by enterprises increases to ≥ 30% of 
total patent applications 
 
Targets for the year of 2012 (from 2012 
patent development measure):†† 
• Patent applications = 15% full-year 
growth 
• Invention patent applications = 18% 
full-year growth 
• Enterprises patent applications = 
20% full-year growth 
Tianjin IP Plan issued in 2011, targets by the year 
of 2015: 
• Invention patent owned = 9 per 
IP Strategy issued in 2010, targets for the 
following 3 years: 
• The total number of patent 
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ten thousand people 
• Annual patent applications= 
50,000 
• Patent applications 
granted=20,000 
• Double the total number of 
proprietary intellectual 
property rights 
applications ≥ 200,000 
• The total number of valid patents ≥ 
40,000, with valid invention patents 
accounts for 1/3 of the total number 
of valid patents 
• The proportion of valid patents 
accounts for over 60% of the total 
enterprises patents  
• The number of enterprises owning 
patents accounts for 5,000 
• The total number of foreign patent 
applications accounts for 1,000 
 
Targets for the year of 2012 (from 2012 IP 
implementation measure):†† 
• The number of patent applications = 
40,000 
• The number of invention patent 
applications = 12,000 
• The number of patent applications 
granted = 15,000 
• Invention patents owned ≥ 7.5 per 
ten thousand people 
• The number of patent applications of 
Binhai New Area = 13,000 
• The number of patent applications of 
strategic emerging industries = 2,000 
• Patents in force owned by pilot zone 
≥ 30% full-year growth 
• The number of patent applications of 
pilot zone = 2,000 
Tibet
419
 No publicly available plan No publicly available strategy 
Publically announced that a strategy is 
being drafted, but is not currently 
available420 
 
Xinjiang  See strategy column to the right IP Strategy issued in 2010, targets for the 
following 5 years: 
• Patent applications ≥ 15% annual 
growth rate 
• Patents applications granted ≥15% 
annual growth rate 
 
†Promotion Plan of Xinjiang IP Strategy (2011-
2015), targets during 2011-2015: 
• Patent applications and granted ≥ 
25% annual growth rate 
• Patent applications = 30,000 
• Patent applications granted = 18,000 
• The proportion of invention patents 
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Source: Author’s review of readily available provincial/municipal 12
th
 Five Year IP Plans and equivalent plans, and recent IP 
Strategies and equivalent strategies. Translations are from the European Chamber thus are unofficial. Note 1: The targets 
herein are based on the express provisions in the policies collected, whereas other targets may exist. Note 2: †Xinjiang’s IP 
Promotion Plan herein is included as it spans five years. ††Note 3: These one-year implementation plans included even 
though they are not multi-year as they mention specific quantitative targets ostensibly for implementing the multi-year 
plans/strategies. Note 4: Although not all include quantitative patent development targets, it is worth noting that a one 
year 2012 IP promotion plan (called a Provincial/ Municipal 2012 Major Tasks on the Implementation of IP Strategy) has 
been issued for the following provinces/municipalities: Beijing, Fujian, Gansu, Guangdong, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Henan, 
accounts for over 35% of the total 
patent applications 
By the year of 2015: 
• Invention patents owned = 1.09 per 
ten thousand people 
 
*Other general targets 
 
Targets by the end of 2012 (from 2012 IP 
implementation measure)†† 
• The number of patent applications = 
5,500 
• The number of patent applications 
granted = 3,800 
 
 
 
Yunnan IP Plan issued in 2011, targets by the year 
of 2015 
• The growth number of patent 
applications = 25,000 
• The growth number of invention 
patent applications = 8,500 
• The growth number of invention 
patents granted = 2,500 
• Enterprise patent applications ≥ 
15% annual growth rate 
• Enterprise patents granted ≥ 15% 
annual growth rate 
IP Strategy issued in 2008, targets for the 
following 5 years from 2009 
• The growth number of patent 
applications = 22,000 
• The growth number of patent 
applications granted = 11,000 
 
Zhejiang  IP Plan issued in 2012,targets for every 
year from 2011 to 2015 
• Patent applications = 15% annual 
growth rate 
• Patent application granted = 15% 
annual growth rate 
• Invention patents granted = 25% 
annual growth rate 
By the year of 2015 
• Double the total number of 
patent applications and patents 
granted 
• Total number of invention 
patents granted = 20,000  
• Double the number of 
registrations of invention patents 
per ten thousand people 
*General targets only 
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Hubei, Hunan, Inner Mongolia, Jiangsu, Jilin, Liaoning, Ningxia, Qinghai, Shandong, Shanghai, Shanxi, Tianjin, Xinjiang, and 
Yunnan; and a 2012 Major Tasks of Intellectual Property (Patent) Work has been issued for Anhui and Sichuan. Note 5: 
*The following provinces state a will to greatly increase the foreign patent applications in their 12
th 
Five Year IP Plans: 
Henan, Tianjin, Liaoning, and Zhejiang; and the following state such a will in their IP Strategies: Gansu, Guangdong, Guizhou, 
Henan, Heilongjiang, Hubei, Hunan, Liaoning, Ningxia, Qinghai, Sichuan, and Yunnan. The following provinces state a desire 
to develop key patents in patent-competitive industries within their province within their 12
th 
Five Year IP Plans: 
Guangdong, Hainan, Hubei, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, and Shaanxi; and the following state such a desire in their IP Strategies: Beijing, 
Gansu, Guangdong, Guangxi, Guizhou, Hebei, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Tianjin, Xinjiang, and Zhejiang. 
 
 
 217 
 
 
Ⅶ .2.2 Example IP indicators in performance evaluations for research 
institutes, SOEs, enterprises, Party and other government officials, and others  
 
Table 38: EXAMPLE IP indicators in performance evaluations from China’s Provincial/Municipal 
12
th
 Five Year Plans on Intellectual Property, recent IP Strategies, and equivalent plans  
Province/ 
Municipality/Autonomous 
Region  
Performance-evaluation indicators from 12
th
 Five Year IP Plans, other 
equivalent plans , Provincial IP Strategies and other equivalent plans 
Anhui • IP Plan issued in 2011: 
Section 5, Para1:  “Improve intellectual property coordination mechanism, 
and gradually increase the proportion of the intellectual property indicators 
in the scientific and technological progress targets within a responsible 
evaluation system for Party and government leaders.” 
Chongqing • IP Plan issued in 2011: 
Section 4, Part 1: “ ...Incorporate such intellectual property rights indicators 
as patent creation, patent performance into the review and assessment of 
government-funded projects, and into the identification conditions of 
professional and technical qualification titles for special talents.” 
 
Section 6, Part 3: “Improving the assessment system of intellectual property, 
incorporate the development of intellectual property into the annual 
performance evaluation of the leading municipal bodies…” 
Gansu • IP Plan issued in 2011: 
Section 5, Part 2, para. 3: “Improving the performance evaluation system for 
intellectual property of indigenous innovations. Regulating technology 
innovation activities under the implementation of intellectual property 
policy, ensuring protection of intellectual property and income distribution 
through intellectual property industrialisation. Incorporate the output, 
efficiency, protection of indigenous intellectual property rights into the 
assessment index system of the province's innovation work, also taking 
these indicators as the basis of the performance appraisal, job classification 
and rank promotions for scientific and technical personnel. Perform a 
sample survey to gauge recognition of IP, guiding education regarding IP 
elements among citizens, and attempting to establish a comprehensive 
indicator system to analyse the intellectual property situation.” 
Section 4, Part 2, para. 2: “Implementing the responsibility system for 
administrative work of Intellectual Property, incorporate the 
implementation of Intellectual Property Strategy work into the target 
responsibility assessment…” 
 
Section 5, Part 1, para. 2: “Implementing the responsibility system and 
accountability system. Governments at all levels should incorporate the IPR 
creation, management, protection and use into the government target 
assessment system as an important indicator of the annual work and the 
year-end performance assessment.” 
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Guangxi • Technology and Science Development Plan issued in 2011: 
Section 4, Part 3, Para. 1: “Establish and improve the science and technology 
statistics, monitoring and evaluation system, optimise the assessment of 
target responsibility system on science and technology progress of 
municipal and county Party and government leaders.”   
 
Section 4, Part 5: “Deepening the pilot demonstration of intellectual 
property rights, incorporating intellectual property rights indicators into the 
performance appraisal system of the indigenous innovation of enterprises, 
universities, research institutes and other innovative subjects.”  
Hainan • IP Plan issued in 2011:  
Section 4, Part 3: “Developing patenting promotion and innovation 
mechanisms. Speed up the establishment of making enterprises the main 
body of the patenting mechanism, guide the system and structure of patent 
management, and promote patent innovation and application of enterprise 
units. Maintain engineering technical centres, research and development 
centres, and high and new technology enterprises, and make IPR core 
patent technology of science and technology project planning and 
important basis. Reinforce IPR management of science and technology 
project planning and approval and establish at the provincial and citywide 
level the IPR management mechanisms of this project planning and 
approval. Make the obtainment of indigenous IPR the most important 
prerequisite for the examination and acceptance of project planning for 
important science and technology project planning and innovation 
platforms. Gradually establish an IPR examination and expounding system 
for Hainan’s important science and technology innovation projects. 
Incorporate indigenous IPR output quantity, quality, implementation 
benefits, and IPR system construction condition into the project evaluation 
index system and conduct supervision and management.” 
 
Section 4, Part 5: “Further improving the assessment of patent work, 
consider patent work performance as one of the necessary conditions for 
performance evaluation of corporate technology centers, high-tech 
enterprises and hi-tech industrial parks. Incorporate the management 
performance of patent work, including the amount of R & D investment, the 
quantity and quality of patents, patent transformation, patent transfer and 
patent licensing, into the annual performance management assessment 
indicators for the relevant administrative departments, encouraging 
innovation.”  
Henan • IP Plan issued in 2010: 
Section 4, Part 5: “Considering the results of the intellectual property 
assessment as an important part of the target responsibility performance 
evaluation of the municipal and district Party and government leaders for 
the scientific and technological progress and talents cultivation.” 
Jiangsu • IP Plan issued in 2011: 
Section 4, Part1, para1: “Improve the intellectual 
property strategy and implementation of the performance 
evaluation system, the establishment of a scientific management 
system of patent examination, and to strengthen the implementation 
of performance assessment.” 
 
Section 4, Part 2, Para 1: “Strengthening catalogued evaluation on invention 
performances of universities and institutes, and obtaining original patents 
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should be the key elements of evaluation on basic research and cutting-edge 
technology research, obtaining invention patent and utility models should 
be the key elements of evaluation on applied research, developed 
research…improving patents grants and rewards system, enacting 
‘Measures on Patent Rewards in Jiangsu Province’ to stimulate inventing 
and improve patent quality.” 
 
Section 4, Part 3, Para 1: “Establishing positive interaction mechanism of 
patent transfer from institutions of higher-learning, scientific research 
institutions to enterprises, incorporating patent transfer into the research 
performance evaluation, promoting patent utilisation and industrialisation.” 
 
Section 5, Part 1: “Establishing a scientific work performance assessment 
mechanism, taking the scientific patent management as the important 
indicator to measure the implementation of Scientific Outlook on 
Development and to measure the regional development capacity. ”  
Liaoning • IP Plan issued in 2011: 
Section 3, Part 2, para. 2:  “…Including intellectual property indicators in the 
science and technology implementation and evaluation system as well as in 
the performance evaluation system of SOEs. Encouraging high-education 
institutions and universities to take into account the quantity, quality and 
application of intellectual property in the job classification, rank promotion 
and other performance evaluation index systems of the faculty and research 
staff; increasing the proportion of intellectual property in the science- 
technical evaluation system….” 
 
Section3, Part 2, para. 3: “…Put the year-on –year growth rate of China 
invention patent applications’ into the government performance evaluation 
system…”  
Shaanxi • IP Plan is issued in 2011: 
Section 4, Part 2: “…Establishing a comprehensive evaluation mechanism for 
intellectual property performance, scientifically assess work performance of 
all levels of government and enterprises and institutions …” 
 
Section 3, Part 7: “…Focus on the establishment of evaluation system of 
intellectual property rights for large and medium-sized SOEs…” 
Shandong • IP Plan issued in 2011:  
Section 3 Part 1 Para 2: “Establishing IPR Strategy Implementation 
Evaluation Mechanisms. Perfect the evaluation mechanism of provincial, 
city-wide, and district-wide IPR leadership by holistically bringing into play 
function evaluation, strengthening inter-department cooperation, actively 
creating collaboration, clearly dividing labour, and jointly promoting a 
working atmosphere of IPR implementation strategy. Establish an IPR 
performance evaluation index system. Include the state of strategy 
implementation into the annual government performance goals on a 
departmental, municipal, and district-wide level. Periodically analyse and 
evaluate the state of IPR strategic implementation. 
 
Section 3, Part 2, Para. 2: “Incorporating the annual patents granted and 
the number of invention patents owned per ten thousand people into the 
government assessment indicators.” 
 
Section 3, Part 6, Para 2: “Actively promote patent professionals into the 
range of job classification.” 
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Sichuan • IP Strategy issued in 2009: 
Section 3, Part 4: “Establishing the target assessment and statistical index 
system of government intellectual property work, incorporating the 
number of intellectual property owned and the effectiveness of patent 
transformation into the economic and social development statistics.”  
 
Section 5, Part 3, Article 1: “Incorporating intellectual property indicators 
into such evaluation systems as the identification of high-tech enterprises, 
the evaluation of enterprise technical innovation activities and performance 
appraisal of SOEs.” 
 
Section 5，Part 5, Article 2: “Give full play to the important role of colleges 
and universities, research institutes in the creation of the indigenous 
intellectual property rights. Strengthen scientific and technological work in 
intellectual property management, own intellectual property as a scientific 
and technological innovation, an important indicator of the use of 
intellectual property as important indicators of the evaluation of scientific 
and technological competitiveness, and promote colleges and universities, 
research institutes of intellectual property rights are transferred to the 
enterprise to promote the universities, research institutes, intellectual 
property rights of indigenous innovation, commercialisation, 
industrialisation.” 
 
Section 6, Part1: “Incorporating the implementation of intellectual property 
strategy into the important aspects of government target assessment.” 
Tianjin • IP Plan issued in 2011:  
Section 4, Part 3, Article 1:” …Formulating the Tianjin Guideline on the SOEs’ 
Implementation of Intellectual Property Strategy, further promoting 
incorporation of intellectual property into the performance evaluation index 
of SOEs…” 
 
Section 4, Part 5, Article 2:” …Incorporate the quantitative indicators of 
intellectual property rights and the economic benefits gained from 
intellectual property rights utilisation into the performance appraisal, job 
promotion and reporting incentives for professional and technical 
personnel.” 
 
Section 4, Part 6: “Strengthening the intellectual property-oriented work in 
multiple and district level of technology projects, industrialisation projects 
and all kinds of technological innovation and industrialisation platform, 
Incorporating the acquisition and implementation of patents into the 
assessment index of project-application and project-acceptance” 
 
Section 5, Article 3: “Incorporating the work performance of intellectual 
property into the performance evaluation index system of Party and 
government leading cadres and the person in charge of SOEs.” 
 
Section 5, Article 4: “Strengthening the significance of intellectual property 
in the recognition and evaluation process of a municipal enterprise technical 
centres, engineering technical centres, engineering centres and key 
laboratories, and incorporate the invention, applications, protection and 
management of intellectual property into the performance evaluation index 
system” 
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Source: Review of provincial/municipal 12
th
 Five Year IP Plans, recent IP Strategies, and equivalent plans and strategies. 
Note: This is a non-exhaustive list of performance evaluation criteria from all of these plans. Also, there may be other 
articles within the policies cited herein that are not mentioned hereto but also relate in some ways to patent-related 
performance evaluations. Translations are from the European Chamber thus are unofficial.  
 
 
Zhejiang  • IP Plan issued in 2012: 
Section 5, Article 4: “Establish the evaluation index system, incorporate 
patent indicators into the evaluation system of economic development and 
society progress; strengthen the supervision of the local patent 
work, guidance and assessment. Further establish and improve enterprises, 
especially patent statistical indicators of patent 
pilot demonstration enterprises.” 
 
Section 3, Part 1: “Establish and improve the patent appraisal review 
mechanism of provincial major economic activities, considering the 
evaluation of intellectual property rights as the core of the review 
mechanism…taking the patents owned, especially the invention patents 
owned indicators as the important consideration of the identification and 
the evaluation of high-tech enterprises, provincial major innovation 
platform, industrial technology innovation, strategic alliances and other 
innovative carrier, also as the important index of the job classification and 
rank promotion for professional and technical personnel of institutions of 
higher-learning and research institutes.”  
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Chapter 3 
 
Ⅶ.3.1 Example financial incentives for patent development from major 
recently promulgated sub-central IP plans and strategies 
 
Table 39: Example financial incentives for patent development from major recently promulgated 
sub-central IP plans and strategies 
Province/ 
Municipality/ 
Autonomous Region  
Financial support for patent development from 12
th
 Five Year IP Plans, other 
equivalent plans , Provincial IP Strategies and other equivalent plans 
Anhui • IP Plan issued in 2011: 
Section 4, Part 3, Article 9: “Increasing support for industrialisation of patent 
technology to establish special funds for patent utilisation and patent 
industrialisation, set-up the Anhui Patent Award to improve the patent output 
quality and levels of industrialisation. Establishing a pilot base for patent 
industrialisation, carrying out the pilot support for patent ventures to promote 
the entrepreneurship of non-service inventors and SMEs.”  
 
Section 5, Para. 2: “Establishing the continuously increasing mechanism of 
financial supporting intellectual property budget. Strengthening the 
management of special funds for patent development… Do an excellent job of 
subsidising foreign patent applications.” 
Hebei • IP Plan issued in 2011: 
Section 3, Part 2, Para. 2: “Accelerate the establishment of the government-
guided, project-driven patent boosting system. Continue to increase the financial 
input to enterprises and institutions based on their differences in area, size 
and development stage…”  
 
Section 4, Part 2: “Increase financial investment in the major work of the Hebei 
12
th
 Five Year Intellectual Property Plan, and make adjustments 
according to the annual work priorities. Promote that the government at all 
levels, industry sectors and enterprises, increase patent funding Inputs and 
guide commercial financial institutions to support the patent commercialisation 
and industrialisation, and gradually establish and improve a diversified and 
multi-channel of IP funding input system which is market-oriented and recognise 
enterprises as the mainstay.” 
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Jiangsu • IP Plan issued in 2011: 
Section 2, Part 2: “Promoting the award polices of indigenous invention, 
establish government procurement of patent products, explore a new incentive 
and allocation mechanism of patent transformation…” 
 
Section 4, Part 3, Para. 3: “Exploring the establishment of a patented operating 
mechanism. Explore the establishment of Patent Bank, research on the 
establishment of Patent Bank operating and distribution of benefits mechanism. 
Establish special Patent Bank funds. Actively encourage, guide and support input 
by private capital and other social resources into Patent Banks.” 
 
Section 4, Part 2: “Optimising the subsidisation and awarding system of patents. 
Verify and improve the ‘Jiangsu Management Measures on Provincial Subsidy 
Funds,’ promulgate the ‘Jiangsu Patent Award Measure’, stimulating inventions 
and improving patent output quality.”  
 
Section 5, Part 2: “Increasing the maximum amount of patent rewards, and 
strengthening the rewards to outstanding patents/inventors and enterprises 
with standardisation of IP management. After registering the relevant patent 
technology transaction contracts, the income of patent intermediary service 
organistions engaged in patent technology development, transfer, licensing and 
other related consulting services, can be exempted from the business tax and 
education surcharge. Increase the amount of patent awards, and increase the 
award efforts of excellent patents, excellent inventors and excellent intellectual 
property management of standardised enterprises.” 
 
Section 5, Part 3: “Increasing the financial fund input into patents, establish 
special funds for patent. Establish the stably increasing mechanism of financially 
supporting intellectual property budget, realising the financial investment 
growth rate should be significantly higher than the regular financial revenue 
growth. Increasing grants for invention patent applications and patents granted, 
particularly for invention patents granted. Increase the financial investment on 
the areas including patent services, overseas rights protection, personnel 
training, industry early warning mechanisms. Promote the existing special funds 
of science and technology, education, culture, industry, trade and other areas to 
tilt to the development of patents…”  
Liaoning • IP Plan issued in 2011: 
Section 3, Part 2, para. 3: “Improving the reward system for intellectual property.  
Put ‘the year-on-year growth rate of China invention patent applications’ into 
the government performance evaluation system. Enforcing a special government 
incentive system for intellectual property, providing institutions with the Gold 
Award for China Patents a one-time award of 500,000 RMB and providing the 
institutions with the China Patent Excellence Award with a one-time award of 
200,000 RMB. Formulating municipal and county award measures based on local 
practice. ”  
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Ningxia • IP Strategy issued in 2011: 
Section 5, Part5, Article 38: “Increase capital investment in intellectual 
property work. Increase financial investment in intellectual property work, 
promote various types of intellectual property pilot and demonstration 
projects, cultivate projects with IPR of advantageous enterprises, an intellectual 
property-focused county (city, district), engineering, intellectual 
property, implementation and industrialisation of intellectual property, 
information construction of intellectual property and so on. Establishing special 
funds for invention patent application and maintenance to promote the dramatic 
increase of the number of invention patents owned in Ningxia. Municipalities, 
counties (districts) can increase the financial input for intellectual property 
work according to the economic and social development needs and 
local financial situation to promote regional intellectual property. Establishing an 
intellectual property award mechanism to reward patent technologies, patent 
products and patent inventors. Award the institutions who win the Gold Award 
for China Patents, China Patent Excellence Awards and any other national 
intellectual property awards. Set up the distribution of benefits and reward 
system of intellectual property rights in enterprises and institutions. Award the 
inventors, designers, and promotion and service staff who make contribution in 
the process of intellectual property creation, utilisation and promotion.”  
Shandong • IP Plan issued in 2011:  
Section 3, Part 7, Para. 2: “Increase financial input. Actively see that all levels of 
government further increase the input of patent work, and universally establish 
special funds for patent development in governments at or above the county 
level. Establish a patent reward system, providing recognition awards to 
excellent indigenous innovation projects with significant economic and social 
benefits, as well as to the institutions and individuals who make outstanding 
contributions to the creation and utilisation of patents...”  
Shanghai • IP Plan issued in 2011:  
Section3, Part1, Article 1: “Improve the ‘Shanghai Patent Subsidy Measures’ and 
formulate the ‘Shanghai Reward Measures for Invention Patents’ to further 
optimise the patent application structure and to reward significant inventions…”  
Sichuan • IP Strategy issued in 2009: 
Section 5, Part 3, Article 1: “…Increase financial support and reward 
efforts for invention patents …. Improve the bonus and payment system of 
service invention-creations”. 
 
Section 5, Part 3, Article 2: “Encourage the use and 
industrialisation of intellectual property rights. Strengthen the guiding role of 
government funds for the commercialisation and industrialisation of intellectual 
property, and continuously improve the quantity and use efficiency of special 
funds for patent. Use fiscal, financial, investment, and government 
procurement policies and industry, energy, environmental protection policies to 
guide the patent utilisation of enterprises and institutions. Establish a 
government procurement mechanism and prior purchase polices for important 
equipment and products with indigenous intellectual property rights belonging 
to enterprises and institutions. Encourage financial institutions and venture 
capitalists to increase funds for the commercial utilisation of intellectual 
property.” 
Tianjin • IP Plan issued in 2011:  
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Source: Review of provincial/municipal 12
th
 Five Year IP Plans, recent IP Strategies, and equivalent plans and strategies. 
Note: This is only intended as a sample, i.e. it is a non-exhaustive list of financial incentives from all of these plans. Also, 
there may be other articles within the policies cited herein that are not mentioned hereto but also relate in some ways to 
patent-related financial incentives. Translations are from the European Chamber thus are unofficial.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Section 4, Part 6, Article 1: “Improving patent quantity and quality … enacting 
the “Tianjin Implementation Measures on the Ownership and the Bonus and 
Payment System of Service Invention-Creations.” Implement the “One award, 
Two rewards” system and other relevant regulations. Encourage annual growth 
rates of enterprise patent applications up to 20%.” 
 
Section 5, Part2: “Increasing municipal financial funds on intellectual property, 
establishing special funds for intellectual property at the district and county 
level. …Greatly developing IPR pledge financing, IPR insurance and other 
financial innovations to shape a multi-channel IP funding input system. A certain 
proportion of the financial fund input of key scientific research projects and 
major technological transformation projects should be put into the management 
of intellectual property rights…” 
Section 5, Article 3: “Greatly publicise and recognise the institutions and 
individuals who contribute outstandingly to the field of intellectual property, 
strengthening the influence of awards such as the “Tianjin Patent Award,” 
“Worker Inventor Award,” “Women Inventor Award,” and “Juvenile Inventor 
Award.” Setting forth a wide distribution of awards including taking shares in the 
form of intellectual property rights; accelerating the forming of a new 
distribution system which will stimulate inventions and the implementation of 
patent transformation.” 
 
Section 5, Article 4: “…Strengthen the significance of intellectual property in 
science and technology awards …Special funds such as the key technology 
invention project fund, science and technology invention fund, technology 
invention fund for technological SMEs, and government financial funds should 
tilt towards enterprises with indigenous intellectual property rights. ” 
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Some other issues 
 
Some other (non-exhaustive list of) issues and recommendations flagged for 
inclusion but ultimately not included in the body of the report 
 
Explanatory note: While numerous issues were vetted for further analysis in this study and 
ultimately not included, the following issues were even more seriously considered for potential 
inclusion in the body of this paper although were also ultimately not included. (Reasons for not 
including such issues include that perhaps while problematic in their own right, they either do not 
appear to notably drag down patent quality in China; and/or there is not sufficient evidence for 
these practices to warrant them being highlighted in the body of the paper; and/or they are notably 
diverging views on if the issue mentioned is a problem and/or how it should be addressed.) 
 
Judges are relegated to judicial review after Patent Re-examination Board rulings on invention 
patents 
 
Issue: Even if an invention patent of questionable validity is found in an infringement case in China, 
the infringer needs to file an application with the PRB for invalidating the patent, and only then can 
the judge determine the merits of an invalidation decision. Further, most of time the court will not 
even determine the validity of the patent, but instead focus on the legitimacy and rationality of the 
PRB’s decision. This said, if the court finds the decision was made improperly, the invalidation 
decision can be revoked. 421  
 
At present, the structure of this system in many ways makes sense for China, as judges are not 
typically trained to determine the technical merits of an invention patent’s validity, and thus should 
rely on those at the PRB that are technically trained to do so; however, this is not to say that there 
are still concerns with this system and that it might be improved. For example, some concern may be 
warranted over the incentives PRB reviewers have/do not have to invalidate a patent that one of 
their potential colleagues (other SIPO examiners) formerly approved. Further, it should be noted 
that the aforementioned restraints on the judiciary in patent infringement cases in China contrasts 
with the well-functioning and arguably more efficient procedure in a number of countries where 
judges can determine patent validity without such prior decision from a re-examination board. 
However, unlike in China, in some of these countries, like Germany for example, the judges hearing 
patent cases are not only lawyers and professional judges, but a large proportion are also technically 
trained to review patents; this provides them not only the authority but technical capacity to review 
and authoritatively rule on such cases. 422   
 
Recommendation: China might create a bifurcated system where the PRB is an important first 
instance reviewer of patent validity in patent infringement cases, but a separate patent tribunal, 
presided over exclusively by technically/scientifically qualified judges to determine patent validity, 
might also be established to rule on cases in the second instance. Rules could be issued stipulating 
that in an instance where the PRB and patent tribunal make opposite decisions, the tribunal’s 
decision is followed.  
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Standard of “inventiveness” for utility models* 
 
Issue: Given the proliferation of low quality utility models, it is worth questioning if the statutory 
requirements for Chinese utility models in particular need improving to boost patent quality in China. 
Utility models in China are only required to meet a much lower threshold of “inventiveness,” also 
called “inventive step,” as compared to invention patents. This criterion for patentability in 
particular does not appropriately discourage proliferation of low quality patents in China.423 
 
Recommendation: The State Council and SIPO should revise the standard of inventiveness employed 
to evaluate utility model patents to be in-line with the German approach that there is no difference 
for inventive step for invention patents and inventiveness for utility models.424 
 
*Note: This recommendation was not included in the body of the study as it is the opinion of the 
author that this is not necessary per se at the present stage of China’s development; however, this 
indeed may be prudent to consider at some time in the next decade or so.  
 
Standard of “inventiveness” for invention patents 
 
Issue: Gao et al. (2011) suggests that the concept of inventiveness for invention patents grounded in 
the Patent Law and detailed in the Guidelines for Patent Examination is overly ambiguous. As such, 
the study suggests that when simple technical solutions that can be relatively easily imitated are 
challenged as infringing they are often easily invalidated because they are simple and, in absence of 
a clearer definition, are quickly considered not to satisfy the criteria for inventiveness. (Note that 
instead of argue the point, when a patentee is charged with infringement they often resort to the 
defense of invalidity). This is argued to be an uncertainty in the review process of patent applications 
and adjudication in patent disputes. 
 
Recommendation: As recommended in Gao et al. (2011), the Guidelines for Patent Examination 
should be revised so as to provide a specific and objective criteria for defining “inventiveness” that 
will allow for protection of simple technical solutions that should be protected under the Patent Law. 
This standard might be shifted from the threshold premised on a neutral person skilled in the art 
who does not possess “recognised skill” to a person skilled in the art who does posses recognised 
skill.425 
 
Inventor clawback 
 
Issue: Other countries do not have rigid rules on inventor “clawback” like China. Like non-compete 
agreements, this rule reduces labor mobility although also reduces IPR misappropriation. The basis 
for such rules is listed in the following:  
 
Article 11 of the Implementation Regulations of PRC Patent Law (“Implementing Regulations”) sets 
forth the invention clawback regulation in the PRC.  
 
Under Article 6 of PRC Patent Law, if an invention is made by a person in execution of the tasks of 
the entity to which he belongs, or made by him mainly by using the material and technical means of 
the entity, then the invention is a service invention and its ownership should belong to the entity.  
 
Article 11 of the Implementing Regulations further details the circumstances prescribed in Article 
6.  As to “made by a person in execution of the tasks of the entity to which he belongs,” Article 11 
specifically prescribes that such an invention also refers to those which are made “within one year 
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from his resignation, retirement or change of work, where the invention-creation relates to his own 
duty or the other task entrusted to him by the entity to which he previously belonged.”426   
 
Recommendation: Amend these rules to be more in-line with international practice. 
 
 
Overly strict application of the “doctrine of equivalents” in patent litigation 
 
Issue: Some sources suggest that Chinese courts may apply the “doctrine of equivalents,” the 
technical scope of what a patent covers, overly strictly in some cases. This is particularly problematic 
in infringement cases centering on patent validity, whereas courts may overly narrowly rule a patent 
covers a particularly technical field, and an even closely-related patent is found as not infringing as it 
exists ‘outside’ that particular field.427  
 
Recommendation: Create a joint taskforce of SPC judges and other experts, along with equivalent 
representatives from the EU, to assess trends in Chinese courts’ application of the “doctrine of 
equivalents.” Provide recommendations therein to ensure better application of this principle.  
 
 
Concerns with SAC’s Patent Policy Proposal and CNIS’ Patent Disposal Rules 
 
Issue: A variety of concerns surround two particular rules governing essential patents in China: the 
Disposal Rules for Inclusion of Patents in National Standards (“Patent Disposal Rules”), issued for 
comment on January 21st 2010 by the China National Institute of Standardisation (CNIS)428 (and still 
undergoing review) and a measure to which it closely relates, the Proposed Regulations for the 
Administration of the Formulation and Revision of the Patent-Involving National Standards (“SAC 
Patent Policy Proposal”), issued by the Standards Administration of China (SAC), on November 2nd 
2009.429 As identified by Willingmyre (2009), a range of problems with the wording of the SAC Patent 
Policy Proposal, particularly regarding treatment of compulsory licensing in Articles 12, 13 and 15 
and Article 9, potentially drag down patent owners’ ability to monetise and receive a reasonable 
ROI.430 As identified by Willingmyre (2010), while there are some positive provisions in the Patent 
Disposal Rules, there are still some uncertainties, including the lack of distinction between “essential 
patents” and “essential patent claims,” lack of clarity that a declaration form is not a license, and 
lack of clarity on certain disclosure obligations.431 Collectively, these shortcomings promote inferior 
technologies and/or unnecessarily costly implementation for important standards, and may 
discourage the usage of innovative technologies and related quality patents in international 
standards. 
 
Recommendation: As suggested in Willingmyre (2010), revise the SAC Patent Policy Proposal, 
particularly regarding treatment of compulsory licensing in Articles 12, 13 and 15 and Article 9. 
Specifically, clarify uncertainties over the lack of distinction between “essential patents” and 
“essential patent claims,” lack of clarity that a declaration form is not a license, and lack of clarity on 
certain disclosure obligations.  
 
 
R&D Centre requirements 
 
Issue: The Chinese government employs a wide-range of incentives, for example tax incentives, to 
spur innovation through R&D centres which are directly and indirectly intended to encourage 
patents. These include the ability to be recognised as a qualified R&D Centre if meeting certain legal 
entity, capital and other (in certain situations employment threshold) requirements. If meeting these 
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criteria, enterprises can qualify for exemption of customs duties and import VAT exemptions on 
imported equipment, and a Value-added Tax (VAT) refund for certain domestically-purchased 
equipment. Also, they can receive an EIT exemption on income up to RMB 5 million of transferred 
income on “self-developed” technology and related services, and a 50% reduction of tax on this type 
of income above the aforementioned threshold.432  A range of other tax incentives may be available.  
 
There are some concerns among foreign business about the “overly strict” legal entity and capital 
requirements for becoming an “R&D Centre,”433 in China which may in-turn, albeit indirectly, harm 
innovation and patent quality development in China. Specifically, these requirements may in effect 
limit the ability of operations of foreign enterprises to produce quality patents given they are denied 
access to collaborative networks and financial incentives even though they are just as capable as 
other legally represented entities in innovating and producing quality patents.  
 
Recommendation: Revise the overly strict legal entity and capital requirements for becoming an 
official R&D Centre to better allow otherwise qualified affiliates to establish an R&D Centre in China. 
 
